Sam v. Berryhill

• Court: District Court, S.D. Alabama
• Decided: August 27, 2018
• Docket: 1:17-cv-00422
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION JASON M. SAM, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-00422-N ) NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jason M. Sam brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 12, 13) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 11) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument held March 28, 2018, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings.1

1 With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 20, 21). I. Background On August 5, 2015, Sam filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), alleging disability beginning June

12, 2010.2 After his application was initially denied, Sam requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, which was held on April 18, 2017. On May 5, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Sam’s application, finding him not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 12 – 23). The Commissioner’s decision on Sam’s application became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied his

request for review of the ALJ’s decision on August 17, 2017. (R. 1 – 5). Sam subsequently filed this action under § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him

of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262

2 “Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 49 Stat. 620, as amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (1982 ed., Supp. III).” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). “For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or before the last date for which she were insured.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) (2005)). (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”). II. Standards of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d

1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by

substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a

reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.”).3 “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must…tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the

3 Nevertheless, “[m]aking district courts dig through volumes of documents and transcripts would shift the burden of sifting from petitioners to the courts. With a typically heavy caseload and always limited resources, a district court cannot be expected to do a petitioner’s work for him.” Chavez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceedings). “[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record,” id., and “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it…’ ” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (ellipsis added). Generally, claims of error not raised in the district court are deemed waived. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised in the district court…Because Stewart did not present any of his assertions in the district court, we decline to consider them on appeal.” (applying rule in appeal of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)); Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161 (same); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 651 F. App'x 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 671 F. App'x 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As a general rule, we do not consider arguments that have not been fairly presented to a respective agency or to the district court. See Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating as waived a challenge to the administrative law judge’s reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert that was ‘not raise[d] . . . before the administrative agency or the district court’).”); In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Practices & Flight Attendant Weight Program Litig., 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a party hopes to preserve a claim, argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.”); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying In re Pan American World Airways in Social Security appeal). [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). See also McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) (“We are constrained to conclude that the administrative agency here…reached the result

that it did by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record. In such circumstances we cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence. The review must take into account and evaluate the record as a whole.”). However, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the

[Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’

42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the

proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,

1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). Eligibility for DIB…requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. §[] 423(a)(1)(E)…A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §[] 423(d)(1)(A)…

Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

4 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)- (v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5 “These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”).

5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual steps of this five-step sequential evaluation. If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the

claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v.

Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a

claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted). When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But “when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, “when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look

only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). III. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision At Step One, the ALJ determined that Sam met the applicable insured status requirements through March 31, 2011, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 12, 2010, the alleged disability onset date. (R. 17). At

Step Two, the ALJ determined that Sam had the medically determinable impairments of depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and cannabis abuse, but that he did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments through the date last insured. (R. 17 – 22). Accordingly, the ALJ did not proceed to the subsequent steps of the sequential analysis, and found that Sam was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 22).

IV. Analysis The Social Security regulations provide that, at Step Two if a claimant does “not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” 6 the

6 “[B]asic work activities…mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include— (1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) Capacities for Commissioner “will find that [the claimant] do[es] not have a severe impairment and [is], therefore, not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Even if a severe impairment is found at Step Two, a claimant will still be found not disabled unless

the severe impairment has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. Step two is a threshold inquiry. It allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be rejected. The claimant’s burden at step two is mild. An impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience. Claimant need show only that her impairment is not so slight and its effect is not so minimal. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986). See also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987) (“The severity regulation increases the efficiency and reliability of the evaluation process by identifying at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled even if their age, education, and experience were taken into account.”). “[T]he finding of any severe impairment, whether or not it qualifies as a disability and whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as severe, is enough to satisfy the requirement of step two.” Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). Accord Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App'x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As we have described, step two of the sequential

seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) Use of judgment; (5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). evaluation acts as a ‘screening’ or ‘filter’ to eliminate groundless claims… Accordingly, we have recognized that step two requires only a finding of at least one severe impairment to continue on to the later steps. See Jamison, 814 F.2d at

588.”). Sam argues that the ALJ reversibly erred at Step Two in finding that Sam’s medically determinable mental impairments were not severe.7 Among other record evidence, Sam cites disability ratings made by the Department of Veterans Affairs as supporting a finding that his mental impairments were severe. The ALJ summarized the VA mental disability determinations as follows: In December 2011, the VA assigned [Sam] a 50% disability rating for anxiety disorder, effective May 2003 (Exhibit B9E). In 2015, the VA changed [Sam]’s rating to 50% for major depressive disorder instead of anxiety disorder (Exhibit B11E). (R. 19). However, the ALJ gave the VA ratings “little weight.” (R. 21). Because the undersigned finds the ALJ did not state sufficient cause to discount the VA disability ratings in finding no severe mental impairments, and because this error alone is sufficient to warrant remand for further proceedings, the undersigned declines to address Sam’s other arguments. It is the law of this Circuit that “[a]lthough the V.A.’s disability rating is not binding on the [SSA], it is evidence that should be given great weight.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (providing that other government agency decisions about a person's disability status based on that agency's own rules are not binding on the SSA). It is not disputed that the VA’s “disability” determination relies on

7 The ALJ found that Sam “did not have a severe physical impairment during the adjudication period” (R. 22), and Sam does not dispute that finding here. different criteria than the SSA’s determination.[8] But that does not mean that the ALJ can summarily ignore the VA's determination nor give it “little weight.” Brown-Gaudet-Evans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 673 F. App'x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished).9 The only reasons the ALJ stated for giving “little

8 For example:

For Social Security purposes, a claimant is entitled to disability insurance benefits, when he proves he is under a disability, meaning he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E), (d)(1)(A). In contrast, the VA generally will grant total disability, when “there is present any impairment of mind or body which is sufficient to render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.340(a)(1). Additionally, the VA “shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant,” whenever “there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter.” 38 U.S.C. § 5107. Ostborg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 610 F. App'x 907, 914 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).

9 After Brown-Gaudet-Evans was decided, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 was amended to state: “[I]n claims filed…on or after March 27, 2017, we will not provide any analysis in our determination or decision about a decision made by any other governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or entitled to any benefits. However, we will consider all of the supporting evidence underlying the other governmental agency or nongovernmental entity's decision that we receive as evidence in your claim…” Because Sam’s DIB application was filed in 2015, the current version of § 404.1504 does not apply to it, and the Commissioner is incorrect that “the ALJ was not required to discuss the VA’s decisions, under the recently-revised regulation in effect at the time of the decision.” (Doc. 13 at 10 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504)). Relying on Hunter v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, 808 F.3d 818 (11th Cir. 2015), the Commissioner also argues that the VA ratings did not deserve special consideration because they “were not medical evidence akin to medical opinions, diagnostic scans/tests, or Plaintiff’s testimony; rather, they were administrative decisions.” (Doc. 13 at 10). In Hunter, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit, noting that a “decision is not evidence any more than evidence is a decision[,]” held that a later favorable Social Security decision “is not evidence for § weight” to the VA disability ratings were that they were not based on Social Security regulations and were not binding on the SSA. (R. 21). While those statements are true, they are also, without more, insufficient as a matter of law to

justify assigning “little weight” to a VA disability determination. The December 2011 VA decision assigned Sam a 50% disability rating for anxiety effective May 6, 2003. (R. 204 – 205). This disability rating covers Sam’s entire adjudication period, and the ALJ expressly found Sam’s anxiety to be a medically determinable impairment. Given that a disability claimant’s burden at

405(g) purposes…” 808 F.3d at 822. It is certainly strange that, under this Circuit’s precedent, a disability determination issued by the VA under different rules and regulations must be treated by the SSA as evidence generally entitled to “great weight,” while a disability determination issued by the SSA under its own rules and regulations is not even “evidence” at all. However, under this Circuit’s prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels[, and thus also this Court,] unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). The holding that a VA rating is entitled to “great weight” long preceded Hunter, see DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The examiner did not give any consideration in his findings to the fact that the VA had rated appellant as 100 percent unemployable although he did mention it in evaluating the evidence. While such a rating is not binding on the Secretary, it is evidence that should be considered and it is entitled to great weight.”); Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.”). Therefore, Hunter cannot overrule prior Circuit precedent regarding the significance of VA ratings, see Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Of course, pre-split or “Old Fifth” decisions…are binding on us, and where two prior panel decisions conflict we are bound to follow the oldest one.” (citation omitted)), and there is no indication that precedent has been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by either the Supreme Court or the en banc Eleventh Circuit. Indeed, as demonstrated by the 2016 Brown-Gaudet-Evans opinion, the Eleventh Circuit has continued to treat that holding as binding even a year after Hunter was issued. Step Two, to show at least one impairment that is not so slight, and its effect not so minimal, that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the claimant’s ability to work, is a “mild” one, and given that VA ratings are generally entitled to

“great weight,” ALJ’s failure to give adequate reasons for discounting Sam’s VA ratings cannot be considered harmless.10 Sam requests that the Commissioner’s decision “be reversed and [Sam] found disabled[,]” and only requests a remand for further proceedings in the alternative. (Doc. 12 at 7). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that a court reviewing an agency decision “is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on

such an inquiry. Rather, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (citation and quotations omitted). In the context of Social Security judicial review specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that generally remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings is warranted where, as here, “the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards.” Davis v. Shalala,

985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir. 1993). While this Court may enter an order “awarding disability benefits where the [Commissioner] has already considered the essential evidence and it is clear that the cumulative effect of the evidence establishes

10 The undersigned expresses no opinion as to whether Sam should ultimately be found to have any severe impairments for purposes of Step Two. disability without any doubt[,]” id., Sam has failed to convince the undersigned that this standard is met here.11 Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision denying

Sam a period of disability and DIB is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this decision. “On remand, the ALJ is not required to give the VA’s disability determination controlling weight. In making his own determination of whether [Sam] is disabled, however, the ALJ must seriously

11 Compare Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The credibility of witnesses is for the Secretary to determine, not the courts…The decision of the Secretary here, however, rests not so much on the credibility of the ‘history of pain; presented by Carnes, as on the adoption of a legal standard improper under Listing 10.10(A). []The record in this case is fully developed and there is no need to remand for additional evidence. Based on the facts adduced below and after application of the proper legal standard, we hold that claimant met the requirements of Listing 10.10(A) as early as 1982.”), with Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“Though we have found that the ALJ erred in his application of the legal standards, at this time we decline to enter an order requiring entitlement to disability benefits. While it is true that the opinions of Drs. Todd and Raybin provide strong evidence of disability, it is at least arguable that the report of Dr. Morse is to the contrary. Consequently, it is appropriate that the evidence be evaluated in the first instance by the ALJ pursuant to the correct legal standards.”), and Hildebrand v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:11-CV-1012-ORL-31, 2012 WL 1854238, at *7 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2012) (“The errors noted here compel a return of the case to the Commissioner to evaluate the evidence and make findings in the first instance. For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that certain of the conclusions of the ALJ were not made in accordance with proper legal standards and are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court does not find that only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence; but that the conclusion that was drawn did not meet the standard of review. Under such a circumstance, it would not be appropriate for this Court to substitute its opinion of the weight to be given the evidence for that of the Commissioner. While the Court has the power to do just that in an appropriate case, the Court finds this is not such a case.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:11-CV-1012-ORL-31, 2012 WL 1854249 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2012). consider and closely scrutinize the VA’s disability determination and must give specific reasons if the ALJ discounts that determination.” Brown-Gaudet-Evans, 673 F. App'x at 904 (citing Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. Unit

A Mar. 25, 1981)). V. Conclusion In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision denying Sam’s application for a period of disability and DIB, made final by the Appeals Council’s denial of review on August 17, 2017, is REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings consistent with

this decision. This remand under sentence four of § 405(g) makes Sam a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Sam be awarded Social Security benefits on the subject application following this remand, the Court

hereby grants Sam’s counsel an extension of time in which to file a motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after the date of receipt of a notice of award of benefits from the SSA.12 Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c), “the date

12 See Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) applies to a § 406(b) attorney's fee claim.”); Blitch v. Astrue, 261 F. App'x 241, 242 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“In Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006), we suggested the best practice for avoiding confusion about the integration of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) of receipt of notice … shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary.” If multiple award notices are issued, the time for filing a § 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of receipt of

the latest-dated notice. Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. DONE and ORDERED this the 27th day of August 2018. /s/ Katherine P. Nelson KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

into the procedural framework of a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is for a plaintiff to request and the district court to include in the remand judgment a statement that attorneys fees may be applied for within a specified time after the determination of the plaintiff's past due benefits by the Commission. 454 F.3d at 1278 n.2.”).