Salzer v. United States
This text of 300 F. 764 (Salzer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
(after stating the facts as above). 1 This case is not covered by the Tucker Act (24 Stat. 505); exclusive jurisdiction having been conferred upon this court under section 1 of the War Risk Insurance Act of May 20, 1918, c. 77 (Comp. St. 1918 Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514kk), U. S. v. Pfitsch (June 1, 1921) 256 U. S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 569, 65 L. Ed. 1084,
2. The question raised by these cases is to whom, under the statute regulations, application, and certificate, relevant sections of which arc noted in the margin,1 the monthly installments of the original uncon[766]*766verted war risk term insurance falling due after the death of the named beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the insured are payable. In other words, who is such person or persons within the permitted class of beneficiaries as would, under the laws of New York, be entitled to the insured’s personal property in case of intestacy?
For the reasons stated by Judge Witmer in Cassarello v. United States (D. C.) 271 Fed. 486, affirmed (C. C. A.) 279 Fed. 396, the named beneficiary has no vested interest in the insurance, and the estate of, or those claiming under, the named beneficiary thereby acquire no interest in the installments falling due after the beneficiary’s death. It happens, however, in the instant case, that the named beneficiary is also the identical person to whom the insurance would have been payable if no beneficiary had been named. It may be conceded that naming the wife as beneficiary does not lessen any interest that her estate would have in the installments accruing after her death, had some one else been named as beneficiary, or had no beneficiary been designated. The real question is: Does the person who at the death of the insured would take his personal property in case of intestacy acquire a vested interest in all subsequent installments, even though a designated beneficiary acquires no such vested interest?
It seems clear to me that this is not the proper construction of the act. Prior to the amendment of December 24, 1919 (41 Stat. 371), the insurance was payable only to certain classes. If in this case the wife, as the person entitled to her husband’s estate on intestacy, took at his death a vested interest in the installments payable after her own death, then the installments might go to persons not within the designated classes. Plaintiff endeavors to avoid this conclusion by admitting that only such representatives of the wife as would come within the permitted class of beneficiaries could take. There is, however, in my judgment, nothing in the act prior to the amendment of December 24, 1919, which justifies such construction. The person entitled to tire insurance, whether on the death or in the absence of a named beneficiary, must trace his claim directly from the insured.
[767]*767It is unnecessary in this case to determine whether the installments falling due after the death of a named beneficiary become payable to the person then living and within the permitted class who, at the time of the actual death of the insured would have been entitled to his personal property on intestacy, or to the person then living who would have been so entitled if the insured had died at the time of the later death of the named beneficiary. All that it is necessary to determine here is that, on the death of the named beneficiary, subsequent installments are not payable to any one who, under the laws of the state of the insured’s residence, would not be entitled to his personal property on intestacy, except only as provided by section 15 of the amendment of December 24, 1919 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 514vv[1] ), not here applicable.
Judgment in each case for the defendant.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
300 F. 764, 1922 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 987, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/salzer-v-united-states-nysd-1922.