Samita Bhandary v. Julie A. Emede

Opinion

SAMITA BHANDARY, Case No. 25-cv-05830-EKL

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED v. COMPLAINT

JULIE A. EMEDE, Re: Dkt. No. 8 Defendant.

On July 11, 2025, self-represented Plaintiff Samita Bhandary filed this action and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”), No. 2 (“IFP Application”). In the original complaint, Bhandary alleged that she was labeled a “vexatious litigant” in state court. She claims that her designation as a vexatious litigant violates her rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. She asserted one cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Judge Julie A. Emede of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, seeking injunctive relief from her vexatious litigant designation. On July 18, 2025, the Court granted Bhandary’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the complaint. ECF No. 3 (“Order”). The Court dismissed the complaint, with leave to amend, because Section 1983 does not permit the injunctive relief Bhandary requested, and because the complaint failed to state a claim. Id. at 2-3. Now before the Court is Bhandary’s amended complaint. ECF No. 8 (“Amended Complaint”). The amended complaint re-asserts the same Section 1983 claim against Judge Emede “only in her official capacity.” Id. at 2. The only material difference is that, instead of seeking injunctive relief, Bhandary now seeks “a declaratory judgment that the current application Court violates her constitutional rights of access to courts, due process, and equal protection.” Id. at 1. In this Order, the Court screens the complaint and finds that it must be dismissed, without leave to amend, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, the Court finds that the complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bhandary’s sole cause of action seeks retrospective declaratory relief against Judge Emede in her official capacity as a judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court.1 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this claim in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts from exercising “jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals from state court judgments.” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). A suit brought in federal court is a “de facto” appeal when a party contends that a state court’s decision was erroneous and seeks federal relief from the state court judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). District courts “must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if “the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it,” or if “the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.” Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v.

1 Bhandary does not contend that California’s vexatious litigant statute is facially invalid, but rather “seeks only a declaration that the gatekeeping system, as applied to her, is unconstitutional.” Am. Compl. at 1. The Ninth Circuit has held that the statute does not deny due process nor equal City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). A claim challenging “past or future enforcement of [a] prefiling order,” or the plaintiff’s inclusion on a “vexatious litigant list,” constitutes “a forbidden ‘de facto appeal’ of prior state court judgments.” Earls v. Cantil-Sakauye, 745 F. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claim challenging vexatious litigant designation without leave to amend). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore bars Bhandary’s claims “challeng[ing] the vexatious litigant order and any other state court orders and judgments” arising from enforcement of that order. Bashkin v. Hickman, 411 F. App’x 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal); see also Shuler v. Scott, No. 22-cv-07652-VKD, 2023 WL 8600707, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2023) (holding that claims challenging enforcement of a vexatious litigant order were a “de facto appeal” barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Kleidman v. RFF Fam. P’ship, 22-cv-03947- SPG-AFM, 2023 WL 4495237, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2023) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from reversing vexatious litigant order “by way of declaratory relief”). Second, the doctrine of sovereign immunity also bars this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the claims against Judge Emede because Bhandary “impermissibly seeks retrospective relief” in the form of an order staying enforcement of or vacating state court judgments. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 900 (2022). “The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from bringing lawsuits against a state for money damages or other retrospective relief.” Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). State officials sued in their official capacities are generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Amendment thus applies to Judge Emede, who serves as a state court judge and is being sued in her official capacity. Munoz v. Super. Ct., 91 F.4th 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[A]ctions against state courts and state court judges in their judicial capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); see also Lund, 5 F.4th at 969. Here, Bhandary is seeking retrospective relief against Judge Emede because she challenges judgments and other rulings that issued in the state court proceedings. In particular, Bhandary her filings “led to loss of her property rights abroad.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12, 15. Bhandary further contends that if “Judge Emede had not blocked [her] filings, [she] could have obtained relief on property fraud, contempt, divorce fraud, immigration, sabotage, [and] custody fraud” matters. Bhandary Decl. ¶ 31, ECF No. 8. Because Bhandary “impermissibly seeks retrospective relief” from state court orders, the Court must dismiss her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Lund, 5 F.4th at 969; Berman v. Brown, No. 24-787, 2025 WL 1778824, at *1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2025) (affirming dismissal of claims barred by sovereign immunity); Shuler, 2023 WL 8600707, at *5 (holding that sovereign immunity barred challenges to state court’s issuance and enforcement of a vexatious litigant order). The Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. In making this determination, the Court considers factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the [Plaintiff], repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court also considers “the number of times the plaintiff has already been allowed to amend.” Schwartz v. Miller, 153 F.4th 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2025). Here, the Court finds that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate because amendment would be futile. Bhandary has failed to cure pleading deficiencies after the Court previously granted leave to amend, indicating that further leave to amend would be futile. See Order at 3-4 (granting leave to amend); see also Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d

2 Because Bhandary seeks retrospective relief, the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity does not apply here. See Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). Bhandary alleges that she does not seek “reversal of any state court judgment.” Am. Compl. at 1. Nonetheless, the relief sought in the complaint is retrospective because it challenges prior enforcement of the vexatious litigant order. Lund, 5 F.4th at 969-70 (examining the nature of the relief requested regardless of plaintiff’s characterization of relief as “prospective”); see also Kleidman v. Buchanan, No. 23-cv-1251-WQH-JLB, 2025 WL 755945, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025). Bhandary has not identified any complaint that she intends to file in state court that might be precluded by enforcement of the vexatious litigant order. And even if she 1 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Feb. 10, 2009) (holding that failure to correct pleading 2 deficiencies after dismissal is a “strong indication” that further amendment would be futile); see 3 also Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court’s 4 discretion to deny leave to amend is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously 5 amended.” (quoting Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 6 1996))). 7 The Court also finds that leave to amend would be futile because the Court lacks 8 jurisdiction to hear Bhandary’s claims, or to afford her the relief she seeks. Kroessler v. CVS 9 Health Corp., 977 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2020) (“If no amendment would allow the complaint to 10 withstand dismissal as a matter of law, courts consider amendment futile.”); Lamoon, Inc. v. 11 Lamour Nail Prods., Inc., 373 F. App’x 795, 797 (9th Cir. 2010) (When a plaintiffs “claims have 12 underlying legal deficiencies that cannot be cured, amendment would be futile.”). Because the 13 Court lacks jurisdiction, dismissal without granting further leave to amend is warranted. Berman 14 v. Brown, No. 24-787, 2025 WL 1778824, at *1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2025) (affirming dismissal 3 15 without leave to amend of claims barred by sovereign immunity); Diviacchi v. State Bar of Cal., a 16 No. 23-16170, 2024 WL 2862123, at *1 (9th Cir. June 6, 2024) (same); McCoy v. Uale, No. 21- 3 17 16877, 2022 WL 10382922, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2022) (affirming dismissal without leave to S 18 || amend of claims precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Gilliam v. Watanabe, 859 F. App’x 19 765, 766 (9th Cir. Sep. 21, 2021) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend of “claims for 20 injunctive and declaratory relief” against state court judge); Earls, 745 F. App’x at 697 (affirming 21 dismissal without leave to amend of challenge to vexatious litigant order). 22 Il. CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Bhandary’s complaint without leave to 24 amend for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close this case. 26 Dated: December 8, 2025 27 Eumi K. Lee 28 United States District Judge