Saguftabanu Momin v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 SAGUFTABANU MOMIN, Case No. 1:26-cv-02003-JLT-SAB-HC

10 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 11 v. CORPUS

12 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,

13 Respondents.

14 15 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 16 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 17 I. 18 BACKGROUND 19 Petitioner is a native of India who entered the United States without inspection in January 20 1997. (ECF No. 1 at 2.1) On December 20, 2004, Petitioner filed a Form I-485 application to 21 adjust her status to that of a permanent resident, and the United States Citizenship and 22 Immigration Services (“USCIS”) approved the application. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 10-1 at 7.) 23 Thereafter, Petitioner filed an application for naturalization with USCIS, the application was 24 approved, and Petitioner was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on August 1, 2014.2 (ECF No. 1 at 2; 25 ECF No. 10-1 at 7.) 26 1 Page numbers refer to ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page. 27 2 Under Indian law, Indian citizens who naturalize to another country are automatically denaturalized as Indian citizens. Thus, when Petitioner became a naturalized U.S. citizen on August 1, 2014, she simultaneously 1 Petitioner pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 2 Georgia to unlawful procurement of citizenship, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425, and 3 conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The conspiracy related to the importation and sale of 4 misbranded male enhancement pills containing undeclared active pharmaceutical ingredients. 5 (ECF No. 10-1 at 44–54, 62–77.) On February 12, 2021, Petitioner was sentenced to an 6 imprisonment term of eighteen months and three years of supervised release. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7 56–58.) On February 23, 2021, Petitioner’s U.S. citizenship was revoked. (ECF No. 10-1 at 41– 8 42.) 9 Petitioner completed her sentence and was released from the custody of the Federal 10 Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in or around August 2022. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On January 27, 2025, 11 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 12 § 1226(a). (Id.; ECF No. 10-1 at 7, 8, 22, 25.) On March 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a bond request. 13 (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On March 14, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied bond, finding 14 Petitioner was a danger to the community and flight risk. (ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 10-1 at 11.) 15 On April 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the bond denial with the Stewart 16 Immigration Court in Georgia. (ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 10-1 at 3.) 17 On July 10, 2025, Petitioner was transferred from the Stewart Detention Center to the 18 Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center in Bakersfield, California. Jurisdiction was transferred to the 19 Adelanto Immigration Court. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) On August 6, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion for 20 a decision on the April 14, 2025 motion for reconsideration of the denial of bond with the 21 Adelanto Immigration Court in California. On August 19, 2025, the Stewart Immigration Court 22 in Georgia ruled on Petitioner’s April 14, 2025 motion and denied reconsideration. (ECF No. 1 at 23 3; ECF No. 10-1 at 14–17.) 24 On October 4, 2025, Petitioner was transferred from the Mesa Verde ICE Processing 25 Center to the California City Detention Facility where she is currently detained. (ECF No. 1 at 4, 26 15.) On October 24, 2025, Petitioner filed a bond request but withdrew the request on November 27 4, 2025 in light of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filing a new charging 1 On January 28, 2026, Petitioner filed a new bond request, and on January 29, 2026, the 2 immigration court set the hearing date for February 4, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) On February 3, 3 2026, DHS filed 251 pages of documents into the bond record. At the bond hearing on February 4 4, 2026, the IJ accepted the documents into the record, found Petitioner to be a flight risk and a 5 danger to the community, and denied bond. (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 10-1 at 19.) 6 On March 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for 7 temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The district judge denied the motion for 8 TRO as untimely and “refer[red] the matter to the assigned magistrate judge for a determination 9 on the merits.” (ECF No. 6.) On April 7, 2026, Respondents filed an answer, and Petitioner filed 10 a reply on April 14, 2026. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.) 11 II. 12 DISCUSSION 13 A. Pre-Deprivation Hearing 14 In the second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that her “continued detention without a 15 pre-deprivation hearing before she was entered into ICE custody on January 27, 2025, violated 16 due process” and that “for such hearings to comply with due process, the government must bear 17 the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight 18 risk or danger to the community.” (ECF No. 1 at 36.) 19 Petitioner contends that “[f]ederal district courts in California have repeatedly recognized 20 the demands of due process and the limitations on DHS’s authority to revoke a noncitizen’s bond 21 or parole set out in DHS’s stated practice and Matter of Sugay both require a pre-deprivation 22 hearing for a noncitizen on bond, like Ms. Momin before ICE re-detains her.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) 23 However, the cases cited by Petitioner to support her contention are distinguishable from the 24 instant matter because Petitioner was not detained by immigration officials, released on bond or 25 recognizance, rearrested, and then detained pursuant to a mandatory detention provision. Here, 26 Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 27 The provision at issue in this case, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, provides the general process for arresting and detaining aliens who are present in the United States and eligible 1 aliens.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). Section 1226(a) establishes the “default rule,” id., giving the Attorney 2 General “broad discretion” over detention matters, Nielsen v. Preap, ––– U.S. ––– –, 139 S. Ct. 954, 956, 203 L.Ed.2d 333 (2019). This provision authorizes the 3 Attorney General, in his discretion, to arrest and detain aliens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 4 1226(a).

5 For these individuals, the Attorney General can either “continue to detain the arrested alien,” or “may release the alien on (A) bond of at least $1,500 ... or (B) 6 conditional parole.” Id. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). When a person is apprehended under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial custody determination. 8 C.F.R. § 7 236.1(c)(8). The alien will be released if he “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and 8 that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Id.

9 . . .

10 . . . Under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may request a bond hearing before an IJ at any time before a removal order becomes final. See 8 11 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19. If at this hearing the detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of the evidence that he is not “a threat to national security, a 12 danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk,” the IJ will order his release. Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 13 (B.I.A. 2006); see also Matter of Barreiros, 10 I. & N. Dec. 536, 537–38 (B.I.A. 1964). The IJ considers various factors in making this determination, including 14 the individual's ties to the United States as well as his employment history, criminal record, history of immigration violations, and manner of entry into this 15 country. Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40. The IJ also decides whether bond or other conditions on the alien's release are appropriate. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 16 1226(a)(2). The detainee may be represented by counsel and can submit evidence in support of his claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b); Matter of Fatahi, 26 I. & N. 17 Dec. 791, 792 (B.I.A. 2016). He can also appeal an adverse decision to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3). 18 On top of this, an individual detained pursuant to § 1226(a) may request an 19 additional bond hearing whenever he experiences a material change in circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The same procedures apply to this new 20 hearing, and its outcome is also appealable to the BIA. See generally id. § 1003.19. By contrast, § 1226(c) on its face offers no opportunity for release on 21 bond. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 23 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2022). 24 “The detention of aliens during removal proceedings has long been upheld as a 25 permissible exercise of the political branches’ authority over immigration. Section 1226(a) offers 26 substantial procedural protections to detained persons,” and the Ninth Circuit has held that 27 “§ 1226(a)’s procedures satisfy due process[.]” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1213. Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that due process requires the government to justify 1 detention under § 1226(a) by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1210–12. Accordingly, the 2 Court recommends denying the second claim for relief. 3 B. Prolonged Detention Without Bond Hearing 4 In the third claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that she “has been detained for over 13 5 months without a bond hearing in violation of Due Process.” (ECF No. 1 at 37.) Petitioner’s 6 assertion that she has not had a bond hearing is incorrect. As noted in the petition itself, 7 Petitioner received bond hearings on March 14, 2025 and February 4, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 4, 5.) 8 Accordingly, the Court recommends denying the third claim for relief. To the extent that 9 Petitioner’s argument is that she has been detained without a constitutionally adequate bond 10 hearing, the Court addresses the adequacy of Petitioner’s February 4, 2026 bond hearing in 11 section II(C)(3), infra. 12 C. February 4, 2026 Bond Hearing 13 In the fourth claim for relief, Petitioner challenges the adequacy of the February 4, 2026 14 bond hearing held by the immigration court. Specifically, Petitioner argues that (1) DHS’s last- 15 minute entry of 251 pages of documents into the record the day before the bond hearing violated 16 due process, and (2) the immigration court’s cursory examination of the evidence before entry 17 into the record and denying Petitioner bond violated due process. (ECF No. 1 at 22–27, 38–39.) 18 1. Jurisdiction 19 Respondents contend that “[t]o the extent the petition challenges the IJ’s discretionary 20 findings, those claims cannot be reviewed,” citing to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). (ECF No. 10 at 5.) 21 “Although § 1226(e) restricts jurisdiction in the federal courts in some respects, it does not limit 22 habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 23 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). Section “1226(e) does not strip a district court of its traditional 24 habeas jurisdiction, ‘bar constitutional challenge[s]’ or preclude a district court from addressing 25 a habeas petition ‘challeng[ing] the statutory framework that permits [the petitioner’s] detention 26 without bail.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 27 (2003)). Accordingly, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the petition, and dismissal is 1 2. Exhaustion 2 Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust 3 administrative remedies. (ECF No. 10 at 5–8.) 4 As a prudential matter, habeas petitioners must exhaust available judicial and administrative remedy remedies before seeking relief. 28 U.S.C § 2241; see also 5 Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 (2006). Courts may 6 require exhaustion as a prudential matter when “(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper 7 decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the 8 agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 9 quotations omitted). If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then “a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the 10 petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 11 2011).

12 However, because exhaustion is not jurisdictional, the requirement may be waived if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of 13 administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury would result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 14 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). “The party moving the court to waive prudential exhaustion 15 requirements bears the burden of demonstrating that at least one of these Laing factors applies.” Aden v. Nielsen, No. C18-1441RSL, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 16 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019). 17 Singh v. Warden, No. 1:26-CV-00172-JLT-EPG, 2026 WL 1328508, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 18 2026). 19 Here, the appeal period has expired and thus, appealing to the BIA would be futile. 20 Further, “district courts in the Ninth Circuit note that the unprecedented delays in the BIA 21 appeals process necessarily mean that Petitioners will suffer irreparable injury if required to wait 22 for a BIA decision before being permitted to file a habeas claim.” Singh, 2026 WL 1328508, at 23 *4 (citing Soriano v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-CV-00900-DGE, 2026 WL 969764 at *4 (W.D. 24 Wash. Apr. 10, 2026); Scott v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-cv-1819, 2025 WL 3514304, at *4 (W.D. 25 Wash. Dec. 8, 2025)). Accordingly, the Court recommends waiving the prudential exhaustion 26 requirement in this instance. 27 3. Analysis 1 alien must also show prejudice—that his rights were violated in a manner so as potentially to 2 affect the outcome of the proceedings.” Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 4 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (subjecting due process violations in immigration proceedings to 5 harmless error review); Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). 6 Here, Petitioner asserts that DHS’s last-minute submission of 251 pages of documents the 7 day before the bond hearing and the immigration court’s cursory examination of the evidence 8 before entry into the record and denying Petitioner’s request for bond violated due process. (ECF 9 No. 1 at 22–27, 38–39.) Petitioner argues that “[d]ue to the extremely late submission, 10 Petitioner’s counsel at that hearing had no opportunity to contest the improper entry of 11 evidence,” (ECF No. 1 at 24), but the “Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply strictly in 12 immigration removal proceedings.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1209 (“reject[ing] Singh’s argument that 13 his due process rights were violated when the IJ admitted his unauthenticated RAP sheet into 14 evidence”). 15 Petitioner also argues that “[d]ue to Petitioner’s counsel’s prevailing on their September 16 8, 2025, argument that Respondents had violated Ms. Momin’s due process rights with improper 17 service, thus justifying another constitutionally compliant hearing, it strains credulity to think 18 that Respondents were not aware that last-minute service is violative of due process.” (ECF No. 19 1 at 24.) The “September 8, 2025, argument” appears to have concerned a new charging 20 document and master calendar hearing. (Id. at 4.) “Bond hearings and removal hearings are 21 separate proceedings and serve separate purposes[,]” and “[b]ond hearings . . . are far less formal 22 than removal hearings.” Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1247, 1243 (9th Cir. 2010). 23 Further, Petitioner does not elaborate on how earlier submission of DHS’s bond 24 documents or a more detailed examination of the evidence by the immigration judge would have 25 potentially affected the outcome of the bond hearing. In the order denying bond, the IJ stated: 26 [Petitioner] is a danger to the community. [Petitioner] was convicted in District Court of conspiracy to deliver undeclared drugs with active pharmaceuticals. In 27 the alternative, [Petitioner] is a significant flight risk such that no amount of bond or conditions would ensure her future court appearances. [Petitioner] has engaged 1 naturalization unlawfully. The deception continued on with obtaining a driver’s license under someone else’s identity. Further, she has presented inconsistent 2 information regarding her familial ties. 3 (ECF No. 10-1 at 19.) Petitioner does not point to any documents submitted that the IJ 4 overlooked in her “cursory” examination and does not allege that the IJ improperly relied on any 5 unreliable evidence. Earlier submission of the DHS bond documents presumably would have 6 allowed Petitioner and her counsel additional time to prepare and gather evidence, but Petitioner 7 does not identify what additional evidence, testimony, or argument she and her counsel were 8 prevented from presenting due to the last-minute submission of the DHS documents. As 9 Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice, the Court recommends denying the fourth claim for 10 relief. 11 D. Substantive Due Process 12 In the first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that she “is not a flight risk or danger to the 13 community,” her “detention is punitive as it bears no ‘reasonable relation’ to any legitimate 14 government purpose,” and thus, her detention is “unjustified and lawful” and “in violation of the 15 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (ECF No. 1 at 35.) 16 “As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to 17 the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 18 739, 746 (1987) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)). “A due process violation 19 occurs when detention becomes punitive rather than regulatory, meaning there is no regulatory 20 purpose that can rationally be assigned to the detention or the detention appears excessive in 21 relation to its regulatory purpose.” United States v. Torres, 995 F.3d 695, 708 (9th Cir. 2021) 22 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747). “The point at which detention constitutes a due process 23 violation requires a case-by-case analysis.” Torres, 995 F.3d at 708 (citing United States v. 24 Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358, 359–60 (9th Cir. 1988)). 25 In Martinez Leiva v. Becerra, the petitioner raised a substantive due process claim, 26 arguing that his detention had “become unconstitutionally punitive, as: (1) it does not serve any 27 nonpunitive governmental interest because he is not a flight risk or danger to his community; (2) it is excessive in relation to any governmental interest; and (3) its duration exceeds the bounds of 1 due process.” Martinez Leiva v. Becerra, No. 23-CV-02027-CRB, 2023 WL 3688097, at *5 2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2023) (footnote omitted). The district court rejected the petitioner’s 3 arguments, stating “that is what bond hearings are for.” Id. 4 Here, as set forth in section II(C)(3), supra, Petitioner has not demonstrated that her 5 February 2, 2026 bond hearing was constitutionally inadequate. At the hearing, the IJ determined 6 that Petitioner is a danger to the community based on her conviction for “conspiracy to deliver 7 undeclared drugs with active pharmaceuticals” and “a significant flight risk” given “a pattern of 8 disrespect for US law,” including conviction for “procuring naturalization unlawfully” and 9 “obtaining a driver’s license under someone else’s identity.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 19.) “The 10 detention of aliens during removal proceedings has long been upheld as a permissible exercise of 11 the political branches’ authority over immigration,” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, and as the 12 IJ has concluded that Petitioner is a danger and flight risk,3 the Court recommends denying the 13 first claim for relief. See Romero-Romero v. Wofford, No. 1:24-CV-00944 JLT SKO (HC), 2025 14 WL 3154399 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (rejecting substantive due process claim of petitioner 15 detained under § 1226(c) for three years who had been afforded bond hearings, bond reviews, 16 and appeals), adopting report and recommendation as modified, 2025 WL 391861 (E.D. Cal. 17 Feb. 4, 2025). 18 III. 19 RECOMMENDATIONS 20 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of 21 habeas corpus be DENIED. 22 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 23 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 24 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 25 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file

26 3 To the extent that Petitioner challenges the IJ’s dangerousness and flight risk determination, a federal court applies an abuse of discretion standard under which “we cannot reweigh evidence ... [but] can [only] determine whether the 27 [IJ] applied the correct legal standard.” Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (last alteration added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014)). Petitioner does 1 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 2 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 3 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 4 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate 5 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 6 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 7 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 8 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le 11 | Dated: _ May 28, 2026 STANLEY A. BOONE 12 United States Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28