Salcido Coronel v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-1961
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 14 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ISAIAS SALCIDO CORONEL, No. 24-1961

Petitioner, Agency No. A200-824-400 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 9, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Isaias Salcido Coronel, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). reopen and reconsider. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and

procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a

motion to reopen or reconsider, as well as the denial of equitable tolling, for abuse

of discretion. Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023);

Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2021). We review questions of law

de novo. Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180. Further, we review for substantial

evidence the BIA’s determination that a noncitizen has not established exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative for purposes of eligibility

for cancellation of removal. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2025). We deny the petition for review.

I

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to

reopen because he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for cancellation of

removal. The BIA may deny a motion to reopen on several grounds, including the

“failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought.” Fonseca-Fonseca, 76

F.4th at 1180 (quoting Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010)).

“[P]rima facie eligibility for relief requires only a threshold showing of

eligibility—a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail on the merits

2 if the motion to reopen were granted.” Id. at 1179. In other words, “a noncitizen

‘demonstrates prima facie eligibility for relief where the evidence reveals a

reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been

satisfied.’” Id. (quoting In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1308 (BIA 2000) (en

banc)). The statutory requirements a noncitizen must satisfy to be eligible for

cancellation of removal include “‘that removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child,’ who is a U.S. citizen

or lawful permanent resident.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 213 (2024)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)) (alteration in original).

To satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement of

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D), “the hardship must be out of the ordinary and exceedingly

uncommon” and “must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm.” Gonzalez-Juarez,

137 F.4th at 1006. Here, for three reasons, substantial evidence supports the

conclusion that Salcido Coronel failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that

the hardship to his children resulting from his removal would be exceptional and

extremely unusual.

First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion even when

considering Salcido Coronel’s son’s epilepsy. As the BIA noted, the medical

documents in the record and Salcido Coronel’s own declaration in support of his

3 motion indicate that his son has been seizure-free since 2010 and has not required

daily medication for his epilepsy since 2014.

Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion even when

considering Salcido Coronel’s daughter’s asthma. The BIA acknowledged his

daughter’s condition but concluded that Salcido Coronel’s asserted hardships,

collectively, did not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. Salcido

Coronel does not point to any evidence in the record that the BIA failed to consider

regarding his daughter’s asthma.

Finally, Salcido Coronel provided no supporting evidence establishing that

any financial or emotional hardship to his children would rise to the level of an

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzalez,

423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that emotional hardships on children

are “sadly common” when a noncitizen parent is removed).

Thus, because its findings are supported by substantial evidence, the BIA did

not abuse its discretion in its determination that Salcido Coronel failed to establish

prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1).

II

We lack jurisdiction to review the issue of whether the BIA abused its

discretion in not exercising its sua sponte authority to reopen Salcido Coronel’s

4 removal proceedings. The BIA “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own

motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). In the

absence of a “sufficiently meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s

decision,” we generally “do not have jurisdiction to review [a] claim that the BIA

should have exercised its sua sponte power” to reopen or reconsider. Ekimian v.

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). We retain

jurisdiction to review this “unfettered discretion” only in “instances where the

agency misconstrues the parameters of its sua sponte authority based on legal or

constitutional error.” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1237 (9th Cir. 2020). There

was no such error in this case. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

decision not to reopen Salcido Coronel’s proceedings sua sponte.

III

Given our conclusion that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in

determining that petitioner did not establish prima facie eligibility for cancellation

of removal and that we lack jurisdiction over the question of whether the BIA erred

in not reopening the proceedings sua sponte, we need not—and do not—reach any

other issue presented or argued by the parties.

PETITION DENIED.