IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Petition for Child No. 86913-2-I Support of DIVISION ONE SAMANTHA SNODDERLY,
Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
BRADLEY SHOCKEY,
Respondent.
SMITH, J. — Samantha Snodderly and Bradley Shockey share one child
together, D.S. In 2022, the Division of Child Support issued an agreed
settlement addressing child support obligations. In 2024, when D.S. was 18
years old but still in high school, Snodderly petitioned to obtain post-secondary
child support. The trial court denied and dismissed Snodderly’s petition, stating it
did not have authority to order post-secondary support because the child was
emancipated. Snodderly appealed.
Because the administrative order of child support is a written agreement
for purposes of RCW 26.09.170(3), which extends the obligation for support past
the age of 18 under certain circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion
when it concluded it did not have authority to order post-secondary child support. No. 86913-2-I/2
FACTS
Samantha Snodderly and Bradley Shockey share one child together, D.S.
In 2006, when D.S. was born, Snodderly and Shockey signed and filed an
acknowledgment of parentage with the appropriate agency. In 2011, Snodderly
and Shockey entered into an administrative order of child support, issued by
Division of Child Support (DCS). In June 2022, they entered into an agreed
settlement with DCS modifying their support obligations concerning D.S. The
agreed settlement of child support included duration provisions for the order.
The agreement specified: The current child support and health care coverage obligations in this settlement / order continue each month until one of the following occurs: (1) A state or tribal court order supersedes this order. (2) This order is modified under WAC 388-14A-3925. The noncustodial parent, physical custodian, or DCS may petition for modification. (3) A child turns 18, or graduates from a secondary school program or the same level of vocational or technical training, which is later, if the child is a full-time student and has not reached age 19.
In February 2024, Snodderly petitioned the court to establish a child
support order and obtain post-secondary support for D.S.1 The administrative
order was still in effect when Snodderly filed the petition. At the time, D.S. was
18, but had not yet graduated high school. Shockey was personally served, but
never responded to the petition. Snodderly obtained an order of default in March
2024.
1 Snodderly did not request a parenting plan.
2 No. 86913-2-I/3
In May 2024, Snodderly and Shockey appeared before the court, where
Snodderly presented final orders. The trial court set a hearing to address
whether it had jurisdiction to order support, considering Snodderly filed the
petition after D.S. turned 18. The court conducted the hearing in June 2024;
Shockey did not appear.
At the hearing, the court determined it did not have jurisdiction to enter a
parenting plan and did not have authority to enter an order for post-secondary
support because D.S. was emancipated and the agreed settlement was not
considered a “written agreement” for purposes of RCW 26.09.170(3). Snodderly
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Snodderly claims the trial court abused its discretion when it determined
D.S. was an emancipated adult and concluded it did not have jurisdiction to order
post-secondary support. Because D.S. was dependent on his parents for
support and the administrative order of child support was a valid, written
agreement for purposes of RCW 26.09.170—which extended the parents’
support obligation beyond the child’s 18th birthday if he was still attending
secondary school and had not reached the age of 19—the trial court abused its
discretion when it determined it did not have authority to order post-secondary
support.
We review a trial court’s decision concerning modification of a child
support order for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39,
46, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
3 No. 86913-2-I/4
manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.” Matter of
Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 386, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018).
“A parent-child relationship extends equally to every child and parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parent.” RCW 26.26A.105. DCS has the
authority to enter child support orders when a party signs an acknowledgment of
parentage. RCW 74.20A.056(1)(a)(i). When it comes to issues of child support,
DCS attempts to settle matters through agreement, when possible. WAC 388-
14A-3600. DCS is authorized to “enter a consent order or agreed settlement” to
finalize child support obligations. WAC 388.14A-3600. An agreed settlement is
“an administrative order2 that reflects the agreement of the noncustodial parent,
the custodial parent, and the division of child support.” WAC 388-14A-1020. An
agreed settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute and is final and
enforceable on the date the last party signs the agreement. WAC 388.14A-3600.
Under RCW 26.09.170(3), “unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly
provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by
emancipation of the child.” For purposes of RCW 26.09.170, emancipation
occurs when the child turns 18 years old, the age of majority.3 In re Marriage of
Cota, 177 Wn. App. 527, 533, 312 P.3d 695 (2013); RCW 26.28.010. But “[t]he
child support obligation is based on dependency, not minority.” Balch v. Balch,
2 An administrative order is “a determination, finding, decree, or order for support . . . establishing the existence of a support obligation.” WAC 388-14A- 1020. 3 An individual may also be emancipated by the occurrence of certain
events, such as marriage or military service. See In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 702, 629 P.2d 450 (1981).
4 No. 86913-2-I/5
75 Wn. App. 776, 779, 880 P.2d 78 (1994) (citing Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d
592, 597, 575 P.2d 201 (1978)). Accordingly, a parent may have a continuing
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Petition for Child No. 86913-2-I Support of DIVISION ONE SAMANTHA SNODDERLY,
Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
BRADLEY SHOCKEY,
Respondent.
SMITH, J. — Samantha Snodderly and Bradley Shockey share one child
together, D.S. In 2022, the Division of Child Support issued an agreed
settlement addressing child support obligations. In 2024, when D.S. was 18
years old but still in high school, Snodderly petitioned to obtain post-secondary
child support. The trial court denied and dismissed Snodderly’s petition, stating it
did not have authority to order post-secondary support because the child was
emancipated. Snodderly appealed.
Because the administrative order of child support is a written agreement
for purposes of RCW 26.09.170(3), which extends the obligation for support past
the age of 18 under certain circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion
when it concluded it did not have authority to order post-secondary child support. No. 86913-2-I/2
FACTS
Samantha Snodderly and Bradley Shockey share one child together, D.S.
In 2006, when D.S. was born, Snodderly and Shockey signed and filed an
acknowledgment of parentage with the appropriate agency. In 2011, Snodderly
and Shockey entered into an administrative order of child support, issued by
Division of Child Support (DCS). In June 2022, they entered into an agreed
settlement with DCS modifying their support obligations concerning D.S. The
agreed settlement of child support included duration provisions for the order.
The agreement specified: The current child support and health care coverage obligations in this settlement / order continue each month until one of the following occurs: (1) A state or tribal court order supersedes this order. (2) This order is modified under WAC 388-14A-3925. The noncustodial parent, physical custodian, or DCS may petition for modification. (3) A child turns 18, or graduates from a secondary school program or the same level of vocational or technical training, which is later, if the child is a full-time student and has not reached age 19.
In February 2024, Snodderly petitioned the court to establish a child
support order and obtain post-secondary support for D.S.1 The administrative
order was still in effect when Snodderly filed the petition. At the time, D.S. was
18, but had not yet graduated high school. Shockey was personally served, but
never responded to the petition. Snodderly obtained an order of default in March
2024.
1 Snodderly did not request a parenting plan.
2 No. 86913-2-I/3
In May 2024, Snodderly and Shockey appeared before the court, where
Snodderly presented final orders. The trial court set a hearing to address
whether it had jurisdiction to order support, considering Snodderly filed the
petition after D.S. turned 18. The court conducted the hearing in June 2024;
Shockey did not appear.
At the hearing, the court determined it did not have jurisdiction to enter a
parenting plan and did not have authority to enter an order for post-secondary
support because D.S. was emancipated and the agreed settlement was not
considered a “written agreement” for purposes of RCW 26.09.170(3). Snodderly
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Snodderly claims the trial court abused its discretion when it determined
D.S. was an emancipated adult and concluded it did not have jurisdiction to order
post-secondary support. Because D.S. was dependent on his parents for
support and the administrative order of child support was a valid, written
agreement for purposes of RCW 26.09.170—which extended the parents’
support obligation beyond the child’s 18th birthday if he was still attending
secondary school and had not reached the age of 19—the trial court abused its
discretion when it determined it did not have authority to order post-secondary
support.
We review a trial court’s decision concerning modification of a child
support order for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39,
46, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
3 No. 86913-2-I/4
manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.” Matter of
Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 386, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018).
“A parent-child relationship extends equally to every child and parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parent.” RCW 26.26A.105. DCS has the
authority to enter child support orders when a party signs an acknowledgment of
parentage. RCW 74.20A.056(1)(a)(i). When it comes to issues of child support,
DCS attempts to settle matters through agreement, when possible. WAC 388-
14A-3600. DCS is authorized to “enter a consent order or agreed settlement” to
finalize child support obligations. WAC 388.14A-3600. An agreed settlement is
“an administrative order2 that reflects the agreement of the noncustodial parent,
the custodial parent, and the division of child support.” WAC 388-14A-1020. An
agreed settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute and is final and
enforceable on the date the last party signs the agreement. WAC 388.14A-3600.
Under RCW 26.09.170(3), “unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly
provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by
emancipation of the child.” For purposes of RCW 26.09.170, emancipation
occurs when the child turns 18 years old, the age of majority.3 In re Marriage of
Cota, 177 Wn. App. 527, 533, 312 P.3d 695 (2013); RCW 26.28.010. But “[t]he
child support obligation is based on dependency, not minority.” Balch v. Balch,
2 An administrative order is “a determination, finding, decree, or order for support . . . establishing the existence of a support obligation.” WAC 388-14A- 1020. 3 An individual may also be emancipated by the occurrence of certain
events, such as marriage or military service. See In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 702, 629 P.2d 450 (1981).
4 No. 86913-2-I/5
75 Wn. App. 776, 779, 880 P.2d 78 (1994) (citing Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d
592, 597, 575 P.2d 201 (1978)). Accordingly, a parent may have a continuing
obligation to provide support for a child over the age of 18 if the order expressly
provides for post-majority support. Balch, 75 Wn. App. at 779.
In accordance with RCW 26.09, the trial court has discretion to order
support “beyond a child’s minority as long as that child is still dependent.”
Wimmer v. Wimmer, 44 Wn. App. 842, 844, 723 P.2d 531 (1986) (citing Childers,
89 Wn.2d at 601). This support may include support for post-secondary
education, as long as it is “expressly provided in the decree.” In re Marriage of
Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 703, 629 P.2d 450 (1981) (quoting RCW 26.09.170).
While the superior court cannot modify a DCS administrative support order to
address post-secondary support, see WAC 388-14A-3925, it can enter an order
for support and supersede the administrative order. RCW 74.20A.055(7).
Here, DCS entered an agreed settlement in June 2022, that stated, “This
Agreed Settlement is a child support order under WAC 388-14A-3600.” The
agreed settlement also noted child support would continue until (1) a state court
order supersedes it, (2) the order is modified under WAC 388-14A-3925, or
(3) the child turns 18 or graduates from a secondary school program, whichever
is later, as long as the child is a full-time student and has not reached the age
of 19.
When the trial court considered Snodderly’s petition for post-secondary
support, it concluded the agreed settlement was not sufficient to preserve the
issue of post-secondary support beyond the child’s 18th birthday because the
5 No. 86913-2-I/6
statute requires a court order to extend the court’s authority past the age of
emancipation. And, because no court order addressing child support was in the
record, the court reasoned it did not have authority to order post-secondary
The trial court believed “the administrative order on its own is not an order
for purposes of [RCW] 26.09.170.” But this interpretation treats children whose
support is ordered through the administrative process differently than children
whose support is established by a dissolution decree, parentage action, or by
filing a petition for child support and a parenting plan. And it does not align with
the intent of RCW 26.26A.105 to prevent discrimination based on the marital
status of parents: “A parent-child relationship extends equally to every child and
parent, regardless of the marital status of the parent.” RCW 26.09.170(3) does
not make this distinction—it encompasses both decrees and agreements in
writing (i.e., administrative orders). The agreed settlement Snodderly and
Shockey entered into is precisely the type of written agreement considered by
RCW 26.09.170(3).
Additionally, because an administrative order of child support is a “written
agreement” for purposes of RCW 26.09.170(3), the court had the authority to
grant Snodderly’s petition, as it was brought before the support obligation for
D.S. terminated.
When Snodderly petitioned to establish a child support order to obtain
post-secondary child support, D.S. was 18 but still attending secondary school.
And even though the trial court ruled that at the time the petition was filed, an
6 No. 86913-2-I/7
administrative order of support existed—which provided it was valid until the child
finished high school or turned 19 years old, whichever happened first—the court
determined there was no written agreement in this case. Consequently, the court
ruled D.S. was emancipated when he turned 18 years old, and it did not have
authority to order post-secondary support. This determination was error. The
language of the agreed settlement makes clear D.S. was still dependent when
Snodderly filed the petition. The agreed settlement was a valid agreement in
writing and, therefore, D.S. was not emancipated for purposes of
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed
Snodderly’s petition for post-secondary support.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WE CONCUR: