Sagicor Life Insurance Company v. Kevin Jang

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 19, 2024
• Docket: 23-55528
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 19 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAGICOR LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, No. 23-55528 a Texas corporation; et al., D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellees, 5:19-cv-02028-JGB-KK

v. MEMORANDUM* KEVIN JANG, an individual; KEVIN H. JANG LAW CORPORATION, a California corporation,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

DANIEL JANG, an individual; DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15, 2024** Pasadena, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: BADE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and CURIEL,*** District Judge.

Kevin Jang and Kevin H. Jang Law Corporation (collectively, Appellants)

appeal two evidentiary decisions made at their trial. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Appellants waived both of their claims because their arguments are devoid of

explanation, record citations, and support from legal authorities. See, e.g.,

Blumenkron v. Multnomah County, 91 F.4th 1303, 1317 (9th Cir. 2024) (concluding

that the plaintiffs abandoned their claims on appeal because their argument was

“vague, unsupported by any citations to case authority, and untethered to the

applicable legal standards”).“We will not do an appellant’s work . . . either by

manufacturing its legal arguments, or by combing the record on its behalf for factual

support.” W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 678 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 2012).

In arguing their first issue on appeal—the exclusion of evidence related to the

insured’s cause of death—Appellants did not cite a single legal authority. Even if

we were to reach the merits of this issue, the argument would fail. The district court

determined that the evidence was irrelevant based on its previous finding that

Appellants initiated litigation without probable cause and its instruction to the jury

that Appellees had a right not to pay the death benefit regardless of the cause of

*** The Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

2 death. We agree that the likelihood this evidence would confuse the issues

outweighed any probative value it had. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The argument on the second issue—Appellees’ expert’s testimony—is

likewise unsupported, and itself is quite muddled. At best, Appellants contends that

the expert testimony about “whether the underlying action was maliciously

prosecuted and [the] resulting damages, and reasonableness of the attorney’s

fees/costs incurred” was not relevant or reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702

and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and that, even if it

was, it should have been excluded under Rule 403. Appellants repeatedly cite the

same pages of trial transcript that do not contain any expert testimony about malice.

Because Appellants fail to identify the precise testimony they are challenging we

cannot reasonably review this issue and we deem it waived.

AFFIRMED.1

1 Appellee’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 18) is denied as moot.