Salvado Saldana III v. General Motors, LLC

Opinion

JS6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADO SALDANA III, Case No. 2:25-cv-11429-MAR Plaintiff, v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND, DKT. 7

Defendant. I. Plaintiff Salvador Saldana III (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action in Los Angeles County Superior Court on November 4, 2025. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1- 1. Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”) removed the matter to this Court on December 1, 2025. Plaintiff now moves to remand to state court, arguing that Defendant has failed to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 7. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED. II. On November 4, 2025 Plaintiff filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.1 Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1-1 at 1-4. Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a 2023 Chevrolet Traverse that was covered by Defendant’s vehicle warranty. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 11. Plaintiff further alleges that the car developed defects, including “infotainment defects” covered by Defendant’s warranty. Id.¶ 12. Plaintiff also alleges that, although he brought the vehicle in for repairs, Defendant failed to repair the defects within a reasonable number of attempts. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. The Complaint does not state the amount Plaintiff paid for the car, but seeks, among other things, actual damages, restitution, “a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages,” and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 5. On December 1, 2025, Defendant removed the matter to this Court, asserting that “[i]n the last 30 days, GM . . . conducted a preliminary investigation and determined that Plaintiff’s citizenship and the reasonable, non-speculative estimation of the amount in controversy placed at issue through Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly give rise to subject matter jurisdiction.” Dkt. 1 (“Notice of Removal”) at 2. The Notice of Removal asserted that “GM has estimated the purchase price of the subject 2023 Chevrolet Traverse to be $59,513.20,” and that, after “statutorily required deductions,” Plaintiff’s actual damages are approximately $45,632.66. Id. at 5. Plaintiff now moves to remand to state court. District courts have original diversity jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court if the case could have

1 Although Plaintiff’s Motion states that the Complaint also alleges a claim pursuant the federal Magnuson-Moss Warrant Act (Motion, Dkt. 7 at 2:7–8), that does not originally been filed in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The case must, however, be remanded to state court if, at any time before final judgment, it appears that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991). Federal courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” such that any doubt as to the propriety of removal is resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). A removing defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. See Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. IV. Plaintiff contends that Defendant has failed to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Mot. at 5. Defendant must therefore establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the statutory threshold. See Ramirez v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. CV2200734MWFMRWX, 2022 WL 2610247, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2022). Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks, among other things, actual damages, civil penalties, and attorney’s fees. Compl. at 5. “Actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act are equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer, minus the reduction in value directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Lukas v. Gen. Motors, LLC., No. 2:25-CV-08305- WLH-MAA, 2025 WL 3456648, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2025) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)–(C) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff who shows a willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act may recover a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). A prevailing plaintiff is also entitled to attorney’s fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s assertion that “Defendant has presented no evidence of either actual damages or civil penalties” is not entirely accurate. Mot. at 6:8–9. In opposition to the instant motion, GM has submitted (1) Plaintiff’s Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”) (Dkt. 13-2) and (2) a “Repair Order Summary,” listing what appears to be the repair history for Plaintiff’s vehicle. Dkt. 13-3. “Courts routinely find that an undisputed Retail Installment Sales Contract can establish actual damages.” Luna v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-CV-01230-LHK, 2021 WL 4893567, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2021). Using the RISC as a reference point, Defendant here estimates Plaintiff’s damages by starting with the total sale price of $59,513.20. Opp. at 6:27. From that figure, Defendant proceeds to subtract several categories of offsets. Id. at 7. These include not only a mileage offset, discussed in further detail below, but also estimates of (1) the amount Plaintiff has paid toward the vehicle loan to date and (2) the amount Plaintiff is likely to pay toward the loan through this conclusion of this case. Id. As courts have recognized, however, uncertainties regarding payments and finance charges complicate efforts to calculate actual damages. See Tutunik v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-01235-JLS-ADS, 2025 WL 1843229, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025); Luna, 2021 WL 4893567, at *7; Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 21-CV-03032-WHO, 2021 WL 2588977, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021). Accordingly, courts often look to the “total cash price” as the “most appropriate measure of actual damages.” Cabrera v. FCA US LLC, No. EDCV-21- 1501-JGBS, 2022 WL 310133, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022); see also Garrett v. Mercedez-Benz USA, LLC, No. EDCV23223JGBSPX, 2023 WL 2813564, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2023); Luna, 2021 WL 4893567, at *7; Messih, 2021 WL 2588977, at *4. The Court begins, then, with the cash price listed in the RISC and identified by Defendant: $35,115.00. Dkt. 13-2 at 2; Opp. at 7:9. That figure must then be reduced by statutory offsets, such as for mileage attributable to Plaintiff. Lukas, 2025 WL 3456648, at *5. Mileage bears on actual damages insofar as it translates to a reduction in a vehicle’s value attributable to a “buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle . . . for correction of the problem that gave rise to the [warranty dispute].” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). By statute, that reduction in value is calculated “by multiplying the actual price of the new motor vehicle . . . by a fraction having as its denominator 120,000 and having as its numerator the number of miles traveled.” Id. Thus, the higher the mileage, the higher the reduction in value, and the lower a plaintiff’s actual damages. The relevant numerator is the number of miles on the odometer at the time of the “first repair for a nonconformity.” Garett, 2023 WL 2813564, at *3; see also Luna, 2021 WL 4893567, at *7; Messih, 2021 WL 2588977, at *4; Gerber, 2017 WL 2705428, at *3; Alvarado v. Fca US, LLC, No. EDCV17505JGBDTBX, 2017 WL 2495495, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2017). Here, Defendant submits that that figure is 29,121 miles. Opp. at 7:3. As stated above, Plaintiff asserts that this figure is not grounded in evidence. Reply at 2. As also stated above, Plaintiff is incorrect that “Defendant offers nothing to assert a mileage offset.” Id. at 2:10. Plaintiff accurately contends, however , that Defendant “does not point to any specific defect, much less the date or mileage of the first repair attempt, from which a mileage offset could even be calculated.” Id. at 2:22–24. The Repair Order Summary submitted by Defendant lacks crucial details. Although it does list various service dates and corresponding odometer readings, in each instance the “Repair Order Type” is listed only as “Service.” Dkt. 13-3. There is no indication of the nature of any service performed or even of the specific issue a particular repair order was intended to address.2 Id.

2 Although there appear to be some Yes/No entries with respect to whether certain parts and labor payments were “warranty pay flag[s]” or “customer pay flag[s],” this As such, it is unclear how Defendant settled upon the repair visit at 29,325 miles to calculate the appropriate mileage offset instead of the visit at 6,382 miles, the visit at 36,842 miles, or any of the other generic “service” orders in the repair history.3 More fundamentally, it is unclear which of the service orders, if any, are related to the defect or defects that form the basis for Plaintiffs Complaint. In other words, “Defendant... provides no evidence about the actual substance of the. . . repair visit. | Without those facts, the Court cannot determine whether that [| visit has anything to do with the defects Plaintiffs claim in this case.’’). Perez v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-09684-MCS-PVC, 2025 WL 3171905, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025) As such, “Defendant’s calculation of actual damages is speculative and self-serving,” and “Defendant... has not met its burden to establish the measure of actual damages in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Accordingly, remand is 13. warranted. V. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is GRANTED. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: This action is REMANDED to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Dated: July 31, 2026 JAA HONORABLE MARGO A. ROCCONI United States Magistrate Judge 3 Defendant asserts, and the RISC appears to confirm, that the vehicle had 204 miles 9g | on the odometer at the time of sale. het 13-2 at 1.