Salazar v. District of Columbia

236 F. Supp. 3d 411, 2017 WL 712267, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24199
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 22, 2017
DocketCivil Action No. 1993-0452
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 236 F. Supp. 3d 411 (Salazar v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Salazar v. District of Columbia, 236 F. Supp. 3d 411, 2017 WL 712267, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24199 (D.D.C. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gladys Kessler, United States District Judge-

In 1993, Plaintiffs filed this Complaint alleging various statutory and Constitutional violations by the District of Columbia (“Defendants” or “District”) in the course of administering its Medicaid Program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq. The Plaintiffs have again alleged failure of the District to meet the dental needs of eligible children under the Medicaid Program and have filed this Motion to Enforce the Dental Order (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 2094].

Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition (“Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 2142], Reply (“Rep.”) [Dkt. No. 2165], Revised Opposition (“Rev. Opp”) [Dkt. No. 2173], and Supplemental Reply (“Sup. Rep.”) [Dkt. No. 2178], and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion- to Enforce is denied..

I. BACKGROUND

In 1996, after a lengthy bench trial, the Court found the District to be in violation of the Medicaid Act. See Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F.Supp. 278 (D.D.C. 1996), and issued a 56 page Opinion setting forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Government then took an appeal of the 1996 Order to the Court of Appeals. However, shortly before oral argument, the Parties decided to enter into a Settlement Order (“the 1999 Settlement Order”) [Dkt. No. 663]. Section 36 of the 1999 Settlement Order mandated that the District “shall provide or arrange for the provision of early and periodic, screening, diagnostic and treatment .services (“ESPDT”) when they are requested by or on behalf of children.” 1999 Settlement Order ¶ 36. A number, of its' requirements exceeded obligations imposed by federal law.

In 2004, the Plaintiffs again alleged violations of the Medicaid Act and Section 36 of the 1999 Settlement Order. The Court found the District to still be in violation of Section 36 obligating, the District-to provide EPSDT dental services, and entered the 2004 Dental Order [Dkt. No. 1033], which again included standards exceeding those required by federal law in order to ensure provision of dental services to the eligible children.

Between 2006 and 2012, the District filed various Motions, many of which asked the Court to vacate or modify the 2004 Dental Order, or to terminate the 1999 Settlement Order. See e.g. [Dkt-Nos. 1153, 1618, and 1627]. These Motions were either denied or withdrawn. On April 20, 2012, at the request of the Parties, the Court entered an Order referring the case for mediation [Dkt. No. 1790]. The Parties mediated in good faith from July 2012 to August 2014, but, unfortunately, were unable to reach a final agreement. Rev. Opp. at 5.

*413 From 1999 until the present time, Plaintiffs and the District of Columbia have been working diligently, overcoming many obstacles in their way, including the difficult transition to Obamacare, to ensure that the children of the District were receiving the services to which they were entitled under the various provisions in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq, and accompanying regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 430, et seq.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District Courts have the authority to enforce the terms of their mandates. See The Fund for Animals v. Norton, 390 F.Supp.2d 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2005). A motion to; enforce may be granted when a “plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant has not complied with a judgment entered against it.” Heartland Hosp. v. Thompson, 328 F.Supp.2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2004). A motion to enforce should be denied if a plaintiff “has received all relief required by that prior judgment.” Id. (citing Watkins v. Washington, 511 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Violated Paragraph 80 of the Settlement Order

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Motion to' Enforce violates Paragraph 80 of the Settlement Order which requires that

Before any party moves the Court to enforce or construe this Order ... it shall give the other party 10 days’ notice of its intention. During that 10 day period, the parties shall negotiate in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute without seeking a decision from the Court before filing it.

The District admits that Plaintiffs gave it 10 days’ notice before filing the Motion to Enforce. However, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to negotiate in good faith in an effort tO' resolve this dispute without the involvement of the Court. In light of the two years of good faith, but unsuccessful, mediation which preceded the filing of Plaintiffs’ Motion,, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not violated Section 80 of the Settlement Order.

B, The Major Provisions of the 2004 Dental Order

In its Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, the District set forth the major. requirements contained in the 2004 Dental Order, which includes both preventive and therapeutic dental services. The following is an overview of all those requirements:

The 2004 Dental Order provides that the District must create a detailed dental periodicity schedule that sets forth the ages and frequency that dental services should be provided to children, and to distribute this schedule to all managed care organizations (MCOs), dentists, and pediatric health care providers. In addition, the Dental Order requires the District to submit a yearly CAP with detailed information.concerning the provision of EPSDT dental services. In the CAP, the District must address the. current number of providers of. dental EPSDT services and the District’s efforts to maintain a sufficient number of those providers who are willing to and able to provide dental services to EPSDT-eligible children., The CAP also must address reimbursement rates and streamlining of administrative proceedings to encourage greater provider participation. Id, The District must include detailed information concerning available providers, including names, addresses, and telephone numbers. Id. Moreover, the District must report steps taken to ensure training, skills, and knowledge of providers to *414 deliver EPSDT dental services. Under the CAP, the District annually must distribute a provider bulletin to licensed dentists and pediatric health care providers describing dental health education and discussing guidance regarding oral hygiene for various ages and categories. Id. The District must describe its efforts to coordinate activities and communication among the D.C. Department of Health Care Finance (DHCF), MCOs, dentists, pediatric care providers, and the Department of Health’s (DOH) Oral Health Program.

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Bluebook (online)
236 F. Supp. 3d 411, 2017 WL 712267, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/salazar-v-district-of-columbia-dcd-2017.