Salah Mohsen Ahmed Mohsen v. William Derevere, Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility; Kristi Noem, Director, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Patrick Divver, Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement San Diego Field Office

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 1, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02138
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 SALAH MOHSEN AHMED MOHSEN, No. 25cv2138-BTM-DEB

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 13 A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14

15 WILLIAM DEREVERE, Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility; 16 KRISTI NOEM, Director, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; TODD 17 LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 18 and Patrick DIVVER, Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement San Diego Field Office,

20 Respondents.

22 23 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Salah Mohsen Ahmed Mohsen’s petition for 24 a writ of habeas corpus. 25 A. Background 26 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Yemen, arrived at the Mexico-U.S. border in 27 2019. Petitioner was required to wait in Mexico under a metering system. In February 28 2022, Petitioner presented an application for parole at the border. Petitioner was detained 1 without an adjudication of his application. In March 2022, Petitioner filed a petition for a 2 writ of habeas corpus. 3 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in response granted Petitioner 4 parole. Petitioner thus voluntarily dismissed his habeas petition. On December 15, 2022, 5 USCIS dismissed Petitioner’s asylum application without his consent. Petitioner moved 6 to reopen his application. That request is still pending. 7 While on parole, Petitioner received employment authorization and started a 8 business. Petitioner married a U.S. citizen. Petitioner was awaiting the adjudication of 9 his application for asylum. At a “check-in” with immigration officials on July 21, 2025, 10 Petitioner was detained. Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear. Petitioner was 11 told that his parole was revoked. 12 Petitioner claims that his parole was unlawfully terminated. Petitioner contends 13 that Respondents failed to follow the mandatory requirements for revocation of parole. 14 The Government claims that this Court lacks jurisdiction. The Government 15 contends that Petitioner is properly detained because his parole now expired. The 16 Government argues that Petitioner is an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 17 Thus, in the Government’s view, Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing and his 18 detention is mandatory. 19 B. Discussion 20 Whether there is jurisdiction to review the revocation of parole depends on 21 whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exercised its discretion when 22 revoking parole. See Hassan v. Chertoff, 593 F.3d 785, 789-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (per 23 curiam) (finding no jurisdiction over discretionary decision to revoke parole because 24 DHS followed the regulations at issue); see also Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824, 2025 25 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194953, *15-24 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (maintaining jurisdiction to 26 review lawfulness of parole revocation); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-CV-04212, 2025 27 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160866, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025) (“[T]he Court finds that § 28 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude the Court from reviewing the lawfulness of the 1 revocation of Petitioner’s parole.”); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, ____ (D. 2 Or. 2025) (“[T]he Review Statute and the Parole Statute do not preclude this District 3 Court from reviewing whether the decision to terminate Petitioner’s parole was lawful.”). 4 There will be jurisdiction if DHS failed to follow the law when revoking parole. Because 5 that issue is ripe for review, Petitioner is not required to further exhaust any potential 6 administrative remedies. The Government has also waived the issue of exhaustion by 7 raising it in a footnote. See United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1015 n.8 (9th Cir. 8 2020) (finding an issue in a footnote insufficiently raised). In any event, exhaustion 9 would be futile because of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). 10 Congress allows for the revocation of parole “when the purposes of such parole 11 shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served.” 8 U.S.C. 12 § 1182(d)(5)(A). When the Secretary so opines, “the alien shall forthwith return or be 13 returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue 14 to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the 15 United States.” Id. Under regulations, the Secretary has delegated the decision making 16 to various officials. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(a) (listing the officials). 17 Due process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate 18 official on whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of the 19 reasons for the termination; and (3) a fair opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the 20 termination. See Noori, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194953, *29 (“Petitioner was entitled to 21 due process in his parole revocation. Particularly, he was entitled to both notification of 22 revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to be heard and 23 contest the determination.”); Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at ____ (“[A]s a noncitizen with 24 connections in the United States who is no longer at the threshold of initial entry, 25 Petitioner is entitled to due process rights.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 26 Here, Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole without making the finding set forth 27 in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Respondents have not submitted evidence showing that the 28 Secretary or a designee found that the purposes of Petitioner’s parole have been served. 1 | The revocation of Petitioner’s parole is thus neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 2 | 1182(d)(5)(A) nor the demands of due process. See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d 3 | (explaining that 1182(d)(5)(A) “has a mandatory requirement—parole may be terminated 4 | or revoked only when in the Secretary’s opinion the parole’s purposes have been met’). 5 | The Court adopts and incorporates the reasoning from Y-Z-L-H and Noori. 6 Although Respondents contend that Petitioner’s parole has since expired, 7 | Respondents have failed to adequately show that Petitioner’s parole did in fact expire. 8 | Because nothing in the record adequately demonstrates that Petitioner’s parole was 9 | expired or lawfully revoked, Petitioner is entitled to reinstatement of his parole. 10 C. Conclusion 11 For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. 12 | Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody on the preexisting 13 | conditions of supervision. Petitioner’s parole is reinstated. The Court retains jurisdiction 14 | to enforce the Writ. Respondents shall file a status report demonstrating compliance no 15 | later than December 3, 2025. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 | Dated: December 1, 2025 _ 18 La Fil pence Honorable Barry Ted Moskowit 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28