Sambrano v. Moreno

Opinion

WO

Yesenia Sambrano, No. CV-20-01975-PHX-GMS

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Phillip Moreno,

Defendant. Before the Court is Defendant Philip Moreno’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52). Also pending is Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Report and Testimony of Ron Hergert (Doc. 53). For the following reasons, the motions are granted in part and denied in part. This case concerns the search of Plaintiff’s vehicle and seizure of her cell phone. Plaintiff Yesenia Sambrano (“Plaintiff”) is employed by the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry as a Correctional Officer II. As part of her duties, she was assigned to provide security at a hospital in Phoenix while an inmate, W.C., was hospitalized in 2020. W.C. was an inmate at ASPC-Lewis, and had been housed in the Rast Unit, at a time when Plaintiff previously worked there. On September 9, 2020, after W.C. was discharged from the hospital, officers at the hospital discovered a cell phone on a food tray allegedly intended for W.C. Because inmates are not permitted to have cell phones, W.C. was questioned at ASPC-Lewis. During questioning, it was revealed that W.C. already had a cell phone in his possession. When interviewed about how he obtained the phone, W.C. stated that a hospital employee named “Norma” and “COII Sambrano” assisted him in securing the phone. Defendant Phillip Moreno was then assigned to investigate the case. Upon reviewing the list of correctional officers who worked during W.C.’s hospital stay, Defendant learned that officers Yesenia Sambrano and Mary Zambrano had both worked. Defendant then questioned W.C. to determine which officer he was referencing. W.C. stated that he did not know the officer’s first name, but “it started with a Y” and her last name was spelled “S-A-M-B-R-A-N-O.” W.C. allegedly further explained that Officer Sambrano was in touch with another inmate at a different facility, G.S., and she was aware that W.C. owed G.S. money. However, in the interview, Defendant showed W.C. photos of Officer Sambrano, to which he responded it was not her and he did not recognize her. (Doc. 57 ¶ 24.) Defendant and his supervisor interviewed Plaintiff on September 15, 2020. Plaintiff denied any participation or connection to securing cell phones for W.C., even when pressed by the investigators who stated that they had information linking her to the scheme. She also denied knowing hospital employee Norma Benitez, who confessed to providing W.C. with the cell phone later that day. Ms. Benitez stated that she could not identify Officer Sambrano as anyone she knew. Defendant told Plaintiff he intended to seize her phone, which she kept in her car, pursuant to the prison policy. Defendant alleges that he believes Plaintiff consented to such a search because she had signed a waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights and consent form at the beginning of her employment and was aware that anyone on the grounds was subject to search. Plaintiff led Defendant and his supervisor to the parking lot and gave Defendant the keys to her vehicle. Defendant removed the phone from the driver’s side door. After seizing the phone, he believed he needed a warrant to search the phone. On September 16, 2020, Defendant applied for a search warrant to search the phones of Plaintiff and Ms. Benitez. He submitted two affidavits simultaneously, one for each suspect. Defendant alleges that he included all of the relevant information to the investigation in the affidavits supporting the warrant requests. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant misrepresented several aspects of the investigation in the affidavit, including Ms. Benitez’s confession, the failed identification, and W.C.’s credibility. The magistrate issued the search warrant on September 16, 2020. Defendant then contacted another investigator to arrange for downloading data from the phones, but the investigator was unable to access any data on Plaintiff’s phone because of the security settings. Defendant asked Plaintiff for the PIN to unlock her phone, but she refused. On September 28, 2020, Defendant returned Plaintiff’s phone to her, having been unable to access any of the data. The parties agree that the phone was returned undamaged and in good working condition. On October 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action, alleging that the warrantless search and seizure violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in her vehicle, consented to the search, or that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies. Additionally, Plaintiff amended her complaint on December 3, 2021, adding a § 1983 Judicial Deception claim and alleging that Defendant made deliberately false statements or recklessly disregarded the truth in his affidavit supporting the search warrant. Thereafter, Defendant filed the instant summary judgment motion as well as a motion to exclude Plaintiff’s expert witness, Ron Hergert. I. Legal Standard Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. “The purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non- moving party’s case.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit has said, “[t]his burden is not a light one.” Id. To meet this burden, the “non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.” Id. Additionally, parties opposing summary judgment are required to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” establishing a genuine dispute or “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A district court has no independent duty “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). II. Analysis A. Search and Seizure “In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sampson v. County of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, to overcome qualified immunity Plaintiff must show that Defendant (1) “violated a federal statutory or constitutional right” and (2) “the unlawfulness of [his] conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). A clearly established right exists when “every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Such a right can be demonstrated in one of two ways: (1) a government actor is on notice when existing precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” or (2) if “a violation [is] so obvious that it puts every reasonable government actor on notice that the conduct violates the law.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741; Lamorie v. Davis, 485 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2020). Courts are permitted to “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 1. Violation of Fourth Amendment The Court analyzes only the second prong of qualified immunity because here, even if Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, Plaintiff does not show a violation of a clearly established right, as required to overcome qualified immunity. A governmental official only “violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” al- Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. “Although the Supreme Court does not require a [precedential] case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Evans v. Skolnik, 997 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)). Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court has also warned . . . not to find clearly established law lurking in the broad history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment or in broad historical assertions.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). In fact, the “Supreme Court has repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff unsuccessfully advances two reasons why Defendant violated a clearly established right. The first is that “[t]he need for a warrant based upon probable case has been known since the adoption of the 4th amendment.” (Doc. 56 at 8.) While it is certainly true that a warrant is a historical requirement under the Fourth Amendment, to find that this alone creates a clearly established right runs counter to the admonition “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Evans, 997 F.3d at 1066. Moreover, Defendant does not dispute that a warrant is typically required to conduct a search; instead, he argues that longstanding and specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement apply to the search in this case. Second, Plaintiff unsuccessfully uses two Ninth Circuit cases to illustrate that the right to be free of Defendant’s search and seizure was clearly established. See United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1975). Both of those cases, however, address when an employee has a diminished expectation of privacy through the notice of, or a waiver to, an employer. In Gonzalez, the Court considered whether a store policy on a military base that permitted randomized searches of employees’ bags to deter theft violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit surveyed several precedential cases addressing randomized searches by the government in schools or workplaces. The Court ultimately determined that “Mr. Gonzalez’s expectation of privacy was limited by his knowledge of the store policy of searching employees’ belongings to deter and apprehend theft.” Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1054. The Court followed the framework set out in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). It asked: (1) whether the search was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the search, as actually conducted, was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1054. It found that the prevention of theft is a legitimate justification for a search and there was no evidence that the search went beyond the scope of its justification. Id. Thus, because “no probable cause is needed for such an employee search, but reasonableness is required,” there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 1055. The second case, United States v. Bunkers, concerned the warrantless search of a U.S. postal worker’s locker for stolen packages. 521 F.2d at 1220. The Court held that Bunkers’ “private interest in the locker is at most a very restricted and regulated employment related use thereof” because “[t]he inspectors held the continuing regulatory leave and unrestricted right to inspect and search the locker at any time ‘where there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal activity.’” Id. Thus, the search of the employee’s locker and subsequent seizure of stolen parcels was reasonable and lawful. These cases do not “place[] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” as Plaintiff is required to show. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Plaintiff asserts that these cases would have put Defendant on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, but to the extent these cases are on point, they more likely do the opposite. As to Gonzalez, the Court held that such a search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, meaning that to whatever extent this case is on point, it does not put reasonable officers on notice as to what is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. And, while Bunkers may be more on point, it would suggest to a reasonable officer that Defendant’s conduct was lawful. In that case, the Court determined that Bunkers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of his “government supplied employment connected locker” because he was on notice it could be searched, and the search was conducted pursuant to a “well-founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Bunkers, 521 F.2d at 1220. As in Bunkers, Officer Sambrano had, at minimum, notice that investigators could search her vehicle if they believed it contained evidence. (Doc. 51 ¶ 2; Doc. 57 ¶ 2.) Additionally, even if the officers did not have probable cause, they likely had reasonable suspicion that Officer Sambrano was involved in criminal activity, based on W.C.’s description of the events. To be sure, there are differences between this case and Bunkers. Most importantly, Defendant searched Plaintiff’s vehicle, rather than a “government supplied[,] employment connected” space. Bunkers, 521 F.2d at 1220. This fact may make the case less like Bunkers, but it does not mean that Bunkers informed officers that their conduct was unlawful. At the very least, the case demonstrates that the contours of when an employee’s property may be searched at her workplace without a warrant due to a diminished expectation of privacy are not clearly defined. Although Plaintiff does not cite any other precedential cases, other cases exist explaining the differing requirements for workplace searches related to investigation of criminal activity, investigation for work-related purposes, or both. For example, in O’Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court addressed a warrantless search of a physician’s office to search for evidence of his improper acquisition of a computer and sexual harassment of two hospital employees. 480 U.S. 709, 712 (1987). Hospital officials conducted the search. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that public employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work and opted for a more particularized approach. It said, “[t]he legitimate privacy interests of public employees in the private objects they bring to the workplace may be substantial. Against these privacy interests, however, must be balanced the realities of the workplace, which strongly suggest that a warrant requirement would be unworkable.” Id. It further explained that “[w]hile police, and even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct.” Id. At least one circuit court has held that a less stringent standard applies if “the dominant purpose[] of the warrantless search . . . was to acquire evidence of criminal activity,” so long as the search is also “work-related.” United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2000). In this case, it is unclear whether the search was pursuant to a workplace incident, in furtherance of criminal penalties, or both.1 In any event, the issues presented are not clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity. Namely, to what extent, if any, can an employee’s expectation of privacy in her vehicle on government property be reduced through legitimate regulation? See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion). An employee likely has a stronger 1 The parties offer varying reasons for the search. Defendant notes that “[p]romoting prison contraband is a criminal offense as well as a form of employee misconduct.” (Doc. 52 at 2 n.1.) expectation of privacy in her vehicle than in her office, her work-issued computer, or work- issued locker. However, when combined with the fact that Plaintiff signed a consent form indicating an understanding that her car could be searched for evidence, and the widely recognized diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles, the Court cannot say that, if the search was unlawful, every reasonable officer would understand it to be so. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s expectation of privacy in an automobile . . . [is] significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s home.”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s blanket contention that the need for a warrant based on probable cause has been known since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment sidesteps the inquiry entirely—it is equally well known that a search based on consent or the automobile exception do not require a warrant. And Plaintiff does not offer any cases to demonstrate that if Defendant conducted the search pursuant to her consent or the automobile exception that he violated a clearly established right. Thus, because the only cases provided by Plaintiff do not address the facts at issue here; namely, the search of an automobile, presumed consent, or a search for a workplace-related incident at a prison, Defendant did not violate a clearly established right. As such, he is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. B. Judicial Deception Plaintiff’s judicial deception claim survives summary judgment because Plaintiff has made the requisite showing that there are genuine disputes of material fact about whether Defendant made representations that were deliberately false or recklessly disregarded the truth. On summary judgment for a judicial deception claim, “the plaintiff must make a ‘substantial showing’ of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth, and establish that but for the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have occurred.” Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff identifies approximately seven statements that Defendant either omitted or stated falsely in his affidavit: (1) Benitez’s confession to purchasing the phone; (2) Benitez’s confession to purchasing W.C. tobacco; (3) Benitez’s statement that she did not recognize Officer Sambrano; (4) Benitez’s statement that no corrections officers were involved in her obtaining the phones and delivering them to W.C.; (5) W.C.’s statement that he had Sambrano’s telephone number, when the number he provided officers did not belong to Sambrano; (6) W.C.’s failure to identify Sambrano in a photograph on two occasions; and (7) Defendant’s statement that W.C. had proven to be credible. As to Ms. Benitez’s confession, Plaintiff does not make a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth. The search warrant requests for Ms. Benitez’s and Plaintiff’s phones were sent to the magistrate at the same time. The requests were consecutively numbered such that they were sent as a singular package. The same magistrate signed both search warrants on the same day. Thus, it is not clear that Defendant omitted any information about Ms. Benitez’s confession because the magistrate, upon reading the entire package, would have been informed that she confessed to delivering the phones. Yet both the quantity and the nature of the remaining undisclosed statements present a genuine dispute of material fact about whether they were omitted with reckless disregard for the truth and whether they were material. The Ninth Circuit is clear that “the government need not include all of the information in its possession to obtain a search warrant.” Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009). However, at the time of the affidavit, the only information forming the probable cause determination as to Sambrano was information that W.C. provided. Thus, while Defendant was not required to include all information in his possession, the fact that W.C.’s statements were the only link between Plaintiff and the alleged criminal activity indicates that the Defendant should have taken care to include facts relevant to the accuracy of the identification. Because the affidavit includes several statements from the interview where W.C. implicates Plaintiff but does not address W.C.’s failure to recognize Plaintiff in a photo, the omission could have been deliberate. Similarly, because Defendant stated in the affidavit that Ms. Benitez and Officer Sambrano were both involved in the scheme, Ms. Benitez’s statements that she did not know Officer Sambrano and the fact that she had previously provided W.C. contraband, could have been deliberately omitted. At the very least, a reasonable jury could determine that omission of these statements was reckless in light of the significant reliance on W.C.’s statements. Additionally, W.C.’s erroneous statement about Plaintiff’s phone number and failure to identify her in a photo could have been material to the probable cause determination. As noted above, W.C.’s identification and explanation were the primary, if not only, basis for probable cause. While W.C. provided certain statements identifying Plaintiff (such as her last name and that her first name begins with a “Y”), he also provided an incorrect phone number that he claimed belonged to Officer Sambrano. In the affidavit, however, Defendant implied that the identification was unequivocal. (Doc. 51-8 at 13) (“Furthermore, W.C. alleged that a uniformed correctional officer who was later identified as Yesenia Sambrano . . . facilitated W.C. being provided a cellular phone.”). Because the magistrate must have relied heavily on W.C.’s identification as the primary factor creating probable cause, knowledge that certain aspects of his identification were flawed, including failure to identify her in a photo and providing an incorrect phone number could have undermined the probable cause determination. Similarly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Defendant’s statement that W.C. had proven credible was deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for truth. Although W.C. implicated Ms. Benitez in the scheme, who ultimately confessed to participating, that was the only evidence Defendant possessed as to W.C.’s credibility. Defendant also did not include any of W.C.’s criminal history. United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1555 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that when other information supports a finding of probable cause, an informant’s low credibility is inconsequential). Here, because no other information supported a finding of probable cause, W.C.’s credibility is consequential. Plaintiff has established that there are sufficient facts cutting against W.C.’s reliability such that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the credibility statement was deliberately false or recklessly disregarded the truth. Thus, if a jury found that Defendant’s statements about W.C.’s credibility were false, the falsity likely materially affected whether probable cause existed. Additionally, the fact that the officers were ultimately unable to search Plaintiff’s phone is not dispositive of the claim. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that a search did not occur. Instead, she alleges that the search warrant authorized Defendant to retain the phone for an extended period of time. This appears to be true because, after obtaining the search warrant, Defendant retained the phone for approximately twelve more days as he attempted to access its data. (Doc. 51 ¶¶ 62-66.) The elements of the judicial deception claim, as set out by the Ninth Circuit are: 1) deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth, and 2) “but for the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have occurred.”2 Liston, 120 F.3d at 973 (emphasis added). Here, the challenged action is the retention of the phone after the initial seizure, in reliance on an allegedly faulty search warrant. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that if the search warrant did not issue, Defendant would not have retained the phone for that time period. Defendant also appears to concede as much, stating “Moreno informed Officer Sambrano that he was going to seek a warrant to search her phone and if a judge would not sign off on the search warrant, the phone would be returned to Officer Sambrano.” (Doc. 51 at 6.) Thus, because Plaintiff is challenging the seizure and retention of her phone and Defendant does not appear to challenge that he would have returned the phone if the search warrant did not issue, Plaintiff makes the requisite showing on summary judgment. Lastly, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on the judicial deception claim. The Ninth Circuit has “consistently applied the rule that summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is not appropriate once plaintiff has made a judicial deception claim.” Chism v. Washington State, 661 F.3d 380, 393 (9th Cir. 2011). This is because 2 Defendant attempts to argue that the requirement is narrower; he asserts the standard should be “but for the dishonesty, the search would not have occurred.” (Doc. 52 at 13.) For this proposition, he quotes Chism. 661 F.3d 380 (9th Cir. 2011). It is clear, however, that the quote in Chism modifies an earlier standard for the specific facts of that case—a case in which a search did occur. Chism does not hold that a Plaintiff cannot bring a judicial deception claim if officers rely on a warrant to retain a person’s property for an unreasonable period of time, but do not actually conduct the search. “[i]n judicial deception cases, our qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage is swallowed by the question of reckless or intentional disregard for the truth. . . . . [T]his merger is sensible because no reasonable officer could believe that it is constitutional to act dishonestly or recklessly with regard to the basis for probable cause in seeking a warrant.” Id. at 393 n.15. In light of such clear precedent, the fact that Plaintiff’s phone was only seized and retained pursuant to the search warrant, but not actually searched, does not establish grounds for qualified immunity. As such, the motion for summary judgment on the judicial deception claim is denied. III. Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Report and Testimony of Ron Hergert is granted in part and denied in part, however, several aspects of the report and testimony are likely to be inadmissible at trial. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. The Court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the proffered testimony is both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). Expert opinion testimony is reliable “if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 565. When making this determination, the Court should consider (1) whether the theory can be and has been tested, (2) whether the theory has been peer reviewed and published, (3) what the theory’s known or potential error rate is, and (4) whether the theory enjoys general acceptance in the applicable scientific community. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317; Murray v. S. Route Mar. SA, 870 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2017). However, these factors are not exhaustive, nor are they “equally applicable (or applicable at all) in every case.” Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317. “Applicability ‘depend[s] on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.’” Murray, 870 F.3d at 922 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)). Expert opinion must be “relevant to the task at hand” and “logically advance[] a material aspect of the proposing party’s case.” Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315. “Therefore, a federal judge should exclude scientific expert testimony under the second prong of the Daubert standard unless he is ‘convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute in the case.’” Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 900 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court is afforded broad discretion when acting in its gatekeeper role. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000); Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150–53. However, “Rule 702 should be applied with a ‘liberal thrust’ favoring admission.” Messick v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588). “Shaky but admissible evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not exclusion.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010). The “test of reliability is flexible, and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. In some cases, “the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.” Id. However, an expert’s testimony must not include “unsubstantiated speculation [or] subjective beliefs.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 942 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the witness has significant experience in the fields of policing and misconduct investigations. His experience indicates that he is qualified to testify on general objective policing and investigation standards, as well as how to determine if police misconduct has occurred. He thus would be qualified to testify as to standards or practices required in setting forth facts, and what facts should be presented, in requesting a search warrant, so that a court might evaluate the credibility of a witness’s story. Nevertheless, to the extent Mr. Hergert arrives at legal conclusions, such conclusions are inadmissible and irrelevant. Nationwide Transport Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an ultimate issue of law.”). Mr. Hergert offers several legal conclusions about whether probable cause existed, whether the seizure was improper, or whether Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. These opinions are necessarily excluded so as not to invade the “distinct and exclusive province of the court.” Id. Further, some of his conclusions about Defendant’s demeanor and methodology in interviewing witnesses are at best marginally relevant and will likely run afoul of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. To the extent Mr. Hergert opines about which witness testimony Defendant should have believed and should not have believed, he does not appear to have provided in his report an adequate basis of expertise on which the Court would allow him to testify to such conclusions. For example, in Observation 4, Mr. Hergert explains his “general impression” of Defendant during questioning, and states that “[t]he story W.C. presented makes no logical sense.” (Doc. 53-2 at 7.) He does not provide any objective standard by which he assesses the interview and arrives at his apparent assessment that Defendant should not have believed W.C.. In Observation 8, the expert reviews Defendant’s demeanor in his interview with Plaintiff, concluding “I believe he treated her in an unprofessional and disrespectful manner.” (Doc. 53-2 at 13.) Observations 11 and 12 also contain such subjective opinions. These opinions, specifically his opinions about Defendant’s demeanor and methodology in interviewing witnesses, are not the product of reliable methods or explained experience. At least at this point, such observations also do not seem to relate sufficiently to the only remaining claim at issue—whether Defendant knowingly or recklessly omitted necessary information from the search warrant affidavits—they thus will likely be excluded at trial. However, again by way of example, and without any effort to completely parse what would and would not be admissible at trial, Observation 6, some of Observation 8, and Observations 10, 13, and 14 are not excluded at this time because they contain opinions that are sufficiently reliable, relevant, and helpful to the jury. These observations primarily concern Defendant’s potential investigative bias against Plaintiff. Although Mr. Hergert does not expressly reference objective investigation standards, he points to specific actions or statements that Defendant makes and explains why they may suggest an investigative bias. Based on his qualifications and experience, the observations are sufficiently reliable. Further, they are relevant to the remaining judicial deception claim. The observations and analysis can help the jury assess whether Defendant’s statements in the affidavit were deliberately false or recklessly disregarded the truth because they explain why he may have } improperly omitted information regarding W.C.’s identification of Plaintiff. They further help the jury understand whether it was truthful for Defendant to represent W.C. as credible in the affidavit. Thus, these observations are not excluded. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted as to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claim (Count I). It is denied as to the Judicial Deception Claim (Count ID). IT IS FURTHER OREDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Report and Testimony of Ron Hergert (Doc. 53) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted as to the purely legal conclusions. It is denied without prejudice as to the remaining opinions. Dated this 23rd day of March, 2023. Wi, A Whacrsay Sooo) Chief United States District Judge

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