Salsitz v. Peltz

210 F.R.D. 95, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19612, 2002 WL 31323644
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 17, 2002
DocketNo. 99 CIV.2202 (LTS)(MHD)
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 210 F.R.D. 95 (Salsitz v. Peltz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Salsitz v. Peltz, 210 F.R.D. 95, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19612, 2002 WL 31323644 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

Opinion

[96]*96 OPINION AND ORDER

SWAIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Norman Salsitz (“Plaintiff’) brings this putative class action against defendants Nelson Peltz (“Peltz”), Peter W. May (“May”) and Triare Companies, Inc. (“Triare” or the “Company”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 14(e)”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t, 78n(e), in connection with Triarc’s March 1999 “Dutch Auction” self-tender solicitation. Plaintiff moves for certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a class consisting of all persons or entities “who held stock in Triare as of March 10, 1999 and who suffered damages thereby” (the “Class”)1.

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 1998, Defendants Peltz, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Triare, and May, the President and Chief Operating Officer of Triare, who at the time owned (collectively) approximately 26% of Triarc’s stock, offered to purchase all of the then outstanding shares of Triare Class A and Class B common stock from the public for $18.00 per share. Triare formed a special committee of its Board of Directors (“Special Committee”) to evaluate this proposal (the “Going Private Offer”). On March 10, 1999, approximately five months later, Peltz and May withdrew their Going Private Offer, stating “we believe it is not in the best interests of the shareholders at this time.” (Compl.1136). On that same day, Triare announced that it would commence a Dutch auction self-tender proceeding (“Dutch Auction”) to acquire up to 5.5 million shares of Triare Class A and Class B common stock from the public at a price between $16.25 and $18.25 per share.

Thereafter, on March 23, 1999, Plaintiff filed this action alleging that the Company’s proxy materials in connection with the Dutch Auction were materially misleading and, therefore, violative of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act. Plaintiff claims that (i) the proxy materials failed to make any meaningful disclosure as to the reasons why the [97]*97Going Private Offer was aborted (Compl.HH 44, 45); (ii) the proxy materials failed adequately to disclose “any valuation or study that [had] been made with respect to the dutch auction” and the abandoned Going Private Offer, including any valuations conducted by defendants and by Wasserstein Perella (which advised May and Peltz in connection with the Going Private Offer and subsequently advised the Company in connection with the Dutch Auction) (id. at 1f 48); (iii) the proxy materials failed to disclose the compensation received by Wasserstein Perel-la in connection with the Going Private Offer (id. at U 49); (iv) the proxy materials, which disclosed that the board of directors (“Board”) had unanimously approved the Dutch Auction, failed to identify any reasons or rationale for voting in favor of an offer between $16.25 and $18.25 “when it had already been determined that an $18.00 per share price was unfair” (id. at 1147); (v) the proxy materials failed to disclose that Peltz and May would be the “ultimate beneficiaries” of the Dutch Auction (id. at 1140, 41); (vi) the proxy materials failed to disclose that “Wasserstein Perella suffered from a disabling conflict,” having represented Peltz and May individually in the Going Private Offer and Triare with respect to the Dutch Auction (id. at 1150); and (vii) statements in the proxy materials that “the Board of Directors of the Company has unanimously approved the offer” and that “neither the Company nor its Board of Directors make any recommendation to any stockholder as to whether to tender all or any of his or her shares” create a misrepresentation as to whether the Board of Directors favored the Dutch Auction, (id. at 1146).

DISCUSSION

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Plaintiff seeks certification of a class consisting of all persons or entities who held stock in Triare as of March 10, 1999 and who suffered damages. Compl. It 25. Plaintiff contends that this action is appropriate for class certification because the members of the proposed class of Triare shareholders number in the thousands and the wrongs complained of arise from the same course of conduct by Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that his claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class and that he has demonstrated his adequacy by selecting counsel experienced in the prosecution of complex securities class actions. Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and, invoking Article III of the United States Constitution’s “ease or controversy” limitation, argue that Plaintiff cannot represent a class of Triare shareholders because he did not suffer an individual injury as a result of the conduct at issue and, therefore, lacks standing to assert the claims in the Complaint.

“[C]lass certification issues are ... ‘logically antecedent’ to Article III concerns ... and pertain to statutory standing, which may properly be treated before Article III standing.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999); Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., No. 5:91 Civ. 682, 2000 WL 888385, at *6 (D.Conn. June 22, 2000). Rule 23’s requirements “should be treated first, ‘mindful that [the Rule’s] requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints ....’” Stevelman, 2000 WL 888385, at *6 (quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)).

Rule 23(a)

Under Rule 23, one or more of the members of a class may bring suit on behalf of all other class members only if “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.CivJP. 23(a). “‘Rule 23 is given liberal rather than restrictive construction, and courts are to adopt a standard of flexibility.’” Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing satisfaction of the requirements for class certification. Medicare Beneficiaries’ Defense Fund v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 938 F.Supp. 1131, 1139 (E.D.N.Y.1996). Defen[98]*98dants argue that Plaintiff fails to meet Rule 23’s requirements of typicality and adequacy. Typicality

The economic gravamen of Plaintiffs Section 14(e) claim is that the Dutch Auction underpriced the Company’s stock.

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210 F.R.D. 95, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19612, 2002 WL 31323644, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/salsitz-v-peltz-nysd-2002.