OPINION
COCHRAN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by KELLER, P.J., MEYERS, PRICE, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, and HOLCOMB, JJ.
Appellant Albert Salazar was found guilty of five counts of molesting the younger brother and sister of a teenager to whom he gave music lessons. The court of appeals reversed one of the counts — that of aggravated sexual assault of the little boy — because it found that the only evidence of the assault was Mr. Salazar’s extrajudicial confession, which he repudiated at trial.
This, the court of appeals held, rendered the evidence insufficient under the
corpus delicti
rule which requires that an out-of-court confession be corroborated by some evidence that the offense actually was committed.
We granted review to consider the court’s application of that rule.
Because we find that the
corpus delicti
rule was indeed satisfied in this case, we reverse the court
of appeal’s decision, and reinstate the full judgment and sentence of the jury.
I.
Appellant, although a high school dropout, remained involved in school band. He volunteered with a middle school band and gave private music lessons to its members. In this capacity he met Joshua, the older brother of the two victims in this case. Appellant started giving Joshua saxophone lessons in 1997. Every Sunday appellant would come to Joshua’s apartment for the lessons. Joshua lived with his grandmother, his little brother Julian, and his little sister Alexandria (Alex). Alex and Julian were home alone one afternoon during the summer of 1998, while Joshua was out of town and their grandmother was at work. Though the music lessons were on hold for the summer, appellant, then age eighteen, came to the apartment. Finding the two children alone, appellant sexually molested both of them. Julian was only six years old at the time; Alex was seven. When confronted by police, appellant gave a written statement admitting that he had sexually abused both children.
Appellant was indicted on five counts: one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of indecency with a child. Appellant pled guilty to all but two of the five charges.
He pleaded “not guilty” to the attempted aggravated assault of Julian (by pulling down Julian’s underwear or by rubbing his penis on Julian’s buttock intending to cause his penis to contact or penetrate Julian’s anus) and the aggravated sexual assault of Julian (by causing Julian’s penis to penetrate his mouth). Appellant denied the attempted aggravated sexual assault charge against Julian and testified that, although he rubbed his penis on Julian’s behind, he did not have any intent for his penis to touch Julian’s anus. Appellant denied the aggravated assault charge and testified that, although he put Julian’s penis
on
his mouth, he did not put Julian’s penis
in
his mouth.
When asked why he had confessed in writing to putting Julian’s penis
in
his mouth, appellant said he simply mis
read the confession before he signed it. The jury evidently rejected appellant’s trial testimony and found him guilty on both counts.
On appeal, appellant argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the aggravated sexual assault count. Appellant contended that, although there was corroboration of the commission of the crime of aggravated sexual assault, there was no independent corroboration of the specific manner and means of committing that offense. That is, the State did not independently corroborate every jot and tittle of the specific manner in which he committed the offense as outlined in his written confession.
The court of appeals agreed and held that there was no independent evidence that appellant put Julian’s penis
in
his mouth, because at trial appellant testified that he only put Julian’s penis
on
his mouth. Julian’s outcry statement to his grandmother was that appellant “kissed” Julian’s penis, but at trial, Julian himself denied any oral sexual contact at all.
The court of appeals held that “[t]he jury received no evidence of the crime other than the out of court confession which appellant denies.”
Implicit in this holding is the notion that the
corpus delicti
rule is not satisfied unless the State presents evidence to corroborate every element and descriptive allegation in the indictment. The State argues that the court of appeals
misapprehends the
cot'pus delicti
rule. Rather than requiring independent corroboration of each element and descriptive allegation, the rule requires that there be some independent evidence tending to show the essential nature of the charged crime. We agree.
II.
The historical rationale for the common law
corpus delicti
corroboration rule is explained by Professors Perkins and Boyce.
The
corpus delicti
rule guarded against the shocking spectacle and deleterious effect upon the criminal justice system when a murder victim suddenly reappeared, hale and hearty, after his self-confessed murderer had been tried and executed.
Although such cases were far and few between,
they demonstrated that the old adage, “he wouldn’t have confessed unless he were guilty,” is not inevitably true. “The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”
Over time, the
corpus delicti
rule expanded to cover crimes other than murder.
Wigmore explains the American concept of the
corpus delicti
rule thus:
[Every crime] reveals three component parts,
first,
the
occurrence
of the specific kind of injury or loss (as in homicide, a person deceased; in arson, a house burnt; in larceny, property missing);
secondly,
somebody’s criminality (in contrast, e.g., to accident) as the source of the loss, — these two together involving the commission of a crime by
somebody;
and
thirdly,
the accused’s
identity
as the doer of this crime.
In most American jurisdictions, including Texas, the
corpus delicti
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OPINION
COCHRAN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by KELLER, P.J., MEYERS, PRICE, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, and HOLCOMB, JJ.
Appellant Albert Salazar was found guilty of five counts of molesting the younger brother and sister of a teenager to whom he gave music lessons. The court of appeals reversed one of the counts — that of aggravated sexual assault of the little boy — because it found that the only evidence of the assault was Mr. Salazar’s extrajudicial confession, which he repudiated at trial.
This, the court of appeals held, rendered the evidence insufficient under the
corpus delicti
rule which requires that an out-of-court confession be corroborated by some evidence that the offense actually was committed.
We granted review to consider the court’s application of that rule.
Because we find that the
corpus delicti
rule was indeed satisfied in this case, we reverse the court
of appeal’s decision, and reinstate the full judgment and sentence of the jury.
I.
Appellant, although a high school dropout, remained involved in school band. He volunteered with a middle school band and gave private music lessons to its members. In this capacity he met Joshua, the older brother of the two victims in this case. Appellant started giving Joshua saxophone lessons in 1997. Every Sunday appellant would come to Joshua’s apartment for the lessons. Joshua lived with his grandmother, his little brother Julian, and his little sister Alexandria (Alex). Alex and Julian were home alone one afternoon during the summer of 1998, while Joshua was out of town and their grandmother was at work. Though the music lessons were on hold for the summer, appellant, then age eighteen, came to the apartment. Finding the two children alone, appellant sexually molested both of them. Julian was only six years old at the time; Alex was seven. When confronted by police, appellant gave a written statement admitting that he had sexually abused both children.
Appellant was indicted on five counts: one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of indecency with a child. Appellant pled guilty to all but two of the five charges.
He pleaded “not guilty” to the attempted aggravated assault of Julian (by pulling down Julian’s underwear or by rubbing his penis on Julian’s buttock intending to cause his penis to contact or penetrate Julian’s anus) and the aggravated sexual assault of Julian (by causing Julian’s penis to penetrate his mouth). Appellant denied the attempted aggravated sexual assault charge against Julian and testified that, although he rubbed his penis on Julian’s behind, he did not have any intent for his penis to touch Julian’s anus. Appellant denied the aggravated assault charge and testified that, although he put Julian’s penis
on
his mouth, he did not put Julian’s penis
in
his mouth.
When asked why he had confessed in writing to putting Julian’s penis
in
his mouth, appellant said he simply mis
read the confession before he signed it. The jury evidently rejected appellant’s trial testimony and found him guilty on both counts.
On appeal, appellant argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the aggravated sexual assault count. Appellant contended that, although there was corroboration of the commission of the crime of aggravated sexual assault, there was no independent corroboration of the specific manner and means of committing that offense. That is, the State did not independently corroborate every jot and tittle of the specific manner in which he committed the offense as outlined in his written confession.
The court of appeals agreed and held that there was no independent evidence that appellant put Julian’s penis
in
his mouth, because at trial appellant testified that he only put Julian’s penis
on
his mouth. Julian’s outcry statement to his grandmother was that appellant “kissed” Julian’s penis, but at trial, Julian himself denied any oral sexual contact at all.
The court of appeals held that “[t]he jury received no evidence of the crime other than the out of court confession which appellant denies.”
Implicit in this holding is the notion that the
corpus delicti
rule is not satisfied unless the State presents evidence to corroborate every element and descriptive allegation in the indictment. The State argues that the court of appeals
misapprehends the
cot'pus delicti
rule. Rather than requiring independent corroboration of each element and descriptive allegation, the rule requires that there be some independent evidence tending to show the essential nature of the charged crime. We agree.
II.
The historical rationale for the common law
corpus delicti
corroboration rule is explained by Professors Perkins and Boyce.
The
corpus delicti
rule guarded against the shocking spectacle and deleterious effect upon the criminal justice system when a murder victim suddenly reappeared, hale and hearty, after his self-confessed murderer had been tried and executed.
Although such cases were far and few between,
they demonstrated that the old adage, “he wouldn’t have confessed unless he were guilty,” is not inevitably true. “The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”
Over time, the
corpus delicti
rule expanded to cover crimes other than murder.
Wigmore explains the American concept of the
corpus delicti
rule thus:
[Every crime] reveals three component parts,
first,
the
occurrence
of the specific kind of injury or loss (as in homicide, a person deceased; in arson, a house burnt; in larceny, property missing);
secondly,
somebody’s criminality (in contrast, e.g., to accident) as the source of the loss, — these two together involving the commission of a crime by
somebody;
and
thirdly,
the accused’s
identity
as the doer of this crime.
In most American jurisdictions, including Texas, the
corpus delicti
rule requires some corroboration of the first two elements — an injury or loss and a criminal agent — although it does not also require any independent evidence that the defendant was the criminal culprit.
Its purpose is to ensure that a person is not convicted of a crime that never occurred, based solely upon that person’s extra-judicial confession.
The rule was not intended, however, to ensure that all confessions are corroborated in specific details or to ensure that the suspect does not falsely confess to a crime that did occur but for
which he had no culpability.
Thus, it satisfies the
corpus delicti
rule if some. evidence exists outside of the extra-judicial confession which, considered alone or in connection with the confession, shows that the crime actually occurred.
III.
The issue in this case, then, is whether there was any independent evidence which, considered with the confession, proved that someone committed the crime of aggravated sexual assault upon the six-year-old boy. There was ample evidence of the crime, including:
1. Julian’s grandmother’s testimony, that Julian told her that appellant had kissed him “down there” and “on his private parts”;
2. Alex’s testimony, that appellant asked Julian if what he was doing “felt good”; and
3. Appellant’s in-court confession that he put Julian’s penis
on
his mouth.
This evidence fulfills the purpose of the
corpus delicti
rule. It assures that the very crime to which appellant confessed, and for which he was prosecuted, actually happened.
The fact that appellant testified that he put Julian’s penis
on
his mouth rather than putting the child’s private part
in
his mouth is irrelevant for purposes of the
corpus delicti
rule. The
corpus delicti
rule is satisfied by the State producing some independent evidence that someone had sexual contact with Julian’s private part and that the act was performed with criminal intent.
It is this independent evidence which distinguishes the present case from
Smith v. State,
the case on which the court of appeals relied. In
Smith,
this Court overturned a statutory rape conviction — despite the defendant’s extrajudicial confession — because at trial, both the defendant and the victim denied that the sexual act occurred.
In
Smith,
there was no other
independent evidence that a statutory rape had occurred on the day in question.
In this case, however, appellant told the jury that he had put Julian’s penis on his mouth, and Julian told his grandmother, who in turn told the jury, that appellant had “kissed” his private part. If the jury believed this evidence, as it clearly did, then there is ample evidence that the assault occurred, albeit in a slightly different manner than that described in appellant’s out-of-court confession. That the crime occurred in a slightly different manner than appellant described in his out-of-court statement is immaterial to the determination whether the
corpus delicti
rule has been satisfied. It has. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the full judgment and sentence of the trial court.
WOMACK, JJ., not participating.