1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAMESURF, INC., Case No.: 3:22-cv-00412-RSH-DDL
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 13 v. FILE UNDER SEAL IN 14 INTUIT, INC., CONNECTION WITH DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 15 Defendant. PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE 16 PLEADINGS 17 [ECF Nos. 145, 156] 18
19 Pending before the Court are motions to seal filed by plaintiff Samesurf, Inc. 20 (“Samesurf”) and defendant Intuit, Inc. (“Intuit”). ECF Nos. 145, 156. The motions pertain 21 to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to Defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the 22 pleadings, and to Defendant’s reply in support of that motion. As set forth below, these 23 motions to seal are denied. 24 I. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Courts have historically recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public 26 records and documents, including judicial records.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 27 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept 28 1 secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City 2 & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm 3 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption of access is 4 ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly because 5 they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have 6 confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 7 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 8 (2d Cir. 1995)). 9 To overcome this presumption of access, a party must show either “good cause” or 10 “compelling reasons” to seal a record, depending on the motion to which the record relates. 11 Id. at 1096-97. The Ninth Circuit has made it “clear that public access to filed motions and 12 their attachments does not merely depend on whether the motion is technically 13 ‘dispositive.’” Id. at 1100–01 (“[O]ur circuit looks past the literal 14 dispositive/nondispositive label.”). “Rather, public access will turn on whether the motion 15 is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Id. If the motion is “more than 16 tangentially related to the merits of a case,” the movant must show “compelling reasons” 17 for overcoming the presumption in favor of public access. Id. at 1096-99. Otherwise, a 18 party need only show good cause. Id.; see, e.g., Baker v. SeaWorld Ent., Inc., No. 14-cv- 19 2129-MMA-AGS, 2017 WL 5029612, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017). “[T]he ‘compelling 20 reasons standard applies to most judicial records.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098 21 (quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2010)). 22 “The ‘compelling reasons’ standard typically applies to seal requests filed alongside 23 motions for judgment on the pleadings.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Hamerlag, No. 23-cv-780- 24 JLS (AHG), 2025 WL 319248, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2025) (citing Malig as Tr. for 25 Malig Fam. Tr. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 19-cv-02690-HSG, 2021 WL 3709162, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 26 Aug. 20, 2021)). “Under this stringent standard, a court may seal records only when it finds 27 ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on 28 hypothesis or conjecture.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096-97 (alteration in original) 1 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “The mere fact that the production of records may 2 lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 3 without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 4 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). Once a party articulates their compelling reasons, “[t]he 5 court must then ‘conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the 6 party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 7 1097 (alteration in original) (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “What constitutes a 8 ‘compelling reason’ is ‘best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Id. (quoting 9 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599). 10 The fact that material has been designated as confidential pursuant to a protective 11 order does not itself suffice to show compelling reasons to seal that material. See, e.g., 12 Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136 (“[T]he presumption of access is not rebutted where, as here, 13 documents subject to a protective order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive 14 motion.”); In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 15 2020 WL 6395595, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020) (“That a document is designated 16 confidential pursuant to a protective order is of little weight when it comes to sealing court 17 filings.”); In re Incretin Mimetics Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 13md2452 AJB (MDD), 2014 18 WL 1912731, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“Though the Parties themselves may have 19 stipulated to the confidential nature of this information, the ‘compelling reasons’ standard 20 is invoked even if the motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or 21 protective order.”) (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). 22 Even if it may be appropriate to seal a document in its entirety, a party should still 23 redact records whenever possible. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (noting a preference 24 for redactions so long as they “have the virtue of being limited and clear”); Murphy v. Kavo 25 Am. Corp., No. 11-cv-00410, 2012 WL 1497489 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) 26 (denying motion to seal exhibits but directing parties to redact confidential information); 27 see also Chambers Civ. Proc. § VIII (Protective Orders and Requests to File Under Seal). 28 // 1 II. MOTIONS TO SEAL 2 On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed its motion to seal, seeking to seal short summaries 3 of deposition testimony contained in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for 4 partial judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 145. The testimony at issue is that of 5 Defendant’s employees, Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Eftekhari, which Defendant had designated 6 as “Highly confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” pursuant to the Protective Order in this 7 case. Id. at 1. Plaintiff’s motion to seal recites that Defendant’s designation “indicates that 8 Defendant has a good faith belief that the exhibit includes information that is highly 9 sensitive, including but not limited to trade secret or other confidential research, 10 development, or other commercial information.” Id. Plaintiff further states, “Defendant has 11 indicated that the designated information that is included in the Opposition must be filed 12 under seal.” Id. 13 On July 22, 2025, Defendant filed a joinder in Plaintiff’s motion to seal. ECF No. 14 160. Defendant’s joinder, supported by a declaration from counsel, states that the 15 information at issue contains sensitive and proprietary information about its evaluation of 16 technology vendors. ECF No. 160 at 1-2. Defendant’s motion asserts that “[t]he public 17 disclosure of this information might allow competitors to use that information, including 18 how Intuit negotiates with and evaluates third parties, to their advantage and to Intuit’s 19 detriment.” Id. at 2 (citing Kimera Labs Inc. v. Exocel Bio Inc., No. 21-CV-2137-MMA- 20 DDL, 2024 WL 3014639, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2024)).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAMESURF, INC., Case No.: 3:22-cv-00412-RSH-DDL
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 13 v. FILE UNDER SEAL IN 14 INTUIT, INC., CONNECTION WITH DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 15 Defendant. PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE 16 PLEADINGS 17 [ECF Nos. 145, 156] 18
19 Pending before the Court are motions to seal filed by plaintiff Samesurf, Inc. 20 (“Samesurf”) and defendant Intuit, Inc. (“Intuit”). ECF Nos. 145, 156. The motions pertain 21 to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to Defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the 22 pleadings, and to Defendant’s reply in support of that motion. As set forth below, these 23 motions to seal are denied. 24 I. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Courts have historically recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public 26 records and documents, including judicial records.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 27 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept 28 1 secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City 2 & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm 3 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption of access is 4 ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly because 5 they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have 6 confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 7 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 8 (2d Cir. 1995)). 9 To overcome this presumption of access, a party must show either “good cause” or 10 “compelling reasons” to seal a record, depending on the motion to which the record relates. 11 Id. at 1096-97. The Ninth Circuit has made it “clear that public access to filed motions and 12 their attachments does not merely depend on whether the motion is technically 13 ‘dispositive.’” Id. at 1100–01 (“[O]ur circuit looks past the literal 14 dispositive/nondispositive label.”). “Rather, public access will turn on whether the motion 15 is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Id. If the motion is “more than 16 tangentially related to the merits of a case,” the movant must show “compelling reasons” 17 for overcoming the presumption in favor of public access. Id. at 1096-99. Otherwise, a 18 party need only show good cause. Id.; see, e.g., Baker v. SeaWorld Ent., Inc., No. 14-cv- 19 2129-MMA-AGS, 2017 WL 5029612, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017). “[T]he ‘compelling 20 reasons standard applies to most judicial records.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098 21 (quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2010)). 22 “The ‘compelling reasons’ standard typically applies to seal requests filed alongside 23 motions for judgment on the pleadings.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Hamerlag, No. 23-cv-780- 24 JLS (AHG), 2025 WL 319248, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2025) (citing Malig as Tr. for 25 Malig Fam. Tr. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 19-cv-02690-HSG, 2021 WL 3709162, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 26 Aug. 20, 2021)). “Under this stringent standard, a court may seal records only when it finds 27 ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on 28 hypothesis or conjecture.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096-97 (alteration in original) 1 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “The mere fact that the production of records may 2 lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 3 without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 4 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). Once a party articulates their compelling reasons, “[t]he 5 court must then ‘conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the 6 party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 7 1097 (alteration in original) (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “What constitutes a 8 ‘compelling reason’ is ‘best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Id. (quoting 9 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599). 10 The fact that material has been designated as confidential pursuant to a protective 11 order does not itself suffice to show compelling reasons to seal that material. See, e.g., 12 Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136 (“[T]he presumption of access is not rebutted where, as here, 13 documents subject to a protective order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive 14 motion.”); In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 15 2020 WL 6395595, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020) (“That a document is designated 16 confidential pursuant to a protective order is of little weight when it comes to sealing court 17 filings.”); In re Incretin Mimetics Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 13md2452 AJB (MDD), 2014 18 WL 1912731, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“Though the Parties themselves may have 19 stipulated to the confidential nature of this information, the ‘compelling reasons’ standard 20 is invoked even if the motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or 21 protective order.”) (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). 22 Even if it may be appropriate to seal a document in its entirety, a party should still 23 redact records whenever possible. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (noting a preference 24 for redactions so long as they “have the virtue of being limited and clear”); Murphy v. Kavo 25 Am. Corp., No. 11-cv-00410, 2012 WL 1497489 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) 26 (denying motion to seal exhibits but directing parties to redact confidential information); 27 see also Chambers Civ. Proc. § VIII (Protective Orders and Requests to File Under Seal). 28 // 1 II. MOTIONS TO SEAL 2 On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed its motion to seal, seeking to seal short summaries 3 of deposition testimony contained in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for 4 partial judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 145. The testimony at issue is that of 5 Defendant’s employees, Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Eftekhari, which Defendant had designated 6 as “Highly confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” pursuant to the Protective Order in this 7 case. Id. at 1. Plaintiff’s motion to seal recites that Defendant’s designation “indicates that 8 Defendant has a good faith belief that the exhibit includes information that is highly 9 sensitive, including but not limited to trade secret or other confidential research, 10 development, or other commercial information.” Id. Plaintiff further states, “Defendant has 11 indicated that the designated information that is included in the Opposition must be filed 12 under seal.” Id. 13 On July 22, 2025, Defendant filed a joinder in Plaintiff’s motion to seal. ECF No. 14 160. Defendant’s joinder, supported by a declaration from counsel, states that the 15 information at issue contains sensitive and proprietary information about its evaluation of 16 technology vendors. ECF No. 160 at 1-2. Defendant’s motion asserts that “[t]he public 17 disclosure of this information might allow competitors to use that information, including 18 how Intuit negotiates with and evaluates third parties, to their advantage and to Intuit’s 19 detriment.” Id. at 2 (citing Kimera Labs Inc. v. Exocel Bio Inc., No. 21-CV-2137-MMA- 20 DDL, 2024 WL 3014639, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2024)). 21 Also on July 22, 2025, Defendant filed its own motion to seal material in its reply 22 brief, relating to substantially the same deposition testimony of the same employees. ECF 23 No. 156. The argument in Defendant’s motion to seal was the same as that contained in its 24 joinder in Plaintiff’s motion to seal. 25 The Court has reviewed the portions of briefing at issue in the motions to seal, 26 summarizing testimony by Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Eftekhari. The material at issue explains 27 that, when Defendant was evaluating co-browsing vendors in 2015, Defendant focused on 28 the functionality of the vendors’ products rather than on the vendors’ patents. Given that | || this testimony is generalized in nature, and refers to an evaluation conducted ten years ago, 2 Court is not persuaded that the information could be used by Defendant’s competitors 3 their competitive advantage and to Defendant’s competitive detriment. Nor is the Court 4 || persuaded that the material is otherwise sensitive or proprietary in a manner that rebuts the 5 ||presumption of public access. Accordingly, the motions do not establish “compelling 6 || reasons” for sealing. 7 IN. MOTIONS TO SEAL 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Parties’ motions to seal [ECF Nos. 145, 156] are 9 || DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to make publicly accessible the documents 10 ||currently lodged on the docket at ECF Nos. 146 (unredacted version of □□□□□□□□□□□ 11 opposition brief) and 157 (unredacted version of Defendant’s reply brief). 12 SO ORDERED. 13 ||Dated: August 1, 2025 14 Jokut G fw Hon. Robert S.Huie 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28