UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RAHEEL SADIQ,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 2448 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
MARCO RUBIO, Secretary of State, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Raheel Sadiq, a citizen of Germany, applied for a B1/B2 visa in 2018. Over six years later,
the Department of State requested that he submit another application, which he completed at the
end of 2024. After his visa interview in 2024, his application was placed into administrative
processing, and the State Department has taken no further action since then. In July 2025,
Mr. Sadiq sued several officials charged with overseeing the United States’ immigration system,
seeking an order directing them to adjudicate his visa application. The Defendants have moved to
dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Although the Court
understands that Mr. Sadiq has been waiting for many years for an opportunity to visit the United
States, it must dismiss his Complaint because his claim of unreasonable delay fails.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Mr. Sadiq is a citizen and resident of Germany. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. In April 2018, he
submitted a Form DS-160 to apply for a B1/B2 visa. Compl. ¶ 20. “A B1/B2 visa allows
individuals who have a residence in a foreign country which they have no intention of abandoning to enter the United States for business or temporarily for pleasure.” Maui Hope v. Embassy of the
U.S., No. 25-cv-654, 2025 WL 3687556, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2025) (cleaned up). Soon after
submitting the Form DS-160, Mr. Sadiq completed an interview with a consular officer at a U.S.
embassy in Frankfurt, Germany. Compl. ¶ 21. After that interview, his application was placed in
administrative processing. Id. “Subsequently,” Mr. Sadiq “was asked to submit another Form
DS-160 on October 28, 2024.” Compl. ¶ 20. He completed a second interview in October 2024.
Compl. ¶ 21. His application was again placed in administrative processing and remains in that
status. See Compl. ¶ 22.
In July 2025, Mr. Sadiq sued the Secretary of State and other officials charged with
overseeing the United States’ immigration system. Compl. He alleges that the Defendants have
unreasonably delayed adjudicating his visa application, and he seeks a writ of mandamus and relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Compl. ¶¶ 2, 39–40. In September 2025, the
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mot.
Dismiss, ECF No. 3. That motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 4;
Reply, ECF No. 5.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “must construe the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual
2 allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Trudeau v.
FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
DISCUSSION
The Defendants make several arguments in support of dismissal, including that they have
no obligation to adjudicate visa applications and that Mr. Sadiq’s claims are barred by the doctrine
of consular non-reviewability. Mot. Dismiss 4, 9. The Court has previously addressed and rejected
identical arguments in similar cases. See Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369, 2025 WL 2418402,
at *7–11, (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025); Motevali v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-1029, 2025 WL 885116, at *5–6
(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2025). Here, however, the Court need not address these arguments because, even
assuming that Mr. Sadiq prevails on those issues, his claims ultimately fail. See Dep’t of State v.
Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (2024) (“[T]he doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not
jurisdictional[.]”); Sereshti v. Gaudiosi, No. 24-cv-1288, 2024 WL 4625802, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct.
30, 2024) (assuming without deciding the existence of a nondiscretionary duty and collecting
cases).
“The standards for reviewing agency inaction—including visa processing delays—are the
same under the APA and Mandamus Act, so the Court will address both claims together.” Thein,
2025 WL 2418402, at *10 (quoting Doroodchi v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-3170, 2025 WL 1865114, at
*2 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025)). “Unreasonable delay is measured by six factors derived from a single
case: . . . Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. F.C.C. (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *6. The so-called TRAC factors are:
(1) The time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities or a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take
3 into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is “unreasonably delayed.”
In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832 836–37 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(quoting In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 1
“[C]ourts applying the TRAC factors at the motion-to-dismiss stage apply them ‘not to determine
whether there has been an unreasonable delay, but to determine if a plaintiff’s complaint alleged
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for unreasonable administrative delay.’” Motevali,
2025 WL 885116, at *6 (quoting Giza v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1641, 2024 WL 3967284, at *5
(D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2024)). Here, Mr.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RAHEEL SADIQ,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 2448 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
MARCO RUBIO, Secretary of State, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Raheel Sadiq, a citizen of Germany, applied for a B1/B2 visa in 2018. Over six years later,
the Department of State requested that he submit another application, which he completed at the
end of 2024. After his visa interview in 2024, his application was placed into administrative
processing, and the State Department has taken no further action since then. In July 2025,
Mr. Sadiq sued several officials charged with overseeing the United States’ immigration system,
seeking an order directing them to adjudicate his visa application. The Defendants have moved to
dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Although the Court
understands that Mr. Sadiq has been waiting for many years for an opportunity to visit the United
States, it must dismiss his Complaint because his claim of unreasonable delay fails.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Mr. Sadiq is a citizen and resident of Germany. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. In April 2018, he
submitted a Form DS-160 to apply for a B1/B2 visa. Compl. ¶ 20. “A B1/B2 visa allows
individuals who have a residence in a foreign country which they have no intention of abandoning to enter the United States for business or temporarily for pleasure.” Maui Hope v. Embassy of the
U.S., No. 25-cv-654, 2025 WL 3687556, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2025) (cleaned up). Soon after
submitting the Form DS-160, Mr. Sadiq completed an interview with a consular officer at a U.S.
embassy in Frankfurt, Germany. Compl. ¶ 21. After that interview, his application was placed in
administrative processing. Id. “Subsequently,” Mr. Sadiq “was asked to submit another Form
DS-160 on October 28, 2024.” Compl. ¶ 20. He completed a second interview in October 2024.
Compl. ¶ 21. His application was again placed in administrative processing and remains in that
status. See Compl. ¶ 22.
In July 2025, Mr. Sadiq sued the Secretary of State and other officials charged with
overseeing the United States’ immigration system. Compl. He alleges that the Defendants have
unreasonably delayed adjudicating his visa application, and he seeks a writ of mandamus and relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Compl. ¶¶ 2, 39–40. In September 2025, the
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mot.
Dismiss, ECF No. 3. That motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 4;
Reply, ECF No. 5.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “must construe the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual
2 allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Trudeau v.
FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
DISCUSSION
The Defendants make several arguments in support of dismissal, including that they have
no obligation to adjudicate visa applications and that Mr. Sadiq’s claims are barred by the doctrine
of consular non-reviewability. Mot. Dismiss 4, 9. The Court has previously addressed and rejected
identical arguments in similar cases. See Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369, 2025 WL 2418402,
at *7–11, (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025); Motevali v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-1029, 2025 WL 885116, at *5–6
(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2025). Here, however, the Court need not address these arguments because, even
assuming that Mr. Sadiq prevails on those issues, his claims ultimately fail. See Dep’t of State v.
Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (2024) (“[T]he doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not
jurisdictional[.]”); Sereshti v. Gaudiosi, No. 24-cv-1288, 2024 WL 4625802, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct.
30, 2024) (assuming without deciding the existence of a nondiscretionary duty and collecting
cases).
“The standards for reviewing agency inaction—including visa processing delays—are the
same under the APA and Mandamus Act, so the Court will address both claims together.” Thein,
2025 WL 2418402, at *10 (quoting Doroodchi v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-3170, 2025 WL 1865114, at
*2 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025)). “Unreasonable delay is measured by six factors derived from a single
case: . . . Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. F.C.C. (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *6. The so-called TRAC factors are:
(1) The time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities or a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take
3 into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is “unreasonably delayed.”
In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832 836–37 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(quoting In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 1
“[C]ourts applying the TRAC factors at the motion-to-dismiss stage apply them ‘not to determine
whether there has been an unreasonable delay, but to determine if a plaintiff’s complaint alleged
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for unreasonable administrative delay.’” Motevali,
2025 WL 885116, at *6 (quoting Giza v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1641, 2024 WL 3967284, at *5
(D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2024)). Here, Mr. Sadiq’s Complaint is insufficient to allege a claim of
unreasonable delay.
Factors one and two: “The first two TRAC factors focus on the extent of and reasons for
the agency delay.” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *12 (quoting Afghan & Iraqi Allies v. Blinken,
103 F.4th 807, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2024)). “The first factor, which is ‘the most important consideration
under TRAC,’ is that ‘the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of
reason.’” Id. (quoting Afghan & Iraqi Allies, 103 F.4th at 816). And “[t]he second factor ‘gives
content to the first’: ‘where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed
with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may
supply content for this rule of reason.’” Id. (quoting Afghan & Iraqi Allies, 103 F.4th at 816).
“Here, the Defendants have not provided a rule of reason, but the factors still weigh in their
favor.” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *7. “[W]ithout a mandatory timetable for which visas must
1 “Although TRAC set forth this framework to assess whether agency delays are so egregious as to warrant mandamus under the All Writs Act, the D.C. Circuit has routinely applied the same framework to assess claims that agency action has been unreasonably delayed for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act.” Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369, 2025 WL 2418402, at *12, (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Afghan & Iraqi Allies v. Blinken, 103 F.4th 807, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2024)).
4 be adjudicated, courts in this District ‘typically turn to case law as a guide,’ . . . and here, case law
is firmly on the Defendants’ side.” Id. (quoting Niyomwungere v. Blinken, No. 24-cv-1990, 2024
WL 5075827, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024)). “Courts in this District label delays ‘between three
to five years’ as reasonable and generally extend the ‘unreasonable’ label to delays more than five
years.” Id. (quoting Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2024)).
Here, the Parties offer different measurements of the delay suffered by Mr. Sadiq.
Mr. Sadiq understandably counts his delay as starting when he submitted his first Form DS-160 in
April 2018, and by that measure, he has been waiting over seven years. Opp’n 8, 20. The
Defendants start the clock when he was last interviewed—meaning that only about nine months
elapsed before he filed this lawsuit. Reply 9. Unfortunately for Mr. Sadiq, the weight of authority
in this District aligns with the Defendants’ measurement. Under this District’s prevailing approach,
“[t]he proper method for calculating delay . . . is the length of time between the last action the
government took on a visa application and the filing of plaintiff’s complaint.” Isse v. Whitman,
No. 22-cv-3114, 2023 WL 4174357, at *6 n.4 (D.D.C. June 26, 2023); accord Motevali,
2025 WL 885116, at *7; Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-1581, 2024 WL 341166,
at *7 n.7 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024). Mr. Sadiq completed his second visa interview in October 2024,
and he filed this lawsuit in July 2025. That means that the relevant delay he suffered was about
nine months. “While there is currently no bright line that makes a delay per se unreasonable, [nine
months] is simply not enough.” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *7 (cleaned up). Thus, these factors
weigh in favor of the Defendants.
Factors three and five: “These factors ‘focus on the interests affected by agency delay.’”
Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *13 (quoting Afghan & Iraqi Allies, 103 F.4th at 817). They “examine
‘the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay,’ including whether ‘human health
5 and welfare’ might be implicated.” Isse, 2023 WL 4174357, at *7. This factor is neutral. Mr. Sadiq
says little about how the delay has affected him. He represents that he has “incurred enormous
costs and significant attorney’s fees,” Compl. ¶ 41, and he suggests that the Defendants’ inaction
“inflicts ongoing human and economic harm,” Opp’n 24—but he does not explain why or
otherwise clarify why he is seeking a visa. Given the lack of any allegations regarding the interests
at play, this factor does not weigh in favor of either Party.
Factor four: “The fourth factor addresses the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority.” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *13 (cleaned up). “This
factor ‘strongly disfavors’ plaintiffs whose request is akin to cutting the line of applications ahead
of them, which would ‘disrupt competing agency priorities with no overall improvement in the
[agency’s] backlog.’” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *8 (quoting Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv.
Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). “This factor is important, as the D.C. Circuit
has ‘refused to grant relief, even though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where
a judicial order putting the petitioner at the head of the queue would simply move all others back
one space and produce no net gain.’” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *13 (quoting Mashpee
Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
According to the Defendants, this is such a queue-jumping scenario. Mot. Dismiss 16–17.
In response, Mr. Sadiq argues that the Defendants offer no evidence supporting that the
government structures nonimmigrant-visa applications into a queue capable of being jumped.
Opp’n 22–23. But at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the focus is on the “factual matter” alleged in
the Complaint. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, Mr. Sadiq’s argument that the Defendants’
approach is structureless is “entirely speculative” because his Complaint “pleaded no facts to
support it.” Niyomwungere¸ 2024 WL 5075827, at *5. Mr. Sadiq also suggests that that even if
6 there is such a queue, concerns about queue-jumping cannot overcome the Defendants’ duty to
adjudicate his visa application. Opp’n 22–23. Yet an agency’s duty to act will exist in every case
applying the TRAC factors—indeed, the existence of such a duty is the precondition for applying
those factors. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 340. And Mr. Sadiq’s position is inconsistent with the D.C.
Circuit’s approach to the fourth TRAC factor. See Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *13 (citing
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1100). In similar cases—i.e., challenges to
visa-application delays in which the complaint is silent about the effect of relief on other visa
applicants—courts have held that this factor favors defendants. See, e.g., Tehran v. Rubio,
No. 25-cv-1584, 2025 WL 3551629, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2025); Dalmar v. Blinken,
No. 23-cv-3315, 2024 WL 3967289, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2024); Sheibani v. Garland,
No. 23-cv-2773, 2024 WL 3043156, at *5 (D.D.C. June 18, 2024). The Court concludes that this
factor favors the Defendants here too.
Factor six: Finally, the sixth TRAC factor “notes that ‘the court need not find any
impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably
delayed.’” Afghan & Iraqi Allies, 103 F.4th at 820 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Here, both
Parties agree that the Plaintiff has not alleged any impropriety. Opp’n 24; Reply 15. This factor is
neutral.
* * *
The Court concludes that Mr. Sadiq’s Complaint has failed to allege facts stating a
plausible claim for unreasonable delay. Based on the alleged facts, several TRAC factors—
including the most important factors—weigh in favor of the Defendants, and the other factors are
neutral. Accordingly, the factors tilt against Mr. Sadiq. Again, the Court understands Mr. Sadiq’s
7 frustrations with the well-documented delays in our visa-adjudication system. But the TRAC
factors squarely require dismissal of his Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 3.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: April 3, 2026