OPINION
VOSS, Presiding Judge.
This is a special action review of an Arizona Industrial Commission (“commission”) award denying apportionment under the second injury fund statute.
See
Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. (“A.R.S.”) § 23-1065(0 (Supp.1991). We address one issue: whether a brain tumor (meningioma) is a “[c]erebral vascular accident,” one of the listed impairments under subsection 23-1065(C).
See
A.R.S. § 23-1065(C)(3)(k). The Administrative Law Judge (“A.L.J.”) concluded that this phrase refers to a stroke. We agree and accordingly affirm the award denying apportionment for a meningioma.
In August 1986, while working as a welder for the self-insured petitioner employer (“SRP”), respondent employee (“claimant”) injured his neck. SRP accepted compensability.
In October 1986, claimant underwent neck surgery for the industrial injury. He did return to work, but new diagnostic testing because of ongoing symptoms revealed a previously undiagnosed meningioma.
In October 1987, claimant underwent
brain surgery for the meningioma. Neuropsychological testing after the surgery established a permanent impairment of at least ten percent as a result of the meningioma and surgery.
In November 1988, claimant ended his employment with SRP. In March 1989, the industrial injury became stationary with an unscheduled permanent impairment. The commission subsequently issued an award for permanent partial disability,
see generally
A.R.S. § 23-1047, which SRP protested. It also notified the commission (“Special Fund”) of its intention to claim apportionment under section 23—1065(C).
See generally
A.R.S. § 23-1065(D). SRP and claimant, with the Special Fund’s consent and the commission’s approval, ultimately settled their dispute. This agreement expressly preserved SRP’s right to pursue its claim to apportionment under section 23-1065(C).
Hearings ensued on the apportionment question. Among the witnesses were two neurologists, Michael Epstein, M.D., and Charles L. Echols, Jr., M.D. Dr. Epstein defined a meningioma as a benign tumor in the connective tissue that envelopes the brain. Both experts agreed that claimant’s tumor was long-standing, had grown from underneath the brain into the frontal lobes, was vascular
, and was an unforeseen occurrence.
Both experts also testified about the medical definition of “cerebral vascular accident.” Dr. Epstein stated that “cerebral vascular accident ... means stroke, it doesn’t mean tumor.” In his opinion, this phrase is outmoded because the risk factors for stroke are now known and therefore a stroke is no longer described as accidental. On cross-examination, Dr. Epstein testified that while “cerebral vascular” and “cerebrovascular” are synonymous in medical parlance, the terms “cerebral,” “vascular,” and “accident” have ordinary nonmedical meanings as well as medical meanings and that several of the listed impairments employ nonmedical terms. But, Dr. Epstein bluntly discredited SRP’s suggested ordinary meaning definition of “cerebral vascular accident” as any unforeseen occurrence involving blood vessels of the cerebrum as a “perversion” of language:
No. I mean that is like spelling first P-hi-r-s-t, and taking the “gh” from enough, and the “tí” from nation. There’s a perversion of words. A cerebral vascular accident is a stroke. A tumor is not a stroke. [T]here is no equation here. It’s a perversion of the language which you’re enjoying, and it’s garbage. No doctor will equate the two. No one will stop laughing after they leave the room.
Id.
Dr. Echols testified that “cerebral vascular accident” is medically defined to mean “a normally occurring blood vessel that’s caused a thrombosis or spontaneous rupture. I’ve never heard it used in the context of a tumor.”
After the hearings, the parties submitted legal memoranda. The A.L.J. then issued the award denying apportionment. The critical findings concerning the classification of a meningioma are as follows:
7. According to A.R.S. § 23-1065 C3 [sic], pre-existing impairment to cause apportionment must consist of one of listed diseases or conditions set forth therein. The employer has taken the position that meningioma is equivalent to cerebral vascular accident as it involves all three words when used in lay sense without describing an illness. It is deemed that intent of language “cerebral vascular accident” was to describe a stroke. That a meningioma takes place
in cerebrum, involves vascular tissue and is an accident, does not, in the undersigned’s opinion, mean impairment from a brain tumor to be considered as intent of the statute [sic]. If legislature desired impairment from brain tumor to constitute grounds for apportionment, they [sic] could have used such language.
8. Based primarily on fact that a meningioma is not considered to be the same as a cerebral vascular accident which admittedly was medically used to describe a stroke, it is deemed apportionment should not take place in the instant case. .
The A.L.J. affirmed the award on administrative review. SRP responded by timely bringing this special action.
On review, SRP asserts that a meningioma is a “[c]erebral vascular accident” within the meaning of A.R.S. section 23-1065(C)(3)(k) because the impairments listed in section 23-1065(C)(3) are “general conditions, descriptive of different specific medical diagnoses or etiological agents,” rather than “specific medical [sic] diagnosed conditions____” The Special Fund answers by arguing that section 23-1065(C)(3)(k) refers only to strokes.
In 1986, the legislature substantially amended A.R.S. § 23-1065.
See
1986 Ariz. Sess.Laws Ch. 172, § 2 (retroactively applicable to Jan. 1, 1986). Subsection (C)
is adapted from the Model Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law.
See
Model Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law (Revised) § 20 (The Council of State Governments 1963) (“Model Act”)
reprinted in
4 Arthur Larson,
The Law of Workmen’s Compensation,
at 631, 670-72 (1990).
Both subsection 23-1065(C) and section 20 of the Model Act restrict apportionment
to listed preexisting impairments.
The Model Act also includes a catchall provision permitting apportionment for unlisted impairments causing a specified degree of disability.
See
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OPINION
VOSS, Presiding Judge.
This is a special action review of an Arizona Industrial Commission (“commission”) award denying apportionment under the second injury fund statute.
See
Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. (“A.R.S.”) § 23-1065(0 (Supp.1991). We address one issue: whether a brain tumor (meningioma) is a “[c]erebral vascular accident,” one of the listed impairments under subsection 23-1065(C).
See
A.R.S. § 23-1065(C)(3)(k). The Administrative Law Judge (“A.L.J.”) concluded that this phrase refers to a stroke. We agree and accordingly affirm the award denying apportionment for a meningioma.
In August 1986, while working as a welder for the self-insured petitioner employer (“SRP”), respondent employee (“claimant”) injured his neck. SRP accepted compensability.
In October 1986, claimant underwent neck surgery for the industrial injury. He did return to work, but new diagnostic testing because of ongoing symptoms revealed a previously undiagnosed meningioma.
In October 1987, claimant underwent
brain surgery for the meningioma. Neuropsychological testing after the surgery established a permanent impairment of at least ten percent as a result of the meningioma and surgery.
In November 1988, claimant ended his employment with SRP. In March 1989, the industrial injury became stationary with an unscheduled permanent impairment. The commission subsequently issued an award for permanent partial disability,
see generally
A.R.S. § 23-1047, which SRP protested. It also notified the commission (“Special Fund”) of its intention to claim apportionment under section 23—1065(C).
See generally
A.R.S. § 23-1065(D). SRP and claimant, with the Special Fund’s consent and the commission’s approval, ultimately settled their dispute. This agreement expressly preserved SRP’s right to pursue its claim to apportionment under section 23-1065(C).
Hearings ensued on the apportionment question. Among the witnesses were two neurologists, Michael Epstein, M.D., and Charles L. Echols, Jr., M.D. Dr. Epstein defined a meningioma as a benign tumor in the connective tissue that envelopes the brain. Both experts agreed that claimant’s tumor was long-standing, had grown from underneath the brain into the frontal lobes, was vascular
, and was an unforeseen occurrence.
Both experts also testified about the medical definition of “cerebral vascular accident.” Dr. Epstein stated that “cerebral vascular accident ... means stroke, it doesn’t mean tumor.” In his opinion, this phrase is outmoded because the risk factors for stroke are now known and therefore a stroke is no longer described as accidental. On cross-examination, Dr. Epstein testified that while “cerebral vascular” and “cerebrovascular” are synonymous in medical parlance, the terms “cerebral,” “vascular,” and “accident” have ordinary nonmedical meanings as well as medical meanings and that several of the listed impairments employ nonmedical terms. But, Dr. Epstein bluntly discredited SRP’s suggested ordinary meaning definition of “cerebral vascular accident” as any unforeseen occurrence involving blood vessels of the cerebrum as a “perversion” of language:
No. I mean that is like spelling first P-hi-r-s-t, and taking the “gh” from enough, and the “tí” from nation. There’s a perversion of words. A cerebral vascular accident is a stroke. A tumor is not a stroke. [T]here is no equation here. It’s a perversion of the language which you’re enjoying, and it’s garbage. No doctor will equate the two. No one will stop laughing after they leave the room.
Id.
Dr. Echols testified that “cerebral vascular accident” is medically defined to mean “a normally occurring blood vessel that’s caused a thrombosis or spontaneous rupture. I’ve never heard it used in the context of a tumor.”
After the hearings, the parties submitted legal memoranda. The A.L.J. then issued the award denying apportionment. The critical findings concerning the classification of a meningioma are as follows:
7. According to A.R.S. § 23-1065 C3 [sic], pre-existing impairment to cause apportionment must consist of one of listed diseases or conditions set forth therein. The employer has taken the position that meningioma is equivalent to cerebral vascular accident as it involves all three words when used in lay sense without describing an illness. It is deemed that intent of language “cerebral vascular accident” was to describe a stroke. That a meningioma takes place
in cerebrum, involves vascular tissue and is an accident, does not, in the undersigned’s opinion, mean impairment from a brain tumor to be considered as intent of the statute [sic]. If legislature desired impairment from brain tumor to constitute grounds for apportionment, they [sic] could have used such language.
8. Based primarily on fact that a meningioma is not considered to be the same as a cerebral vascular accident which admittedly was medically used to describe a stroke, it is deemed apportionment should not take place in the instant case. .
The A.L.J. affirmed the award on administrative review. SRP responded by timely bringing this special action.
On review, SRP asserts that a meningioma is a “[c]erebral vascular accident” within the meaning of A.R.S. section 23-1065(C)(3)(k) because the impairments listed in section 23-1065(C)(3) are “general conditions, descriptive of different specific medical diagnoses or etiological agents,” rather than “specific medical [sic] diagnosed conditions____” The Special Fund answers by arguing that section 23-1065(C)(3)(k) refers only to strokes.
In 1986, the legislature substantially amended A.R.S. § 23-1065.
See
1986 Ariz. Sess.Laws Ch. 172, § 2 (retroactively applicable to Jan. 1, 1986). Subsection (C)
is adapted from the Model Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law.
See
Model Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law (Revised) § 20 (The Council of State Governments 1963) (“Model Act”)
reprinted in
4 Arthur Larson,
The Law of Workmen’s Compensation,
at 631, 670-72 (1990).
Both subsection 23-1065(C) and section 20 of the Model Act restrict apportionment
to listed preexisting impairments.
The Model Act also includes a catchall provision permitting apportionment for unlisted impairments causing a specified degree of disability.
See
Model Act, section 20(d) (“No condition shall be considered a ‘permanent impairment’ unless it is one of the following [listed] conditions ... or
unless it would support a rating of disability of 200 weeks or more if evaluated according to standards applied in compensation claims.”)
(emphasis added). Subsection 23-1065(0) conspicuously omits this catchall provision.
See
A.R.S. § 23-1065(C)(3) (permitting apportionment only if “[t]he employee’s preexisting impairment is due to one or more of the following [listed impairments]____”).
According to Larson, the listed impairments in section 20 of the Model Act were intended “to remove completely from controversy a number of the commonest prior impairments____” 2 Arthur Larson,
supra,
§ 59.32(e) at 10-492.474 to .475 (1992). The listed impairments, therefore, are specific impairments, not general categories of impairments. All unlisted impairments fall under the catchall provision of the Model Act.
Id.
at 492.475 to .477.
The question arising from this comparison is whether by deleting the catchall provision from section 23-1065(C)(3), the legislature intended to restrict apportionment to the listed impairments or to transform the Model Act’s list of specific impairments into general categories of impairments. In our opinion, the legislature more probably intended to restrict apportionment to the listed specific impairments.
If the legislature had intended to extend apportionment to other impairments, it would have retained the Model Act’s catchall provision or a modified version of it.
SRP nevertheless argues that subsection 23-1065(C)(3)(k) includes a meningioma because the phrase “[cjerebral vascular accident” is undefined and the terms “cerebral,” “vascular,” and “accident” have ordinary meanings that apply to a meningioma. We disagree.
Statutory language normally has its ordinary meaning. A.R.S. § 1-213. This generalization does not apply if language is used in a technical sense.
Id.
This exception applies to the interpretation of subsection 23-1065(C)(3), which lists impairments, and the term “impairment” has a technical meaning in workers’ compensation law.
See Smith v. Industrial Comm’n,
113 Ariz. 304, 305 n. 1, 552 P.2d 1198, 1199 n. 1 (1976) (adopting definition of “permanent impairment” in AMA Guides). The AMA Guides define “permanent impairment” as “a purely medical condition____”
Id.
Among the purely medical conditions listed in subsection 23-1065(C)(3) is a “[cjerebral vascular accident.” A.R.S. § 23-1065(C)(3)(k). The medical experts who testified in the present case unanimously defined this phrase to refer exclusively to a stroke. If the statutory language has its intended technical meaning, it cannot apply to a meningioma.
SRP lastly argues that this technical definition of “cerebral vascular accident” defeats the remedial purpose of a second injury apportionment statute. We agree that the purpose of subsection 23-1065(C) is to encourage employers to hire handicapped workers by protecting such employers from the burden of increased compensation liability resulting from the combination of preexisting impairments and industrial injuries.
See Window Rock School Dist. #8 v. Industrial Comm’n,
26 Ariz.App. 14, 16, 545 P.2d 976, 978 (1976). But the court in
Window Rock
rejected the argument that the court should ignore language in the predecessor statute in order to provide a more comprehensive second injury fund remedy than the legislature had provided.
Id.
We also reject SRP’s invitation to interpret the current second injury fund statute in a manner that is at best unheard-of and at worst a perversion of the phrase “cerebral vascular accident.” SRP’s remedy is by legislation, not by judicial intervention.
The A.L.J. correctly interpreted subpart (k) of subsection 23-1065(C)(3) to refer exclusively to strokes. SRP concedes that a meningioma is not a stroke and that no other listed impairment includes a meningioma. We accordingly affirm the award denying apportionment for this reason alone.
CLABORNE and EUBANK, JJ., concur.