Safadi v. Snohomish County

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 17, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00887
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 AMAR SAFADI, 11 CASE NO. 23-cv-00887 RAJ Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER 13 SNOHOMISH COUNTY, et al., 14 Defendants. 15

16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Snohomish County’s (the 18 “County” or “Defendant”)1 Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary 19 20 Judgment. Dkts. # 23, 38. Defendant moves for dismissal for proper service of process, 21 failure to state a claim, and summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff Amar Safadi 22 (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Safadi”) responded to these motions by filing numerous responses and 23 declarations. Dkts. # 26-33, 35. 24 25

26 1 Defendant Snohomish County contends Plaintiff’s discovery response confirmed that the County is the “the sole defendant in this action despite summons being requested for other parties.” Dkt. # 23; see also Dkt. # 24. Plaintiff 27 does not refute this. Therefore, the Court considers Snohomish County as the only defendant in this action. 1 Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 23. Separately, 2 Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on statute of limitations 3 grounds. Dkt. # 38. Plaintiff filed responses and declarations opposing Defendant’s 4 Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkts. # 26- 5 33, 35, 39-40. However, the Court does not reach the merits of the statute of limitations 6 7 arguments presented in Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 38. 8 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 9 Judgment, Dkt. # 23, and DENIES as moot Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary 10 Judgment on Statute of Limitations Grounds. Dkt. # 38. 11 12 II. BACKGROUND 13 14 Plaintiff, Mr. Safadi, began this action on June 13, 2023, when he filed the initial 15 complaint with this Court. Dkt. # 6. On July 15, 2023, Mr. Safadi filed an Amended 16 Complaint (the “Complaint”) which is the operative complaint in this matter. Dkt. # 15. 17 Mr. Safadi, proceeding pro se, alleges Snohomish County, the Snohomish County 18 19 Prosecutor’s Office, and the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office retaliated against him for 20 the 2018 qui tam lawsuit (the “lawsuit”) he filed against the county and its officials alleging 21 RICO violations. Dkt. # 15. This Court dismissed the lawsuit, Safadi v. Roe et al., 18-cv- 22 01305, (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2019), sua sponte. Mr. Safadi alleges that since the lawsuit, 23 24 the County and its officials have retaliated against him by filing criminal complaints against 25 him and arresting him four times. Mr. Safadi claims the County violated his Fourth, Eighth, 26 27 1 and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s allegations are set 2 forth in greater detail infra Sections IV. A, B, and C. 3 Defendant Snohomish County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 4 14, 2024. Dkt. # 23. Defendant filed a separate Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 5 statute of limitations grounds, on March 6, 2024. Dkt. # 38. 6 7 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, asserting Plaintiff did not 8 properly serve Defendant in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 9 Washington law for serving a state agency, such as Snohomish County. In response, Mr. 10 Safadi argues that he perfected service by sending the Summons and Complaint to the 11 12 Snohomish County Executive and the Snohomish County Auditor via certified mail 13 delivered by the United States Postal Service. Dkt. # 33. 14 Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. Defendant 15 argues this Court should grant summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to establish 16 17 Monell liability on the part of Snohomish County or that a constitutional violation occurred. 18 Dkt. # 23. Defendant asserts the officers arrested Mr. Safadi pursuant to valid Failure to 19 Appear Bench Warrants. 20 Defendant moved for partial summary judgment based on statute of limitations 21 22 grounds for alleged claims that occurred outside of the three-year limitations period for his 23 personal injury and §1983 claims. Dkt. # 38. Because the Court agrees with Defendant 24 that summary judgment as a matter of law should be granted in Defendant’s favor, it will 25 not analyze the limitations issues Defendant raised in Dkt. # 38. 26 27 1 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) 3 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to properly serve 4 Defendant in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Washington State 5 law. Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff argues he properly served the County. Dkt. # 33. 6 7 A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a defendant without proper service of 8 process. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999); 9 S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n the absence of proper service 10 of process, the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s 11 12 person or property unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction or waived lack of 13 process.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) allows a defendant to move to dismiss 14 an action where service of process of a summons and complaint is insufficient. See Fed. 15 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). 16 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) provides that a plaintiff suing a state or local 18 government commences the action by “delivering a copy of the summons and of the 19 complaint to its chief executive officer” or “serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed 20 by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.” Fed. R. 21 22 Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Washington law mandates that a plaintiff suing a county must serve the 23 County Auditor with the summons. See RCW 4.28.080(1). A court may dismiss claims 24 for failure to comply with Washington law service requirements. See Durbin v. 25 Washington, No. 2:22-cv-0200-JHC, 2022 WL 7636212, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2022) 26 27 1 (dismissing claims where plaintiff failed to comply with RCW 4.28.080(1)), aff'd, 2023 2 WL 4486744 (9th Cir. July 12, 2023). 3 Here, proper service was not accomplished. Dkt. # 33. As discussed more below 4 infra Section IV. B, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff only served the County via 5 certified mail. Dkts. # 23, 33. 6 7 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Summary Judgment 8 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law, arguing Plaintiff 9 failed to establish Monell liability on the part of the County or that a constitutional violation 10 11 occurred. See Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff opposes this motion. See Dkts. # 26-33, 35. 12 On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), if matters outside the pleadings are 13 presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary 14 judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “All parties must be given a reasonable 15 16 opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. Snohomish 17 County moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, and both parties submitted 18 declarations. Therefore, the Court will convert the County’s motion to dismiss into a 19 motion for summary judgment. 20 21 Summary judgment is supported if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 22 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 23 fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 24 The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute 25 26 of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving 27 1 party meets his or her burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and 2 identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & 3 Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2000). A genuine dispute of material fact 4 is presented when there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 5 the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986). 6 7 To establish that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed, the movant may cite the record 8 or show “that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute, or 9 that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. 10 P. 56(c)(1). In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 11 12 present specific facts, and cannot rely on conclusory allegations. Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 13 137, 138 (9th. Cir. 1993). Although “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in the non- 14 movant’s favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 15 144, 158-59 (1970)), “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the 16 17 plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 18 reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The Court’s ultimate 19 inquiry is to determine whether the ‘specific facts’ set forth by the non-moving party, 20 coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or 21 22 reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 23 Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). 24 However, a court need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable 25 fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also White v. McDonnell 26 27 Douglas Corp., 904 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1990) (the court need not “speculate on which 1 portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obliged to wade through and 2 search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s 3 claim”). The opposing party must present significant and probative evidence to support its 4 claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th 5 Cir. 1991). Uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving testimony” will not create a 6 7 genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 8 (9th Cir. 2002); T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. 9 Plaintiff failed to submit evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact to 10 establish Monell liability on the part of the County. Plaintiff’s evidence to support Monell 11 12 liability is discussed in greater detail infra Section IV.C. 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 A. Factual Allegations 15 Mr. Safadi alleges Snohomish County, the Snohomish County Prosecutor’s Office, 16 17 and the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office retaliated against him for filing the lawsuit. 18 The Complaint alleges that shortly after Mr. Safadi initiated the lawsuit, a Snohomish 19 County prosecutor filed a “frivolous and retaliatory criminal complaint” against him for 20 violating a no-contact-order. Dkt. # 15. Mr. Safadi alleges the state court issued bench 21 22 warrants for his arrest and he has been wrongfully arrested and incarcerated on four 23 occasions: 1) February 2, 2020; 2) June 17, 2020; 3) March 19, 2021; and 4) March 23, 24 2023. Id. at 9. Mr. Safadi claims that the warrants were invalid, and therefore the arrests 25 violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges 26 27 the warrants were invalid because the signing judge did not have her oath of office filed in 1 accordance with RCW 36.16.060, which requires all county officers to file “his or her oath 2 of office in the office of the county auditor and his or her official bond in the office of the 3 county clerk” before entering office. Mr. Safadi alleges that bail was set at $5000 after two 4 of the arrests, which he argues is excessive under the Eighth Amendment because of his 5 indigent status. Id. at 9. 6 7 Mr. Safadi further alleges that during the March 19, 2021 arrest, the officers used 8 excessive force while taking him into custody causing him to suffer musculoskeletal 9 injuries and his glasses to break. Id. at 5. Mr. Safadi specifically alleges that officers 10 stopped him while he was driving, and Deputy Sheriff Blake Iverson “abruptly came 11 12 running and smashed [his] driver-side window with a knife, physically assaulted [plaintiff], 13 and threatened his life.” Id. Upon his release, Mr. Safadi alleges his wallet was returned 14 to him with $150 missing. Id. at 6. 15 In the Complaint, Mr. Safadi alleges that the retaliatory prosecution and officers’ 16 17 actions stem from a pattern, policy, or practice of Snohomish County or the Sheriff’s 18 Office. These allegations include: 1) the Sheriff’s Office lacks accreditation through the 19 Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs “likely due to an official policy, 20 custom, or practice of the Sheriff’s Office;” 2) the alleged police misconduct occurred after 21 22 Mr. Safadi’s communication with a county-elected official which plaintiff alleges “is a 23 telltale sign of an official policy, custom, and or practice starting from the top-down to gag 24 uncomfortable voices of dissent;” and 3) “[t]he ongoing repeated and escalating 25 misconduct during the past three years is another proof of such pattern of malpractice in 26 27 public safety.” Dkt. # 15 at 7-8. 1 B. Service 2 Mr. Safadi began this action June 13, 2023, when he filed the initial complaint with 3 this Court. Dkt. # 6. On July 5, 2023, the initial complaint was mailed to the Snohomish 4 County Auditor. Dkt. # 14. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and Praecipe for 5 Summons on July 24, 2023. Dkts. # 15-16. Summons were requested for the Snohomish 6 7 County Sheriff’s Office and the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney. Dkt. # 16. On 8 July 26, 2023, the Amended Complaint, Summons, and accompanying documents were 9 mailed to the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, the elected Prosecuting Attorney, and the 10 elected Sheriff. Dkt. # 19. Return receipts of the mail are noted on the docket. Dkts. # 8- 11 12 10, 20-22. Plaintiff confirms that he served the Complaint and Summons via certified mail 13 and asserts that his service is sufficient. Dkt. # 33 at 4. 14 The parties’ filings in this matter demonstrate that Mr. Safadi has not effectuated 15 in-person delivery of the Complaint and Summons on the County. Therefore, Mr. Safadi 16 17 has not perfected personal service on Snohomish County as required by the Federal Rules 18 of Civil Procedure and Washington state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (j)(2); RCW 4.28.080. 19 Where service is insufficient, courts have discretion to quash service and allow additional 20 time to serve the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Court declines to exercise this 21 22 discretion because Plaintiff’s claims cannot withstand Defendant’s Motion for Summary 23 Judgment, discussed below. 24 25 26 27 1 C. Summary Judgment 2 Next, Snohomish County argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim and should 3 be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot prove Monell liability. As mentioned above, the 4 Complaint generally alleges that Snohomish County, the Snohomish County Prosecutor’s 5 Office, and the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office have criminally pursued him in 6 7 retaliation for the lawsuit and Mr. Safadi asserts claims under § 1983 for violations of the 8 Fourteenth, Eighth, and Fourth Amendments. Id. 9 a. Monell Liability 10 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of 11 12 state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 13 1983. To establish municipal, or Monell liability, Plaintiff must prove the existence of an 14 unconstitutional government policy, regulation, or custom that caused the alleged 15 deprivation of rights. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988); see also 16 17 Monell v. New York City. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 485 U.S. 112 (1978). To impose liability 18 against a county for alleged unconstitutional conduct of its officers and agents, “a plaintiff 19 must show: (1) that a county employee violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) that 20 the county has customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) that these 21 22 customs or policies were the moving force behind the employee’s violation of 23 constitutional rights.” Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006). 24 Under Monell, municipalities can be liable for deprivation of constitutional rights 25 when the deprivation occurs pursuant to “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or 26 27 custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final 1 policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Monica, 915 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2 2019) (discussing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95). A municipality may not be sued under a 3 theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-95. To prove a Monell claim, the 4 plaintiff must (1) identify a custom or policy that is attributable to the municipality and that 5 caused his injury; and (2) demonstrate that the custom or policy was adhered to with 6 7 “deliberate indifference” to his rights. Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th 8 Cir. 2016). 9 Plaintiff does not clearly articulate a policy that caused his alleged constitutional 10 violations. Plaintiff broadly claims that Snohomish County has a practice and informal 11 12 policy of retaliation, use of excessive force, and improper hiring practices. See Dkt. # 33 13 at 10-13. These broad assertions fall short of what is necessary to establish Monell liability. 14 i. Official Policy, Pattern or Practice 15 An official policy includes the decisions of the lawmakers, “the acts of its 16 17 policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have 18 the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citations omitted). The 19 official policy in question then, may be either “formal or informal.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 20 at 131. 21 22 A formal policy is “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from 23 among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final 24 policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 25 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality). An informal policy exists when a plaintiff “can prove the 26 27 existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by an ordinance or an 1 express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or 2 usage with the force of law.” Praprotnick, 485 U.S at 127. A plaintiff must show a pattern 3 of similar incidents in order for the factfinder to conclude that the alleged informal policy 4 was “so permanent and well settled” as to carry the force of law. Id. Usually, an informal 5 policy cannot be established by a single constitutional deprivation. Christie v. Iopa, 176 6 7 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 Plaintiff provides insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that 9 Snohomish County had a pattern, practice, or policy that caused any of his alleged 10 constitutional violations. Indeed, most of the evidence submitted relies on negative media 11 12 coverage of Snohomish County and is irrelevant to this case. 13 1. Retaliation 14 Mr. Safadi submitted exhibits in support of his claim that the County has a pattern 15 or practice of retaliation against “voices of dissent and punish those who dare to question 16 17 authorities.” Dkt. # 15. In opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Safadi provided articles 18 discussing employment lawsuits against the County. See Dkt. # 27, Ex. 8-9. Plaintiff also 19 submitted exhibits relating to a social media post about “retribution” in the Snohomish 20 County Sheriff’s Office. See Id. All the exhibits to support this point relate to workplace 21 22 issues. These workplace disputes discussed in the media are unrelated to this case and are 23 insufficient to demonstrate a county-wide pattern, practice, or policy of the type of 24 retaliation Mr. Safadi claims. 25 26 27 1 2. Excessive Force 2 Mr. Safadi submitted exhibits such as news articles, court filings, and a civilian 3 complaint to demonstrate the County has a pattern or practice of using excessive force on 4 civilians. See Dkt. # 27, Ex. 9-10; see also Dkt. # 29, Ex. 21. One allegation is an 5 unsubstantiated Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office Complaint Intake form from a non- 6 7 party alleging officers beat him when arresting him during a domestic violence incident. 8 See Dkt. # 29, Ex. 21. This uncorroborated allegation of force, without context of how it 9 relates to Mr. Safadi’s case, cannot create a material issue of fact that a pattern or practice 10 exists. Plaintiff also submitted exhibits that pertain to a highly publicized fatal police 11 12 shooting, subsequent litigation, and settlement. See Dkt. # 27, Ex. 9-10. Again, Plaintiff 13 failed to explain how this incident pertains to his case. See Id. Therefore, these exhibits 14 are insufficient to show the County has a pattern, practice, or policy of using excessive 15 force. 16 17 3. Improper Hiring 18 Plaintiff submitted exhibits in support of his assertion that the County has a “long 19 track record of hiring, retaining[,] and rehiring incompetent deputies with [sic] history of 20 excessive use of force[.]” Dkt. # 33 at 12. Plaintiff included various allegations that the 21 22 County and the Sheriff’s Office “missed red flags” in several officers’ background checks. 23 Id. at 13. In paragraphs 62 through 66 of the opposition brief, Plaintiff relied upon 24 unsubstantiated articles regarding the hiring practices of officers that are not related to the 25 claims in this case. Id. 26 27 1 To the extent Plaintiff bases his Fourth Amendment claims against the County for 2 the decision to hire and retain Officer Iverson after “several written reprimands,” those 3 claims are insufficient to establish the County or the Sheriff’s Office has an improper hiring 4 policy. Id. Plaintiff cited to blemishes in Deputy Iverson’s employment record and 5 reprimand history, but he failed to connect these reprimands to his alleged constitutional 6 7 violations. See Id.; see also Dkts. # 29, 31. 8 Mr. Safadi’s failure to articulate a pattern of hiring beyond missing “red flags” and 9 his reliance upon unsubstantiated allegations about hiring practices cannot create a dispute 10 of material fact that the County’s hiring practices violated his constitutional rights. 11 12 Plaintiff failed to point to sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment that the County 13 was deliberately indifferent to his rights; that is that it “disregarded a known or obvious 14 consequence” of the decision to hire or retain Officer Iverson. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs of 15 Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1997). Moreover, Plaintiff does not 16 17 show any causal connection between a specific constitutional violation and the decision to 18 hire the officer or allow him to stay on the force. Flores v. City of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 19 1154, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2014). 20 21 V. CONCLUSION 22 Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court 23 finds that Plaintiff fails to establish a formal or informal policy that caused the alleged 24 constitutional violations; therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish Monell liability. Because 25 Plaintiff failed to establish a policy under Monell, this Court need not reach Defendant’s 26 27 1 argument in its Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that no constitutional violation 2 occurred. 3 For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 4 GRANTED. Dkt. # 23. The Court will not address Defendant’s Motion for Partial 5 Summary Judgment based on statute of limitations grounds, which is DENIED as moot. 6 7 Dkt. # 38. Plaintiff’s claims against Snohomish County are DISMISSED. 8 9 10 Dated this 17th day of April, 2024. 11 12 A 13 14 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27