OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Haxhi P. Sadiku, a native and citizen of Albania, entered the United States on April 14, 1997 on a nonimmigrant B-l visa, with authorization to remain until May 13, 1997. On November 10, 1999, he was served with a Notice to Appear, alleging that he was removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an overstay. At a master calendar hearing, he admitted the factual allegations through counsel, Jose Camilo, Esquire, and conceded removability. On August 26, 1997, Sadiku filed his application for asylum under INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), and withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18, claiming a fear of persecution on account of political opinion. At a hearing on the merits on July 10, 2000, the Immigration Judge denied his applications, concluding that he lacked credibility and that conditions had changed in Albania. His application for voluntary departure was denied. On February 5, 2003, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, specifically agreeing with the IJ’s findings concerning credibility. Sadiku did not petition for review of this decision.
On March 9, 2007, Sadiku, through new counsel, Timothy G. Griffin, Esquire, filed an untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing for 90 day filing deadline), motion to reopen. He alleged that prior counsel inadequately supported and presented his claim that he and his family suffered persecution under the old Communist regime and at the hands of the new Socialist and Democratic Parties. Prior counsel did not, for example, submit evidence that he bore physical scars from torture. Sadiku argued that the filing deadline should be equitably tolled in his ease because prior counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in handling his asylum claim, specifically, in failing to prepare him adequately to testify. He noted, however, that he had not filed a complaint with disciplinary authorities because “no violation of applicable disciplinary rules is alleged here.” A.R. 71. Several new items were submitted in support of the motion to reopen. Sadiku’s sister submitted a statement, dated March 19, 2007, in which she noted that his wife was so distraught over
the May 1996 stabbing that she suffered a miscarriage. Sadiku’s father submitted a statement, dated March 16, 2007, attesting to the circumstances surrounding the stabbing and the miscarriage, A.R. 31. Other family members submitted recently executed statements as well. In addition, a nurse, Liri Selim Bici, submitted a statement, dated March 14, 2007, that she was present when three men brought Sadiku to the hospital, wounded and bleeding from stab wounds, and that he remained in the hospital for two weeks. A.R. 34.
On March 28, 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen. The Board concluded that Sadiku’s allegations of ineffective assistance were vague and they did not excuse the 4 year delay in filing. Citing
Mahmood v. Gonzales,
427 F.3d 248, 252-53 (3d Cir.2005), the Board held that Sadiku had failed to show diligence in making his claims against prior counsel in a motion to reopen. In addition, he had failed to comply with the requirements of
Matter of Lozada,
19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), for making a claim of ineffective assistance.
See also Zheng v. Gonzales,
422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir.2005). The Board also declined to exercise its
sua sponte
authority to reopen proceedings. Sadiku timely petitioned for review of this Board decision in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the matter was transferred here for lack of venue.
We will deny the petition. We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We are not authorized to review the Board’s February 5, 2003 decision, because the petition for review is timely,
see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (providing for thirty period for filing petition for review), only as to the March 28, 2007 decision.
See Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
514 U.S. 386, 405-06, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (holding that, in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen, Congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders). Here, Sadiku did not seek review in this Court of the Board’s February 5, 2003 decision, and we thus have no jurisdiction to address the arguments he raises in his brief concerning whether the IJ’s and Board’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence,
see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Chen v. Ashcroft,
376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir.2004).
We review the denial of a motion to reopen under an abuse of discretion stan
dat’d.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty,
502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). The Supreme Court has stated that “[m]otions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored,” noting that “as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.”
Id.
We will not disturb the Board’s discretionary decision unless it was arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.
See, e.g., Sevoian v. Ashcroft,
290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir.2002). “An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings,” and such a motion “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),(B). Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C.
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OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Haxhi P. Sadiku, a native and citizen of Albania, entered the United States on April 14, 1997 on a nonimmigrant B-l visa, with authorization to remain until May 13, 1997. On November 10, 1999, he was served with a Notice to Appear, alleging that he was removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an overstay. At a master calendar hearing, he admitted the factual allegations through counsel, Jose Camilo, Esquire, and conceded removability. On August 26, 1997, Sadiku filed his application for asylum under INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), and withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18, claiming a fear of persecution on account of political opinion. At a hearing on the merits on July 10, 2000, the Immigration Judge denied his applications, concluding that he lacked credibility and that conditions had changed in Albania. His application for voluntary departure was denied. On February 5, 2003, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, specifically agreeing with the IJ’s findings concerning credibility. Sadiku did not petition for review of this decision.
On March 9, 2007, Sadiku, through new counsel, Timothy G. Griffin, Esquire, filed an untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing for 90 day filing deadline), motion to reopen. He alleged that prior counsel inadequately supported and presented his claim that he and his family suffered persecution under the old Communist regime and at the hands of the new Socialist and Democratic Parties. Prior counsel did not, for example, submit evidence that he bore physical scars from torture. Sadiku argued that the filing deadline should be equitably tolled in his ease because prior counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in handling his asylum claim, specifically, in failing to prepare him adequately to testify. He noted, however, that he had not filed a complaint with disciplinary authorities because “no violation of applicable disciplinary rules is alleged here.” A.R. 71. Several new items were submitted in support of the motion to reopen. Sadiku’s sister submitted a statement, dated March 19, 2007, in which she noted that his wife was so distraught over
the May 1996 stabbing that she suffered a miscarriage. Sadiku’s father submitted a statement, dated March 16, 2007, attesting to the circumstances surrounding the stabbing and the miscarriage, A.R. 31. Other family members submitted recently executed statements as well. In addition, a nurse, Liri Selim Bici, submitted a statement, dated March 14, 2007, that she was present when three men brought Sadiku to the hospital, wounded and bleeding from stab wounds, and that he remained in the hospital for two weeks. A.R. 34.
On March 28, 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen. The Board concluded that Sadiku’s allegations of ineffective assistance were vague and they did not excuse the 4 year delay in filing. Citing
Mahmood v. Gonzales,
427 F.3d 248, 252-53 (3d Cir.2005), the Board held that Sadiku had failed to show diligence in making his claims against prior counsel in a motion to reopen. In addition, he had failed to comply with the requirements of
Matter of Lozada,
19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), for making a claim of ineffective assistance.
See also Zheng v. Gonzales,
422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir.2005). The Board also declined to exercise its
sua sponte
authority to reopen proceedings. Sadiku timely petitioned for review of this Board decision in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the matter was transferred here for lack of venue.
We will deny the petition. We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We are not authorized to review the Board’s February 5, 2003 decision, because the petition for review is timely,
see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (providing for thirty period for filing petition for review), only as to the March 28, 2007 decision.
See Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
514 U.S. 386, 405-06, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (holding that, in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen, Congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders). Here, Sadiku did not seek review in this Court of the Board’s February 5, 2003 decision, and we thus have no jurisdiction to address the arguments he raises in his brief concerning whether the IJ’s and Board’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence,
see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Chen v. Ashcroft,
376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir.2004).
We review the denial of a motion to reopen under an abuse of discretion stan
dat’d.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty,
502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). The Supreme Court has stated that “[m]otions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored,” noting that “as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.”
Id.
We will not disturb the Board’s discretionary decision unless it was arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.
See, e.g., Sevoian v. Ashcroft,
290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir.2002). “An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings,” and such a motion “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),(B). Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
See also Luntungan v. U.S. Attorney General,
449 F.3d 551, 555 (3d Cir.2006) (per curiam).
Sadiku’s motion to reopen was almost fours year late. Because the motion to reopen was untimely, and none of the exceptions apply,
the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying it.
Doherty,
502 U.S. at 323, 112 S.Ct. 719;
Sevoian,
290 F.3d at 174. In
Mahmood,
427 F.3d at 250-51, we held that attorney conduct can provide a basis for equitable tolling of the ninety-day deadline, but failure to exercise due diligence in asserting ineffective assistance of counsel undermines any claim for equitable tolling of the motion to reopen deadline,
id.
at 252-53.
See also Borges v. Gonzales,
402 F.3d 398, 407 (3d Cir.2005). Here, Sadiku waited almost four years after the Board’s decision to file his motion to reopen, and he offered no reason for this lengthy delay. His bald assertion that prior counsel did not tell him that his asylum application had been denied does not account for the four year delay.
In addition, in
Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft,
259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir.2001), we held that the Board’s procedural requirements for asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are a reasonable exercise of the Board’s discretion. A motion based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be supported by an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts that sets forth in detail the agreement that was
entered into with prior counsel with respect to the actions to be taken. Furthermore, prior counsel must be informed of the allegations and allowed the opportunity to respond. Finally, if it is asserted that prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a violation of ethical or legal responsibilities, the motion should reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities, and if not, why not.
Lozada,
19 I.
&
N. Dec. at 638. We agree that Sadiku failed to comply with the
Lozada
requirements. Thus, the Board’s denial of the motion as untimely was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law, and the Board properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion to reopen,
see Zheng,
422 F.3d at 106. Because the motion was untimely, we may not consider its merits, and specifically Sadiku’s contention that he had new evidence, the aforementioned statements, that previously were unavailable and thus provided a basis for reopening removal proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.