FILED Apr 14 2025, 8:35 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Salvador A. Jones, Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
April 14, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-1102 Appeal from the Floyd Circuit Court The Honorable Justin B. Brown, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 22C01-2109-F5-1582
Opinion by Judge Mathias Judges Foley and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 1 of 29 Mathias, Judge.
[1] Salvador A. Jones appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony robbery. Jones
raises eight issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the
following five issues:
1. Whether Jones properly invoked his right to be tried within 180 days under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”).
2. Whether Jones’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution attached prior to his initial hearing before an Indiana judicial officer, and whether his right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution attached prior to Indiana officials taking custody over him.
3. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it permitted the State to use self-authenticating affidavits as part of the foundation for the admissibility of surveillance videos and photographs.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of certain evidence.
5. Whether Jones’s six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Between April 2 and April 22, 2021, three banks were robbed in or near
Louisville, Kentucky. In each robbery, a black man around 5’7” or 5’8” and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 2 of 29 170 to 200 pounds entered the bank wearing a face mask and a dark hoodie
with the hood up. In the last two, the robber handed a written note to the tellers
demanding cash. In each case, the teller surrendered cash and the robber fled
the scene.
[4] In the mid-morning hours of April 29, a black man between 5’6” and 5’9” with
a “medium build” entered a U.S. Bank branch in New Albany. Tr. Vol. 4, p.
65. He was wearing a face mask and a dark hoodie with the hood up. He
handed a note to one of the tellers demanding cash; the teller complied; and he
fled the scene. The next day, a person fitting that description and acting in that
same manner robbed another bank in Louisville. Louisville and New Albany
detectives coordinated their investigations and identified a black Toyota Venza
as a vehicle common to the proximity of all but one of the banks near the times
they were robbed.
[5] On May 5, a person matching the descriptions from the other robberies entered
another bank in Louisville, handed the teller a note demanding cash, received
cash, and fled the scene. Responding Louisville law enforcement officers
immediately put out an alert for a black Toyota Venza. Indian Hills Police
Department Officer William Duncan was driving his patrol vehicle to the bank
in response to the robbery when he received the alert for a black Toyota Venza.
He immediately observed a vehicle matching that description heading in the
direction opposite from the bank.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 3 of 29 [6] Officer Duncan began to follow the Venza, which, after some very careful
operation, 1 “t[ook] off at a very high rate of speed.” Tr. Vol. 5, p. 17. Officer
Duncan lost sight of the Venza. However, a report on the Venza’s license plate
number revealed that the vehicle was registered to Nikira Gibbs, Jones’s wife.
[7] Kentucky officers went to Gibbs’s residential address and encountered her
standing near the street with her cell phone. Prior to the arrival of the officers,
Jones had called Gibbs and instructed her to report the Venza as a stolen
vehicle; she was in the process of making that report when officers arrived at
her residence. Officers showed her photographs of the suspected robber, and
Gibbs had “an emotional response” but did not explicitly say the suspect was
Jones. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 120. She did identify the Venza in the photographs as hers.
[8] A few days later, officers obtained a warrant to “ping” Jones’s cell phone; that
ping showed that he was in Nashville, Tennessee. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 208. When
Tennessee law enforcement officers located Jones, he was wearing a wig.
Louisville Metro Police Department Officer Benjamin Dean interviewed Jones
while he was in the custody of Tennessee law enforcement; in that interview,
Jones confessed to having robbed the Kentucky banks, but, when asked “if he
1 The officer testified as follows:
Q [by the State:] Okay. And how is that vehicle being operated? A We are doing the speed limit. He’s using his turn signals the whole time. Q Is that normal for . . . traffic in that area? A No, ma’am. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 16.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 4 of 29 had committed any robberies outside of Louisville,” Jones responded that “he
had never been to New Albany.” Id. at 216. Officer Dean noted that he had
“never mentioned New Albany.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 211. Jones also informed
officers on where to find the Venza, which officers had not yet located. 2 And, in
ensuing phone calls made from a jail, Jones relayed details about several of the
robberies that were not publicly known. Officers also obtained, via a search
warrant, Jones’s historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”). The CSLI
placed Jones near the New Albany bank at the time of its robbery.
[9] In September 2021, the State charged Jones in relevant part with Level 5 felony
robbery. At that time, Jones was incarcerated in federal prison in Kentucky and
facing federal charges for the Kentucky robberies. Jones was later found guilty
of those offenses and remanded into federal custody.
[10] While in federal custody, Jones sent letters to the Floyd County prosecutor and
trial court requesting disposition of the State’s charge against him. However, he
did not submit an IAD request to any of his custodial officials. On April 20,
2023, the Floyd County prosecutor sent an IAD detainer request to officials at
the federal prison in custody of Jones. 3 Jones was then officially informed of the
detainer and his rights under the IAD. On November 13, Indiana officials took
2 In the one robbery in which the Venza was not identified in nearby surveillance videos, Jones stated that he had taken a bus to and from the bank. 3 It is not clear whether the detainer request occurred on April 20 or April 28, 2023. The prosecutor appears to have made the request on April 20. Ex. Vol. 8, p. 19. But the Federal Bureau of Prisons recorded the request as “lodged . . . on April 28, 2023.” Id. at 26. We use the April 20 date in this opinion. The difference is immaterial to our analyses.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 5 of 29 custody over Jones, and he had his initial hearing before the trial court the next
day.
[11] On November 15, Jones moved to dismiss the State’s charge against him as
untimely under the IAD, which the trial court denied. The court then held
Jones’s trial in May 2024, and a jury found him guilty of Level 5 felony
robbery. The trial court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Jones
accordingly.
[12] This appeal ensued.
1. Jones did not properly invoke his right under the IAD to be brought to trial within 180 days of the State’s detainer request. [13] On appeal, Jones first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to dismiss because he was not timely brought to trial under the IAD.
This issue presents us with questions of law we review de novo. E.g., State v.
Robinson, 863 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. As our
Supreme Court has made clear, the “procedures [of the IAD] are not mere
technicalities and . . . require[] strict compliance.” State v. Greenwood, 665
N.E.2d 579, 582 (Ind. 1996).
[14] As we have explained:
both Indiana and Kentucky are parties to the IAD. In relevant part, this statute provides that
[w]henever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 6 of 29 party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint.
[Ind. Code] § 35-33-10-4 (emphasis added). . . . Once a detainer is filed, the defendant may file a request for final disposition, which triggers the requirement that he be brought to trial within 180 days. . . .
Robinson, 863 N.E.2d at 896. Thus, the “filing of a formal detainer” is a
prerequisite to a defendant being able to “avail himself of the 180-day time limit
set forth in the IAD.” Id. at 897.
[15] Here, much of Jones’s argument relies on documents that predate the Floyd
County prosecutor’s formal detainer request on April 20, 2023. See Appellant’s
Br. at 18-20. But those documents are of no moment because it is the filing of
the detainer that activates the ability of the defendant to then avail himself of the
180-day time limit. Id. at 896-97. We therefore decline to consider the
documents Jones relies on that predate April 20, 2023.
[16] Jones also relies on letters he wrote on May 12 and May 19, 2023, which he
sent directly to the trial court’s clerk and which were filed to the trial court’s
docket on May 30. But the IAD states that a defendant who desires to avail
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 7 of 29 himself of the 180-day time limit “shall” send that request “to the warden,
commissioner of correction[,] or other official having custody of him,” and that
official shall, in turn, submit it with proper certification to the prosecuting
official and the appropriate court. I.C. § 35-33-10-4(3)(b). Our Supreme Court
has expressly held that that language means that the defendant cannot simply
deliver his request to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court; he
must deliver it through his custodial authority. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d at 581-
82. Jones did not deliver either his May 12 request or his May 19 request
through his custodial authority; he therefore cannot rely on those requests.
[17] Jones also asserts that he submitted one of his pre-April 20 requests to his
custodial authority, and, thus, his custodial authority erred in stating that Jones
had not invoked his 180-day request with federal officials. But Jones is again
mistaken when he relies on a pre-April 20 request, and he has submitted no
evidence of a post-April 20 request that he provided to his custodial authority.
[18] Finally, Jones argues that we are being “hyper-technical” in our reading and
application of the IAD when, across time, he did give his custodial authority,
the prosecutor, and the court notice of his desire to be tried within 180 days.
Appellant’s Br. at 24. But Jones’s argument is contrary to law. Again, the
“procedures [of the IAD] are not mere technicalities and . . . require[] strict
compliance.” Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d at 582. Jones seeks to avoid strict
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 8 of 29 compliance for a “broader and more liberal” approach under the IAD.
Appellant’s Br. at 25. We reject his theory of relief on this issue. 4
2. Neither Jones’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor his Article 1, Section 13 right to counsel attached prior to November 2023. [19] Jones next asserts that, in his May 12, 2023, letter to the trial court, he
requested the appointment of counsel, which he did not receive. Jones thus
argues that the trial court denied him his right to counsel under both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the
Indiana Constitution when the court did not immediately appoint him counsel
pursuant to that request, which he contends was prejudicial to him as he could
have used the assistance of legal counsel to properly navigate the IAD process.
We review such questions de novo. E.g., Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1033
(Ind. 2024).
[20] But we initially address the State’s assertion that Jones’s singular right-of-
counsel analysis in his brief, which encompasses both of his arguments under
the United States and Indiana Constitutions, is insufficient to preserve both
issues. See Appellee’s Br. at 32 n.6. Our case law lacks clarity on the issues
presented by Jones, and the State’s responsive brief, which addresses the merits
of Jones’s arguments but does not recognize the threshold questions we address
4 The State also argues that Jones was timely brought to trial under Indiana Code section 35-33-10-4(4). Jones does not suggest otherwise in his brief on appeal, and we therefore do not consider that question.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 9 of 29 below, proves the point. We therefore decline to resolve either of Jones’s right-
to-counsel arguments under a theory of waiver and instead decide them
separately on their merits. E.g., Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491-92 (Ind.
2023) (reaching the merits of an argument that was omitted by the parties
because “their omissions illustrate a larger, confusing trend in Indiana
caselaw”).
2.1. There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Indiana prior to the initial hearing before an Indiana judicial officer.
[21] The trial court was not obliged under the Sixth Amendment to appoint counsel
for Jones in response to his May 12, 2023, request. The Supreme Court of the
United States has made clear that “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance
before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty
is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that
trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Rothgery v.
Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
[22] Here, at the time he sent the May 12, 2023, request, Jones was in federal
custody in Kentucky. He did not have his initial hearing before the Indiana trial
court on the Indiana charge until November 14, 2023. Therefore, Jones’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel on the Indiana charge did not exist prior to
November 14, 2023. Id.
[23] We acknowledge that, in Winston v. State, 263 Ind. 8, 11-12, 323 N.E.2d 228,
230 (1975), our Supreme Court interpreted a plurality opinion of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 10 of 29 Court of the United States in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684, 688 (1972)
(plurality opinion), to say that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
in Indiana upon the filing of an information. But the Court in Rothgery made
clear that that is incorrect. 554 U.S. at 202-03. The Rothgery Court concluded
that the concern for when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches is not
when charges are formally filed but when “the government has committed itself
to prosecute, the adverse positions of government and defendant have
solidified, and the accused finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society[] and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law.” Id. at 198 (cleaned up). The Court concluded that
that happens at the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer, which
is also when the vast majority of the States, including Indiana, “take the first
step toward appointing counsel.” Id. at 203-04 & 204 n.14 (citing, inter alia, I.C.
§§ 35-33-7-5, -6 (West 2004)).
[24] Thus, Rothgery has superseded our Supreme Court’s interpretation in Winston as
to when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches in Indiana. We are, of
course, obliged to follow Rothgery on this question of federal law. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err under the Sixth Amendment when it did not appoint
counsel for Jones prior to the November 14, 2023, initial hearing because
Jones’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached prior to that date.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 11 of 29 2.2. There is no Article 1, Section 13 right to counsel prior to the defendant being in the custody of Indiana officials.
[25] We thus consider whether Jones’s May 12, 2023, request required the trial court
to appoint him counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution.
Whether Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution applies to a
defendant who is in the custody of foreign officials and engaged in the IAD
process is a question of first impression for Indiana’s courts.
[26] Article 1, Section 13 provides in relevant part that, “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be heard by himself and
counsel . . . .” As our Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he right to counsel
protections afforded through Article 1, Section 13[] . . . are sometimes broader
than those flowing from the Sixth Amendment—particularly in the context of
invocation of the right and when the right attaches.” Jewell v. State, 957 N.E.2d
625, 633-34 (Ind. 2011). With respect to when the right attaches, our Supreme
Court has “long recognized” that it is the “right of an accused in this state to
have counsel at all critical stages following the point of arrest.” 5 Sims v. State, 274
Ind. 495, 501, 413 N.E.2d 556, 559-60 (1980) (emphasis added); 6 see also Jewell,
957 N.E.2d at 634 (citing cases).
5 Our Supreme Court has used “arrest,” “detained,” and “custody” interchangeably in this context. See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 388-89, 391 (Ind. 2022). 6 At least five Indiana and federal opinions refer to our Supreme Court’s 1980 opinion in Sims as having been overruled on other grounds by our Supreme Court’s 1995 opinion in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 1995). See Jones v. Brown, 756 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014); M.D. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 301, 305 (Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 12 of 29 [27] Jones’s argument under Article 1, Section 13 is premised on his assertion that
that right to counsel attaches at the filing of an information. Appellant’s Br. at
27. In support of his premise, Jones cites only a plurality opinion of our
Supreme Court in Hoy v. State, 225 Ind. 428, 432-34, 75 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1947)
(plurality opinion). But nothing in either that plurality opinion or the separate
opinion concurring in the result (which had the vote of three Justices) declares
that the right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 attaches upon the filing of
an information. To the contrary, as our Supreme Court made clear in Sims, the
right attaches at the “point of arrest.” 413 N.E.2d at 559-60. Indeed, our
Supreme Court has recognized several occasions in which the right to counsel
under Article 1, Section 13 applies after an arrest and prior to the filing of an
information. See, e.g., Jewell, 957 N.E.2d at 634; see also Pirtle v. State, 163 Ind.
16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975).
[28] But what our Supreme Court has never held is that the Article 1, Section 13
right to counsel attaches upon a defendant’s arrest and custody in a foreign
jurisdiction. And Jones provides no argument on appeal as to how it would be
possible to even implement such a holding. We therefore conclude that the right
2018); Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 957 (Ind. 2009); Posso v. State, 180 N.E.3d 326, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021); Miller v. State, 846 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. That is not correct. Our Supreme Court’s 1980 opinion in Sims reversed the defendant’s conviction under Article 1, Section 13 and remanded for a new trial. 413 N.E.2d at 560. After the retrial, the defendant again appealed and again ended up before our Supreme Court, and, in the second appeal, our Supreme Court discussed jury instructions on possible lesser included offenses. Sims v. State, 456 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. 1983). It is the 1983 opinion’s discussion of lesser included offenses, not any part of the 1980 opinion, that our Supreme Court overruled in Wright. See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 570 (citing Sims, 456 N.E.2d at 388).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 13 of 29 to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 attaches at the “point of arrest” by an
Indiana official. Here, that means the point at which Indiana obtained physical
custody over Jones, which was at the conclusion of the IAD process on
November 13, 2023. He therefore had no right to counsel under Article 1,
Section 13 prior to that moment, and the trial court did not err under the
Indiana Constitution when it did not act on Jones’s May 12, 2023, request.
2.3. The critical-stage analyses argued by the parties are not applicable where the right to counsel has not attached.
[29] The parties’ right-to-counsel arguments on appeal focus on the right to counsel
during a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. Appellant’s Br. at 27-29;
Appellee’s Br. at 31-35. But the critical-stage question under both the United
States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution is a post-attachment question.
See Rothgery, 554 U.S. 211-12; Sims, 413 N.E.2d 559-60. That is, once the right
to counsel has attached, a defendant must be afforded counsel at all critical
stages of the proceeding after that attachment. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. 211-12;
Sims, 413 N.E.2d 559-60. There is, legally at least, no such thing under either
constitutional provision as a critical stage of a criminal proceeding prior to the
attachment of the right to counsel. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. 211-12; Sims, 413
N.E.2d 559-60. Accordingly, the parties’ arguments on appeal are nonstarters
as neither of Jones’s constitutional rights to counsel attached prior to the
conclusion of the IAD process.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 14 of 29 3. The trial court did not commit fundamental error when it permitted the State to use self-authenticating affidavits as part of the foundation for the admissibility of surveillance videos and photographs. [30] During Jones’s jury trial on the Level 5 felony robbery charge, the State sought
to admit certain surveillance videos and related photographs from businesses
near the New Albany bank into evidence. As part of the foundation for that
evidence, the State relied on self-authenticating affidavits. See Ind. Evidence
Rule 902(11). Jones objected to those affidavits only on the ground that they
lacked trustworthiness. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 128.
[31] However, on appeal Jones furthers no argument on the trustworthiness ground
he asserted at trial. Instead, he now contends that the State did not give him
sufficient written notice of its intent to rely on the self-authenticating affidavits.
See Evid. R. 902(11). As this was not the basis for Jones’s objection to the
affidavits in the trial court, he has not preserved this argument for appellate
review. See Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. 2010) (“A party may
not add to or change his grounds for objections in the reviewing court.”).
[32] Thus, on appeal, Jones must demonstrate fundamental error in the State’s use
of the affidavits. To demonstrate fundamental error, an appellant must show
that the alleged error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant
violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable
and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind.
2018) (emphases added; quotation marks omitted). Fundamental error is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 15 of 29 “extremely narrow” and “encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge
should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Id. (emphasis added;
quotation marks omitted). Further, if the trial judge “could recognize a viable
reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not blatant
enough to constitute fundamental error.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[33] Our Supreme Court has expressly limited the reach of the fundamental-error
doctrine in claims of allegedly improper evidence:
improperly seized evidence is frequently highly relevant, [and] its admission ordinarily does not cause us to question guilt. That is the case here. The only basis for questioning [the defendant’s] conviction lies not in doubt as to whether [he] committed these crimes[] but rather in a challenge to the integrity of the judicial process. . . . Here, there is no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance on the part of the investigating officers and no contention that the evidence is not what it appears to be. In short, the claimed error does not rise to the level of fundamental error.
Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (emphasis added). We see no
reason why a different rule should apply to affidavits that are used to establish a
foundation for the admissibility of evidence.
[34] However, aside from simply saying so, Jones presents no argument supported
by cogent reasoning as to how the State’s use of the self-authenticating
affidavits made a fair trial impossible or was a blatant due-process violation. He
does not suggest on appeal that the affidavits were “not what [they] appear[ed]
to be.” Id. He simply asserts that he should have had more time to look over the
affidavits before the trial court relied on them. That is not a basis for Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 16 of 29 fundamental error. See Nix v. State, 158 N.E.3d 795, 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)
(“Nix’s argument on this issue would turn fundamental error from a rare
exception to the general rule for appellate review.”), trans. denied. Accordingly,
we reject Jones’s challenge to the self-authenticating affidavits.
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of the evidence. [35] We next consider Jones’s several challenges to the trial court’s admission of
certain evidence. A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of
evidence, and its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Hall v.
State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only if the trial
court’s ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before it and the errors affect a party’s substantial rights. Id.
4.1. The surveillance videos and photographs.
[36] Jones first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into
evidence, over his objections, surveillance videos and related photographs from
businesses near the U.S. Bank in New Albany at the time of that robbery.
According to Jones, the videos and photographs were inadmissible under
Indiana’s silent-witness doctrine.
[37] Under the silent-witness doctrine, our trial courts may admit videos and
photographs “as substantive rather than demonstrative evidence.” McCallister v.
State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 561 (Ind. 2018). To do so, “there must be a strong
showing of authenticity and competency, including proof that the evidence was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 17 of 29 not altered.” Id. at 561-62. That is, “there must be adequate proof of the
reliability of the process that produced what the photographs” or videos depict.
Stott v. State, 174 N.E.3d 236, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
[38] As we have explained:
[Indiana’s case law] addressing surveillance footage or images derived from that footage under the silent-witness theory establish[es] that the evidence may be admissible when there is testimony from someone with knowledge on the security system that produced the video or image, on the integrity of the system’s process, and on whether video or image was altered. For example, in McCallister v. State, our supreme court found that testimony from a hotel manager authenticated “a DVD purporting to show surveillance video” of a hotel lobby by describing how the security system operated, by verifying the accuracy of the time-and-date stamp on the footage, and by indicating that the video showed what it purported to show. 91 N.E.3d at 561-62. Similarly, in Flowers v. State, the security director for a company that owned an apartment complex authenticated surveillance footage from the complex as well as several images derived from that footage “in several important respects.” 154 N.E.3d 854, 869-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The director’s testimony established that he was intimately familiar with the type of system in place, including how it worked, where the cameras were placed, and how the cameras operated. Id. at 869-70. He also accessed the footage multiple times and signed and dated the DVD to which the video had been saved. Id. at 870. Likewise, in Rogers v. State, a CVS supervisor authenticated surveillance footage and images derived from that footage through extensive testimony “regarding CVS’s security system and the procedure he used to view, copy, and edit the footage.” 902 N.E.2d 871, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 18 of 29 Id. We have also acknowledged the importance of an appropriate foundation
for such evidence given that “it is increasingly easier in today’s digital age to
manipulate or distort images.” Id. at 247.
[39] As the State notes in its brief, all of the videos and photographs Jones now
challenges were supported by the self-authenticating affidavits we discussed in
part 3, supra. See Ex. Vol. 9, pp. 246-50; Ex. Vol. 10, pp. 2-15. And Jones does
not assert that those self-authenticating affidavits were insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the silent-witness doctrine. Indeed, Jones’s argument on this
issue disregards the self-authenticating affidavits altogether, which we
understand to mean that he has premised the viability of this argument on his
theory that the self-authenticating affidavits should have been excluded under
the fundamental-error doctrine. As we explained above, Jones’s challenge to the
self-authenticating affidavits under the fundamental-error doctrine fails. And,
therefore, so does his derivative argument that the videos and photographs were
not supported by a sufficient foundation under the silent-witness doctrine.
4.2. Evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies.
[40] Jones also asserts that the trial court erred under Indiana Evidence Rules 403
and 404(b) when it admitted into evidence testimony and exhibits relating to the
Kentucky bank robberies.7 Jones challenged the evidence in question under
7 Specifically, this evidence consisted of witness testimony and exhibits relating to the April 2, 2021, robbery; witness testimony and exhibits relating to the April 8, 2021, robbery; a transcript of prior testimony relating to the April 22, 2021, robbery; a transcript of prior testimony and associated exhibits relating to the April 30,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 19 of 29 those Rules during pretrial conferences, and, at the close of the final pretrial
conference, the court informed Jones that it would “note your continuous and
ongoing objection” to that evidence. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 207. Further, during the start
of Jones’s second day of trial, the court reiterated that Jones’s continuing
objection to the evidence was still in effect and would remain so “throughout
trial.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 130. We therefore address Jones’s challenge to this
evidence on the merits. 8
[41] As our Supreme Court has explained:
Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants. The Rule’s mandate is clear: a court may not admit evidence of another crime, wrong, or act “to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). This restriction prevents the jury from indulging in the “forbidden inference” that a criminal defendant’s prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.
But Rule 404(b) does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts evidence—only its use as character evidence. Indeed, the Rule
2021, robbery; witness testimony and video evidence relating to the May 5, 2021, robbery; and witness testimony and supporting exhibits from investigating Kentucky law enforcement officers. 8 The State is correct that, during trial, Jones informed the court that he had “[n]o objection” to some parts of the body of evidence the State introduced relating to the Kentucky robberies. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 89, 94, 142-43, 147-48. And the State is also correct that our Court has, on several occasions, stated that an assertion of “[n]o objection” forfeits the protections of a previously recognized continuing objection. See, e.g., Hostetler v. State, 184 N.E.3d 1240, 1245-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. However, we need not parse the record here between preserved issues and forfeited ones. The trial court admitted all of the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies under the same rationale, and, thus, our review of that decision applies equally to all of that evidence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 20 of 29 plainly states that other-bad-acts evidence may be admissible for other purposes, and it provides an illustrative list—to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). So when the State claims that other-bad-acts evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court is tasked with deciding whether that evidence is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act.
If the evidence passes that relevance test, it has to clear a second hurdle: Indiana Evidence Rule 403’s balancing test. In applying Rule 403, the trial court must conclude that the evidence’s probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice—otherwise, the evidence is not admissible.
Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up).
[42] Here, the State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence relating to
the Kentucky robberies was relevant under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception. 9
As we have summarized:
Evidence of other crimes admitted under the identity exception [is] generally evaluated based upon whether such crimes are “‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.” Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997). The rationale behind this exception “is that the crimes, or means used to commit them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them.” Id. (citing Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. 1993)). While the “signature crime”
9 The trial court instructed the jury that the evidence of the Kentucky bank robberies was admissible only for the purposes of establishing Jones’s identity. The court further ordered the parties to omit all references to Jones’s convictions for those robberies.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 21 of 29 test focuses on similarity and uniqueness between the charged and uncharged conduct, we note that in addition courts have long considered “whether or not the evidence is so specifically and significantly related to the charged crime in time, place and circumstance as to be logically relevant to one of the particular excepted purposes.” Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1346 (Ind. 1982) (citing Montgomery v. State, 274 Ind. 544, 548, 412 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1980), reh’g denied; Duvose v. State, 257 Ind. 450, 451, 275 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1971)). Both “the timing and similarity of the incidents are factors in the larger inquiry into whether the incidents were relevant to a matter in issue.” Hicks[ v. State], 690 N.E.2d [215,] 222 [(Ind. 1997)].
Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphases added),
trans. denied.
[43] Jones argues that the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies was not
admissible under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception because there was nothing
about the manner in which any of the instant robberies occurred that rose to the
level of a “signature crime.” See Appellant’s Br. at 36-40. To paraphrase Jones’s
argument, there is nothing about a man of average height and build in a hoodie
handing a note demanding cash to a teller that distinguishes any of the instant
robberies from any other run-of-the-mill robbery.
[44] But the signature-crime test is a subset of Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception, not
the whole of it. Bishop, 40 N.E.3d at 952-53 (quoting Thompson, 690 N.E.2d at
234). And the State can rely on Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception without
establishing the requirements of a signature crime if “the evidence is so
specifically and significantly related to the charged crime in time, place and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 22 of 29 circumstance as to be logically relevant.” Id. at 952 (quoting Malone, 441
N.E.2d at 1346).
[45] Jones does not argue on appeal that the evidence of the Kentucky robberies fails
to satisfy the “time, place[,] and circumstance” logical-relevancy test. See id.; see
also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). And we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in any event. All of the Kentucky robberies were within
about one month of each other, with the New Albany robbery in between them.
All of the Kentucky robberies were in or near Louisville, with the New Albany
robbery a short distance away across the Ohio River. And Jones admitted to
having committed the Kentucky robberies, which, regardless of whether they
were committed in a “signature” way, were committed in the same way as the
New Albany robbery. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence of the Kentucky robberies under Evidence Rule 404(b)(2).
[46] And neither did the court err under Rule 403. The evidence was highly relevant,
and, while it was undoubtedly prejudicial, it was not unfairly prejudicial. See
Evid. R. 403; see also Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 179 (Ind. 2017). We
therefore affirm the trial court’s admission of the State’s evidence relating to the
Kentucky bank robberies under Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b).
4.3. Transcripts of prior witness testimony.
[47] Jones next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into
evidence transcripts of the testimony of two bank tellers from Jones’s Kentucky
trial. Jones argues that the admission of those transcripts violated his right to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 23 of 29 confront the witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 10 and also constituted inadmissible hearsay. The rule dispositive to
both of those arguments is the same for our purposes: if the witnesses were
unavailable, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the
transcripts. See, e.g., Berkman v. State, 976 N.E.2d 68, 75-76 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied.
[48] There is no dispute that the State issued subpoenas to the two witnesses in
question, Justin Miracle and Karla Humke, both of whom had last known
addresses in Kentucky, on February 23, 2024. There is no dispute that, in doing
so, the State followed the necessary statutory procedures and worked with
Kentucky officials to attempt to serve the subpoenas. And there is no dispute
that Kentucky officials were unable to locate and serve Miracle and Humke
with those subpoenas.
[49] Still, Jones asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the transcripts of those
two prior witnesses’ testimony because the State did not issue the subpoenas
early enough prior to his May 11 trial date. But the State acted in plenty of time
to serve the subpoenas based on known information, and Jones cites no
authority that requires the State to account for potential unknowns in the timing
of issuing a subpoena. We therefore conclude, based on the totality of the
circumstances before it, that the trial court acted within its discretion when it
10 Jones does not argue that his right to face-to-face confrontation under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution was violated.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 24 of 29 determined that Miracle and Humke were unavailable at the trial and admitted
the transcripts of their prior testimony.
4.4. CSLI evidence.
[50] Jones also challenges the trial court’s admission of the State’s CSLI evidence. In
particular, Jones asserts that the CSLI evidence was not properly authenticated;
that the State did not give Jones proper notice under Evidence Rule 902(11) of
the self-authenticating affidavit in support of the CSLI evidence; and that the
State’s witness who testified in support of the CSLI evidence did not rely on a
properly scientific computer program to analyze the CSLI evidence.
[51] Jones’s argument that the CSLI evidence was not properly authenticated is a
nonstarter. He contends that the self-authenticating affidavit in support of the
CSLI evidence was not proper because the affidavit lacked a notary’s signature.
Jones cites no authority that requires a notary’s signature in order for an
affidavit to be used as foundation evidence. And he does not argue that the
affidavit was otherwise insufficient on its face to meet our self-authentication
requirements.
[52] Jones’s argument that the State did not give him proper notice of the self-
authenticating affidavit is likewise meritless. We understand his argument here
to be that the self-authenticating affidavit was signed after the final pretrial
conference, but Jones is simply incorrect. The self-authenticating affidavit was
signed in September 2022 and provided to Jones well before the final pretrial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 25 of 29 conference, which itself was several weeks before his trial. There is no error
here.
[53] Neither did the trial court err when it permitted the State’s witness, Louisville
Metro Police Department Detective Timothy O’Daniel, to testify that Jones’s
CSLI showed that Jones was near the location of the New Albany bank at the
time of its robbery. According to Jones, the trial court erred here because the
mapping program Detective O’Daniel relied on was neither calibrated nor peer
reviewed. Thus, he continues, the “technical and methodological bases for
admitting the cell phone location records were insufficiently sound . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. at 49.
[54] But Jones cites no authority that requires a testifying law enforcement officer
who regularly uses a cell-phone location mapping program to establish—or to
even understand—any calibration or peer-review information for that program
before he may testify to the program’s output. Indeed, the authority Jones relies
on discusses and describes expert testimony under Evidence Rule 702.
However, we have repeatedly recognized that law enforcement officers need
not have an expert-level understanding of cell-phone location mapping
programs and may instead testify “based on [their] specialized training about
general principles” in such matters. McCowan v. State, 10 N.E.3d 522, 533 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014), summarily aff’d in relevant part, 27 N.E.3d 760, 768 (Ind. 2015).
Of course, Jones was free to present his own evidence to the jury challenging
the reliability of the cell-phone location mapping program, but he did not
present any such evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 26 of 29 4.5. Jail phone calls.
[55] Jones’s last evidentiary challenges are to the admission of the recordings of his
jail phone calls. According to Jones, the State’s self-authenticating affidavit in
support of those recordings was insufficient because a notary did not certify the
affidavit or indicate that the affidavit was sworn under oath. As we noted in
part 4.4, supra, there is no notary requirement for self-authenticating affidavits,
and, thus, this argument fails.
[56] Jones also argues that the affidavits were not timely provided to him. But we
agree with the State that Jones has not preserved that argument for our review
because he stated only a different ground for his objection to the recordings at
trial. See Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 220-23. And neither is Jones’s bald claim of
fundamental error on appeal persuasive. There is therefore no error on this
issue.
5. Jones’s six-year sentence is not inappropriate. [57] The last issue in this appeal is whether Jones’s six-year sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this
determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that
come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.
2008).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 27 of 29 [58] Sentence modification under Rule 7(B), however, is reserved for “a rare and
exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per
curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence
imposed by the trial court, and that deference will prevail unless the defendant
demonstrates compelling evidence on appeal that portrays the nature of the
offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality
in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v.
State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[59] Jones’s Level 5 felony conviction carries a sentencing range of one to six years
with an advisory term of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court gave
Jones the maximum term. The trial court relied in notable part on Jones’s
extensive criminal history and that he committed the instant offense while
released on parole.
[60] We affirm Jones’s sentence. Jones is a serial robber. He robbed the New Albany
bank as part of a month-long robbery spree across two states. He has two other
robbery convictions along with several other prior convictions and juvenile
adjudications. And he had been released on parole for six months prior to
engaging in this particular spree of robberies. Jones’s argument for a revised
sentence on appeal is not persuasive, and we reject it.
Conclusion [61] For all of these reasons, we affirm Jones’s conviction and sentence.
[62] Affirmed. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 28 of 29 Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Andrew R. Rutz Law Office of Andrew R. Rutz New Albany, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1102 | April 14, 2025 Page 29 of 29