Samantha Flowers v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 11, 2022
DocketAT-315H-16-0752-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Samantha Flowers v. Department of Defense (Samantha Flowers v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Samantha Flowers v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SAMANTHA NI’COLE FLOWERS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-315H-16-0752-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: May 11, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Samantha Ni’Cole Flowers, Indian Head, Maryland, pro se.

Christopher Midgley, Fort Lee, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she has a statutory right of appeal as an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND ¶2 Effective November 17, 2015, the agency appointed the appellant to a competitive-service position as a Sales Store Checker. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 10-14. Less than 1 year later, effective July 29, 2016, the agency terminated her employment during her probationary period for misconduct. Id. at 27-31. The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her termination. IAF, Tab 1. ¶3 The administrative judge issued an order setting forth the law applicable to the question of the Board’s jurisdiction and ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument showing that her appeal was within the Board’ s jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant did not respond to the order. The agency responded to the order and moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tabs 7-8. Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to raise nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction because she did not 3

allege that her termination was based on conditions arising prior to her appointment or that it was based on partisan political reasons or marital status discrimination. ID at 2-3. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has opposed the appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An appellant has the burden of establishing that the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). A probationary employee in the competitive service has a limited regulatory right of appeal. See 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. If such a person is terminated for reasons that arose after her appointment, as was the appellant, she may appeal to the Board only if she raises a nonfrivolous claim that her termination was based on partisan political reasons or marital status. 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b). ¶6 The administrative judge correctly determined that the Board lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 because the appellant did not allege that her termination was due to discrimination on the basis of marital status or partisan political affiliation. ID at 3. Although on review the appellant explains that she failed to respond to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order because she was confused about the Board’s process, she does not dispute any of the administrative judge’s findings or offer any evidence or argument raising nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. ¶7 A probationary employee also may appeal her termination to the Board if she meets the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). See McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1340-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The definition of “employee” includes an individual in the competitive 4

service (i) who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment; or (ii) except as provided in section 1599e of title 10, 2 who has completed 1 year of current continuous service under other than a tempo rary appointment limited to 1 year or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). ¶8 The appellant does not dispute that she was serving a probationary period at the time of her termination. IAF, Tab 1 at 1. She also had completed less than 1 year of current continuous service when she was terminated. IAF, Tab 7 at 10-14, 27-31. Although the record reflects that the appellant had prior Federal service from November 9, 2009, to February 2, 2012, IAF, Tab 7 at 32-35, such service does not count towards the 1-year current continuous service requirement because there was a break in service, see, e.g., Claiborne v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 118 M.S.P.R. 491, ¶ 6 (2012) (stating that current continuous service means a period of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a break in Federal civilian employment of a workday). Thus, the appellant does not satisfy the definition of employee set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A).

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Ann M. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force
307 F.3d 1339 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Samantha Flowers v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/samantha-flowers-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2022.