SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF No. 2:21-cv-01761-TLN-CKD AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. PAUL BETENBAUGH, et al., Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of America’s (“Plaintiff”) Administrative Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 55.) Defendant Paul Betenbaugh (“Defendant”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 59.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// The Court need not provide a detailed factual background of this action, as it was set forth fully in the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 40 at 2–4.) In short, this action involves an insurance coverage dispute. (Id. at 2.) Defendant is an insured under a Homeowners Policy and Umbrella Policy with Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant sought defense coverage under those policies in an underlying state court action, in which Defendant had been sued for: (1) internet impersonation; (2) defamation; (3) false light; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) Plaintiff agreed to defend Defendant in the underlying action, subject to a reservation of rights. (Id. at 4.) On September 1, 2021, a jury reached a unanimous verdict against Defendant in the underlying action. (Id.) On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging: (1) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to defend Defendant under the Homeowners Policy; (2) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to indemnify Defendant under the Homeowners Policy; (3) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to defend Defendant under the Umbrella Policy; (4) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to indemnify Defendant under the Umbrella Policy; and (5) a claim for reimbursement of defense fees and expenses. (ECF No. 1 at 17–22.) Defendant filed his answer on January 21, 2022. (ECF No. 14.) On September 27, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for leave to amend his answer to add counterclaims and parties to this action. (ECF No. 22.) On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) On September 29, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Defendant’s motion to amend his answer. (ECF No. 40.) On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant administrative motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 55.) The Ninth Circuit has held that “district courts have discretion to permit successive motions for summary judgment,” and that doing so may “foster[ ] the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ resolution of suits.” Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). However, due to the potential for abuse, district courts retain discretion to “weed out frivolous or simply repetitive motions.” Id. (citing Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[A] successive motion for summary judgment is particularly appropriate on an expanded factual record.” Id. Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second motion for summary judgment to “raise new legal issues” that were not decided in the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 55 at 3.) In its prior order, the Court found there was no duty to defend under the Homeowners Policy because that policy only provided coverage for damage caused by an “occurrence,” which was clearly defined in the policy as “an accident.” (ECF No. 40 at 10–11.) Because the Court found the occurrence at issue in the underlying action was not an accident, the Court found there was no coverage under the Homeowners Policy. (Id. at 11.) However, the Court was unable to reach the same conclusion as to coverage under the Umbrella Policy because that policy defined “occurrence” differently than the Homeowners Policy. (Id.) Unlike the Homeowners Policy which defined an “occurrence” only as an “accident,” the Umbrella Policy defined an “occurrence” as either an “accident” or “an offense, committed during the coverage period, which results in personal injury.” (Id.) Defendant pointed out this distinction in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff seemingly acknowledged the oversight and offered new argument on the issue in its reply. (Id.) The Court declined to consider Plaintiff’s argument raised for the first time in reply, noting that Plaintiff offered no reason why it failed to make the argument sooner. (Id.) Based on Plaintiff’s failure to adequately raise the issue in its moving papers, the Court was unable to conclude as a matter of law whether Plaintiff had a duty to defend under the Umbrella Policy and denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. (Id.) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment apparently seeks to remedy its previously inadequate briefing on the issue of whether there is coverage under the alternative definition of “occurrence” in the Umbrella Policy. (ECF No. 55 at 3.) Plaintiff argues that allowing it to file a motion for summary judgment on this purely legal question is in the interest of judicial economy because it will potentially resolve the entire action. (Id. at 3–5.) In opposition, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s motion improperly seeks reconsideration of the prior order, successive motions for summary judgment are generally disfavored, and Plaintiff failed to provide proper notice under Local Rule 230(b). (ECF No. 58 at 2–6.) Plaintiff titles its motion as an “administrative motion.” (ECF No. 55 at 1.) However, Plaintiff’s motion is devoid of any citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Local Rules that would permit this type of motion. For the first time in reply, Plaintiff argues the motion is brought pursuant to Local Rule 233. (ECF No. 59 at 2.) Eastern District of California Local Rule 233 states, Miscellaneous administrative matters which require a Court order may be brought to the Court’s attention through a motion for administrative relief. Examples of matters that such motions may address include motions to exceed applicable page limitations; requests to shorten time on a motion; requests to extend a response deadline; requests to alter a briefing schedule; or requests to alter a discovery schedule that does not affect dispositive motion filing dates, trial dates, or the final pre-trial conference. Plaintiff’s motion does not fit into one of the delineated examples of proper motions for administrative relief. As such, Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that its administrative motion is the proper vehicle for seeking leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion also ignores that the dispositive motion deadline, as set forth in the Pretrial Scheduling Order, has long passed. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) The parties have not stipulated to modify the dispositive motion deadline, nor has Plaintiff filed a properly noticed motion to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 16. (See id. at 7 (setting forth the procedure for modification of the Pretrial Scheduling Order).) A Rule 16 motion, which involves a showing of good cause, appears to be a prerequisite to consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment after the dispositive motion deadline. See Hoffman, 593 F.3d at 912 (“The district court’s decision to allow Defendant to file another motion for summary judgment . . . required the district court first to modify the pretrial order.”); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604
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SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF No. 2:21-cv-01761-TLN-CKD AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. PAUL BETENBAUGH, et al., Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of America’s (“Plaintiff”) Administrative Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 55.) Defendant Paul Betenbaugh (“Defendant”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 59.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// The Court need not provide a detailed factual background of this action, as it was set forth fully in the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 40 at 2–4.) In short, this action involves an insurance coverage dispute. (Id. at 2.) Defendant is an insured under a Homeowners Policy and Umbrella Policy with Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant sought defense coverage under those policies in an underlying state court action, in which Defendant had been sued for: (1) internet impersonation; (2) defamation; (3) false light; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) Plaintiff agreed to defend Defendant in the underlying action, subject to a reservation of rights. (Id. at 4.) On September 1, 2021, a jury reached a unanimous verdict against Defendant in the underlying action. (Id.) On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging: (1) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to defend Defendant under the Homeowners Policy; (2) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to indemnify Defendant under the Homeowners Policy; (3) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to defend Defendant under the Umbrella Policy; (4) a claim for declaratory relief that it had no duty to indemnify Defendant under the Umbrella Policy; and (5) a claim for reimbursement of defense fees and expenses. (ECF No. 1 at 17–22.) Defendant filed his answer on January 21, 2022. (ECF No. 14.) On September 27, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for leave to amend his answer to add counterclaims and parties to this action. (ECF No. 22.) On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) On September 29, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Defendant’s motion to amend his answer. (ECF No. 40.) On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant administrative motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 55.) The Ninth Circuit has held that “district courts have discretion to permit successive motions for summary judgment,” and that doing so may “foster[ ] the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ resolution of suits.” Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). However, due to the potential for abuse, district courts retain discretion to “weed out frivolous or simply repetitive motions.” Id. (citing Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[A] successive motion for summary judgment is particularly appropriate on an expanded factual record.” Id. Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second motion for summary judgment to “raise new legal issues” that were not decided in the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 55 at 3.) In its prior order, the Court found there was no duty to defend under the Homeowners Policy because that policy only provided coverage for damage caused by an “occurrence,” which was clearly defined in the policy as “an accident.” (ECF No. 40 at 10–11.) Because the Court found the occurrence at issue in the underlying action was not an accident, the Court found there was no coverage under the Homeowners Policy. (Id. at 11.) However, the Court was unable to reach the same conclusion as to coverage under the Umbrella Policy because that policy defined “occurrence” differently than the Homeowners Policy. (Id.) Unlike the Homeowners Policy which defined an “occurrence” only as an “accident,” the Umbrella Policy defined an “occurrence” as either an “accident” or “an offense, committed during the coverage period, which results in personal injury.” (Id.) Defendant pointed out this distinction in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff seemingly acknowledged the oversight and offered new argument on the issue in its reply. (Id.) The Court declined to consider Plaintiff’s argument raised for the first time in reply, noting that Plaintiff offered no reason why it failed to make the argument sooner. (Id.) Based on Plaintiff’s failure to adequately raise the issue in its moving papers, the Court was unable to conclude as a matter of law whether Plaintiff had a duty to defend under the Umbrella Policy and denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. (Id.) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment apparently seeks to remedy its previously inadequate briefing on the issue of whether there is coverage under the alternative definition of “occurrence” in the Umbrella Policy. (ECF No. 55 at 3.) Plaintiff argues that allowing it to file a motion for summary judgment on this purely legal question is in the interest of judicial economy because it will potentially resolve the entire action. (Id. at 3–5.) In opposition, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s motion improperly seeks reconsideration of the prior order, successive motions for summary judgment are generally disfavored, and Plaintiff failed to provide proper notice under Local Rule 230(b). (ECF No. 58 at 2–6.) Plaintiff titles its motion as an “administrative motion.” (ECF No. 55 at 1.) However, Plaintiff’s motion is devoid of any citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Local Rules that would permit this type of motion. For the first time in reply, Plaintiff argues the motion is brought pursuant to Local Rule 233. (ECF No. 59 at 2.) Eastern District of California Local Rule 233 states, Miscellaneous administrative matters which require a Court order may be brought to the Court’s attention through a motion for administrative relief. Examples of matters that such motions may address include motions to exceed applicable page limitations; requests to shorten time on a motion; requests to extend a response deadline; requests to alter a briefing schedule; or requests to alter a discovery schedule that does not affect dispositive motion filing dates, trial dates, or the final pre-trial conference. Plaintiff’s motion does not fit into one of the delineated examples of proper motions for administrative relief. As such, Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that its administrative motion is the proper vehicle for seeking leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion also ignores that the dispositive motion deadline, as set forth in the Pretrial Scheduling Order, has long passed. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) The parties have not stipulated to modify the dispositive motion deadline, nor has Plaintiff filed a properly noticed motion to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 16. (See id. at 7 (setting forth the procedure for modification of the Pretrial Scheduling Order).) A Rule 16 motion, which involves a showing of good cause, appears to be a prerequisite to consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment after the dispositive motion deadline. See Hoffman, 593 F.3d at 912 (“The district court’s decision to allow Defendant to file another motion for summary judgment . . . required the district court first to modify the pretrial order.”); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment” and “carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence”). Not only does Plaintiff’s motion fail to address Rule 16, but the Court is also unable to glean any arguments from Plaintiff’s motion as to whether there is good cause to modify the dispositive motion deadline. See San Diego Cnty. Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, No. 18-CV-967-GPC-RBB, 2020 WL 6685034, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) (“[A]bsent a showing of good cause, the Court denies [Defendant’s] ex parte motion to file a second dispositive motion.”). Even if the Court was able to look past the foregoing deficiencies, the Court ultimately declines to exercise its discretion to grant Plaintiff leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. “A renewed or successive summary judgment motion is appropriate especially if one of the following grounds exists: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) [the] need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Brazill v. Cal. Northstate Coll. of Pharmacy, LLC, No. CIV. 2:12- CV-1218-WBS, 2013 WL 4500667, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff does not argue that any of those circumstances exist in the instant case. Instead, Plaintiff merely argues it would be in the interest of judicial economy to allow a second motion for summary judgment on the sole remaining legal issue because it would potentially avoid the need for trial. (ECF No. 55 at 4–5.) It is unclear whether it would be significantly more efficient to allow a second motion for summary judgment rather than proceed to trial. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that the interest of judicial economy should excuse Plaintiff from failing to adequately raise the issue in its original motion for summary judgment — especially considering that Plaintiff has made no effort to explain its failure to do so. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Administrative Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 55.) The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within thirty (30) days of the electronic filing date of this Order indicating their readiness to proceed to trial and proposing trial dates. The Joint Status Report should include dates counsel are available for trial, the estimated length of trial, and whether the parties intend to proceed with a bench trial or jury trial. DATED: January 17, 2025 7, B TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE