Safeco Insurance Company Of America v. RIP VAN 899, LLC

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF 4 AMERICA, Case No. 2:23-cv-01417-ART-NJK 5 Plaintiff, v. ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 6 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE RIP VAN 899, LLC, et al., PLEADINGS 7 Defendants. 8 9 Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America 10 (Safeco) brings this suit against Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Rip Van 899, 11 LLC (Rip Van), seeking a declaration that it is not required to provide for 12 representation of Rip Van in an ongoing state court tort litigation. Rip Van brings 13 counter claims alleging that Safeco acted unfairly in its handling of a Landlord 14 Insurance Policy under which Rip Van claims coverage. 15 Before the Court is Safeco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF 16 No. 27.) The Court grants that motion in part and denies it in part, for the reasons 17 identified below. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Rip Van is an LLC wholly owned and operated by Dooley Tu. (ECF Nos. 1 20 at ¶ 4; 14 at ¶ 7.) Rip Van owns a property at 2913 Black Forest Dr., in Las Vegas, 21 NV (the Black Forest Property). (ECF No. 14 at ¶ 14.) Tu is not named on any 22 ownership documents related to the property and has not held herself out as an 23 owner of that property. (Id. at ¶ 18.) In February 2020, Rip Van rented the Black 24 Forest Property to Tania Guzman. (ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 17; 14 at ¶ 19.) Unbeknownst 25 to Van and Tu, Guzman began operating a business out of the property, called 26 Compassionate Heart Services (CHS). (ECF No. 14 at ¶ 20.) CHS is alleged to be 27 a “halfway house” for people who have been discharged from mental health 28 facilities. (Id.) On December 31, 2020, a patient of CHS, Christopher Brown, 1 drowned in a pool located at the Black Forest property. (Id. at ¶ 22.) On July 12, 2 2022, Brown’s estate brought claims in state court against Guzman, CHS, and 3 Rip Van alleging nine causes of action, including negligence and wrongful death. 4 (ECF No. 1-1.) Tu was later named as a defendant. (ECF No. 27 at 4 n.4.) 5 Safeco and Tu are parties to a “Landlord Insurance Policy” that provides 6 premises liability coverage for the Black Forest Property. (ECF No. 1-2 at 11.) Rip 7 Van is not a named party to that contract, even though it owns the property 8 covered by the contract and is, for all intents and purposes, the sole landlord of 9 the property. (Id.) 10 On September 11, 2023, Safeco brought litigation in this court, naming Rip 11 Van and the estate of Christopher Brown as defendants and seeking a declaration 12 that the Landlord Policy does not require it to represent Rip Van in the underlying 13 state court litigation.1 (ECF No. 1.) Rip Van then brought counterclaims against 14 Safeco and others, alleging 10 causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach 15 of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Unjust Enrichment; 16 (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; (5) Bad Faith; (6) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (7) 17 Civil Conspiracy; (8) Equitable Estoppel; (9) Declaratory Relief; (10) Respondeat 18 Superior. (ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 29-93.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Parties to federal litigation are entitled to seek judgment on the pleadings 21 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is 22 “functionally identical” to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 24 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, “[i]n reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings 25 pursuant to Rule 12(c), the court ‘must accept all factual allegations in the 26 complaint [and counterclaims] as true and construe them in the light most 27 1 Safeco does not dispute that it is required to represent Tu, since her name is on the 28 contract. (ECF No. 27 at 4 n.4.) 1 favorable to the non-moving party.’” Lopez v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 2 301 F. Supp. 3d 78, 83 n.6 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 3 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)). “‘[J]udgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking 4 all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party 5 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 6 486 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007)). To survive a motion for judgment on the 7 pleadings, a claimant’s complaint must give fair notice of a legally cognizable 8 claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 9 555 (2007). “A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory 10 allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a violation 11 is plausible, not just possible.” Insco v. Aetna Health & Life Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 12 2d 1180, 1185 (D. Nev. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 559 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Safeco makes three sets of arguments in its motion. First, it argues that 15 the Landlord Policy does not cover Rip Van. This issue is potentially dispositive 16 of Safeco’s claim for declaratory judgment and Rip Van’s counterclaims for breach 17 of contract (Claim 1), breach of the implied covenant (Claim 2), bad faith (Claim 18 5), and declaratory relief (Claim 9). Second, Safeco argues that, even if the 19 Landlord Policy covers Rip Van, Rip Van cannot be said to have acted in bad faith. 20 This issue is potentially dispositive of Rip Van’s counterclaims for breach of the 21 implied covenant (Claim 2) and bad faith (Claim 5). Finally, Safeco argues that 22 none of Rip Van’s remaining counterclaims are cognizable under Nevada Law or 23 that Rip Van has failed to properly state those claims. This issue is potentially 24 dispositive of Rip Van’s remaining claims, which include unjust enrichment 25 (Claim 3), negligent misrepresentation (Claim 4), breach of fiduciary duty (Claim 26 6), civil conspiracy (Claim 7), equitable estoppel (Claim 8), and respondeat 27 superior (Claim 10). 28 A. COVERAGE UNDER THE CONTRACT 1 Safeco makes two arguments for why the Landlord Policy does not cover 2 Rip Van. First, it argues that the Policy only covers parties named in the contract, 3 and Rip Van is not a named party. Second, it argues that, even if Rip Van were a 4 named party, the contract’s exception for damages related to the provision of 5 “professional services” would bar Rip Van from asserting coverage. 6 1. Named Parties 7 Safeco is correct that the Landlord Policy does not cover Rip Van, on its 8 face. The Policy provides premises liability coverage only to the “insured.” (ECF 9 No. 5-2 at 31.) The Policy defines “insured” as (1) the named insured shown in 10 the policy’s declarations; (2) their relatives residing in their home; (3) persons 11 under the age of 21 who are under the care of either of the above. (Id. at 36 12 (defining “insured”), 29 (defining “you”).) It is uncontested Rip Van does not fall 13 into any of these categories. 14 Even though Rip Van is not entitled to coverage on the face of the Landlord 15 Policy, it has alleged facts that, if true, would entitle it to reformation of the Policy 16 under the doctrine articulated in Nolm, LLC v. County of Clark. 100 P.3d 658, 17 661-63 (Nev. 2004). In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court held that 18 reformation was an appropriate remedy where one party had made a unilateral 19 mistake as to a central provision of a contract, that mistake was not the result of 20 gross negligence, and the non-mistaken party knew of the mistake and failed to 21 disclose it. Id. The court held that it was irrelevant which party bore the risk of 22 mistake. Id. at 740. 23 Here, Rip Van alleges that it and Tu intended Rip Van to be the named 24 party on the Policy and that Safeco knew of their intention and purposefully left 25 Tu as the named insured. (ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 16, 78.) To support this allegation, 26 Rip Van alleges that (1) the Policy refers to itself as a “Landlord Policy” (ECF No. 27 5-2 at 3); (2) Rip Van is the sole owner and landlord of the property in question, 28 and Safeco knew this fact (ECF No. 14 at ¶ 18); (3) insurance companies like 1 Safeco have a practice when selling landlord policies of confirming that the 2 insured actually owns the covered property (id. at ¶ 14); (4) Payne and Legacy 3 were agents of Safeco (id. at ¶ 90); (5) Payne and Legacy were specifically 4 instructed to buy a policy that would insure the property in question (id. at ¶¶ 5 11-13, 15-16). 6 Read in a light most favorable to Rip Van, its alleged unilateral mistake was 7 not a result of gross negligence. See Nolm, 100 P.3d at 662 (finding no gross 8 negligence when county plaintiff inadvertently sold a larger parcel of land than it 9 intended because “the sale was the result of multiple County departments 10 attempting to coordinate their respective duties, the County departments were in 11 a period of flux and the sale of the remnant parcels was assigned to a division 12 that had never before conducted such sales”); see also Hart v. Kline, 116 P.2d 13 672, 674 (Nev. 1941) (defining gross negligence as “substantially and appreciably 14 higher in magnitude and more culpable than ordinary negligence” and 15 “equivalent to the failure to exercise even a slight degree of care”). Further, Rip 16 Van’s allegations are sufficient to support a claim for reformation under Nevada 17 law. 18 2. Professional Services Exception 19 Safeco next argues that, even if Rip Van were covered under the Landlord 20 Policy, the policy’s “professional services” exception would bar coverage in this 21 case. 22 The professional services exception states that Safeco will not provide 23 liability coverage for “bodily injury or property damage . . . arising out of the 24 rendering or failing to render professional services.” (ECF No. 5 at ¶ 32.) 25 “Professional services” is not defined in the contract, and the parties disagree 26 about whether the accident in question (Christopher Brown drowning at the 27 Black Forest Property while arguably under Guzman and CHS’s care) constituted 28 a “fail[ure] to render professional services.” 1 Safeco is not entitled to judgment on this issue. Even if the Court were to 2 hold that the phrase “fail[ure] to render professional services” is unambiguous 3 and to adopt Safeco’s definition of professional services as “an[y] activity done for 4 remuneration,” a reasonable juror could conclude that Christopher Brown’s 5 death did not arise out of a failure to render professional services. (ECF No. 35 at 6 6 (citing Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, No. 98-55052, 1999 WL 1073821 (9th 7 Cir. 1999)).) There is a discrepancy in the pleadings as to whether CHS was a 8 halfway house or something closer to a medical establishment. (Compare ECF No. 9 5 at ¶ 20 (“Guzman did not inform Apex that she ran a medical services facility”) 10 with ECF No. 14 at ¶ 20 (“Guzman used the property as a halfway house . . . .”).) 11 The Court must assume it was a halfway house for purposes of this motion, since 12 that assumption would seem to impose fewer “professional” duties on Guzman 13 and CHS. Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925. Given this, the Court concludes that Guzman 14 and CHS’s range of “professional services” may not have extended to the sort of 15 poolside supervision that the state tort plaintiffs allege could have prevented 16 Christopher Brown from drowning. 17 B. BAD FAITH 18 Safeco gives three reasons why Rip Van’s “bad faith” counterclaims should 19 be dismissed. 20 First, Safeco argues that Rip Van cannot state a claim for bad faith or 21 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Rip Van has 22 not alleged that a valid contract exists between itself and Safeco. That argument 23 fails because, as explained above, it is impossible to say at this time that there is 24 no contract between Rip Van and Safeco as a matter of law. 25 Safeco next argues that Rip Van has failed to allege a denial of coverage in 26 support of its bad faith claim. Nevada law does not require Rip Van to make such 27 an allegation. The Nevada Supreme Court held in Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Potter 28 that an insurer could be held liable on a claim for “bad faith,” even when it was 1 uncontested that the insurer had not denied coverage. 912 P.2d 267, 272 (Nev. 2 1996). 3 Finally, Safeco suggests that it should not be held liable for either of Rip 4 Van’s “bad faith” counterclaims because it has acted fairly in its coverage 5 determination proceedings and has therefore complied with its tort and contract 6 “good faith” obligations as a matter of law. 7 This argument fails as well. Rip Van alleges that Safeco is attempting to 8 deny coverage with no reasonable basis for doing so and with knowledge that it 9 has no reasonable basis for doing so. (ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 60-61.) This is sufficient 10 to survive a 12(c) motion. Guaranty, 912 P.2d at 272 (“Bad faith is established 11 where the insurer acts unreasonably and with knowledge that there is no 12 reasonable basis for its conduct.”). 13 C. REMAINING CLAIMS 14 Finally, Safeco argues that the Court must dismiss Rip Van’s remaining 15 claims because (1) they are not available as a matter of law or (2) they have not 16 been pled with requisite plausible facts. The claims in question are Unjust 17 Enrichment (Claim 3); Negligent Misrepresentation (Claim 4); Breach of Fiduciary 18 Duty (Claim 6); Civil Conspiracy (Claim 7); Equitable Estoppel (Claim 8); 19 Respondeat Superior (Claim 10). 20 1. Unjust Enrichment 21 In Nevada, unjust enrichment requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff 22 conferred a benefit on defendant; (2) the defendant appreciated that benefit; (3) 23 the defendant accepted and retained the benefit under circumstances such that 24 it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of the value 25 thereof. Unionamerica Mortg. and Equity Trust v. McDonald, 626 P.2d 1272, 1273 26 (Nev. 1981). Unjust enrichment cannot be alleged when there is an existing valid 27 contract between the parties. Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., 566 P.2d 819, 824 28 (1977) (“To permit recovery by [unjust enrichment] where a written agreement 1 exists would constitute a subversion of contractual principles.”) 2 Safeco argues that Rip Van cannot allege unjust enrichment while 3 simultaneously alleging the existence of a valid contract. Safeco is mistaken. Rip 4 Van is entitled to plead its unjust enrichment claim in the alternative, and it has 5 done so here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e); Molsbergen v. U.S., 757 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th 6 Cir. 1985). 7 Furthermore, Rip Van alleges facts sufficient to support a claim for unjust 8 enrichment, since Rip Van alleges that it conferred a benefit on Safeco in the form 9 of regular insurance payments, that Safeco appreciated that benefit, and that it 10 accepted and retained that benefit without providing Rip Van anything in return, 11 such as insurance coverage. See Unionamerica Mortg. and Equity Trust v. 12 McDonald, 626 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Nev. 1981). 13 2. Negligent Misrepresentation 14 Safeco argues that Rip Van’s negligent misrepresentation must be 15 dismissed because negligence claims are not available to an insured against its 16 insurer. It specifically argues that Nevada law already imposes duties of care on 17 insurers through contract law, the tort of bad faith, and the implied covenant of 18 good faith and fair dealing and that the existence of a duty of care sounding in 19 negligence would undermine those existing duties. 20 The Court holds that Nevada law recognizes a claim for negligent 21 misrepresentation against an insurance company in some cases and that Rip Van 22 has alleged facts sufficient to support that claim here. 23 Since the Nevada Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of 24 whether a claim for negligent misrepresentation can be sustained against an 25 insurance company by an insured, the Court must resolve this issue as it expects 26 a Nevada Court would. Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 658 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 27 2011). 28 Nevada recognizes claims for negligent misrepresentation in non-insurance 1 cases. Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P,.2d 11381 (Nev. 1998). 2 Nevada courts have also held insurers to have duties towards their insured, 3 outside of the duty supplied by the tort of bad faith, that sound in tort law. For 4 example, in Grand Hotel Gift Shop v. Granite State Ins. Co., the Nevada Supreme 5 Court acknowledged that an insurer may sometimes be liable to an insured based 6 on its failure to properly train or supervise its employees. 839 P.2d 599, 603 (Nev. 7 1992). In the same order, the Nevada Supreme Court considered the viability of 8 a simple negligence claim against an insurance company. Id. While the court 9 ultimately upheld the lower court’s decision to bar evidence of the insurer’s 10 negligence at trial, it did so because the plaintiff had not put the defendant on 11 notice of its negligence claim. Id. at 603-04. The court gave no indication that 12 negligence claims are unavailable against insurers as a matter of law. 13 Some courts outside of Nevada have held that the tort of bad faith bars 14 some negligence claims, but the opinions of those courts are not binding on this 15 one, and their holdings are inapposite. The U.S. District Court for the District of 16 Nevada and the California Court of Appeals, for example, have both held 17 negligence claims to be barred when a plaintiff alleges negligence related to the 18 processing of an insurance claim. Phillips v. Clark County School Dist., 903 F. 19 Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (D. Nev. 2012) (holding the duty of good faith barred 20 plaintiff’s independent claim that insurer was negligent in its denial of his 21 insurance claim); Sierzega v. Country Preferred Ins. Co., No. 2:13-CV-1267 JCM- 22 NJK, 2014 WL 1668630 at *5 (D. Nev. 2014) (same, for plaintiff’s claim that 23 defendant had negligently delayed his policy payment); Adelman v. Associated 24 Intern. Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 352, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “an 25 insured can recover in tort against an insurer for the improper handling of a claim 26 only upon a showing that the insurer acted in bad faith . . . such a showing 27 requires something more than simple negligence.”) (emphasis added). It makes 28 sense that the tort of bad faith would bar negligence claims in such cases, since 1 bad faith already supplies a duty of care in the processing of insurance claims 2 that is “something more than simple negligence.” Adelman, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 3 356; see also Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 272 (Nev. 1996) 4 (acknowledging that bad faith has typically only applied to cases of “unreasonable 5 denial or delay in payment of a valid claim” but holding that it can also apply to 6 situations where an insurer acted wrongfully while processing and ultimately 7 granting a claim for coverage). But Rip Van does not allege negligent 8 misrepresentation in the processing of its insurance claim. (See ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 9 52-53.) Rather, it alleges that Safeco negligently misrepresented the scope of its 10 Landlord Policy, when that policy was first entered. (Id.) Such allegations are not 11 barred by the tort of bad faith. 12 Because Nevada allows for negligent misrepresentation claims in other 13 contexts, such a claim is not barred here, and Nevada courts have held insurers 14 to have duties towards their insured that sound in tort law, this Court holds 15 Safeco to be susceptible to a claim for negligent misrepresentation, on the facts 16 alleged. 17 3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 18 Safeco argues there is no independent cause of action for breach of 19 fiduciary duty in an insurer/insured relationship, under Nevada law. Safeco is 20 correct. The Nevada Supreme has never acknowledged that a claim for breach of 21 fiduciary duty by an insured against an insurer. And, in Powers v. United Services 22 Auto. Ass’n, the court explicitly declined to hold that such a claim exists. 962 23 P.2d 596, 603 (Nev. 1998) (“We are not adopting a new cause of action based on 24 an insurance company’s failure to put its insured’s interests above its own; we 25 are merely recognizing that breach of the fiduciary nature of the insurer-insured 26 relationship is part of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”); Strabala v. State 27 Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 124 F. App’x 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The district 28 court was . . . correct in finding that Nevada law does not recognize an 1 independent claim for breach of fiduciary duty against an insurer.”); Walker v. 2 State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1150 (D. Nev. 2017) (holding 3 that “breach of fiduciary duty is not a cognizable claim against an insurer”). 4 Rip Van’s counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty is dismissed, with 5 prejudice. 6 4. Civil Conspiracy 7 Safeco argues that Nevada’s tortious bad faith cause of action bars claims 8 for civil conspiracy against insurers for the same reasons it bars claims for 9 negligent misrepresentation. The Court disagrees for the same reasons it holds 10 that claims of negligent misrepresentation can sometimes be brought against 11 insurers. To the extent that Rip Van alleges a civil conspiracy that does not 12 challenge actions related to Safeco’s handling of its insurance claim, that civil 13 conspiracy claim survives Safeco’s motion. 14 Rip Van alleges specifically that Safeco, Payne, and Legacy conspired to 15 unlawfully avoid naming Rip Van as an insured under the Policy, despite their 16 knowledge that Rip Van was the owner of the Las Vegas property, and that this 17 directly and proximately caused harm to Rip Van. (ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 71-74.) This 18 is sufficient to survive a 12(c) motion. See Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock 19 Transfer Co., Inc., 335 P.3d 190, 198 (Nev. 2014). 20 5. Equitable Estoppel 21 Safeco agrees that equitable estoppel can be a valid claim by an insured 22 against its insurer. It argues only that Rip Van has failed to state a claim for 23 equitable estoppel here. 24 In Nevada, estoppel requires that: 25 (1) [Safeco] must be apprised of the true facts; 26 (2) [Safeco] must intend that [its] conduct be acted upon, or must so act 27 that [Rip Van] has the right to believe it was so intended; 28 (3) [Rip Van] must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and 1 (4) [Rip Van] must have relied to [its] detriment on the conduct of [Safeco]. 2 Cheqer, Inc. v. Painters and Decorators Joint Committee, Inc., 655 P.2d 996, 998- 3 99 (Nev. 1982). Both sides agree that the first two elements have been satisfied; 4 Safeco argues that elements three and four are lacking. The Court holds that Rip 5 Van has satisfied both of those elements. 6 Rip Van alleges that it was unaware that the Landlord Policy did not cover 7 it. (ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 13, 15.) It supports this allegation with allegations that Tu 8 communicated her intent that Rip Van be covered by the Landlord Policy and 9 that Tu received a “Landlord Policy” that covered the property in question, of 10 which Rip Van was the sole owner. (Id. at ¶ 11; ECF No. 5-2 at 3.) Rip Van further 11 alleges that it relied to its detriment on Safeco’s indication that it would be 12 covered under the policy by continually paying the policy premiums and 13 refraining from seeking coverage elsewhere. (See ECF No. 14 at ¶ 17.) 14 Assuming these facts to be true, the Court concludes that Rip Van has 15 alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for equitable estoppel. 16 6. Respondeat Superior 17 Finally, Safeco argues that Nevada law does not allow for negligence claims 18 against insurers under a theory of respondeat superior. 19 The Court holds that Nevada law likely does allow such claims for two 20 reasons. First, California law, which the Nevada Supreme Court looks to for 21 guidance, states that an insurer may be vicariously liable for the tortious actions 22 of its agent when the insurer authorized or directed the agent to perform those 23 actions. Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (Cal. App. 24 1996); Leigh-Pink v. Rio Properties, LLC, 989 F.3d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 2021) (“where 25 Nevada law is lacking, its courts have looked to the law of other jurisdictions, 26 particularly California, for guidance”). Second, the Nevada Supreme Court has 27 held that the agency relationship of an insurer and its agent can be relevant to 28 the question of whether the agent’s actions can be ascribed to the insurer under 1 || a theory of mutual mistake. Grand Hotel Gift Shop v. Granite State Ins. Co., 839 2 || P.2d 599, 603 (Nev. 1992). 3 The Court further holds that Rip Van has sufficiently pled its claim for 4 || respondeat superior, since it alleges that Legacy and Payne were agents of Safeco, 5 || that they committed wrongful acts in the course of their employment and under 6 || control of Safeco, and that Safeco knew of their wrongful behavior. (ECF No. 14 7 || at 44 10, 16, 90); Molino v. Asher, 618 P.2d 878, 880 (Nev. 1980). 8 The Court has considered Safeco’s other arguments and finds they are 9 || without merit. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 It is therefore ordered that Safeco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 12 || (ECF No. 277) is granted in part and denied in part, in keeping with this order. 13 14 Dated this 22=4 day of August 2024. 15 16 17 Ares jlorect en 18 ANNER.TRAUM 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28