1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SAMITA BHANDARY, Case No. 25-cv-07208-EKL
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 9 v. COMPLAINT
10 AGRADOOT GHATAK, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 11 Defendants. 11
12 13 On August 26, 2025, self-represented Plaintiff Samita Bhandary filed this action and an 14 application to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”), No. 3 (“IFP 15 Application”). In the original complaint, Bhandary alleged that her former spouse, Defendant 16 Ghatak, “concealed evidence, committed perjury, and fraudulently claimed rights in Plaintiff’s 17 property” in certain state court proceedings. Compl. ¶ 8. Bhandary alleged that Ghatak’s counsel 18 in those proceedings, Defendant Vindiola, “knowingly misrepresented facts, obstructed court 19 review, and controlled property proceeds.” Id. ¶ 9. Bhandary also alleged that her own counsel in 20 the state court proceedings, Defendant Walsh, “failed to protect [her] rights, colluded with 21 opposing counsel, and blocked [her] court access.” Id. ¶ 10. Bhandary asserted claims under 42 22 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). 23 On September 2, 2025, the Court granted Bhandary’s application to proceed in forma 24 pauperis and screened the complaint. ECF No. 9 (“Order”). The Court dismissed the complaint, 25 with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Id. Now before the Court is Bhandary’s amended 26 complaint. ECF No. 11 (“Amended Complaint”). The amended complaint asserts the same 27 claims, but adds three new Defendants: Madan Ahuwalia, the Milpitas Police Department, and the 1 I. THE COMPLAINT IS DEFICIENT 2 Section 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding in 3 forma pauperis. The Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss claims that are 4 frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief 5 against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. 6 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). For the following reasons, Bhandary 7 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 8 First, Bhandary asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action 9 for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” 10 of the United States. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 11 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, 12 and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 13 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th 14 Cir. 1987). For the following reasons, Bhandary fails to state a Section 1983 claim against any 15 Defendant. 16 Bhandary’s claims against Ghatak, Vindiola, Walsh, and Ahuwalia fail because none of 17 these Defendants acted under color of state law. Ghatak is Bhandary’s former spouse and a party 18 to the state court proceedings. Am. Compl. at 2. The complaint does not allege that Ghatak acted 19 under color of state law. Vindiola and Walsh are private lawyers, and “a lawyer representing a 20 client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ 21 within the meaning of § 1983.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also 22 Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Ahuwalia is a 23 lawyer who “was appointed as Minor’s Counsel” in the state court proceedings. Am. Compl. at 2. 24 However, even a court-appointed lawyer does not act under color of state law for purposes of 25 Section 1983. Sutton v. Llewellyn, 288 F. App’x 411, 412 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that private 26 attorney “did not act under color of state law, even though he was appointed by the court”); Kirtley 27 v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 against “a 1 As private actors, Ghatak, Vindiola, Walsh, and Ahuwalia may be liable for a conspiracy 2 under Section 1983 only if Bhandary plausibly alleges “the existence of an agreement or meeting 3 of the minds” to violate constitutional rights. Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th 4 Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 5 1999)). Bhandary has not alleged any such agreement or meeting of the minds between private 6 and state actors. Instead, Bhandary has offered only conclusory allegations that these Defendants 7 acted “in concert” and “conspired with state actors.” Am. Compl. at 3-4, 6. These allegations are 8 insufficient.1 See Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161 (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the lawyer 9 was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of due process are insufficient.”). Accordingly, 10 Bhandary fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Ghatak, Vindiola, Walsh, and Ahuwalia. 11 Bhandary’s Section 1983 claims against the Milpitas Police Department (“Milpitas PD”) 12 and the Santa Clara County District Attorney (“Santa Clara DA”) also fail. Bhandary faults the 13 Milpitas PD for its “systemic inaction” and for failing to adequately investigate her complaints. 14 Am. Compl. at 2. But a police department’s “cursory investigation” or failure to investigate is not 15 a violation of Bhandary’s civil rights. Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) 16 (per curiam) (holding that police department’s “inadequate investigation” and decision to not 17 recommend criminal charges was insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim). Bhandary alleges 18 that the Santa Clara DA “declined to prosecute criminal violations.” Am. Compl. at 3. However, 19 “a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for the decision not to prosecute.” Roe v. City & 20 Cnty. of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, Bhandary’s conclusory allegations 21 that “both Milpitas PD and Santa Clara DA adopted a practice of prematurely closing reports and 22 refusing to investigate,” Am. Compl. at 7, are insufficient for municipal liability against either 23 Defendant, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); A.E. ex rel. 24 Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). 25
26 1 If anything, Bhandary’s allegations undermine an inference of a conspiracy between the private and state actors. For example, the complaint alleges that Vindiola “altered” court orders “without 27 judicial approval,” and “misled [police department] and [district attorney] officials.” Am. Compl. 1 Second, Bhandary asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SAMITA BHANDARY, Case No. 25-cv-07208-EKL
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 9 v. COMPLAINT
10 AGRADOOT GHATAK, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 11 Defendants. 11
12 13 On August 26, 2025, self-represented Plaintiff Samita Bhandary filed this action and an 14 application to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”), No. 3 (“IFP 15 Application”). In the original complaint, Bhandary alleged that her former spouse, Defendant 16 Ghatak, “concealed evidence, committed perjury, and fraudulently claimed rights in Plaintiff’s 17 property” in certain state court proceedings. Compl. ¶ 8. Bhandary alleged that Ghatak’s counsel 18 in those proceedings, Defendant Vindiola, “knowingly misrepresented facts, obstructed court 19 review, and controlled property proceeds.” Id. ¶ 9. Bhandary also alleged that her own counsel in 20 the state court proceedings, Defendant Walsh, “failed to protect [her] rights, colluded with 21 opposing counsel, and blocked [her] court access.” Id. ¶ 10. Bhandary asserted claims under 42 22 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). 23 On September 2, 2025, the Court granted Bhandary’s application to proceed in forma 24 pauperis and screened the complaint. ECF No. 9 (“Order”). The Court dismissed the complaint, 25 with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Id. Now before the Court is Bhandary’s amended 26 complaint. ECF No. 11 (“Amended Complaint”). The amended complaint asserts the same 27 claims, but adds three new Defendants: Madan Ahuwalia, the Milpitas Police Department, and the 1 I. THE COMPLAINT IS DEFICIENT 2 Section 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding in 3 forma pauperis. The Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss claims that are 4 frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief 5 against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. 6 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). For the following reasons, Bhandary 7 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 8 First, Bhandary asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action 9 for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” 10 of the United States. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 11 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, 12 and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 13 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th 14 Cir. 1987). For the following reasons, Bhandary fails to state a Section 1983 claim against any 15 Defendant. 16 Bhandary’s claims against Ghatak, Vindiola, Walsh, and Ahuwalia fail because none of 17 these Defendants acted under color of state law. Ghatak is Bhandary’s former spouse and a party 18 to the state court proceedings. Am. Compl. at 2. The complaint does not allege that Ghatak acted 19 under color of state law. Vindiola and Walsh are private lawyers, and “a lawyer representing a 20 client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ 21 within the meaning of § 1983.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also 22 Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Ahuwalia is a 23 lawyer who “was appointed as Minor’s Counsel” in the state court proceedings. Am. Compl. at 2. 24 However, even a court-appointed lawyer does not act under color of state law for purposes of 25 Section 1983. Sutton v. Llewellyn, 288 F. App’x 411, 412 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that private 26 attorney “did not act under color of state law, even though he was appointed by the court”); Kirtley 27 v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 against “a 1 As private actors, Ghatak, Vindiola, Walsh, and Ahuwalia may be liable for a conspiracy 2 under Section 1983 only if Bhandary plausibly alleges “the existence of an agreement or meeting 3 of the minds” to violate constitutional rights. Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th 4 Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 5 1999)). Bhandary has not alleged any such agreement or meeting of the minds between private 6 and state actors. Instead, Bhandary has offered only conclusory allegations that these Defendants 7 acted “in concert” and “conspired with state actors.” Am. Compl. at 3-4, 6. These allegations are 8 insufficient.1 See Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161 (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the lawyer 9 was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of due process are insufficient.”). Accordingly, 10 Bhandary fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Ghatak, Vindiola, Walsh, and Ahuwalia. 11 Bhandary’s Section 1983 claims against the Milpitas Police Department (“Milpitas PD”) 12 and the Santa Clara County District Attorney (“Santa Clara DA”) also fail. Bhandary faults the 13 Milpitas PD for its “systemic inaction” and for failing to adequately investigate her complaints. 14 Am. Compl. at 2. But a police department’s “cursory investigation” or failure to investigate is not 15 a violation of Bhandary’s civil rights. Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) 16 (per curiam) (holding that police department’s “inadequate investigation” and decision to not 17 recommend criminal charges was insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim). Bhandary alleges 18 that the Santa Clara DA “declined to prosecute criminal violations.” Am. Compl. at 3. However, 19 “a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for the decision not to prosecute.” Roe v. City & 20 Cnty. of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, Bhandary’s conclusory allegations 21 that “both Milpitas PD and Santa Clara DA adopted a practice of prematurely closing reports and 22 refusing to investigate,” Am. Compl. at 7, are insufficient for municipal liability against either 23 Defendant, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); A.E. ex rel. 24 Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). 25
26 1 If anything, Bhandary’s allegations undermine an inference of a conspiracy between the private and state actors. For example, the complaint alleges that Vindiola “altered” court orders “without 27 judicial approval,” and “misled [police department] and [district attorney] officials.” Am. Compl. 1 Second, Bhandary asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which provides a cause of 2 action against conspiracies to deprive “equal protection of the laws.” Among other elements, a 3 Section 1985(3) claim requires a conspiracy, and “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 4 invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & 5 Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983) (quoting Griffin v. 6 Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Here, Bhandary fails to plausibly allege a conspiracy for 7 the reasons stated above, and she also fails to allege any racial or other class-based discriminatory 8 animus. Given these pleading deficiencies, and the lack of a plausible Section 1983 claim, the 9 Section 1985(3) claim must be dismissed as well. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 10 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]o state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must first 11 have a cognizable claim under § 1983.”). 12 For these reasons, Bhandary’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 13 II. DISMISSAL IS WITH PREJUDICE 14 The Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and without 15 leave to amend. In making this determination, the Court considers factors such as “undue delay, 16 bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the [Plaintiff], repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 17 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of 18 the amendment, and futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The 19 Court also considers “the number of times the plaintiff has already been allowed to amend.” 20 Schwartz v. Miller, 153 F.4th 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2025). 21 Here, the Court finds that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate because 22 amendment would be futile. Bhandary failed to cure pleading deficiencies after the Court 23 previously granted leave to amend. See Order at 3-4 (granting leave to amend). This failure to 24 cure pleading deficiencies indicates that further leave to amend would be futile. Zucco Partners, 25 LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Feb. 10, 2009) (holding 26 that failure to correct pleading deficiencies after dismissal is a “strong indication” that further 27 amendment would be futile); see also Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 1 plaintiff has previously amended.” (quoting Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 2 || 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996))). 3 The Court also finds that leave to amend would be futile because Bhandary’s claims are 4 || legally deficient, and she has not asserted any other legal theory that could support a claim. 5 || Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp., 977 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2020) (“If no amendment would allow 6 || the complaint to withstand dismissal as a matter of law, courts consider amendment futile.”); 7 || Lamoon, Inc. v. Lamour Nail Prods., Inc., 373 F. App’x 795, 797 (9th Cir. 2010) (When a 8 || plaintiffs “claims have underlying legal deficiencies that cannot be cured, amendment would be 9 || futile.”). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. 10 || I. CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Bhandary’s complaint without leave to 12 || amend for failure to state a claim. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: December 8, 2025
16 GaP Eumi K. Lee 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28