PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Anthony Sadberry and Denise Sadberry (collectively, “Sadberry”) appeal the Tax Court’s decision in favor of Defendant-Appellee Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”). In 1999, Sadberry received a series of early distributions from annuities in order to fund his daughter’s education. The parties do not dispute that $61,548 of the distributions were taxable.
However, Sadberry contends that the taxable distributions were eligible for a tax-free rollover, and that as a result, the $61,548 need not have been included in his income on his amended tax return. In addition, Sadberry argues he is not liable for related tax penalties. We disagree.
I
The standard of review for judgments of the Tax Court is the same standard we apply when reviewing other trial courts. We review factual determinations for clear error and conclusions of law
de novo. Dunn v. CIR,
301 F.3d 339, 348 (5th Cir. 2002).
II
Only withdrawals from certain retirement plans are eligible for tax-free rollovers. 26 C.F.R. § 1.402(c)-2. A tax-free rollover occurs when a distribution
from a qualified retirement plan
is deposited into another qualified retirement plan within a sixty-day time period.
See generally id.;
26 C.F.R. § 1.403(b) — 2; 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(31)-l; I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(A). The issue is whether the retirement plan from which Sadberry received an early distribution is a qualified retirement plan for purposes of a tax-free rollover.
Distributions from pension plans, profit-sharing plans, annuity plans, individual retirement accounts, and individual retirement annuities may qualify for a tax-free rollover if the plans meet the definitions set out in the Internal Revenue Code.
See
I.R.C. §§ 402(c)(4),
403(a)(4), 403(b)(8),
408(d)(3)(A). Sadberry purchased a Flexible Premium Deferred Annuity Contract
from Glenbrook Life and Annuity (“FPDAC”) and multiple Flexible Premium Retirement Annuity policies from Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. (“FPRA”). On appeal, Sadberry primarily disputes the Tax Court’s determination that one FPRA,
and consequently an early distribution from that FPRA, was not qualified for a tax-free rollover. He argues that the FPRA was qualified, or alternatively, that the record does not contain enough information to determine the status of this FPRA. While the Tax Court determined that the FPRA in question was a nonqualified annuity, in Sadberry’s brief, he refers to the FPRA as an “IRA,” although he does not indicate whether he characterizes the FPRA as an individual retirement annuity or an individual retirement account. Sadberry contends that the Tax Court made unjustified assumptions in concluding the FPRA was a nonqualified annuity.
A
Because the Tax Court determined that the FPRA at issue was a nonqualified annuity and Southern Farm Bureau calls it an annuity,
we begin by assuming that the FPRA is an annuity. Operating under this assumption, we must decide whether the FPRA is one of the qualified annuities under the Internal Revenue Code: a qualified annuity under I.R.C. § 403(a) or a qualified individual retirement annuity under I.R.C. § 408(b).
In order to meet the requirements of a qualified annuity, the FPRA must fit the definition set out in I.R.C. § 403(a)(1). I.R.C. § 403(a)(4).
Section 403(a)(1) defines a qualified annuity as a contract “purchased by an employer for an employee under a plan which meets the requirements of section 404(a)(2).” Section 404(a)(2) is entitled “Employees annuities’ ” and incorporates portions of section 401(a), which describes qualified pension,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans.
Thus, in order to meet the requirements of a qualified annuity, an employer must have created the FPRA for the benefit of his employees.
Sadberry’s employer did not set up the FPRA for Sadberry’s benefit. Rather, Sadberry funded the FPRA with his own post-tax funds. As a result, the FPRA is not a qualified annuity.
We next assume the FPRA is an individual retirement annuity and turn to whether the FPRA is qualified based on that characterization. Distributions from an individual retirement annuity qualify for a tax-free rollover if the account meets the definition in I.R.C. § 408(b).
See
408(d)(3)(A). In 1999, to qualify under this section, the FPRA must have limited the annual contribution or premium to $2,000. Because the FPRA at issue does not limit its annual premiums, it does not qualify as an individual retirement annuity according to the Internal Revenue Code or for a tax-free rollover. Under section 408(a), in 1999 an individual retirement account was subject to the same $2,000 limit. Therefore, to the extent Sadberry argues the FPRA is an individual retirement account, we conclude it was not qualified for a tax-free rollover.
Having determined the FPRA is not a qualified annuity, individual retirement annuity or individual retirement account, we next assume the FPRA is a pension or profit-sharing plan. Distributions from a pension or profit-sharing plan qualify for a tax-free rollover if the pension or profit-sharing plan meets the definition in I.R.C. § 401(a).
Like a qualified annuity, under section 401(a), the plan, must be created by an employer for the benefit of his employees.
See also
26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-l(a)(2), (b)(1)®. Retirement benefits of these plans are generally measured by factors such as years of service and compensation received by the em-. ployee. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-l(b)(l)(i), (ii). As we have explained, Sadberry’s employer did not set up the FPRA for Sadberry’s benefit; Sadberry funded the FPRA with his own post-tax funds. In addition, the FPRA does not measure benefits by reference to Sadberry’s years of employment or compensation. Therefore, the Tax Court was correct in concluding that the FPRA. at issue is not a qualified pension or profit sharing plan.
Since Sadberry is not a section 501 organization
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PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Anthony Sadberry and Denise Sadberry (collectively, “Sadberry”) appeal the Tax Court’s decision in favor of Defendant-Appellee Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”). In 1999, Sadberry received a series of early distributions from annuities in order to fund his daughter’s education. The parties do not dispute that $61,548 of the distributions were taxable.
However, Sadberry contends that the taxable distributions were eligible for a tax-free rollover, and that as a result, the $61,548 need not have been included in his income on his amended tax return. In addition, Sadberry argues he is not liable for related tax penalties. We disagree.
I
The standard of review for judgments of the Tax Court is the same standard we apply when reviewing other trial courts. We review factual determinations for clear error and conclusions of law
de novo. Dunn v. CIR,
301 F.3d 339, 348 (5th Cir. 2002).
II
Only withdrawals from certain retirement plans are eligible for tax-free rollovers. 26 C.F.R. § 1.402(c)-2. A tax-free rollover occurs when a distribution
from a qualified retirement plan
is deposited into another qualified retirement plan within a sixty-day time period.
See generally id.;
26 C.F.R. § 1.403(b) — 2; 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(31)-l; I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(A). The issue is whether the retirement plan from which Sadberry received an early distribution is a qualified retirement plan for purposes of a tax-free rollover.
Distributions from pension plans, profit-sharing plans, annuity plans, individual retirement accounts, and individual retirement annuities may qualify for a tax-free rollover if the plans meet the definitions set out in the Internal Revenue Code.
See
I.R.C. §§ 402(c)(4),
403(a)(4), 403(b)(8),
408(d)(3)(A). Sadberry purchased a Flexible Premium Deferred Annuity Contract
from Glenbrook Life and Annuity (“FPDAC”) and multiple Flexible Premium Retirement Annuity policies from Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. (“FPRA”). On appeal, Sadberry primarily disputes the Tax Court’s determination that one FPRA,
and consequently an early distribution from that FPRA, was not qualified for a tax-free rollover. He argues that the FPRA was qualified, or alternatively, that the record does not contain enough information to determine the status of this FPRA. While the Tax Court determined that the FPRA in question was a nonqualified annuity, in Sadberry’s brief, he refers to the FPRA as an “IRA,” although he does not indicate whether he characterizes the FPRA as an individual retirement annuity or an individual retirement account. Sadberry contends that the Tax Court made unjustified assumptions in concluding the FPRA was a nonqualified annuity.
A
Because the Tax Court determined that the FPRA at issue was a nonqualified annuity and Southern Farm Bureau calls it an annuity,
we begin by assuming that the FPRA is an annuity. Operating under this assumption, we must decide whether the FPRA is one of the qualified annuities under the Internal Revenue Code: a qualified annuity under I.R.C. § 403(a) or a qualified individual retirement annuity under I.R.C. § 408(b).
In order to meet the requirements of a qualified annuity, the FPRA must fit the definition set out in I.R.C. § 403(a)(1). I.R.C. § 403(a)(4).
Section 403(a)(1) defines a qualified annuity as a contract “purchased by an employer for an employee under a plan which meets the requirements of section 404(a)(2).” Section 404(a)(2) is entitled “Employees annuities’ ” and incorporates portions of section 401(a), which describes qualified pension,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans.
Thus, in order to meet the requirements of a qualified annuity, an employer must have created the FPRA for the benefit of his employees.
Sadberry’s employer did not set up the FPRA for Sadberry’s benefit. Rather, Sadberry funded the FPRA with his own post-tax funds. As a result, the FPRA is not a qualified annuity.
We next assume the FPRA is an individual retirement annuity and turn to whether the FPRA is qualified based on that characterization. Distributions from an individual retirement annuity qualify for a tax-free rollover if the account meets the definition in I.R.C. § 408(b).
See
408(d)(3)(A). In 1999, to qualify under this section, the FPRA must have limited the annual contribution or premium to $2,000. Because the FPRA at issue does not limit its annual premiums, it does not qualify as an individual retirement annuity according to the Internal Revenue Code or for a tax-free rollover. Under section 408(a), in 1999 an individual retirement account was subject to the same $2,000 limit. Therefore, to the extent Sadberry argues the FPRA is an individual retirement account, we conclude it was not qualified for a tax-free rollover.
Having determined the FPRA is not a qualified annuity, individual retirement annuity or individual retirement account, we next assume the FPRA is a pension or profit-sharing plan. Distributions from a pension or profit-sharing plan qualify for a tax-free rollover if the pension or profit-sharing plan meets the definition in I.R.C. § 401(a).
Like a qualified annuity, under section 401(a), the plan, must be created by an employer for the benefit of his employees.
See also
26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-l(a)(2), (b)(1)®. Retirement benefits of these plans are generally measured by factors such as years of service and compensation received by the em-. ployee. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-l(b)(l)(i), (ii). As we have explained, Sadberry’s employer did not set up the FPRA for Sadberry’s benefit; Sadberry funded the FPRA with his own post-tax funds. In addition, the FPRA does not measure benefits by reference to Sadberry’s years of employment or compensation. Therefore, the Tax Court was correct in concluding that the FPRA. at issue is not a qualified pension or profit sharing plan.
Since Sadberry is not a section 501 organization
and the FPRA at issue does not meet the Internal Revenue Code definition of a pension plan, profit-sharing plan, annuity plan, individual retirement account, or individual retirement annuity, the Tax Court correctly determined that the FPRA at issue was not eligible for a tax-free rollover.
Sadberry contends that the record regarding the FPRA is incomplete, and that the burden is on the Commissioner to ensure the necessary information is avail
able. However, the record contains enough information to exclude the FPRA from each category of qualified retirement plan. Therefore, it is adequate for our purposes. Even if the record did not contain enough information to determine the status of the FPRA, the taxpayer has the burden of proof in showing the Commissioner is wrong.
See Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115, 54 S.Ct. 8, 78 L.Ed. 212 (1933);
Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. CIR.,
154 F.3d 527, 530 (5th Cir.1998). Sadberry has not met this burden because he has presented no evidence that the FPRA is qualified for a tax-free rollover under the Internal Revenue Code.
B.
Sadberry also argues that the Commissioner is equitably estopped from claiming the FPRA distribution did not qualify for a tax-free rollover. In order to claim equitable estoppel against the government, Sadberry must meet the requirements laid out in
Heckler v. Community Health Services, Inc.,
467 U.S. 51, 59-61, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984).
See also Norfolk S. Corp. v. CIR,
104 T.C. 13, 60, 1995 WL 9185 (1995),
modified,
104 T.C. 417, 1995 WL 151756 (1995). Equitable estoppel can be applied against the government only when (1) the government has made a false representation, (2) the false representation involves an error in a statement of fact and not in an opinion or statement of law, (3) the party claiming equitable estoppel is ignorant of the true facts and reasonably relies on the false representation of the government, and (4) there are adverse effects due to the false representation.
Id.
Sadberry maintains that the 1999 instructions for filling out a Form 1040 were misleading, and that he relied on these instructions in filing his taxes when he excluded the taxable distributions at issue from his income. However, as the Tax Court correctly concluded, the instructions designated for use in preparing 1999 returns were not misleading.
See, e.g.,
IRS, Dep’t of the Treasury, Publication 575, Pension and Annuity Income 29 (1999) (“If you withdraw cash or other assets from a
qualified
retirement plan in an eligible rollover distribution, you can defer tax on the distribution by rolling it over to another
qualified
retirement plan.”)(emphasis added); IRS, Dep’t of the Treasury, Publication 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs) 4, 14 (1999)(“The trustee or custodian [of a qualified IRA] generally cannot accept contributions of more than $2,000 a year.”). They clearly explain that only distributions from qualified plans are eligible for tax-free rollovers.
It is apparent from Sadberry’s briefing, not that the instructions are ambiguous, but that Sadberry simply did not follow them. Sadberry points to the instructions for line 15a and 15b, rather than the instructions for lines 16a and 16b. Sadberry contends that the instructions for lines 15a and 15b directed that he leave line 15b blank. Due to the nature of the form, if line 15b is blank, the distribution in question would not be included in Sadberry’s total income.
As the argument goes, the Commissioner should therefore be es-topped from claiming that distribution should have been included in Sadberry’s gross income.
First, we agree with the Tax Court that, based on the 1999 Form 1040 instructions, the FPRA was not an IRA,
and that the instructions to line 16a and 16b are more relevant.
However, assuming the contrary, the instructions to lines 15a and 15b plainly indicate that a taxpayer should
only
refrain from reporting his total IRA distribution on line 15b if one of five distinctly numbered exceptions apply.
None of the five exceptions apply to Sad-berry; thus, it is apparent that, according to the instructions, Sadberry should not have left line 15b blank. In his brief, Sadberry groups together the instructions from two unrelated paragraphs.
More
specifically, he argues that the statement regarding a conduit IRA functions as one of the five exceptions. Any cursory reading of the instructions establishes that is not the case. Notwithstanding the standard confusion that confronts us all with respect to the IRS’s tax forms, the 1999 Form 1040 instructions are unambiguous, and the Commissioner did not make any false representations.
Furthermore, to the extent Sadberry claims his “detriment is the inability to retain money that [he] should never have received in the first place,” this argument fails.
Heckler,
467 U.S. at 61, 104 S.Ct. 2218. Because Sadberry did not include the taxable annuity proceeds as part of his income on his 1999 tax returns and amended returns, the government refunded him money to which he was not entitled.
This cannot be the basis for estoppel against the government.
Id.
Sadberry also alludes to statements IRS officials made during a settlement agreement with Sadberry as grounds for equitable estoppel. However, Sadberry has not shown he relied to his detriment on any alleged misrepresentations of fact during this meeting. As the Tax Court accurately held, the elements of equitable estoppel are absent here.
See Graff v. CIR,
74 T.C. 743, 761-65, 1980 WL 4471 (1980).
C.
Section 6662 imposes a twenty percent penalty when a taxpayer substantially underreports his income on his tax return, measured against the amount of tax imposed on him by the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(1),(b)(2).
However, no penalty is imposed if the taxpayer shows he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4. “The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances.”
Id.
The Tax Court found that Sadberry substantially understated his income,
and without deciding whether he acted in good faith, held that Sadberry did not act with reasonable cause. The Tax Court explained that based on Sadberry’s knowledge, education, and experience as an attorney, in conjunction with the fact that the 1999 Form 1040 instructions did not support his position, Sadberry did not have reasonable cause to substantially understate his income.
There is not clear error in the Tax Court’s finding that Sadberry failed to act with reasonable cause, given all the pertinent facts and circumstances.
See
26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4;
Srivastava v. CIR,
220 F.3d 353, 367 (5th Cir.2000),
overruled on other grounds, CIR v. Banks,
- U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 826, 160 L.Ed.2d 859 (2005). We also agree with the Tax Court that, because the FPRA was not a qualified plan and no exception applies, Sadber
ry is liable for the section 72(q)
ten percent penalty for premature distributions from nonqualified plans.
Ill
As we find that the FPRA was not a qualified pension plan, profit-sharing plan, annuity plan, individual retirement account, or individual retirement annuity, we are in agreement with the rulings of the Tax Court on the points brought forward to us: the FPRA premature distributions were not eligible for tax-free rollover treatment, Sadberry is liable for the ten percent penalty on the FPRA and FPDAC distributions under section 72(q), and Sad-berry is also liable for the twenty percent penalty for a substantial understatement of income tax under section 6662. Sadberry has failed to show he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to his failure to report as income the taxable portion of the FPRA and FPDAC distributions. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Tax Court.
AFFIRMED.