Filed 8/27/26 Salem v. Aljojo CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
NADIA KAMEL SALEM, B346381 (Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV09355)
v.
ADNAN MOHAMED ALJOJO,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Kassouni Law and Timothy V. Kassouni for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Zach’s Law and Zachary C. Skidelsky for Defendant and Respondent.
Nadia Kamel Salem sued her eldest son, Adnan Mohamed Aljojo, for the cancellation of a quitclaim deed obtained by fraud.1 After a bench trial, the trial court held that Adnan fraudulently obtained title to Nadia’s home but found the statute of limitations barred her claim. To reach the latter conclusion, the court relied on statements appearing in a letter offered by Adnan as proof that Nadia retained a law firm to pursue him for fraud more than four years before filing her case. Nadia contends the letter contained hearsay and its admission constituted prejudicial error.
We agree with Nadia, reverse the judgment, vacate the award of prevailing party costs, and remand the matter with directions to enter judgment in her favor.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In the 1990s, Nadia and her husband Mohamed Aljojo immigrated to Los Angeles and purchased a family home on Clinton Street. They have seven children, including Adnan, Amal, Emad, Adel, and Huda. In 1994 and 1998, Nadia and Mohamed executed durable powers of attorney, appointing Adnan as their attorney-in-fact to manage the family home. In 2001, Mohamed and Nadia conveyed the Clinton home to Nadia as her separate property. Mohamed died in 2020.
A. The Quitclaim Deed, Revocation, and Demand Letter In January 2016, Nadia traveled with Adnan to the United States Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to transfer money between banks. Adnan presented Nadia with a document written in English to complete the transfer of funds. Nadia did not read
1 In accordance with the appellate briefing, we refer to the parties and their family members by first name. We intend no disrespect.
3
or speak English and signed the document without reviewing it. The document Nadia signed was actually a quitclaim deed transferring title to the Clinton home to Adnan.
In July 2017, Adnan and Adel were engaged in a dispute concerning Adel’s right to occupy the Clinton home. Nadia executed a formal revocation of Adnan’s power of attorney to prevent his ouster of Adel. Adnan filed an unlawful detainer action against Adel, and his counsel in that action purportedly received a letter dated September 28, 2017, from a law firm stating it represented Nadia. The letter demanded that Adnan return title of the property to Nadia.
B. Complaint and Trial Nadia commenced this action on March 16, 2022, and filed the operative first amended complaint alleging a single claim to cancel the quitclaim deed due to fraud and nondelivery. (See Civ. Code, § 3412.) The complaint alleged Adnan “fraudulently represented to [Nadia] that she was signing a bank authorization form when, in fact, she was signing a quitclaim deed” conveying the Clinton home to Adnan. Nadia requested an order cancelling the quitclaim deed. Adnan’s demurrer and motion for summary judgment, each raising statute of limitations defenses based upon the September 2017 demand letter, were overruled and denied.
The court held a three-day bench trial on Adnan’s statute of limitations defense and Nadia’s underlying claim. Nadia testified she never intended to convey the Clinton home to Adnan. Amal and her children, Adel and his family, and Huda lived in the Clinton home at various times. Nadia did not learn about Adnan’s fraudulent conduct in obtaining title to the home until 2022 when Amal told her Adnan “got the house in his name.”
4
On cross-examination, Nadia was questioned about the 2017 disagreement over Adel’s occupation of the Clinton home. Nadia knew about the “issues between” Adel and Adnan and tried to “reconcile” their conflict by revoking Adnan’s power of attorney. Nadia denied knowing “any attorneys” involved in the unlawful detainer action Adnan filed against Adel. Nadia “did not help” Adel find a lawyer to defend himself. She testified, “I am the owner of the house. I told him [to] take away the lawsuit, Adnan. Adel is your brother and the house belongs to me. I came here to reconcile between them.”
Nadia was then asked about the 2017 revocation. She admitted cancelling Adnan’s power of attorney at an American consulate in Saudi Arabia. When asked if her “lawyer in California type[d] up this document and ask you to have it notarized,” she replied, “I don’t have an attorney at all.” Nadia “never hired an attorney” and never saw an attorney for the revocation. Asked why she revoked Adnan’s power of attorney, Nadia replied, “When Adnan wanted to kick out Adel, I am the owner of the house. How could he do this without my knowledge?” Nadia “did not know” Adnan claimed ownership of the Clinton home during this dispute. “If [Adnan] said ‘this is my house,’” Nadia “would have kicked him out myself. This is my house, not his house.”
Nadia was also cross-examined about a state bar complaint Adel purportedly filed against the law firm that issued the demand letter to Adnan.2 As before, Nadia testified she had “never been to an attorney” in connection with the unlawful
2 According to questions posed by Adnan’s counsel during crossexaminations of Nadia and Emad, Adel retained the law firm to represent him in the 2017 unlawful detainer.
5
detainer action and denied wanting to join her son’s state bar complaint.3 Emad echoed Nadia’s testimony: “My mother [has] never seen an attorney. She never hired an attorney” and “has nothing to do with the attorney of Adel.” Nadia and Emad also testified about Adnan’s history of signing other people’s names on financial documents.4 Nobody from the law firm that issued the demand letter testified. Adnan’s prior counsel who purportedly received the demand letter did not testify either.
Adnan testified he purchased the Clinton home but placed title in his parents’ names to avoid child support payments. Adnan admitted the initial deeds transferred title to his parents and that he refinanced the home on Nadia’s behalf “[o]n multiple occasions.” Though he admitted Nadia never told him she intended to transfer the Clinton home to him, Adnan testified that Nadia “gifted” it to him through the quitclaim deed. Adnan acknowledged he had “forged names on documents bearing [his] family members’ signatures” because he was “authorized to do all of the work.” Adnan said that nobody in his family disputed his claim of ownership in 2017.
When discussing the unlawful detainer action against Adel, Adnan testified that his prior attorney forwarded him the September 2017 demand letter. Over Nadia’s hearsay objection,
3 She testified, “I don’t know any attorneys. I have not hired any attorneys except this one over here,” and “I have never been to an attorney.” 4 In its statement of decision, the trial court observed, for example, that Adnan had admitted to forging Emad’s signature in various situations and “obtaining a false driver’s license in Emad’s name, with Adnan’s picture. Adnan also admitted falsely claiming to be Emad in a court proceeding.”
6
the court admitted the letter into evidence. The letter appears on letterhead for the Law Offices of Phillip Myer, is addressed to Adnan’s former counsel, is signed by a person identified as “Case Manager Civil Litigation,” and attaches Nadia’s notarized revocation of Adnan’s power of attorney. The letter states in relevant part:
“This office has been retained by Nadia Salem to pursue an action against your client Adnan Aljojo for . . . return of the [Clinton home] which was fraudulently transferred by your client pursuant to a Power of Attorney (Now Revoked) . . .
“This letter will serve as a formal written demand to your client Adnan Aljojo to return legal ownership and transfer title of the above referenced property back to our client Nadia Salem forthwith and without compensation.”
C. Statement of Decision and Judgment The court issued a statement of decision finding Nadia to be the true owner of the Clinton home before execution of the quitclaim deed. The court found Nadia’s testimony about signing the quitclaim deed “credible, and Adnan’s testimony was not.” It then found by “clear and convincing evidence that Adnan obtained the [quitclaim deed] by fraud.”
Notwithstanding these findings, the court found Adnan met his burden of establishing Nadia’s claim was barred under the three-year statute of limitations for fraud. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) In support, the court stated: “The evidence showed that, on September 28, 2017, Nadia’s attorney sent a letter to Adnan’s attorney, stating that Nadia would pursue a claim against Adnan for, among other things, conversion and return of the Clinton property. . . .” The court issued judgment in
7
favor of Adnan and awarded him $12,702 in prevailing party costs. Nadia appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Demand Letter Is Inadmissible Hearsay Nadia contends the trial court erred by admitting the demand letter “to prove the truth of its contents,” namely, that she retained Myer and was thus on notice of Adnan’s fraud. Adnan agrees “[t]he letter was admitted solely to establish that Appellant, through counsel, was on notice of the alleged fraud no later than September 2017.” He argues, however, that this constituted a non-hearsay purpose. We agree with Nadia.
The trial court’s admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Evans v. Hood Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1040 (Evans).) The court’s discretion is “‘subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown.’ [Citations.] ‘The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, . . . Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion. [Citation.]’” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of its content.” (Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 442, 447, fn. omitted (Hart); see Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “A document is generally a form of written verbal expression. If it is prepared before trial and offered to prove the truth of the words it contains, it is hearsay.” (Hart, at p. 447.)
8
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as provided by law. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).)
An out-of-court statement may be admitted for a nonhearsay purpose “if the statement is ‘“significant irrespective of the truth or falsity of its content.”’ [Citation.]” (Evans, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1043–1044.) “‘“The first and most basic requirement for applying the not-for-the-truth limitation . . . is that the out-of-court statement must be offered for some purpose independent of the truth of the matters it asserts. That means that the statement must be capable of serving its nonhearsay purpose regardless of whether the jury believes the matters asserted to be true. . . .”’” (Hart, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 447, citations omitted; see id. at p. 448 [“the nontruth purpose for which a statement is offered must be relevant”].)5 This limitation “can prove analytically elusive when the words themselves also make an assertion. [Citation.] If the words are admitted for a nonhearsay purpose the jury is not allowed to consider the truth of any substantive assertion, . . .” (Id. at p. 448.)
Courts have admitted out of court statements for the nonhearsay purposes of establishing the speaker’s knowledge or state of mind (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1150; Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 114, 125 (Taylor)). Out of court statements may also be admitted for
5 “For example, suppose A hit B after B said, ‘You’re stupid.’ B’s out-of-court statement asserts that A is stupid. If those words are offered to prove that A is, indeed, stupid, they constitute hearsay and would be inadmissible unless they fell under a hearsay exception. However, those same words might be admissible for a nonhearsay purpose: to prove that A had a motive to assault B. The distinction turns not on the words themselves, but what they are offered to prove.” (Hart, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 447–448.)
9
the nonhearsay purpose of showing an “effect on the listener” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1115; People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907 (Scalzi)) or to demonstrate “certain information” was imparted to the listener (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 863 (Montes)). The demand letter was not used for any of these nonhearsay purposes.
The key disputed fact in this case was whether Nadia had notice or knowledge of Adnan’s fraud in September 2017. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d); Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373–1374.) Adnan admits he offered the demand letter to establish this fact. If Nadia had authored the letter, it might be used for the nonhearsay purpose of showing her knowledge of an accrued claim in 2017. (See Taylor, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 125.) But Nadia did not author the letter. A case manager associated with an attorney named Myer, neither of whom testified at trial, purportedly wrote the letter.
The only way to “link” Nadia to the demand letter was through the truth of the substantive assertion in the letter itself—that Myer was retained by Nadia to pursue an action against Adnan for fraud. (See Hart, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 448.) Because the letter was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, Nadia’s hearsay objection should have been sustained. (See ibid.; see also In re Marriage of M.P. & M.C. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107 [same principle]; Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 526, 541 (Am-Cal Investment) [same].)
The authorities cited by Adnan do not persuade us otherwise.6 Almost all of them address statements offered to
6 Adnan’s appellate brief cites these cases generally, “providing no help as to what part of the opinion has relevance to this case.” (In re
10
show the effect on the listener. (E.g., People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 100; Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 863; Scalzi, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 907.) The demand letter was not offered to prove the effect on its recipients; it was offered to attribute knowledge or notice of a claim to Nadia. Adnan failed to establish whether Nadia received the demand letter or had any affiliation with its author. It was error to admit the demand letter for its truth.
B. The Error Was Prejudicial Nadia contends the error was prejudicial. We agree. Reviewing courts may not reverse a judgment or set aside a verdict “by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence” unless the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b); see F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1107; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) To establish a miscarriage of justice, Nadia must demonstrate prejudice, “‘that is, that a different result would have been probable if the error had not occurred.’ [Citation.]” (Evans, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.)
Nadia has established prejudice. As discussed, the court admitted the demand letter to establish Nadia’s notice for purposes of claim accrual under Adnan’s statute of limitations defense, a “critical issue involved in the trial.” (Am-Cal Investment, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 541.) Its finding that the September 2017 demand letter established such notice was unsupported by legally admissible evidence. (Compare id. at pp. 534–535, 541–543.)
S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 412.) “[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to carry appellate counsel’s burden.” (Ibid.)
11
Adnan contends any evidentiary error was harmless because the statute of limitations ruling “did not rest solely” on the demand letter. In support, he avers additional evidence established: (1) Nadia “retained counsel, investigated the transaction, and formally threatened litigation”; (2) Nadia “joined with her son Adel” to file a state bar complaint against the attorney affiliated with the letter; and (3) the demand letter was “accompanied” by Nadia’s revocation of Adnan’s power of attorney. We address, and reject, each averment in turn.
Adnan cites no evidence other than the demand letter to support his first averment that Nadia “retained counsel, investigated the transaction, and formally threatened litigation.” The citations he provides are to the demand letter itself and the court’s statement of decision. Neither constitutes independent evidence. (See Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1379 [statement of decision “is not evidence”].)
Adnan’s second averment is also unsupported by the record. Adnan cites his own trial exhibit to establish Nadia’s joinder to a purported state bar complaint filed by Adel against the law firm that authored the demand letter. That exhibit, a screenshot of a typewritten message dated March 27, 2018, bearing a handwritten signature, provides: “I Nadia Kamel would like to join the complaint my son, Adel Aljojo, filing [sic] against the law offices of Philip [sic] Myer.” When shown this exhibit at trial and asked if she signed it, Nadia testified, “What is this for?” and “I don’t know because Adnan would sign my name everywhere.” Adnan did not identify who authored the writing, how Nadia’s signature came to appear on it, how he obtained a copy of it, or how he obtained personal knowledge of Adel’s state bar complaint or the nature thereof. Adel did not
12
testify, and no state bar complaint was offered into evidence to corroborate the writing Nadia disavowed. Without such evidence, the writing Adnan offered into evidence does not corroborate Nadia hiring or consulting with the law firm.
The same is true of Adnan’s final averment. The fact that Nadia’s revocation was attached to the demand letter proves only that the person who prepared the letter had the revocation in their possession. The only admissible evidence contextualizing Nadia’s revocation was her own testimony. Nadia testified that she revoked Adnan’s power of attorney to “reconcile” his ongoing dispute over occupancy of the Clinton home with Adel. When she executed the revocation, Nadia believed she owned the home, did not know that Adnan claimed ownership, and wanted him to stop exercising her power as the owner. Absent other contextualizing evidence, it cannot be reasonably inferred from the revocation that Nadia was on notice Adnan had fraudulently procured her signature on the quitclaim deed. (See Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 [“Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence”].)
Independent of the hearsay statements in the demand letter, Adnan presented insufficient admissible evidence to prove the facts upon which he based his statute of limitations affirmative defense. (Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 613–614 [declarations of alleged agent “‘are not admissible to prove the fact of his agency or the extent of his power as such agent’”].) The judgment must thus be reversed.
A reversal of judgment “‘“based on insufficiency of the evidence should place the parties, at most, in the position they were in after all the evidence was in and both sides had rested.” [Citations.] . . . “[F]or our justice system to function, it is
13
necessary that litigants assume responsibility for the complete litigation of their cause during the proceedings.”’ [Citation.]” (Frank v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 805, 833– 834; see Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 [absent sufficient evidence to support judgment, proper remedy is reversal with directions].) As the party asserting a statute of limitations defense, Adnan bore the burden to “prove the facts necessary to enjoy its benefit.” (Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10.) Adnan has neither requested retrial nor cited authority in his appellate brief authorizing retrial as a remedy for a successful appeal on grounds of insufficient evidence supporting the judgment.
We therefore reverse the judgment, vacate the prevailing party cost award in Adnan’s favor and, in light of the court’s findings in favor of Nadia on the merits, direct the lower court to enter judgment in her favor.7
7 In light of our conclusions, we do not address Nadia’s remaining contentions. (See Prouty v. Gores Technology Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1237, fn. 4.)
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the prevailing cost award in favor of Adnan and enter a modified judgment in favor of Nadia on her claim for cancellation of the Quitclaim Deed (Civ. Code, § 3412). Nadia shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
DAUM, J.