Sales Ramirez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 25-196
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 7 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIZANDRA JOSEFINA SALES No. 25-196 RAMIREZ; R. A. S. R., Agency Nos. A215-536-233 Petitioners, A215-536-234 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 5, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Lizandra Josefina Sales Ramirez and her minor daughter R.A.S.R.,

Guatemalan natives, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of their applications

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). for asylum and withholding of removal.1 Petitioners raise three claims in their

petition for review: (1) a challenge to the IJ’s nexus finding; (2) a challenge to the

IJ’s unable-or-unwilling finding; and (3) due process challenges to their hearing

before the IJ.2 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount

them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

Where the BIA “agree[s] with the IJ’s findings and add[s] its own reasoning,

we review both the BIA’s decision and the portions of the IJ’s decision adopted by

the BIA.” Diaz v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2025). We review questions

of law and due process claims de novo and factual findings for substantial

evidence. See Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020). “In

reviewing the BIA’s decisions, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that

agency.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021).

1. Petitioner first challenges the BIA and IJ’s finding that she failed to

establish the requisite “nexus” between the persecution she alleges and a protected

ground. Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2023).

1 R.A.S.R. is a derivative asylum applicant who did not file an independent application. References to Petitioner therefore refer to Lizandra Josefina Sales Ramirez. 2 The remainder of Petitioner’s arguments are either waived, United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2002), or unexhausted, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

2 25-196 Petitioner argues that she was assaulted because of her indigenous ethnicity or

related protected social groups (Indigenous Guatemalan women and Mam women),

relying largely on general country conditions evidence. However, Petitioner has

not shown sufficient evidence that any of her attackers targeted her because of her

protected traits, as opposed to general criminal motive. Nor does Petitioner’s

country conditions evidence suffice. See id. at 1019 (explaining that country

conditions evidence as to the “general vulnerability of women in Guatemala”

cannot establish the motive for individual past persecution nor that future

persecution is more likely than not). Absent more individualized evidence,

Petitioner has failed to establish that “any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude” that she has shown the requisite nexus between her Mam

identity and her past or fear of future persecution, as substantial evidence review

requires.3 Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en

banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Petitioner next challenges the BIA and IJ’s finding that she failed to

provide sufficient evidence establishing that the Guatemalan government was

unwilling or unable to protect her. The IJ evaluated the available evidence and

concluded that it did not establish that the government was unable or unwilling to

3 Because she has not shown that any past persecution she experienced was because of a protected ground, Petitioner’s argument that she is entitled to a presumption of future persecution because of a protected ground necessarily fails.

3 25-196 control Petitioner’s attackers.

The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion. Petitioner

mainly highlights the Hastings Women’s Law Journal article that suggests a very

small percentage of complaints of violence against women ultimately result in a

punitive sentence. But as that article notes, collection limitations rendered the

underlying data “outdated and inconsistent.” Substantial evidence therefore

supports the BIA and IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner “did not meet her burden of

proof to show that Guatemalan authorities were or would be unable or unwilling to

protect her.” See Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (9th Cir.

2020).

3. Finally, Petitioner argues that the IJ engaged in two due process

violations. “To prevail on a due process challenge to deportation proceedings,

[Petitioner] must show error and substantial prejudice.” Grigoryan, 959 F.3d at

1240 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means “that the challenged

proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that she was prevented from reasonably

presenting her case.” Id. (citation modified).

First, Petitioner contends that the IJ failed to “consider the evidence

presented in support of [her] nexus claim in her asylum argument.” But the IJ

considered the evidence Petitioner references, including Dr. Hernandez’s

psychological evaluation, Dr. Green’s report on conditions in Guatemala, and the

4 25-196 2021 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report. As the BIA recognized,

Petitioner has failed to “identify any testimony or other evidence that she was

unable to present or evidence that was overlooked by the [IJ].” There was

accordingly no due process violation.

Second, Petitioner argues that the IJ’s decision not to make a formal

credibility determination violated due process. Petitioner cites no case holding that

due process requires a credibility determination. In any event, the IJ found that

“[d]espite several inconsistencies, . . . [Petitioner] testified credibly, generally.”

The BIA was therefore required to presume Petitioner’s credibility. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019).

There is accordingly no evidence that the IJ or BIA violated Petitioner’s due

process rights.

PETITION DENIED. Petitioner’s motion to stay removal, Dkt. 4, and

supplemental motion to stay removal, Dkt. 6, are DENIED as moot. The

temporary stay of removal, Dkt. 4, shall dissolve upon issuance of the mandate.

5 25-196