NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
MITCHELL SABOL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
: :
v. :
: :
JANETTE KABANA, AND AMBERLYNN : No. 707 EDA 2026 THREADGILL :
Appeal from the Order Entered February 24, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2021-60921
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2026
Mitchell Sabol (“Father”) appeals from the order denying and dismissing
his petition for both contempt and modification of custody entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Bucks County on February 24, 2026. After careful review,
we affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the pertinent factual and
procedural history of the case as follows:
[Father] and Janette Kabana [(“Mother”)] are the natural parents of minor child E.K.Z. [(“Child”)] born August [] 2018. [Child] has been in the care of Amberlynn Threadgill since birth, and Threadgill is the custodial parent. This custody matter began [] on May 28, 2021, when Threadgill had custody of [] Child and her former partner, Cristina Alfonso-Zea, filed a complaint for custody against Mother, [Father], and Threadgill. Following the complaint, a custody conference was held on August 3, 2021. Despite proper service, [Father] failed to appear for the custody conference. As of the custody conference, it was reported that [Father] had never seen [] Child nor had any contact with [] Child. A hearing was
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scheduled and held on October 12, 2021. [Father] was again not present. A subsequent hearing was held on January 31, 2022. [Father] was not present once again despite proper service.
[Father] filed a complaint in custody on December 2, 2024, requesting immediate temporary custody of [] Child for concerns regarding [] Child’s safety and requesting conciliation with Mother. [Father] then filed a petition to modify custody on December 11, 2024, based upon the order entered by the Hon. Jordan B. Yeager on March 21, 2022[, which] resulted from [Alfonso-Zea’s May 28, 2021] complaint in custody[.] This order provided [Father] with no custodial time given that he failed to appear for the proceedings despite receiving proper service. A custody conference was fixed for March 18, 2025, before a custody conference officer following [Father’s] petition to modify. Pursuant to the report of the custody conference officer, [Father] asserted he had weekly visits with [] Child, arranged by Threadgill, between January 2023 and January 2024. [Father] stated he has had no contact with [] Child since January 2024. Following the custody conference[,] a hearing was scheduled for May 5, 2025. [Father] requested and was granted a continuance. The hearing was rescheduled and held on July 22, 2025.
At the hearing, the Hon. Matthew D. Weintraub placed on the record his finding for each of the sixteen child custody factors. The court ultimately awarded [] Threadgill primary physical and legal custody of [] Child, on an interim basis, with the exception that Threadgill be obligated to inform Mother and [Father] of any “major decisions and milestones” in [] Child’s life. [N.T. Custody Hearing, 7/22/25, at 8.] The court further ordered that, through Threadgill and [Father’s] attorneys, [Father] shall pick a reunification therapist through his health insurance. [See id.] It was at the therapist’s discretion to determine what next steps should be taken regarding contact between [] Child and [Father]. ... [T]he court filed an interim custody order on August 12, 2025[.]
[O]n November 24, 2025, [Father] filed a petition for contempt of custody and modification of custody order alleging that Threadgill was in contempt of the custody order and therefore custody
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should be modified. A custody conference [relating to this joint petition] was scheduled and held on December 18, 2025[.] The custody conference officer made the recommendation that [Father’s] petition for contempt and petition for modification be denied and dismissed based upon the information gleaned during the conference. On January 22, 2026, [Father] filed a petition to amend [Child’s] birth certificate [to reflect] that he is [] Child’s father.
A hearing before the Hon. Charissa J. Liller was scheduled and held on February 11, 2026 [for the court to] rule on the petition for contempt, the petition for modification[,] and the petition to amend birth certificate. At the hearing, the custody conference officer’s report was incorporated into the record by agreement of the parties. When asked by [the] court to confirm that [Father] had no contact with [] Child for years, [Father] replied that “[Mother] gifted the child to [Threadgill].” [N.T. Hearing, 2/11/26, at 13.] [The] court entered an order on the record on February 11, 2026 in which it denied and dismissed [Father’s] petition for contempt, petition for modification, and petition to amend birth certificate[1] and dismissed [] Alfonso-Zea as a party to the matter. [The] court then ordered an addendum to the August 12, [2025] custody order which clarified Paragraph 6 [as follows]: “Threadgill shall keep [Father] and [Mother] informed of any legal custody decisions she makes on behalf of [Child]. Threadgill does not need permission from [Father] or [Mother] for any legal custody decisions related to [Child].” [Addendum to Custody Order, 2/24/26, at ¶ 1.]
Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/26, at 1-4 (prefixes, unnecessary capitalization, and
footnotes omitted). Father timely filed a notice of appeal. Both the trial court
and Father have complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), (b).
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1 On March 20, 2026, Father withdrew the portion of his appeal concerning
the dismissal of his petition to amend Child’s birth certificate.
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On appeal, Father presents the following questions for our review:
1) Did the family court err in denying [Father’s] petition for modification of the prior custody order in light of [Father’s] superior constitutional right as the natural parent?
2) Did the family court err in denying [Father’s] petition for contempt?
Appellant’s Brief, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Because Father’s issues are related, we address them in tandem. Father
challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for contempt and modification
of custody.
We review a trial court’s determination in a custody case for an abuse of discretion, and our scope of review is broad. Because we cannot make independent factual determinations, we must accept the trial court’s finding[s] that are supported by the evidence. The trial judge’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings, however, do not bind this Court. We may reject the trial court’s conclusions, but only if they involve an error of law or are unreasonable in light of its factual findings.
Smith v. Smith, 281 A.3d 304, 311 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted).
Furthermore:
This Court will reverse a trial court’s order denying or granting a civil contempt petition only upon a showing that the trial court misapplied the law or exercised its discretion in a manner lacking reason. In proceedings for civil contempt of court, the general rule is that the burden of proof rests with the complaining party to demonstrate that the defendant is in noncompliance with a court order. To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.
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Sawyer v. Anusionwu, 357 A.3d 1252, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2026) (brackets
and citations omitted). In the context of custody proceedings, “[i]t is settled
that an adjudication of contempt is not a proper basis to modify an existing
custody arrangement.” J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(footnote and citations omitted); see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(g). Rather, “a trial
court’s ability to alter custody as a contempt sanction is restricted to
circumstances where the responding party is given express notice that custody
will be at issue during the proceeding and the modification is based upon the
determination of the child’s best interest.” J.M., 164 A.3d at 1267.
Father claims that the trial court committed reversible error and abused
its discretion by denying his joint petition where Threadgill was in contempt
of the court’s custody order and the court failed to apply “the heavy
presumption that both state and federal constitutional law require in a contest
between a natural parent [] and a non-parent with in loco parentis standing[.]”
Appellant’s Brief, at 24. Regarding the denial of his petition for modification,
Father specifically disputes the court’s application of the best-interest factors
in reaching its underlying custody determination, as memorialized in the
August 12, 2025 custody order. See id. at 28-31. Father further disputes the
denial of his petition for contempt because “the evidence established that
Threadgill intentionally failed to comply with provisions of the court’s prior
August 2025 order” where she “refused to agree to [Father’s]
recommendation” of a specific therapist to facilitate reunification and “failed
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to inform [Father] of major events and milestones in [Child’s] life.” Id. at 32.
We disagree.
The trial court adequately addressed its denial of Father’s petition as
follows:
[Father] argued in his joint petition for contempt and modification that[,] because of Threadgill’s alleged contempt[,] it was in the best interest of [] Child that custody be modified to allow him direct contact with [] Child. [Father] alleges that Threadgill has not informed him of major events and milestones in [Child’s] life and that Threadgill has not agreed to his recommendation of [a therapist] nor provided an alternative recommendation for a therapist for reunification therapy. According to the custody conference officer’s report, which was reviewed by [the] court and incorporated into the record by agreement of all parties, [Father] did not demonstrate that Threadgill was in willful contempt of the custody order regarding milestones because [Father’s] definition of “milestones” was akin to regular updates on [Child’s] interests and her day-to-day life. Further the custody conference officer stated that [Father] did not demonstrate that Threadgill was in willful contempt of the order regarding reunification therapy because the issue was with the language of the contract provided by [the therapist,] which [was in contravention to the custody order’s mandate that Father bear responsibility for the costs of reunification therapy].
Therefore, [the] court made the determination that modification, based upon the alleged contempt, would not be in the best interests of [] Child. [Father’s] request to modify custody to include direct contact with [] Child was premature given that reunification therapy needed to occur first pursuant to the court’s August 12, 2025 interim custody order. At the point the court entered the August 12, 2025 interim custody order, [Father] had not seen [] Child for at least one and a half years, which is why the court ordered reunification therapy between [Father] and [] Child. Additionally, at the hearing on February 11, 2026, [Father] acknowledged that [] Child does not even know that he is her father. No evidence was presented at the hearing on February 11, 2026, that indicated [Father] had any contact whatsoever with [] Child since the August 12, 2025 interim order was entered.
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[Father] does not set forth any arguments nor any new information that would suggest a change in circumstance affecting the court’s prior best interest analysis, and he has had no contact with [] Child [since] the court’s August 12, 2025[] interim custody order. The analysis of the custody factors by the court [] remains the same[,] and the custody order as it stands remains in the best interests of [] Child.
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[Father] argues in his petition for contempt that Threadgill willfully failed to obey the [August 12, 2025] custody order. He avers that Threadgill has failed to inform him of “major events and milestones” in [] Child’s life. [Father] namely mentions [] Child’s birthday and the start of the school year, and he alleges that Threadgill has not responded to his emails regarding the aforementioned events and milestones. [Father] further argues that Threadgill has not agreed to [Father’s] recommendation of [a particular] reunification therapist nor has she provided any alternative.
[At] the custody conference, [Father] argued that Threadgill refused to sign the agreement provided by the agreed reunification therapist [and averred] that Threadgill did so to postpone the start of the reunification process. Threadgill stated that she was not attempting to delay the reunification process, rather she had an issue with the language used in the costs provision of the agreement, which stated that the costs shall be split between the parties. This is contradictory to the [August 12, 2025] custody order which states that [Father] shall be solely responsible for the costs of reunification therapy. Threadgill [averred] that she requested an addendum to the agreement to reflect the appropriate cost language but had not yet received anything. However, at the January 15, 2026[] custody conference[,] the parties executed [the therapist’s] agreement with a handwritten modification reflecting that [Father] is solely responsible for the costs of reunification therapy. Threadgill’s immediate execution of the agreement following the modification evidenced that she was not wrongfully intending to delay the reunification process[;] rather[,] she had a good faith concern over the language in the agreement. Therefore, [Father’s] argument for contempt on that issue became moot. [The] court correctly denied [Father’s] petition for contempt based on this
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issue given that [Father] was unable to prove contempt by a preponderance of the evidence.
Next, [Father averred] that Threadgill was in contempt of the custody order because she was not providing [him] updates on “major events and milestones” in [] Child’s life. [Father] argued that Threadgill failed to share that [] Child was now interested in chess, the date of the first day of school, and how [] Child enjoyed the holidays. [Father] also found issue with the fact that Threadgill only relays information to him through her attorney. Threadgill argued, with Mother’s agreement, that none of what [Father] was requesting constituted “major events and milestones” in [] Child’s life[ and indicated] that she understood major events and milestones of a seven-year-old to mean important school events, medical procedures, and growth/developmental milestones such as losing a first tooth [and] not [the] day to day activities of [] Child. The custody conference officer’s position was that [Father’s] definition of “major events and milestones” was more akin to regular updates on [] Child’s interests and daily activities. It was the custody conference officer’s position and recommendation that Threadgill was not in willful contempt of providing updates on “major events and milestones” and that [Father’s] petition for contempt should be denied and dismissed.
[The] court found that the language in the [August 12, 2025] custody order regarding this provision was too vague and up for interpretation by the parties, which led to [the] court amending the language in Paragraph 6 of the custody order. Based upon this finding, [the] court denied [Father’s] petition for contempt on this issue. It was clear from the record that Threadgill did not wrongfully intend to keep information from [Father]. Both [Father] and Threadgill had differing understandings of what constitute “major events and milestones” in [] Child’s life.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/26, at 7-9; 11-13 (unnecessary capitalization,
footnotes, prefixes, and some quotation marks omitted).
We discern no abuse of the discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Father’s petition. See Smith, 281 A.3d at 311. Although Father asserts in his
brief that he was seeking sole legal and primary physical custody of Child in
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his petition to modify, our review of the record confirms that this assertion is
disingenuous. See Appellant’s Brief, at 30-31 (citing Petition for Modification
of Custody Order, 11/24/25). Rather, in his petition to modify, Father merely
requested that the court “modify the custody order allowing [Father] direct
contact with [Child].” See Petition for Modification of Custody Order,
11/24/25, at ¶ 7.2 At the February 11, 2026 hearing on Father’s petition, he
offered no evidence, beyond that of the purported contempt, to suggest that
it would be in Child’s best interest to modify the custody order, which is
particularly salient where court-ordered reunification therapy had not yet been
completed. See N.T. Hearing, 2/11/26, at 1-8. Furthermore, Father failed to
establish that Threadgill willfully violated the court’s August 12, 2025 custody
order. See Gross v. Mintz, 284 A.3d 479, 489 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“A party
must have violated a court order to be found in civil contempt.”) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s petition for
contempt and modification.
Order affirmed.
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2 To the extent Father challenges the court’s underlying consideration of the
child custody factors at the July 22, 2022 hearing and its ultimate determination that it was in Child’s best interest for Threadgill to retain sole legal and primary physical custody, his argument is not properly before us, as he did not appeal from the court’s August 12, 2025 custody order. See S.S. v. T.J., 212 A.3d 1026, 1034 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“[A] party may not use an appeal from the disposition of a petition for modification of custody as a substitute for an appeal from an underlying order for the purpose of relitigating matters pertaining to the underlying order.”).
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Date: 9/2/2026