Salinger v. Colting

641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 91 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1319, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56012, 2009 WL 1916354
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 1, 2009
Docket09 Civ. 5095 (DAB)
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (Salinger v. Colting) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 91 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1319, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56012, 2009 WL 1916354 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DEBORAH A. BATTS, District Judge.

Plaintiff J.D. Salinger brings suit against Defendants Fredrik Colting, writing under the name John David California, Windupbird Publishing Ltd., Nicotext A.B., and ABP, Inc., doing business as SCB Distributors Inc., alleging claims for Copyright Infringement and common law Unfair Competition. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ novel, 60 Years Later: Com *254 ing Through the Rye (hereinafter “60 Years ”), is a derivative work of his novel, The Catcher in the Rye (hereinafter “Catcher ”), and that the character of Mr. C from 60 Years, is an infringement on his character, Holden Caulfield, from Catcher.

Plaintiff now moves for a preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from publishing, advertising, or otherwise distributing 60 Years in the United States of America during the pendency of this suit. For the following reasons, a preliminary injunction is GRANTED.

I. INTRODUCTION

As set forth on the record of June 17, 2009, and for the reasons stated therein, the Court found that Plaintiff possesses a valid Copyright in the novel The Catcher in the Rye, that the character of Holden Caulfield (“Holden” or “Caulfield”) is sufficiently delineated so that a claim for infringement will lie. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.12 (2009) (“[I]n those cases recognizing such protection, the character appropriated was distinctively delineated in the plaintiffs work.”). Additionally, for the reasons stated on the record of June 17, 2009, the Court found that the Plaintiff had access to Catcher and that there are similarities that are probative of copying between the works. Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir.1998). Finally, the Court found that Plaintiff has shown that there is substantial similarity between Catcher and 60 Years, as well as between the character Holden Caulfield from Catcher, and the character Mr. C from 60 Years, such that it was an unauthorized infringement of Plaintiffs copyright. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.2001) (finding that “substantial similarity” exists where “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work”); Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 139 (“Under the ‘ordinary observer’ test ... two works are substantially similar where the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the same.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The Court now addresses Defendants’ claim that their novel 60 Years and its protagonist Mr. C constitute fair use of Plaintiffs copyrighted work under 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(l)-(4). The Court bases its analysis on the oral arguments of June 17, 2009 and the parties’ submissions. 1

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard

Under Rule 65, “[t]o obtain a preliminary injunction a party must demonstrate: (1) that it will be irreparably harmed if an injunction is not granted, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.” Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.1999)).

B. The Fair Use Doctrine

“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copy *255 righted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). At the Constitutional level, while the “Copyright Clause and the First Amendment [are] intuitively in conflict, [they] were drafted to work together to prevent censorship” such that “the balance between the First Amendment and copyright is preserved, in part, by the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use.” Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1263 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985))).

“Copyright law thus must address the inevitable tension between the property rights it establishes in creative works, which must be protected up to a point, and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to express them — or ourselves by reference to the works of others, which must be protected up to a point. The fair-use doctrine mediates between the two sets of interests, determining where each set of interests ceases to control.” Blanch v. Boons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir.2006); see also Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d 513, 540 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“At stake in this case are the incentive to create original works which copyright protection fosters and the freedom to produce secondary works which monopoly protection of copyright stifles — both interests benefit the public”) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 1105,1109 (1990) (hereinafter “Leval”)) (noting that although “the monopoly created by copyright ... rewards the individual author in order to benefit the publicf,]” on the other hand “the monopoly protection of intellectual property that impeded referential analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process.”)

The doctrine of Fair Use was codified in § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. Section 107 calls for a four-factor test:

Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use:

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641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 91 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1319, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56012, 2009 WL 1916354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/salinger-v-colting-nysd-2009.