Salloum v. Dept of Transportation

Opinion

25CA1808 Salloum v Dept of Transportation 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1808 State Personnel Board No. 25B077

Ayman Salloum, Complainant-Appellant, v. Department of Transportation, Respondent-Appellee, and State Personnel Board, Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE GROVE

Gomez and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 27, 2026

Ayman Salloum, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob W. Paul, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cait K. Stover, Assistant Attorney General, Alex R. Bransford, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

No Appearance for Appellee

¶1 Ayman Salloum appeals an order issued by the State Personnel Board (the Board) dismissing his appeal as untimely. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Salloum was employed in the environmental unit at the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) for about twenty years. During this time, he filed at least ten internal grievances and multiple appeals to the Board alleging harassment, retaliation, hostile work environment, denial of religious accommodation, and discrimination.

¶3 In February 2025, Salloum had a meeting with his supervisor regarding issues with his timesheet. According to Salloum, his supervisor accused him of time theft and fraud. The day after this meeting, Salloum filed a Step One grievance against his supervisor, see Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-13(A), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1, alleging that she had engaged in “continued unprofessional conduct.” He requested “an immediate written apology for accusing [him] of stealing and being fraudulent”; “$100,000 compensation for defamation, character assassination, pain and sufferings”; “that CDOT takes all disciplinary measures necessary . . . against [his

2

supervisor]”; and that he “no longer be supervised by [his supervisor].”

¶4 The Step One Decision denied Salloum’s requested relief, finding Salloum did not describe any adverse action suffered as a result of the incident with his supervisor. The decision also noted that Salloum had acknowledged that there was confusion regarding his timesheet and that he had decided to change his schedule without discussing it with his supervisor. And finally, it stated that Salloum entered hours worked on a day when he had told his supervisor he would not be working, thereby creating the appearance or potential for fraudulent time reporting.

¶5 Following the Step One Decision, Salloum continued the grievance process by submitting a written Step Two grievance. See id. at Rule 8-13(B). His Step Two grievance requested the same relief as his Step One grievance.

¶6 On April 30, 2025, and before a Step Two Decision was issued, Salloum was terminated from his employment at CDOT. According to CDOT, the termination was for disciplinary reasons.

¶7 On May 7, 2025, Salloum appealed his termination to the Board, claiming discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in

3

violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA). Then, on May 13, 2025, Salloum filed another appeal — the one at issue here — duplicating his May 7 claims and adding a claim regarding CDOT’s failure to issue a Step Two Decision related to his supervisor’s conduct during the February meeting.

¶8 The ALJ issued an order to show cause directing Salloum to explain why his May 13 appeal should not be dismissed as untimely given that he filed it more than ten days after the notice of his termination. See id. at Rule 8-15(A) (providing that a pending grievance “is ended” upon the termination of the grievant’s employment); id. at Rule 8-7(A) (“Appeals or petitions for hearing are timely if received by the Board or postmarked no later than ten (10) days after receipt of the written notice of the action, or if no notice was required, no later than ten (10) days after the employee knew or should have known of the alleged improper action.”).

¶9 In his response to the show cause order, Salloum asserted that his appeal “grieved discriminatory defamation” and was not an isolated incident but part of a series of “consistent . . . discriminatory employment actions,” referencing his previous grievances and appeals. Salloum then argued that his May 13

4

appeal related to a new adverse action and was not a duplication of any of his previous appeals. He also alleged that his April 30 termination was intended to prematurely end the grievance process and cover up the discriminatory actions that formed the basis for his grievance. Salloum cited Board Rule 8-15(C) for the proposition that separation from employment does not preclude the Board from hearing a discrimination claim related to the facts underlying a grievance. Salloum did not otherwise address the timeliness of his May 13 appeal.

¶ 10 The ALJ issued an order dismissing Salloum’s May 13 appeal with prejudice. The ALJ concluded that the adverse action Salloum was actually appealing was his termination and, therefore, the Board did not have jurisdiction over the May 13 appeal because Salloum filed it more than ten days after his notice of termination. Salloum filed a request for Board review. The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision dismissing the appeal. Salloum’s May 7 appeal

5

remained unaffected and proceeded independently. Salloum now appeals the dismissal of his May 13 appeal.1 II. Dismissal of May 13 Appeal

¶ 11 Salloum contends that the ALJ erroneously determined that his May 13 appeal only challenged his termination and was therefore untimely and that the ALJ failed to properly apply the grievance procedure timelines. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 The Board is an administrative agency governed by the State Administrative Procedure Act. §§ 24-4-101 to -107, C.R.S. 2025. We may only reverse the decision of an administrative agency if we conclude that it acted “arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority.” Rice v. Auraria Higher Educ. Ctr., 131 P.3d 1096, 1100 (Colo. App. 2005); see also § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.

1 Salloum’s appellate briefing violates several requirements of C.A.R.

28. However, because Salloum is self-represented, we exercise our discretion to address his arguments to the extent that we understand them, and we construe his arguments broadly, focusing on substance rather than form. See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61,

¶ 5.

6

2025. We must resolve all reasonable doubts regarding the propriety of the ruling in the Board’s favor, and we will not disturb the ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Dep’t of Corr. v. Stiles, 2020 CO 90M, ¶ 30; Lawley v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1252 (Colo. 2001). However, we review an agency’s ruling on its own jurisdiction de novo because it is the province of the court to define the scope of agency enabling statutes. Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 65 P.3d 1008, 1015 (Colo. 2003).

¶ 13 Salloum argues his appeal was timely under several Board Rules. “In construing an administrative regulation, we apply the same rules of construction that we would in interpreting a statute,” first analyzing the words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Berumen v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 COA 73,

¶ 19. We read and consider the regulatory scheme “as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” Id. “And as with statutes, if the language of a regulation is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to other rules of construction.” Id.

7

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Salloum maintains he followed the procedures laid out in Rule 8-14 and therefore his appeal was timely. That rule, however, provides deadlines for an employee’s appeal to the Board if the employer fails to issue a Step Two Decision. Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-14(b), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. Rule 8-15(A), on the other hand, provides that “[i]f a grievant is separated from employment in the state personnel system, any grievance pending at the department level is ended.” Id. at Rule 8-15(A). Thus, following his termination, Rule 8-14 no longer applied. Because Salloum’s Step Two grievance “ended” at the moment of his termination, the deadlines outlined in Rule 8-7 for filing an appeal to the Board applied.

¶ 15 Board Rule 8-7 states:

Appeals or petitions for hearing are timely if received by the Board or postmarked no later than ten (10) days after receipt of the written notice of the action, or if no notice was required, no later than ten (10) days after the employee knew or should have known of the alleged improper action.

Id. at Rule 8-7(A). The plain language of Rule 8-7 ties the start of the ten-day clock to the notice of action being challenged. The ALJ

8

determined that the action Salloum was challenging on appeal was his termination; and because Salloum filed his appeal thirteen days after his notice of termination, it was untimely.

¶ 16 Salloum maintains that his appeal was not limited to his termination. Even if we agree with Salloum, the other adverse actions encompassed by his grievance (i.e., his supervisor’s conduct during the February meeting, his employer’s alleged failure to follow grievance procedures in March and April, etc.) all occurred before he was terminated. Because his termination signaled the end of the grievance process and occurred thirteen days prior to his appeal, his appeal was untimely.

¶ 17 Salloum asserts that because Rule 8-15(C) provides “[a] separation does not preclude the Board from hearing a discrimination or a whistleblower claim related to the facts underlying a grievance,” his claims “did not vanish upon termination.” Id. at Rule 8-15(C). Although we agree with Salloum that Rule 8-15(C) preserves the Board’s jurisdiction to hear an employee’s claims after termination, we conclude that, when a grievance “ends” as the result of an employee’s termination, Rule 8- 7 governs when such claims must be brought.

9

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The Board’s order of dismissal is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.