SAFE Federal Credit Union v. Henry

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: May 18, 2011
• Docket: 2011-UP-230
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

SAFE Federal Credit Union, Respondent,

v.

Jefford Henry, Jr., Appellant.

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Appeal From Lee County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-230
Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 18, 2011   

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AFFIRMED

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Jefford Henry, Jr., pro se, of Bishopville, for Appellant.

Christy C. Jones, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jefford Henry, Jr. appeals a trial court's grant of summary judgment to SAFE Federal Credit Union (SAFE) in two causes of action for recovery of an automobile and collection of an $8,371.20 balance on the related purchase-money loan.  Henry argues the trial court erred because (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the summary judgment affidavits offered by SAFE were inadmissible; and (3) he presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he satisfied the loan and SAFE retained an interest in the automobile.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: S.C. Const. art. V, § 11 (providing the circuit courts have "original jurisdiction" in civil cases where the legislature has not granted "exclusive jurisdiction" to "inferior courts").

2. As to whether the summary judgment affidavits offered by SAFE were inadmissible: Holroyd v. Requa, 361 S.C. 43, 60, 603 S.E.2d 417, 426 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Failure to object to the introduction of evidence at the time the evidence is offered constitutes a waiver of the right to have the issue considered on appeal.") (citations omitted).

3. As to whether Henry presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact: Bovain v. Canal Ins., 383 S.C. 100, 105, 678 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2009) ("[A] trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Klippel v. Mid-Carolina Oil, Inc., 303 S.C. 127, 129, 399 S.E.2d 163, 164 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Under Rule 56, SCRCP, when a party makes a motion for summary judgment and supports it by affidavits the adverse party may not rest on the allegations of his pleadings but must respond by affidavits or other evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact."); see also Higgins v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 326 S.C. 592, 599, 486 S.E.2d 269, 272 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding the trial court ordinarily may not consider factual statements made during argument on the summary judgment issue) (citation omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

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[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.