Sammy C. Ford v. Joy Delton Handy

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 10, 2024
• Docket: 55,475-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered April 10, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 55,475-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

SAMMY C. FORD, JR. Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

JOY DELTON HANDY Defendant-Appellant

Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 80,067

Honorable Nicholas E. Gasper, Judge

CHARLES NEUPERT & Counsel for Appellant ASSOCIATES, LLC By: Charles J. Neupert, Jr.

BETHARD & BETHARD, LLP Counsel for Appellee By: Robert E. Bethard

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ. THOMPSON, J.

In 1970, a husband conveyed to his parents a home on over an acre of

land located in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, which was the separate property of

his wife, Joy Handy. The husband’s parents then conveyed the property to

their daughter and her husband in 1972, who later consolidated ownership in

a 1982 conveyance to only the wife’s name, before it was ultimately

inherited through a succession affidavit in 2018 by her son, Sammy Ford,

Jr., who is the plaintiff in this action.

Mr. Ford instituted a declaratory judgment proceeding for ownership

of the property when Mrs. Handy and her descendants recently began

undertaking actions which appeared to suggest they intended to exert

ownership of the land. The trial court held there had been sufficient

evidence to sustain a claim for ten-year good faith acquisitive prescription,

as well as 30-year acquisitive prescription. For the reasons set forth in more

detail below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment ruling the property had

been acquired through ten-year good faith acquisitive prescription.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This declaratory judgment action asserting ten-year good faith

acquisitive prescription or 30-year acquisitive prescription of a one-acre

parcel of land was brought by the current record owner, Sammy C. Ford, Jr.,

(hereinafter “Sammy”) against the prior owner, Joy Delton Handy

(hereinafter “Joy”). Joy opposes the action, asserting she never participated

in any deed conveying her ownership interest and that there had not been

sufficient possession of the property by the opposing party to deprive her of

her ownership interest in the property. On February 18, 1967, Ruby Price Delton conveyed a one-acre tract

of land in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, that is the subject of this lawsuit

(hereinafter, the “Subject Property”) to her daughter, Joy, as her separate

property.1 At the time of that conveyance, Joy was married to Odis Handy,

Sr., and they had three sons, Odis Handy, Jr., Cedric Handy, and Anthony

Handy. In 1970, Joy separated from her husband, and she and her sons

moved to California.

On August 19, 1970, after Joy had moved to California, Odis Handy,

Sr. executed a deed that purported to convey the Subject Property, which

includes a house, to his parents, A.J. Handy and Annie Bell Handy. A.J. and

Annie Handy agreed to assume the outstanding mortgage on the property.

Joy was not included in the deed for the conveyance. The parties agree that

at the time of this conveyance, Odis Handy, Sr. had no actual ownership

interest in the Subject Property, as it was his wife’s separate property, which

she received in the prior conveyance from her mother.

On April 21, 1972, A.J. and Annie Bell Handy conveyed the Subject

Property to Sammy C. Ford, Sr. and Ola Mae Ford, husband and wife. Ola

Mae was the daughter of A.J. and Annie Handy and was Joy’s sister-in-law.

The Fords also assumed the mortgage on the property from the Handys. Ola

Mae and Sammy Ford, Sr. began living in the house on the property in 1972.

In 1974, Joy returned from California with her children and began

living in Mansfield, Louisiana. She and Odis Handy, Sr. reconciled and

1 This conveyance includes the following language: “This property is purchased by the vendee with her own separate paraphernal funds, under her separate administration and for her separate use and benefit.” This language is sufficient to transfer the Subject Property to Joy as her separate property. La. C.C. arts. 2341; 2342.

2 remained married for many years. Joy never resumed living in the house on

the Subject Property.

On April 21, 1982, Sammy Ford, Sr. conveyed his portion of the

Subject Property to Ola Mae. Years later, in 1995, Ola Mae mortgaged the

Subject Property in order to make certain improvements to the house. On

October 17, 2000, Ola Mae died, leaving her son, Sammy Ford, Jr., as her

sole heir. It was not until December 11, 2018, that Sammy filed a small

succession affidavit for his mother in order to transfer the Subject Property

to his name, likely necessitated by the May 14, 2018 oil and gas lease he had

signed covering the Subject Property.

In 2017, Joy asserted that she owned the Subject Property, having

never conveyed her interest in any deed translative of ownership, which

triggered the eventual filing of the current litigation by Sammy, the son and

heir of Ola Mae. Sammy filed a petition for declaratory judgment on

December 26, 2018, asserting his ownership of the Subject Property through

the various deeds and succession documents, which Joy opposed. 2 The

matter progressed to a trial on October 10, 2022.

At the trial, witness testimony provided that Ola Mae lived on the

Subject Property from 1972 until her death in 2000. Joy testified that she

allowed Ola Mae to occupy the house, and Ola Mae lived there with her

permission, consent, and acquiescence. Sammy testified he lived on the

Subject Property from the time he was three years old until he married in

1990. After his mother died, Sammy leased the property to his sister-in-law

2 Despite arguments to the contrary, a petition for declaratory judgment was an appropriate vehicle for this claim at the time. La. C.C.P. art. 3654; 1026 Conti Holding, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, 22-01288 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 930.

3 for about one year, and he lived on the property after she moved out until

around 2006. Sammy testified that after 2006, he maintained the property

on a regular basis. In 2012, he lost his eyesight and continued to maintain

the property intermittently and to the best of his ability, once he regained

some of his eyesight.

Joy contends that from 2000 to 2017, the Subject Property fell into a

state of disrepair. She claims that Google Earth photos reflect an abandoned

house with no doors or windows. A nearby neighbor testified that the

property was vacant during this time. During this time period, Cedric,

Anthony, and Odis Handy, Jr. all testified that they used the property on a

regular basis to cross to access their hunting property located just north of

the Subject Property. From 2016 to 2017, Joy’s son, Odis Handy, Jr. started

the process of demolishing the house on the land and clearing the property

so that he could place a mobile home on it.

Sammy’s wife told him in 2018 that “No Trespassing” signs were

placed on the property, and when Sammy investigated, he learned that Joy

had burned down the house on the Subject Property, put up the signs, and

installed a gate. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that

Sammy Ford, Jr.’s family acquired the property through both 10- and 30-

year acquisitive prescription and named Sammy Ford, Jr. as the owner of the

Subject Property. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Joy asserts three assignments of error, all of which involve whether

Sammy acquired the Subject Property through acquisitive prescription.

Those assignments of error are: 1) the district court erred in finding Sammy

4 had just title and was in good faith; 2) the district court erred in finding

Sammy possessed the property as owner; and 3) the district court erred in

finding Joy’s possession only began in 2017.

The determination of whether property has been acquired through

acquisitive prescription is one of fact and subject to the manifest error

standard. Brunson v. Hemler, 43,347 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 989 So. 2d

246, writ denied, 08-2297 (La. 12/12/08), 996 So. 3d 1119. Where findings

are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the

findings of the trier of fact demand great deference and are virtually never

manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La.

1989). “When there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial

court’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly

wrong.” Frith Farms DeSoto Parish Int. P’ship, LLP v. Lee, 53,116 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 284 So. 3d 1247, quoting Hamel’s Farm, LLC v.

Muslow, 43,475 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 988 So. 2d 882, writ denied, 08-

2431 (La. 1/30/99), 999 So. 2d 754.

Ownership and other real rights in immovables may be acquired by

the prescription of ten years. La. C.C. art. 3473. The requisites for the

acquisitive prescription of ten years are possession for ten years, good faith,

just title, and a thing susceptible of acquisition by prescription. La. C.C. art.

3475; 1026 Conti Holding, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, 22-01288 (La.

3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 930; EOG Resources, Inc. v. Hopkins, 48,577 (La. App.

2 Cir. 11/27/13), 131 So. 3d 72, writ denied¸13-2861 (La. 3/14/14), 134 So.

3d 1196. This allows a person who purchases immovable property by a

deed translative of title and who has a reasonable and objective belief that he

5 is acquiring valid title to the property to secure the title through peaceable

possession for ten years when there has not been any disturbance by the true

owner. 1026 Conti Holding, LLC, supra. Our law has long recognized that

immovable property can be acquired by acquisitive prescription through

possession. See La. C.C. arts. 3446 and 3486; 1026 Conti Holding, LLC,

supra. “Acquiring ownership in this manner is no less valid and effective

than by conventional title and, in fact, can supersede it.” 1026 Conti

Holding, LLC, supra. The party asserting acquisitive prescription bears the

burden of proving all the facts that are essential to support it, including

possession for the requisite years. Id.

In the present matter, Sammy had the burden of proving possession of

ten years, good faith, just title, and that the Subject Property was susceptible

of acquisition by prescription. As a preliminary matter, La. C.C. art. 3485

states that all private things are susceptible of prescription unless

prescription is excluded by legislation. The Subject Property is private

property and, thus, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.

For the purposes of acquisitive prescription, a possessor is in good

faith when he reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations, that

he is the owner of the thing he possesses. La. C.C. art. 3480. The good faith

determination is largely objective. La. C.C. art. 3480, comment (c). The

possessor’s belief the seller owned the property must be reasonable by

objective standards. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently stated:

The basis of [the possessor’s] good faith is his mistaken belief in the seller’s ownership. Whether founded on an error of law or an error of fact, this belief is thus the first necessary ingredient of good faith ....

6 The second ingredient of good faith is the requirement that the possessor’s belief in the seller’s ownership be reasonable by objective standards .... [The] process of evaluating the reasonableness of the possessor’s belief is simply a process of evaluating the seriousness of his mistake and its impact on society in general. Depending on the circumstances, the possessor’s mistake may be objectively justifiable or excusable, or it may be inexcusable.

1026 Conti Holding, LLC, supra, quoting Symeonides, Property, 47 La. L.

Rev. 429, 429-30 (1986). Here, the trial court found that Ola Mae was in

good faith because it was reasonable to believe that her parents owned the

property in 1972 when they conveyed it to her and her husband. The public

records reflected at that time that A.J. and Annie Handy acquired the Subject

Property by recorded deed from Odis Handy, Sr. and they even assumed a

mortgage on the Subject Property, which was then assumed by Ola Mae and

Sammy, Sr. Any analysis of the public records regarding the 1970

conveyance of the Subject Property from Odis Handy to his parents, A.J. and

Annie Handy, would necessarily include acknowledgment that at the time

husbands were authorized to convey community property without the

signature of their spouse.3

Although Odis Handy, Sr. was not an owner in fact of the Subject

Property, the deed signed by him in 1970 could serve as a basis for the good

faith understanding of any subsequent purchaser that this conveyance was

effective. If nothing else, it could start the clock ticking on a ten-year good

faith acquisitive prescription argument. Certainly the 1972 subsequent

conveyance by A.J. and Annie Handy to Ola Mae and Sammy Ford, Sr.

3 The pre-1980 Louisiana community property system designated the husband as “head and master,” the “sole manager” of the community property. See La. C.C. art. 2404 (1870); La. C.C. art. 2370 (1825); La. C.C. art. 66 (1808).

7 would serve as a start date for determination of a ten-year good faith

acquisitive prescription claim. We find no error in the reasonableness of this

mistaken belief and the trial court’s finding of good faith on behalf of Ola

Mae, dating back at least to the 1972 deed in her chain of ownership, as

detailed below.

A just title is a juridical act that is sufficient to transfer ownership or

another real right. La. C.C. art. 3483. The act must be written, valid in

form, and filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which

the immovable is situated. EOG Resources, Inc., supra. A just title does not

necessarily equate to valid title. The Comments to Article 3483 state:

A just title is a juridical act, that is, a licit act intended to have legal consequences. Moreover, it is an act translative of ownership or of another real right, such as a sale, donation, or exchange. A just title need not be derived from the true owner because if that were the case, prescription would have no place. The law merely requires an act which, if it had been executed by the true owner, would have conveyed ownership or established another real right.

(Emphasis added). See also Williams v. Wiggins, 26,060 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/17/94), 641 So. 2d 1068 (“just title need not be derived from the true

owner. It is enough that a deed contains language sufficient to convey

access rights had the grantor possessed such rights.”). While the sale of

something belonging to another does not convey ownership, it can serve the

purchaser as a just title for acquisitive prescription. Heirs of John Beckwith

LLC v. Sims, 20-0476 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/21), 315 So. 3d 306.

The record includes the deed whereby A.J. and Annie Handy

conveyed the Subject Property to Ola Mae and Sammy Ford, Sr. That deed

is dated April 21, 1972, describes the Subject Property, lists the parties,

states that Ola Mae and Sammy, Sr. would be assuming the remaining

8 mortgage, and includes the book, page, and file number, evidencing that it

was recorded in the conveyance records of the DeSoto Parish clerk of court.

Although the conveyance was not executed by the true owner, Joy, it is an

act translative of ownership of the Subject Property to Ola Mae and Sammy,

Sr. The record then reflects a credit sale, whereby Sammy, Sr. conveyed his

interest in the Subject Property to Ola Mae as her separate property. This

sale is dated April 21, 1982, describes the Subject Property, states that Ola

Mae will assume the remainder of the mortgage on the property, and notes

the book, page, and file number to indicate that the sale was filed in the

conveyance records of DeSoto Parish. Considering this, the trial court

correctly found that the requirement for just title was met.

Finally, the record reveals that Ola Mae lived on the Subject Property

from 1972 until her death in 2000. The evidence reflects, and the trial court

found, that Ola Mae lived in the house located on the Subject Property in

peaceful possession for more than ten years without any disturbance by the

true owner.

Joy argues that Ola Mae was a precarious possessor during this time

period because she testified that she gave Ola Mae permission to live on the

Subject Property. Joy further argues that the trial court erred in finding that

her possession of the Subject Property only began in 2017, directing us to

the testimony from her sons regarding their clearing of the property as they

traversed it to get to their adjacent hunting property. As noted above, we

give great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility

determinations. Rosell, supra. The trial court noted in its reasons for

judgment that despite Joy’s testimony, her actions in the years that Ola Mae

9 lived on the Subject Property were not indicative of ownership, including

not moving back into the home when she returned from California and not

listing the property as an asset in her bankruptcy in 2006. We do not find

any manifest error in the trial court’s determination that Ola Mae had at least

ten years of peaceful possession of the Subject Property.

In sum, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s determination

that Ola Mae Ford acquired the Subject Property through ten-year

acquisitive prescription and that Sammy Ford, Jr., as her sole heir, is the

owner of the property. Because we have affirmed the trial court’s finding

that Ola Mae Ford acquired the property though acquisitive prescription of

ten years, any argument concerning 30-year acquisitive prescription has

been pretermitted. Joy’s assignments of error are without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Costs of this appeal are assigned to Joy Handy.

AFFIRMED.