Sablan v. Sablan

Opinion

2 ;_·.:- n _\,\_ -··. 3

5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM

6 ANTONIO ARTERO SABLAN, DOMESTIC CASE NO. DM0277-11

7 Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 8 v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Bench Trial) 9 PATRIA UNTALAN SABLAN, 10 Defendant. 11

12 INTRODUCTION

13 This matter came before the Honorable Maria T. Cenzon for a Bench Trial on August 2, 14 14, 16, and 19, and September 5, 9, 11, 16, 26, and 27, 2013. 1 Attorney David J. Lujan 15 appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Antonio Artero Sablan ("Plaintiff'). Attorney William B. Pole '·! 16 appeared on behalf of Defendant Patria Untalan Sablan ("Defendant"). Upon review of the 17

18 pleadings, oral and written arguments and legal authorities presented by the parties, as well as

19 testimony and evidence received during the trial of this matter, the Court now issues its 20 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 21 FINDINGS OF FACT 22 By a preponderance of the evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact: 23

24 1. Undisputed Facts.

__, 25 Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Reno, Nevada on March 30, 1984, and c:::::( 26 z - 27 1 Upon request of the parties, their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted for the Court's consideration on November 29, 2013. - 28 0:::: Page 1 of40 0 separated in March, 2009, although, during the course of the marriage, the parties often 1

2 physically separated from each other, only to reunite within one year. Shortly after their

3 marriage in 1984, on August 12, 1985, Defendant filed a Complaint for Divorce from the 4 Plaintiff citing extreme cruelty and wrongful infliction of grievous mental suffering. (Pl.'s 5 Exhibit 22, Complaint for Divorce, Domestic Case No. DM907-85 (Aug. 12, 1985)). Plaintiff 6

7 filed his Answer and Counterclaim on June 11, 1986, alleging extreme cruelty and wrongful

8 infliction of grievous mental suffering. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 23, Answer and Counterclaim, 9 Domestic Case No. DM907-85 (June 11, 1986)). Despite settlement discussions, the parties 10 reconciled and the parties did not continue to prosecute their claims arising out of the 1985 11 Complaint. 12

13 Nearly twenty-five years later, on April 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint

14 for Divorce, seeking dissolution on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. On April 21, 15 2011, Defendant filed her Verified Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce denying 16 irreconcilable differences and alleging abandonment, gross misconduct and infidelity of the 17 Plaintiff. (Def.'s Answer at fJ[ a- e (Apr. 21, 2011)). She also seeks dissolution of the marriage 18

19 on the following grounds: extreme mental cruelty, desertion, and adultery "giving rise to the

20 dissolution of the marriage."2 Defendant seeks spousal support/alimony in the amount of Five 21 Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) per month from Plaintiff. Plaintiff answered to the Counterclaim 22 on May 16, 2011, asserting the defenses of laches, estoppel, recrimination and condonation. 23 (PI's. Reply to Counterclaim at p. 2 (May 16, 2011)). 24

-J 25 <( 2 Counterclaim at'][ 5, p. 3 (April21, 2011). Defendant counterclaimed that the Plaintiff repeatedly threatened her 26 2 with physical harm during the course of the marriage. Guam law provides under 19 GCA § 8209 that "departure or absence of one party from the dwelling place, caused by cruelty or by threats of bodily harm from which danger (0. 27 would be reasonably apprehended from the other is not desertion by the absent party, but it!§. desertion 12y the other llli!!Y·" 28 a:: c···, ""'"-· ,f Page2of40 4; There are no minor children of the marriage, as the parties' son, Paul Sablan, was born 1

2 in 1985 in Guam and has reached the age of majority; therefore, there are no issues regarding

3 child support or custody. The residency requirements of 19 GCA § 8318(a) are met, and it is 4 undisputed that both parties were residents of Guam for at least 90 days immediately preceding 5 the filing of the Complaint. 6

7 2. The Parties' Living Arrangements during the Course of their Marriage.

8 A few days after the parties' married in March, 1984, in Reno, Nevada, Plaintiff 9 returned to Guam and Defendant remained in the states for four months until July 1984, to 10 complete her studies. (Bench Trial, September 19, 2013 at 11:21:00). Sometime in January 11 1985, the parties had a disagreement and Defendant left the marital home for a night to stay 12

13 with her mother and then returned to live with Defendant. (ld. at 11 :28:00). This was to be the

14 first of many periods of separation during the course of the marriage of the parties. Later that 15 January, Defendant left Guam to visit her daughter from a previous marriage, while she was 16 five to six months' pregnant with the parties' son, and returned to Guam after a couple of 17 weeks. (/d. at 11:23:00). The parties resided together until they separated again on July 17, 18

19 1985. (/d. at 11:29:35).

20 During the marriage, the parties continued to have numerous cycles of separation and 21 reunion. Defendant testified that she lost track of how many periods of separation they endured 22 "because it happened so often," but confirmed that, until the filing of this action, the longest 23 period of time that they had been separated was for eleven ( 11) months until Plaintiff flew to 24

-J 25 California to ask Defendant to return to Guam with their son "to become a family again." <( :z 26 (Bench Trial, Aug. 19, 2014 at 11:38:46 to 11:40:20). Other typical periods of separation (!) 27 lasted approximately two months. (/d. at 11:41:22-34). Over the 24 years of the marriage, the 0:::: 28 Page3 of40 0 parties "attempted" to divorce three times before the Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint. The

2 first three attempts were initiated by Defendant, who never prosecuted the first one beyond the

3 filing of the Verified Complaint and never actually refiled again. (/d. at 11:30:46 to 11:32: 17). 4 3. The Parties' Sexual Relationship During the Marriage and Accusation of Adultery. 5 The parties engaged in little sexual relations during their nearly twenty-five (25) year 6 marriage. Defendant could not dispute Plaintiff's estimation that the parties had sex over the 7

8 course of their over 24-year marriage between 60 to 75 times in total; however, the Court finds 9 it compelling that Defendant would not immediately challenge a notion that the husband and 10 wife engaged in intimate marital relations an average of 2 to 3 times a year. Plaintiff testified 11 that although he was prescribed medication to treat his erectile dysfunction, he saw no point in 12

13 taking it if he would be continue to be refused sex by his wife. Defendant admitted that

14 Plaintiff was typically the person who initiated sex and she rarely initiated it on her own, but 15 confirmed that she did initiate it three times in nearly twenty-five years of marriage. (Bench 16 Trial, Sep. 26, 2013 at 4:53:46- 4:55:00). She did not believe that having sex with Plaintiff 17 was a "wifely duty," but stated that she only had sex if she felt affection. She further admitted 18

19 that she simply felt "no affection" for her husband. (/d. at 4:04:50- 4:06:27). The Defendant

20 also admitted that she decided that she would withdraw from the marriage and change her 21 behavior toward him, deciding she would "stand still like an idiot here and see what happens" 22 (Bench Trial, September 26, 2013 at 4:43:40 4:45:49), indicating that she willfully withheld 23 affection and sexual relations from Plaintiff during the marriage. She testified that she surmised 24 __j <:( 25 her actions caused the Plaintiff to feel sorry for himself and led him to eventually start a 226 relationship with another woman. Plaintiff admitted to beginning a sexual relationship in 2010 (!) 27 with another woman named Karen, after the parties separated in 2009. By then, Defendant had 0:::: 28 ----. C---~.) Page4of40 withheld sexual relations from Plaintiff since 2003, despite numerous attempts by the Plaintiff 1

2 to be sexually intimate with her. (Bench Trial, August 16, 2013 at 10:25:28 to 10:26:56).

3 4. Parties Behavior Towards Each Other Contributed to the Dissolution of the Marriage. 4

5 The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant were inconsiderate of the other's

6 needs and desires throughout the marriage. Over the course of the ten-day trial which lasted 7 over a month, it never became clear to the Court why the couple remained married to each other 8 over numerous demands and pleas for attention, affection, and consideration and, in almost 9

10 equal measure, threats of divorce and dissolution.

11 The Plaintiff suffered health issues as a result of his diabetes; however, the Defendant 12 was unsympathetic to his condition, at one time, admitting that she wished he would not 13 recover. When he later underwent surgery off-island, the Defendant refused to attend to him, 14 instead travelling to attend a conference in St. Louis, MO. At that time, Plaintiff admits, his 15

16 friend Karen took care of him and visited him. He testified that it was much later that Karen

17 became his girlfriend. 18 The Plaintiff was inconsiderate of Defendant's needs. Defendant described instances 19 where the Plaintiff said or did something to her which hurt her or devastated her, including 20 tearing up a photo of her and her daughter during an argument. In 2004, the couple argued 21

22 because Defendant wanted to see her father in the hospital before visiting with friends for

23 dinner; instead, Plaintiff dropped her off on the roadside and Defendant had to call a relative to

__, 24 take her to the hospital to visit with her father. <(25 During the 1990s the couple went to counseling many times and at one time, a Z26

(.!)27 psychiatrist recommended that they divorce because they were "two different personalities," but

0:::::28 C'J Page 5of40 the couple continued to remain in the marriage. Defendant also sought counseling on her own. 1

2 One counselor advised the couple that they were incompatible and recommended that they

3 divorce. However, Plaintiff was adamant that they would not get a divorce. (Bench Trial, Sept. 4 16 at 4:47:30 to 4:49:13). Although Defendant had requested, threatened and also commenced 5 divorce proceedings, she never followed through. In 2009, in what became the final separation 6 of the parties, Defendant willingly moved out of the marital residence and into a unit at the 7

8 Pahong Court apartments in Chalan Pago ("Pahong Court"), which is held only in Plaintiff's

9 name. At no time since the separation in 2009 have the parties attempted to reunite. 10 5. Financial Assets and Automobiles 11 A. Retirement Accounts of Plaintiff and Defendant. 12

13 Plaintiff receives a monthly retirement income of approximately $3,000 from the

14 Government of Guam Employees Retirement Fund (GGERF). Plaintiff retired from the 15 Government of Guam with 26.5 years of credit- 19 years credit for his years of employment, 16 plus additional credit from a college internship program and service in the United States Navy. . 17 He also purchased five years of Early Retirement Incentive Program (ERIP) Service Credit, 18

19 executing a Promissory Note in favor of the GGERF on January 10, 2000 for $33,007.79 at 8%

20 interest for 15 years. The final installment payment will be deducted from Plaintiff's retirement 21 pay on the pay period ending December 13, 2014. Sixteen (16) years of the marriage overlap 22 with the Plaintiff's government service. (Pl.'s Ex. 20). 23 Defendant is currently employed with the Government of Guam as a school librarian 24 _ j 25 and has been so employed since September 1993. Defendant has both a 401 retirement plan and <( z 26

27 a 457 deferred compensation plan. As of March 31, 2009, the 401 plan had a total payroll

(D contribution of $42,105.46 and a total account balance of $43,157.13. (Pl.'s Exhibit 37). As of 28 c:r::: Page6of40 r~") '-'·.~ ..... March 31, 2009, the 457 plan had a total payroll contribution of $29,190.40 and a total account 1

2 balance of $27,292.27. (Pl.'s Ex. 36). Defendant admits that these plans are community

3 property. 4 During the marriage, Defendant also contributed to 403-B supplemental retirement plans 5 with AsiaPacific, having Capital Appreciation Fund A and Fund B accounts. As of April 1, 6 2009, the total value of the plan was $6,662.57. Defendant later withdrew these funds to pay 7

8 her attorney in this matter. She admits that this plan is community property.

9 B. Joint Checking with Patrick J.F. Sablan 10 The parties share a joint savings account with their adult son at the Bank of Guam. The 11 balance of the account as of December 31, 2009, was $502.60. (Pl.'s Exhibit 42). The Court 12

13 finds that Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to share in one-third of the checking account

14 as their respective sole and separate property. 15 c. Automobiles 16 The parties own a 2005 Toyota RAV4, License No. SNJ272, which was purchased new 17 for almost $20,000 and which has been in Defendant's possession since the parties separated in 18

19 2009. Plaintiff made the bulk of the payments on the 2005 Toyota RAV4, with the exception of

20 three payments of $462.04 by the Defendant. There is no outstanding loan obligation for the 21 vehicle. 22 Plaintiff is in possession of a 1999 Toyota Pre-Runner Tacoma Pickup, License No. 23 H695, which he purchased from Defendant's sister. This vehicle remains in his possession and 24 _j -<:( 25 there is no outstanding obligation for this vehicle.

z 26 In 2009, after the parties separated, Plaintiff purchased a 2005 Toyota RAV4, License 0 27 No. ASA6737, which remains in his possession. He has been paying this obligation. 0:::: 28 c··-'\ ~·j Page7 of40 ~:

·'

6. Real Property: His, Hers & Theirs. 1

2 a. Lot Nos. 10080, 10081-110081-2 and all other lots adjoining said Urunao- .. Machananao, Dededo Guam (now known as Lot Nos. 7 and 8, Tract 34000) 3 Defendant has an interest in Lot No. 10080 in Urunao (now known as Lot Nos. 7 and 8, 4

(f.-. 5 Tract 34000) and Lot No. 10081-2 in Ritidian, Guam, having inherited these properties prior to

6 the marriage of the parties. On November 28, 1986, Defendant quitclaimed to Plaintiff any 7 interest she might have in these properties. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit A). 3 8 From June 1995 to October 1997, Plaintiff leased out his Urunao property to Yong Nam 9

10 Kim (dba Jungle Beach Adventure) for $10,000 per month. On June 1, 2002, Plaintiff entered

11 into a lease agreement with Urunao Resort Development, Inc., to lease his Urunao property for 12 an amount equal to or greater than $10,000 per month. Plaintiff has used proceeds from the 13 Urunao rental property to purchase other properties. 14 b. Lot No. 2306-3-R7, Mangilao 15

16 Lot 2306-3-R7, Mangilao, Guam, was gifted to Plaintiff in 1986 from his sister Carmen

17 Bisconde. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9. He then sold the property in 1988 for $150,000 and a portion 18 of the proceeds was used to purchase Lot 7079-3 in Yigo in 1989, along with additional 19 consideration, discussed infra at subsection c. Defendant does not dispute that this was 20 Plaintiff's sole and separate property. On November 28, 1986, Defendant executed a Quitclaim 21

22 Deed in which she quitclaimed any interest in this property that she might have to the Plaintiff.

23 (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit A). 24 _j <( 25 3 On November 28, 1986, Defendant voluntarily signed a Quitclaim Deed in which she quitclaimed to Plaintiff any interest she had or may have in (1) Lot 2306-3-R7, Mangilao; (2) Lot 7, Block 6, Tract 232, Sinajana ("Pahong Z26 Court"); (3) Lots 10080, 10081-1, 10081-, and all other lots adjoining said Urunao-Machananao, Dededo (aka "The ~~

Artero Urunao Beach Property"); and (4) all other rights or claims to any properties, such as the Guam Land (!) 27 Claims, that Antonio acquired after March 30, 1984. This Quit Claim Deed is hereinafter referred to as the "Pahong Court" Quitclaim. cr.:: 28 C'J Page8of40 c. Tract No. 927 (formerly Lot No. 7079-3), Yigo 1

2 In April 1989, Plaintiff purchased Lot No. 7079-3, Yigo, in exchange for payment of

3 $85,000 cash from the sale of Lot No. 2306-3-R7, Mangilao in 1988 and his house in Portland, 4 Oregon, both of which were his sole and separate property, having purchased the Portland home 5 prior to the marriage, in August 1979.4 This property consisted of 34,363.00 square meters. 6 Interest in this property was transferred to Plaintiff through a Warranty Deed datedApril4, 1989 7

8 from Rose Aguon Torres aka Rose T. Taijito. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit LLL). In August

9 1989, Plaintiff subdivided the basic lot Lot No. 7079-3 into 17 lots, of which 15 lots were 10 deeded to Plaintiff. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit MMM (Agricultural Subdivision survey 11 Map of Tract No. 927, recorded at the Department of Land Management as Instrument No. 12

13 422122)). The 15 subdivided properties are now designated as Lots 1 through 17 R!W (which is

14 a Public Access and Utility Easement), Tract 927, Yigo. 5 15 (1) Lots 1 and 4, Tract 927, Yigo 16 On June 6, 1994, the parties acquired together, as husband and wife, from Fidel 17 and Maria San Nicolas Lot No. 3242-1-3, Chalan Pago, via Warranty Deed6 by exchanging Lot 18

19 Nos. 1 and 4, Tract 927, Yigo, for which Defendant had signed consents on Deeds of Gift re Lot

20 Nos. 1 and 4, Tract 927, Yigo, stating that she has no interest in these properties? On 21

22 4 Defendant does not dispute that the Portland, OR home was Plaintiffs sole and separate property prior to the 23 marriage of the parties. See also, Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibits LLL (Warranty Deed from Rose Aguon Torres to Antonio Artero Sablan) and MMM (Agreement between Rose Aguon Torres aka Rose T. Taijitro and Antonio ---'24 Pablo Artero Sablan dated April4, 1989). 5 The parties do not dispute that Lot Nos. 15 and 16, Tract 927, Yigo, are not part of the marital estate and so these <:J.: 25 lots are not addressed here. 6 ·.{ Def/Coun(erclaim Pl.'s Exhibit AA. Warranty Deed from Fidel C. San Nicolas and Victoria Sablan San Nicolas 226 to Antonio Artero Sablan and Patria Untalan Sablan, Husband and Wife, dated June 6, 1994 and recorded at the -=-= Department of Land Management on June 10, 1994, as Instrument Number 510157. (.!) 27 7 See Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit G. Deed of Gift from Plaintiff to Grantees of the subject property, with

a: 28 consent to the transfer by Defendant accordingly: "I, PATRIA UNTALAN SABLAN, ... hereby acknowledge that

0 Page9of40 September 2, 1999, Plaintiff transferred Lot Nos. 1 and 4, Tract 927, Yigo, to the San Nicolases 1

2 through a Deed of Gift, in exchange for Lot No. 3242-1-3, Chalan Pago. Defendant signed an

3 acknowledgement clause in the Deed that Lot Nos. 1 and 4 are Antonio's sole and separate 4 property and that she quitclaims any interest she has to grantees. 8 Defendant seeks Lot 1, Tract 5 927, Yigo as her sole and separate property as well as liability for "what is left on the mortgage 6 on said property." (Counterclaim at <][2, p. 15). 7

8 (2) Lot 2, Tract 927, Yigo 9 On January 6, 2002, Plaintiff transferred Lot No. 2, Tract 927, Yigo to Jessica 10 Linda Mendiola via Warranty Deed. (Def.!Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit GG). Defendant 11 executed a consent to the transfer and quitclaimed "all rights that I have or may have to the 12

13 subject property." (/d. at p. 3). Plaintiff had previously constructed a duplex on Lot 2,

14 consideration for which was the transfer of Lot Nos. 7 and 8, Tract 927, Yigo, to the contractor, 15 Del Builders, as discussed infra. 16 (3) Lot 3, Tract 927, Yigo 17 On November 28, 1990, Plaintiff sold and transferred Lot No. 3, Tract 927, 18

19 Yigo, to Jerry R.S. Salas, Cisca H. Salas, and Carlos J.S. Salas via Warranty Deed. The

20 language of this Warranty Deed identifies Plaintiff as "a single man." Defendant did not 21 acknowledge or execute any consent to this transfer. 22

23 subject property is the sole and separate property (not our community property) of my husband, ANTONIO ....._j24 PABLO ARTERO SABLAN, Grantor. I acquiesce with the intent of this "Deed of Gift" and I therefore quitclaim to grantees all claims and rights that I may have on subject property (Lot Number 1, Track 927, Yigo, Guam)." -<(25 8 See footnote 7, supra. Additionally, Defendant executed a Spousal Consent and Release on January 29, 1000,

?26 attendant to a Mortgage on this property with First Hawaiian Bank acknowledging that "she has no claim or interest in the property and joins in the execution of this mortgage solely to quiet Mortgagee's title by conveying

~27 his interest, if any she has, including any homestead interest to Mortgagee and she assumes no liability ... for any liability under [the] provisions of the mortgage .... " Defendant admits that the liability is Plaintiff's only and that only Plaintiff has paid the amounts due under the mortgage. 0::: 28 ("w""' ·~~.,.,J Page 10of40 (4) Lot 5, Tract 927, Yigo 1

2 On February 8, 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant, as husband and wife, executed a

3 Warranty Deed dated February 8, 1994, transferring the property to Beverly Ann Davis. (See 4 Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit II). Defendant did not acknowledge or execute any consent to 5 the transfer in this document. 6 (5) Lot 6, Tract 927, Yigo 7

8 On June 2, 1994, Plaintiff executed a Warranty Deed granting to William

9 Melendez, Jr., and Lien Melendez, husband and wife, his interest in Lot No.6, Tract 927, Yigo. 10 Defendant did not execute the Warranty Deed either as a grantor or to quitclaim any interest she 11 may have had in the property. 12

13 (6) Lots 7 and 8, Tract 927, Yigo

14 On July 20, 1991, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with contractors Del 15 Builders whereby Del Builders would construct a duplex on Lot No. 2, Tract 927, Yigo, in 16 consideration for the transfer of Lot Nos. 7 and 8, Tract 927, Yigo. At the contractor's 17 instruction, Plaintiff transferred Lot No. 7 to Christopher Datu and Gloria S.C. Datu via 18

19 Warranty Deed dated July 20, 1991, and transferred Lot No. 8, Tract 927, Yigo, to Emesto 0.

20 Dizon and Yolanda N. Dizon via Warranty Deed dated July 20, 1991. Defendant did not 21 execute either Warranty Deed as a grantor or to quitclaim any interest she may have had in the 22 property. 23 (7) Lot 9, Tract 927, Yigo 24

_j 25 On June 10, 1990, Plaintiff entered into a Lease Agreement with Louis Falan and <( z 26 LydiaN. Falan, Husband and Wife, for Lot 9, Tract 927, Yigo for a term of five (5) years, (.!) 27 ending on June 9, 1995. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit 00). Defendant did not execute the cr:::: 28 Page 11 of40 (~) Lease Agreement or indicate a waiver of any interest that she may have to the property. 1

2 Subsequently, on January 6, 1998, Plaintiff and the Falans entered into a Lease with Option to

3 Purchase. On January 19, 1999, the Falans exercised their option to extend the lease until 4 December 31,2033. (See Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibits MM and NN). 5 (8) Lot 10, Tract 927, Yigo 6

7 On July 4, 2005, Plaintiff entered into a Lease with the Option to Purchase

8 Agreement for Lot No. 10, Tract 927, Yigo, with Wallace K. Santos for $550 monthly. 9 Defendant did not execute the Lease Agreement or indicate a waiver of any interest that she 10 may have to the property. This lease also remains in effect. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit 11 PP). The last certificate of title indicates that Plaintiff is the sole owner of this Lot. 12

13 (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit QQ).

14 (9) Lots 11 and 12, Tract 927, Yigo 15 On November 28, 1989, Plaintifftransferred Lot Nos. 11 and 12, Tract 927, Yigo :·.J 16 to William Melendez Jr. and Lien Melendez via Warranty Deeds dated November 28, 1989. 17 Defendant did not execute the Warranty Deed either as a grantor or to quitclaim any interest she 18 19 may have had in the property.

20 (10) Lot 13, Tract 927, Yigo 21 On December 6, 1989, Plaintiff transferred Lot No. 13, Tract 927, Yigo to 22 Joaquin V.E. Manibusan, Jr., and Eileen Manibusan via Warranty Deed. Defendant did not 23 execute the Warranty Deed either as a grantor or to quitclaim any interest she may have had in __J 24 '· <:( 25 the property. z 26 (11) Lot 14, Tract 927, Yigo (!) 27 On July 8, 1991, Plaintiff sold and transferred Lot No. 14, Tract 927, Yigo, to 0:::: 28 0 Page 12of40 Elizabeth T. Cabrera via Warranty Deed. The property sold for $55,000, which Plaintiff claims 1

2 to have reinvested in real estate.

3 (12) Lots 15 and 16, Tract 927, Yigo 4 See footnote 5, supra. 5 (13) Lot 17 RIW 6

7 This lot is a public access and utility easement and, therefore, not divisible

8 between the parties. (Def./Counterclaim Plaintiff's Exhibit MMM, referencing Land 9 Management Map No. 483-FY89). 10 d. Lot No.7, Block 6, Tract 232, Sinajana, ("Pahong Court") 11 Plaintiff owns Lot No. 7, Block 6, Tract 232, Sinajana, located at 131 Pahong Court 12

13 ("Pahong Court"), which he purchased on January 16, 1984, before the parties' marriage in

14 March of the same year. He purchased Pahong Court with the proceeds of the sale of his Lot 15 2306-3-10, Mangilao, Guam. Plaintiff had acquired Lot 2306-3-10, Mangilao, Guam, as his 16 sole and separate property in July 1982, when he exchanged his Datson Pickup truck with 17 Ignacio Farfan for the property. He subsequently sold this Mangilao property for $11,000 and 18

19 used $3,500 to pay the remaining balance originally owed for the purchase of Pahong Court and

20 another $7,500 to pay for improvements to Pahong Court. Plaintiff holds a Quitclaim Deed to 21 Pahong Court in his name only. 22 On November 28, 1986, Defendant quitclaimed to Plaintiff any interest she had in 23 1 Pahong Court. (Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff's Exhibit A, Quit Claim Deed dated ' _j24

<::::( 25 11/28/86, filed in the Department of Land Management as Instrument No. 813008). 2 "-'"'- 26 Defendant has lived at Pahong Court since the 2009 separation. She testified that she 0 27 0::: paid rent to Plaintiff for a few months after she moved in, sometime in June 2009. With the 28 0 Page 13of40 exception of rental payments in the amount of $650, Defendant has not paid rent on this .. property to Plaintiff, which is subject to a mortgage with the Bank of Guam in an amount 2

3 exceeding $304,000 and which Plaintiff alone has been paying. The evidence produced at trial ~··

4 established that Plaintiff typically charges $850 per month for the rental of these units. 5 e. Lot No. 20, Block 13, Extension, Tract 212, Malojloj 6 Plaintiff previously owned Lot No. 20, Block 13, Extension, Tract 212, Malojloj, which 7

8 was transferred to him in his name only via Warranty Deed dated November 6, 1989. He 9 bought the property for $35,000. On March 26, 2002, Plaintiff transferred the property to Luis 10 P. Flores and Sylvia Guerrero Flores via Warranty Deed. Defendant signed the Warranty Deed 11 the same day, stating that Plaintiff owned the property as his sole and separate property (not 12

13 community property) and she thereby quitclaims any interest she has in the property. Plaintiff

14 received $75,000 consideration for the property and used the proceeds of this sale to buy Lot 15 No. 3242-PART, Chalan Pago. Defendant does not dispute this is Plaintiff's sole and separate 16 property. 17 f. Lot 276 NEW-1, Merizo 18

19 On July 3, 1990, Lot 276 NEW-1, Merizo, was transferred to both parties as husband

20 and wife through a Warranty Deed from Fred A. Aguon and Ruth N. Aguon. 21 (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit R). On September 19, 1990, Defendant signed a Quitclaim 22 Deed transferring her interest in the property to Plaintiff. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit P). ... 23 Nine years later, on February 17, 1999, Defendant again affirmed that she had no legal interest 24 _j <:( 25 in the property when she executed a Consent of Mortgagor's Spouse in which she z 26 acknowledged that the property is Plaintiff's separate property and she claims no interest in the (_!) 27 (X 28 r··-") ''·'"''"" Page 14of40 property. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit S). 9 The 1999 Mortgage is for a 30-year term and 1

2 secures a loan in the principal amount of $156,000. The uncontroverted testimony is that only

3 Plaintiff has paid for the mortgage on this property and he continues to pay the mortgage. In 4 her Counterclaim, Defendant seeks this property as her sole and separate property, with the debt 5 assigned to the Plaintiff. On Cross-Examination at trial, however, Defendant admitted that she 6 did not want this Merizo property. 7

8 g. Lot No. 4, Block No. 20, Tract No. 232, Sinajana ("Lis Market") 9 On April 24, 1992, Plaintiff acquired in his name only Lot No. 4, Block No. 20, Tract 10 No. 232, Sinajana ("Lis Market"), through a Warranty Deed from Joaquin G. Reyes and Linda 11 T. Reyes. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit AAA). Subsequently, on April 9, 1999, Plaintiff as 12

13 Mortgagor, executed a Mortgage with Power of Sale in favor of GE Capital Guam, Inc., to

14 secure a debt of $150,000. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhbit CCC). Defendant is not obligated 15 under the Mortgage and, in fact, executed a Spousal Consent stating as follows: 16 I, PATRIA U. SABLAN, spouse of ANTONIO ARTERO 17 SABLAN, hereby release and waive my community property interest and hereby convey and transfer any interest that I have or 18 may have in said property to ANTONIO ARTERO SABLAN, and 19 confirm that ANTONIO ARTERO SABLAN shall hold title in his/her name alone as his/her sole and separate property. 20 Plaintiff is the only obligee under the Mortgage and continues to pay the mortgage payments. 21

22 h. Lot No. 3242-1-3, Chalan Pago and the Smithbridge Lease 23 On June 6, 1994, the parties together, as husband and wife, acquired Lot No. 3242-1-3, 24 _J <:( 25 9 The Consent of Mortgagor's Spouse provides as follows: "PATRIA UNTALAN SABLAN acknowledges that z 26 the interest conveyed in this instrument is the separate property of her husband, and that she has read the foregoing instrument carefully and consents to its execution and performance in all aspects. PATRIA UNTALAN SABLAN (.!) 27 herein acknowledges that she has no claim or interest in the property and joins in the execution of this Mortgage solely to quiet Mortgagee's title by conveying her interest, if any she has, including any homestead interest to Mortgagee and she assumes no liability by these presents for any liability under the provisions of the Mortgage." 0::: 28 0 Page 15of40 ~ Chalan Pago, Guam from Fidel and Maria San Nicolas through a Warranty Deed. 1

2 (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exibhit AA). The property was obtained in exchange for Lot Nos. 1

3 and 4, Tract 927, Yigo, for which Patria had signed consents on Deeds of Gift re Lot Nos. 1 and 4 4, Tract 927, Yigo, stating that she has no interest in these properties. (See, discussion supra). 5 On September 3, 2009, Plaintiff and Smithbridge Guam Inc. signed a Lease offer for Lot No. 6 3242-1-3 and Lot No. 3242-Part 2 for a mutual interest in establishing a hard-fill on the 7

8 property. (Def./Counterclaim Pl.'s Exhibit CC). The parties agreed that Smithbridge would 9 lease approximately 198 square meters of the property to operate a hard-fill facility for a period 10 of five (5) years. The testimony at trial was that the lease would benefit the property by 11 allowing it to be used as its best and highest purpose while generating income. The Lease offer 12

13 contained a hand-written consent clause for Defendant to execute indicating her assent to the

14 Lease, which was never executed. During trial, the Plaintiff established that when asked to 15 execute her consent to the Lease, Defendant indicated that it was Plaintiff's property and that "I 16 don't want anything to do with it." Defendant's own testimony at trial was that she believed 17 that everyone who needed to sign the document had already done so, indicating she believed to 18

19 have no legal interest in the property. However, there is no document executed by the

20 Defendant though which she has transferred her legal interest in this property and Plaintiff's 21 testimony is that the property is community property. (Bench TrialS/2/2013 at 4:41:13). 22 i. Lot No.107-3-R2, Yona 23 On August 15, 1997, the parties acquired Lot No. 107-3-R2, Yona, via Warranty Deed 24 _J 25 from Joseph Munoz Baza. Plaintiff paid $5,000 as a down payment and took over mortgage <::( z 26 payments of $1,300 monthly. Plantiff testified that he used proceeds from the Urunao rental (!) 27 and from the sale of lots in Tract 927, Yigo. Defendant did not contradict this testimony. On er:: 28 Page 16of40 C~) August 30, 1997, Plaintiff quitclaimed this property to Patria via Quitclaim Deed, but within a

2 year, Defendant executed a Quitclaim Deed transferring her interest in this property to Plaintiff

3 dated August 10, 1998. Plaintiff subsequently transferred this property to Maria T. Davis (aka 4 Maria Teresita DelaCruz Cabrera Davis) through a Warranty Deed dated December 22, 1998 in 5 exchange for EA No. 450-2 in 1-Denni, Saipan. 6

7 j. Lot No. 3, Block 20, Tract 232, Sinajana, located at 152 Chalan Kanton Tutujan, Sinajana, ("the Blue House") 8 On February 22, 1999, Maria T.C. Sarmiento and Norma S. Okada nka Norma D. 9

10 Sarmiento (the "Sarmientos") entered into a Sales Agreement with Defendant for the purchase

11 of Lot No.3, Block 20, Tract 232, Sinajana (hereinafter the "Blue House"). (Def./Counterclaim 12 PI's. Exhibit B). The purchase price for the property was $130,000.00. Plaintiff testified that 13 he alone paid the required $5,000 down payment to the sellers and $10,000 down payment to 14 Guam Housing Corporation, as required under the Sales Agreement. Plaintiff testified that the 15

16 down payments were funded by Urunao rental income and the lease income and proceeds from

17 the sale of lots in Tract 927, Yigo. On February 20, 1999, the Sarmientos executed a Warranty 18 Deed in favor of Defendant only. The Warranty Deed was recorded at the Department of Land 19 Management, Government of Guam as Instrument Number 598955 on February 23, 1999. 20 Plaintiff was not named in the Sales Agreement or in the Warranty Deed as a grantee or spouse 21

22 of the Defendant. All documentary evidence establishes that Defendant held the property in her

23 name alone. 24 On July 6, 1999, the parties took out a mortgage on the property to secure a loan of _j 25 <::( $146,250. (Pl.'s Exhibit II (4) Mortgage between Mortgagor Patria U. Sablan and Mortgagee z 26 First Hawaiian Bank dated June 30, 1999). The monthly mortgage payment is $1,119.18. (0 27

0::: 28 (:) Page 17 of40 Using his Urunao and Yigo income and proceeds, Plaintiff alone has paid the $15,000 down 1

2 payment, the mortgage payments, the improvements to, and the maintenance costs of the Blue

3 house. The mortgage balance at the time of separation was approximately $127,000, and only 4 Plaintiff has paid the mortgage since then. The balance of the mortgage as of August 10, 2013, 5 is $111,693.05. Defendant does not contest the amounts owing on the mortgage, nor does she 6 dispute that all payments made relative to the house were paid by Plaintiff, including the 7

8 purchase price. However, during the trial, Defendant testified that she believes the Blue House

9 is the parties' community property. She further declared that she did not want the real property 10 itself, but wanted only 50% of the net value of this property, along with a couch and recliner 11 chair contained within. 12

13 k. Lot Nos. 3325-4-R1 & 3325-4-RIW, Chalan Pago

14 On September 29, 1994, Plaintiff acquired in his name only Lot Nos. 3325-4-R1 and 15 3325-4-R/W, Chalan Pago, through a Quitclaim Deed executed jointly by Jessica Linda Iglesias 16 and Patria Untalan Sablan, as co-Administratrix for the Estate of Maria G. Iglesias. Defendant 17 does not claim an interest in this property. 18

19 I. Other Real Property-Parties Do Not Dispute Plaintiff's sole ownership.

20 The ownership of the following real property interests are not in dispute: 21 (1) Lot No. 3242 PART, Chalan Pago- Plaintiff's property 22 On June 5, 2002, Plaintiff acquired in his name only, as his sole and separate property, 23 Lot No. 3242 PART, Chalan Pago, via Quitclaim Deed. Plaintiff bought this property for 24 __j 25 $45,000, using the proceeds of the sale of Lot No. 20, Block 13 Extension, Tract 212, Malojloj. <:( :z: 26 (2) Lease Re. Lot 154-REM-R5, Mongmong/Toto/Maite G 27 On November 3, 2007, Plaintiff, as lessee, entered into a Lease with Option to Purchase cr:: 28 0 Page 18of40 Agreement for Lot 154-REM-R5, Mongmong/Toto/Maite. Plaintiff is leasing this property 1

2 from lessor Geri Ann Mendiola for $500 per month and subleases the property to Leonard and

3 Maria Severin for $500 per month via a Lease with Option to Purchase Agreement dated ''.! 4 February 4, 2008. 5 (3) Lease with Option to Purchase Agreement for Lot 154-REM-5, 6 Mongmong/Toto/Maite 7 On November 3, 2007, Plaintiff, as lessee, entered into a Lease with Option to Purchase 8 Agreement regarding Lot 154-REM-5, Mongmong/Toto/Maite. Plaintiff is leasing this property 9

10 from lessor Clarissa Ann Mendiola for $500 per month. In turn, he subleases the property to

11 Eutistio Hartmen for $500 per month. 12 (4) Saipan Properties: 13 (a) In June 1964, Plaintiff inherited an interest in Lot 007 H44, 14 Chalan Papago, Saipan, from his father, Vicente Tudela Sablan, through his father's probate 15

16 case.

17 (b) On January 2, 1992, Plaintiff acquired in his name only Lot No. 18 2003-3-2, Oleai, Saipan via Warranty Deed. Plaintiff purchased the property for $40,000, using 19 proceeds of the sale of the Yigo subdivided lots. 20 (c) On May 8, 1997, Plaintiff inherited 115 interest in Lot No. 507 21

22 New and Lot No. 037 H 01, Papago, Saipan, from his father, via Decree of Final Distribution in

23 his father's probate case. In 1977, Plaintiff then bought a 1/5 interest in these Lots from his 24 _j sister Carmen.

er::: 28 (:J Page 19 of 40 Plaintiff paid the purchase price using funds received from the Guam Land Claims Act, from 1

2 which he received approximately $44,000. Plaintiff transferred this property to Florentina

3 Togawa and Dolores San Nicolas via Quitclaim Deed dated July 6, 2007, and pursuant to a 4 Sales Agreement with Exchange of Like-Kind Property Provision dated July 6, 2007, between 5 Antonio, Florentina Togawa, and Dolores San Nicolas. Plaintiff exchanged this property for 6

7 Tract 22795-3, Saipan.

8 (e) On September 14, 2007, Plaintiff acquired Lot No. 010 J 21, San 9 Vicente, Saipan, via Warranty Deed, to be held as his sole and separate property. 10 (f) On December 22, 1998, Antonio acquired lot EA No. 450-2, I- 11 Denni, Saipan, via Warranty Deed, in exchange for Lot No. 107-3-R2, Yona. Antonio 12

13 transferred this property back to Maria Cabrera-Parantar (fka Maria Davis) via Warranty Deed

14 dated April22, 2009. Patria signed a Consent of Spouse in the Deed, where she acknowledged 15 that she has no claim or interest in the Lot and that she consents to the Deed. 16 There was no evidence presented during trial which showed that any community 17 property had been used for the purchase or maintenance of the Saipan properties. 18

19 7. Debts of the Parties

20 In addition to the above mortgages, the parties had the following debts at the time of 21 separation: 22 a) First Hawaiian Bank Visa credit card having an account balance of $12,293.49 as of 23 December 24, 2008; 24 __j 25 b) Bank of America Visa credit card having an account balance of $20,337.83 as of <( z 26 December 27, 2008, on which Antonio paid $2,750 on February 26, 2009; 27 U) c) Navy Federal Credit Union Visa credit card having an account balance of c.:r::: 28 Page20of40 (~:J '>.,_ $26,874.29 as of December 9, 2008; 1

2 d) Bank of Hawaii American Express credit card having an account balance of

3 $7,258.17 as of December 11, 2008; 4 e) CitiBank credit card having an account balance of $28,262.36 as of January 4, 2009; 5 f) Navy Federal Credit Union auto loan for the 2005 Toyota RAV4 in Patria's 6 possession, having a balance of $7,062.95 as of December 8, 2008, which was paid 7

8 entirely by Antonio after separation except for three monthly installment payments

9 of $462.04 made by Patria; 10 g) Visa credit card having an account balance of approximately $130,000 as of March 11 2009, and on which Antonio has paid approximately $50,000 since March 2009. 12

13 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

14 A. GROUNDS FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 15 The Plaintiff seeks dissolution on the basis of irreconcilable differences. Defendant 16 avers that Plaintiff treated her with extreme mental cruelty, repeatedly threatened her with 17 physical harm and has committed adultery. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 7 G.C.A. § 18

19 3105 and 19 G.C.A. §8201 et seq. A dissolution of marriage may be granted for irreconcilable

20 differences pursuant to 19 G.C.A. § 8203(g). A dissolution may also be granted for adultery (19 21 G.C.A. §8203(a), 8204) and extreme cruelty (19 G.C.A. §8203(b), 8205). Irreconcilable 22 differences are those grounds which are determined by the Court to be substantial reasons for 23 not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved. 19 _J 24 <:( 25 G.C.A. §8219. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person z 26 other than the offender's husband or wife. 19 G.C.A. §8204. Extreme cruelty is the wrongful (!) 27 ·,1 cr:: 28 infliction of grievous bodily injury, or grievous mental suffering, upon the other by one party to f:J "-- Page21 of40 the marriage. 19 G.C.A. §8205. Based on the findings of fact set forth herein, the Court finds 1

2 that the marriage cannot be continued and that both Plaintiff and Defendant contributed to the

3 dissolution of the marriage. Indeed, based on the testimony at trial, the marriage was fraught 4 with disagreements, numerous periods of separation and a palpable disdain or apathy on the part 5 of the Defendant for the Plaintiff which belies the duration of the nearly 25-year marriage. 6 There is sufficient evidence to support awarding Plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of 7

8 irreconcilable differences.

9 The court, nevertheless, addresses Defendant's contentions regarding extreme cruelty 10 and adultery. As a general rule, a party seeking dissolution on the grounds of cruelty must 11 establish a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant failed to establish that Plaintiff 12

13 inflicted extreme mental cruelty upon her, and the claim that Plaintiff repeatedly threatened

14 Defendant with physical harm, are unsupported by the evidence in this case. 15 On Defendant's allegation of adultery, Plaintiffs testimony at trial confirmed he 16 committed adultery with Karen and the Court finds the admission sufficient to grant dissolution 17 in favor of Defendant on the ground of adultery. 18

19 B. SPOUSAL SUPPORT

20 Guam law permits one spouse to receive alimony or support from the other in order to 21 provide support for himself or herself and his or her children, or to fund the litigation of the 22 divorce action. In this regard, Title 19 GCA § 8402 provides: 23 When an action for dissolution of marriage is pending, the court may, in 24 its discretion, require the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay as __j alimony any money necessary to enable the wife, or husband, to support 25 ..,,1' <::( herself and her children, or to support himself and his children, or ?"' 26 prosecute or defend the action. ~~ ~

When the husband or wife willfully deserts the wife or husband, or when (.!) 27 the husband or wife has any cause of action for dissolution of marriage as 28 0::: _ , _) r~··, Page22of40 provided in § 8203 of this Title, he or she may, without applying for 1 dissolution of marriage, maintain in the Superior Court an action against 2 her or him for permanent support and maintenance of himself or herself or of himself and children or of herself and children. When the husband 3 willfully fails to provide for the wife, she may, without applying for dissolution of marriage, maintain in the Superior Court an action against 4 him for permanent support and maintenance of herself or of herself and 5 children.

6 During the pendency of any such action the court may, in its discretion, require the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay as alimony any 7 money necessary for the prosecution of the action and for support and 8 maintenance, and execution may issue therefor in the discretion of the court. The court, in granting the husband or wife permanent support and 9 maintenance of himself or herself, or of himself and children or herself 10 and children, in any such action, shall make the same disposition of the community property and of the homestead, if any, as would have been 11 made if the marriage had been dissolved by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. The final judgment in such action may be enforced 12 by the court by such order or orders as in its discretion it may from time to 13 time deem necessary, and such order or orders may be varied, altered, or revoked at the discretion of the court. 14 19 GCA § 8402 (2005), cited in Stahl v. Stahl, 2013 Guam 26

16 "Section 8402 is based on former California Civil Code [section] 137, and thus

17 , California cases interpreting section 137 are persuasive." Stahl

18 Guam 3,

22 the marriage and children of either spouse adopted by the other as required by Chapter 34 of

23 Title 5 of the Guam Code Annotated and to make such suitable allowance to the other spouse 24 for that person's support, during that person's life or for a shorter period, as the Court may deem _j 25 <:( just, having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively; and the Court may, from z 26 time to time, modify its order in these respects." The latter provision does not provide for the (!) 27 o~· :::~ 28

c::) Page23 of40 consideration of fault by any of the parties. 1

2 In determining whether or not to grant alimony, the court should consider the

3 comparative guilt of the parties, the needs of one spouse, and the ability of the other spouse to 4 contribute support. Millington v. Millington, 259 Cal.App.2d 896, 916 (Ct. App. 1st 5 1968)(citing Mueller v. Mueller, 44 Cal.2d 527, 530 et seq. (1955) and Nunes v. Nunes, 62 6 Cal.2d 33, 38 (1964)). When considering the totality of the circumstances in this marriage, the 7

8 rule in Millington does not support any award of spousal support. Although Defendant is

9 granted dissolution on the claim of adultery, her withholding of sex and pattern of indifference 10 towards Plaintiff mitigates a finding of comparative fault in her favor. Furthermore, there was 11 virtually no evidence presented at trial of living expenses or income, so the Court cannot 12

13 address the last two prongs of Millington without speculation. Defendant's requested spousal

14 support of $5,000 a month is wholly unsupported by any evidence she requires $5,000 a month, 15 in addition to her current income, in order to sustain her current needs or lifestyle. Nor was any 16 evidence presented showing Plaintiff can afford to pay this amount. Therefore, at this time, the 17 Court will not make an award of spousal support. 18

19 c. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY

20 Pursuant to Guam's divorce laws, community property in a divorce granted for 21 irreconcilable differences must be divided equally, but if the decree is rendered on the ground of 22 adultery or extreme cruelty, "the community property shall be assigned to respective parties in 23 such proportions as the court, from all the facts in the case, and the condition of the parties, may ,_, _ j 24 <:( 25 deem just." 19 GCA § 8411 (2005). The Court finds the behavior of both parties contributed to z 26 the demise of their twenty-five year marriage. However, in granting Plaintiff a divorce on the (D 27 ground of irreconcilable differences and Defendant a divorce on the ground of adultery, the a: 28 (~""' . ~"j Page24of40 Court may divide the community property "in such proportions as the court, from all the facts in 1

2 the case, and the condition of the parties, may deem just" and without a mandatory adherence to

3 equal division. 4 1. The Distribution of Real Property. 5 As discussed in great detail, supra, Plaintiff held numerous interests in real property in 6 his name alone and as his "sole and separate property" prior to the marriage. Property acquired 7

8 by either spouse before marriage is separate property. 19 G.C.A. § 6101(a)(1). Following the

9 marriage, Plaintiff sold or otherwise transferred his interest in property which was held in his 10 name only to purchase or obtain property, title to which was held in several ways: in his name 11 only, in both his and Defendant's names, in his and Defendant's names with Defendant later 12

13 quitclaiming her interest in some of these properties and, finally, in Defendant's name only.

14 One particular property, the marital residence which was also called "the Blue House," was held 15 in Defendant's name only. "Property acquired during the marriage by either husband or wife, or 16 both, is presumed to be community property." 19 G.C.A. § 6105(a)(emphasis added). Pursuant 17 to Guam law, therefore, property that was purchased during the marriage is subject to a 18

19 rebuttable presumption that it is community property, regardless of the title.

20 Where one spouse asserts the separate character of property obtained during the 21 marriage, that spouse has the burden of overcoming this presumption. Kloppenburg v. 22 Kloppenburg, 2014 Guam 5,

__j25 property]; Babauta v. Babauta ("Babauta /"), 2011 Guam 15

C)::~- 28 ' ..... Page25 of40 Kloppenburg, "If the property, or the source of funds with which it is acquired, can be traced, its 1

2 separate property character remains unchanged. But if separate and community property or

3 funds are commingled in such a manner that it is impossible to trace the source of the property 4 or funds, the whole will be treated as community property.... " Kloppenburg at<[ 23, citing In re 5 Marriage of Mix, In re Marriage of Mix, 536 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal.1975)(en banc)(quoting 6 Patterson v. Patterson, 51 Cal.Rptr. 339, 345 (Ct.App.1966)). 7

8 The Pahong Court Quitclaim, which was executed by the Defendant on November 28,

9 1986, evidences an intent on the part of the Defendant to disavow any interest in the properties 10 covered by the Deed. During trial, she disclaimed any interest in the Urunao/Ritidian properties 11 and Lot 2306-3-R7, Mangilao, yet asserts a claim against the Pahong Court property. The Court 12

13 finds that such claims are unsupported by the facts or the law governing her interest, if any, in

14 the properties. "A quitclaim deed only transfers whatever interest the grantor had in the 15 described property at the time the conveyance was made." Taitano v. Lujan, 2005 Guam 26 <[ 19 16 (quoting In reMarriage of Gioia, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 2004)). See also 17 21 GCA § 37101 (2005)("Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved and 18

19 certified and recorded as prescribed by law from the time it is filed with the Director of Land

20 Management is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and 21 mortgagees."). The Pahong Court Quitclaim by itself is not dispositive evidence of any legal 22 interest that Defendant may have had in the properties covered by the Deed. Indeed, the Court 23 finds that the Defendant had no claim on any of those properties to divest. 24 _J 25 During the course of the parties' marriage, Defendant also executed quitclaim deeds or -<( z 26 other documents purportedly transferring any interest she may have in certain real property to (!) 27 Plaintiff. Defendant contends that for certain real property obtained during the marriage and for cr::: 28 r·-.... Page26of40 ''-J which she executed a quitclaim deed, that these were obtained ( 1) without adequate 1

2 consideration ("a price which is equal in value for an act or a thing for which it is given"); 10 or,

3 (2) through a "undue influence" exerted upon her by the Plaintiff which violated a purported 4 fiduciary relationship each shares with the other by virtue of their marital status, and that this 5 "presumption" of undue influence must be rebutted by the spouse who was advantaged by the 6 transaction (the Plaintiff). 11 The Court disagrees with both of these claims. 7

8 a. Mutual consent of husband and wife to contract is sufficient consideration. 9

10 Defendant argues that the quitclaim deeds executed by her and, specifically, the Pahong

11 Court Quitclaim, is invalid because of a lack of "reasonable or complete compensation" or 12 "adequate compensation" which she considers to be "a price which is equal in value for an act 13 or a thing for which it is given." Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 14 8. Guam law does not require that fair market value or other monetary compensation be paid to 15

'" 16 a spouse in order for the agreement to be enforceable. 19 G.C.A. §6111(c) provides that "[t]he

17 mutual consent of the parties is a sufficient consideration for such an agreement." Thus, 18 Defendant's argument that she did not receive monetary compensation must fail unless the 19 Court determines that there was no "mutual consent," i.e. there was a breach of the obligation to 20 act consistent with that of "persons occupying confidential relations with each other." 19 21

22 G.C.A. § 6111(a).

... 23 11 ........J 24 <( II z 25

(.!) 26 10 Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 8. 27 0:: 11 Id. C:J 28 Page27of40 b. There is no evidence that Plaintiff failed to act inconsistent with his 1 statutory obligation to Defendant regarding the Quitclaim. 2 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff exercised "undue influence" over her and, as a 3 consequence, that the Quitclaim Deed should be void for a breach of his fiduciary duty to her. 4

5 Moreover, she argues that there is a presumption of undue influence if the transaction

6 advantages one spouse over the other. Defendant fails to cite to any Guam statute or case law 7 which supports her blanket assertion that "there is no reason to doubt that a married couple has 8 fiduciary duties between each other" or the presumption of undue influence. Def.' s Proposed 9

10 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 8. Defendant cites only to case law from Texas

11 and California, the latter of which interprets a California statute that has not been adopted in 12 Guam and which is, therefore, inapposite. 13 In re. Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), 14 cited to by Defendant in support of her argument that Plaintiff exercised undue influence over 15

16 her, addressed the transmutation of real property from community property to the husband's

17 separate property. California has provisions of law with respect to the transmutation - or 18 interspousal transaction or agreement which works a change in the character of the property. 19 California Family Code Chapter 5, Sections 850 et seq. specifically addresses the transmutation 20 of property and provides that "transmutation is subject to the laws governing fraudulent 21

22 transfers." Cal. Fam. Code § 851(2004). The court in Haines held that specific statutory

23 procedures must be followed for a transmutation to be effective, otherwise there is a __j 24 presumption of undue influence arising from the advantage enjoyed by the spouse benefitting <( 25 .L:~:: from the transmutation. These statutory provisions simply do not apply in Guam. 26 (' ..__,_,,_, 27 c_J 28 Page28of40

" Instead, spouses in Guam may transfer property between each other subject to 19 G.C.A. 1

2 § 611l(a) which provides that "[e]ither husband or wife may enter into any engagement or

3 transaction with the other, respecting property subject, in transaction between themselves, to the 4 general rules which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each ., 5 other." 19 G.C.A. §6111. 12 "Confidential and fiduciary relations are, in law, synonymous and 6 may be said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and 7

8 fidelity of another. The very existence of such a relation precludes the party in whom the trust

9 and confidence is reposed from participating in profit or advantage resulting from the dealings 10 of the parties to the relation." In re. Cover's Estate, 204 P. 583 (Ca. 1922)(citations omitted). 11 The provision of law requiring that interspousal transactions are subject to the general rule 12

13 which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations to each other have been

14 interpreted by California courts to mean that: 15 In every transaction between them by which the superior party obtains a possible 16 benefit, equity raises a presumption against its validity and casts upon the party the burden of proving affirmatively its compliance with equitable requisites and 17 of thereby overcoming the presumption. [citations omitted]. Of course, the mere existence of the marriage relation alone will not, in and of itself, suffice to initiate 18 and support the presumption of undue influence where the transaction between 19 husband and wife is prima facie, or, from all of the circumstances thereof, shown to be fair and free from any material advantage to the husband from and over the 20 wife. 13 21

22 12 California Family Code Section 721 appears to contain statutory provisions which are closest to the language of 23 Section 6111; however, even Section 721 reflects a conscious and deliberate purpose of the California legislature to clarify that that Section 721 of the Family Code "provides that the fiduciary relationship between spouses includes _I 24 all of the same rights and duties in the management of community property as the rights and duties of unmarried <:( business partners managing partnership property, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the

z 25 Corporations Code, and to abrogate the ruling in In reMarriage of Duffy (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 923, to the extent

-- (!) 26 that it is in conflict with this clarification." 13 In re. Cover's Estate, 204 P. at 590 (numerous citations omitted). It is noteworthy to mention, however, that this

-a: 27 and other cases interpreted a statute which was previously identical to Guam's Section 6111 and which has since been repealed and reenacted as California Family Code Section 721, but which also further clarifies and adds the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 0 28 Page29of40 Indeed, in this case, the Court has found that at the time Defendant executed the Pahong 1

2 Quitclaim Deed, she had no legal interest in any of the properties which were subject to the

3 Quitclaim Deed. Even if she had an interest that was then conveyed to the Plaintiff, the 4 conveyance did not fail for lack of consideration because a mutual consent to the transfer is 5 sufficient between spouses under Guam law. Finally, the evidence does not support a finding 6 that Plaintiff exerted any undue influence upon the Defendant in order to obtain the Quitclaim 7

8 Deed or that he enjoyed any advantage over her from the transfer.

9 Based upon the testimony during the trial and the applicable law as discussed herein, the 10 Court HEREBY AWARDS THE REAL PROPERTY AS FOLLOWS: 11 i. Lot No. 3, Block 20, Tract 232, Sinajana, located at 152 Chalan 12 Kanton Tutujan, Sinajana, ("the Blue House") is 13 Community Property.

14 The Blue House was purchased in 1999, during the marriage of the parties, 15 purportedly pursuant to a Sales Agreement between the Sarmientos and Defendant, and title to 16 the Blue House is in Defendant's name. This is the home which the parties shared during their 17 marriage and, therefore, the Court finds that it was the "marital home" of the Plaintiff and 18

19 Defendant. Although the home was purchased with Plaintiff's separate property and title was

20 in Defendant's name only, 19 G.C.A. § 6105(a) provides that such property is presumed to be 21 community property unless the property, or the source of funds with which it is acquired, can be 22 traced. 19 G.C.A. §6105(a); Babauta v. Babauta, 2011 Guam 15 ("Babauta /");Kloppenburg 23 __l at

"~ r""' 26 -cr::..21 provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the property is community property. 028 Page30of40 The Blue House property was obtained for a purchase price of $130,000.00.

2 Although the Sales Agreement was only between the grantors and Defendant, the evidence at

3 trial established that Plaintiff paid the required $5,000 down payment to the sellers and $10,000 4 down payment to Guam Housing Corporation using funds from the proceeds of his Urunao 5 rental and the lease income and proceeds from the sale of lots in Tract 927, Yigo. Defendant did 6 not present any evidence to the contrary, nor did she dispute Plaintiff's testimony. 7

8 On July 6, 1999, the parties together took out a mortgage on the property to

9 secure a loan of $146,250. The monthly mortgage payment is $1,119.18. Using his Urunao and 10 Yigo income and proceeds, Plaintiff alone has paid the $15,000 down payment, the mortgage 11 payments, the improvements to, and the maintenance costs of the Blue house. He is not, 12

13 however, entitled to any reimbursement or credit for any post-separation mortgage payments

14 when mortgage payments on the Blue house were "payment[s] made on account of a debt for an 15 asset which the paying spouse was using" and reimbursement is inappropriate. Babauta I, 2011 16 Guam 15'][ 33. 17 Because the Blue House is the community property of the parties and is subject 18

19 to a mortgage in favor of First Hawaiian Bank which is the obligation of both Plaintiff and

20 Defendant, the provisions of 19 G.C.A. §6104(a) shall apply with regard to the satisfaction of 21 the debt. 22 ii. Tract 927, Yigo and its derivative lots are Plaintiff's Separate 23 Property _j24 Lot Nos. 9 and 10, Tract 927, Yigo, are the only lots remaining in Plaintiff's <:( 25 possession. These lots and any income derived therefrom are his separate property, as they :z26

827 derived from Lot No. 7079-3, which Plaintiff purchased using the proceeds from the sale of Lot - 0:::: 28 c:.') Page31 of40 No. 2306-3-R7, Mangilao, which was Plaintiff's sole and separate property purchased prior to 1

2 the marriage. Defendant has also disavowed several times any interest that she may have had in

3 the property; however, the Court finds Defendant had no interest in this property to quitclaim. 4 Defendant seeks an award of Lot No. 1; however, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court 5 denies Defendant's claim to Lot 1, Tract 927, Yigo. Moreover, Lot 1 is not in the parties' 6 possession and has not been in the parties' possession since September, 1999. 7

8 iii. Lot No. 3242-1-3, Chalan Pago, Guam is Community Property 9 Plaintiff traded two of the subdivided lots from Lot 7079-3, Yigo for Lot No. 3242-1-3, 10 Chalan Pago and the presumption of community property when both parties are named on the 11 title document was not challenged at trial. Indeed, Plaintiff agreed that this property was 12

13 community property and there was no evidence to the contrary. The presumption of community

14 property applies even if payment for this property was derived from Plaintiffs originally 15 separate property because there is no evidence that Defendant legally transferred any ownership 16 that she may have had in the property. Moreover, the Plaintiff's testimony evidences that he 17 believed Defendant to have a legal interest in the property when he requested that Defendant 18

19 consent to the Smithbridge Lease. Consequently, any income from the Smithbridge Lease and

20 any proceeds from the sale of this property shall be divided equally between the parties. 21 iv. Lot No. 276 New-1, Merizo (822 Chalan Canton Tasi, Merizo, Guam 22 is Plaintiff's Separate Property.

23 Defendant seeks this property as her sole and separate property based upon an assertion

___, 24 that undue influence was exerted upon her to execute the 1990 Quitclaim Deed conveying her 25 <:( interest·in this property to the Plaintiff. In support of this assertion, Defendant argues that, but z 26 the Court decrees it community property for the same reasons set forth under Lot No. 3242-1-3, (D 27 28 0::: Page32of40 C.J Chalan Pago: the presumption of community property when acquired in the names of both

2 parties during the marriage was not overcome at trial by Defendant's quitclaim on September

3 19, 1990. 4 v. Lot No. 7, Block 6, Tract 232, Sinajana ("Pahong Court") is 5 Plaintiff's Separate Property 6 Plaintiff purchased this property in Jan. 1984 which preceded the marriage. The 7 property was improved by $7,500 of Antonio's separate property from the sale of Lot 2306-3-10 8 in June 1984. Defendant claims the Pahong Court Quit Claim "fails for want of consideration 9

10 and as the parties got back together after filing for Divorce in 1985;" however, the Court finds

11 that Defendant never held any legal interest in the Pahong Court property to quit claim; 12 therefore, the Court awards this property to Plaintiff as his sole and separate property. Although 13 Defendant has stayed in the Pahong Court property since the parties' separation making minimal 14

15 rental payments, the Court will not order Defendant reimburse Plaintiff. Defendant did not have

16 possession of the marital residence, which was titled in her sole name. Equity and Defendant's 17 need to live somewhere during the pendency of this action determine that she is not required to 18 reimburse Plaintiff for back rent. 19 vi. Lot No.107-3-R2, Yona is Community Property 20

21 Lot 107-3-R2, Yona was purchased in 1997 with Antonio's separate property, but the

22 property was acquired in both of the Parties' names. Antonio quitclaimed his interest to Patria 23 on August 30, 1997; then, Patria quitclaimed her interest back to Antonio on August 10, 1998.

This history creates a presumption, not rebutted at trial, that it was community property. The

property was later exchanged for Lot EA No. 450-2, Saipan. While only Plaintiff can hold title

to Lot EA No. 450-2, Saipan, Defendant is entitled to half its value as her share of the

Page33of40 community property interest in Lot EA No. 450-2. 1 ·.,

2 vii. The Following Real Property Interests are Decreed Plaintiff's Additional Separate Property 3 1) The undefined interest in Lot 007 H44, Saipan which Plaintiff inherited 4

5 from his father.

6 2) The 2/5 interest in Lot 507 New, Saipan: Plaintiff inherited 115 in 1997 7 and purchased 115 before the marriage in 1977. 8 3) The 2/5 interest in Lot 037 H01, Saipan: Plaintiff inherited 115 in 1997 9

10 and purchased 115 before the marriage in 1977.

11 4) Lot 2003-3-2, Saipan was purchased in 1992 and is presumed Antonio's 12 separate property as the purchase was funded by the sale of the subdivided lots in 13 Lot 7079-3, Yigo, which was also his separate property. 14 5) Tract 22795-3, Saipan was acquired by a trade for Lot H-136-10 in 2007. 15

16 When the source of funds for this property is also his separate property the Court

17 presumed it remains Plaintiff's separate property 18 6) Lots 3325-4-R1 and 3325-4-R-W, Chalan Pago were purchased in 19 Antonio's name on September 29, 1994. It is presumptively Antonio's separate 20 property as it was purchased with income from Urunao and the subdivided Yigo 21

22 lots, which were all his separate property.

23 7) Lot H-136-10, Saipan was purchased on January 7, 1990 with Antonio's

__J 24 separate funds from his claim under the Guam Land Claims Act, then traded for <::( 25 z 26 Tract 22795-3, Saipan in 2007, which is presumed Plaintiff's separate property as

(!.) purchased by his separate funds from his personal GLCA claim. 27 'j;!

0:::: 28 0 Page34of40 8) Lot 2306-3-10, Mangilao was purchased in July, 1982 (prior to the 1

2 marriage) and sold in June 1984. Plaintiff used $7,500 of the proceeds to

3 improve Pahong Court. No longer in the possession of Plaintiff, this property 4 was his sole and separate property and proceeds from its sale are Plaintiff's 5 separate property. 6

7 2. Distribution of Personal Property.

8 Based upon the testimony during the trial and the applicable law as discussed herein, the 9 Court HEREBY AWARDS THE PERSONAL PROPERTY AS FOLLOWS: 10 a. Furniture and Appliances located at the "Blue House" to Defendant. 11 All furniture and appliances located at the "Blue House" as of the parties' 12

13 separation shall be the sole and separate property of the Defendant, including, but not limited to

14 the Coconut Grater specifically requested by the Defendant Wife during the trial. All other 15 appliances and furnishings located at the "Blue House" and obtained solely by the Plaintiff after 16 the parties' separation shall be the sole and separate property of the Plaintiff. 17

18 b. Vehicles shall be the sole and separate property of each party in possession of the vehicle since the parties' separation. 19

20 The vehicles that the parties currently have in their possession and control shal

21 remain their separate property. Specifically, the 2005 Toyota RAV4, License No. SNJ272, · 22 Defendant's possession shall remain her sole and separate property; and the 1999 Toyota Pre- 23 __j Runner Tacoma Pickup, License No. H695 and the 2005 Toyota RAV4, License No. ASA673 24 <:( in Plaintiff's possession shall be Plaintiff's sole and separate property. :z: 25 (!) 26 Both parties shall sign any and all documents required to effectuate this property

cr::: 27 distribution and to make the vehicle or vehicles each of their separate property. (::) 28 Page35of40 c. Bank of Guam stock shares and shares in lglecias Corporation are 1 Defendant's separate property. 2 Defendant testified that she owns 40 shares of Government of Guam Stock as 3 well as stock in Iglesias Corporation which she inherited. The Court finds that these shares o 4

5 stock are Plaintiff's sole and separate property.

6 d. Parties' Retirement Benefits Are Community Property. 7 Neither Party disputes that their respective Government of Guam retirement 8 plans comprise community property. Plaintiff's retirement plan is a defined benefit plan (see 4 9

10 GCA Article 1 §§ 8101 et seq.) from which Plaintiff has received a fixed monthly payment

11 since his retirement on or about January of 2000. Defendant's retirement plan is a defined 12 contribution plan (see 4 GCA Article 2 §§ 8201 et seq.) consisting of three separate accounts 13 with a sum certain balance at the time the Parties separated. 14 i. Apportionment of Plaintiff's Defmed Benefit Retirement Plan 15

16 Although Plaintiff's retirement is expressed as a monthly income stream

17 and not a present cash value, the Court calculates the community property component of a 18 defined benefit retirement plan (or pension) using the "time rule" approved in Hart v. Hart, 19 2008 Guam 11, which "is not unreasonable when the 'amount of the retirement benefits is 20 substantially related to the number of years of service."' Id. '][ 42 (citing In re Marriage of 21

22 Lehman, 955 P2d 451, 461 (Cal. 1998)).

23 Under the time rule, the community share of a defined benefit retirement 24 __J payment is the number of years of the marriage that coincide with accrual of the retirement <( 25 z 26 benefit divided by the total years of employment credited towards the retirement benefit.

(!.) 27 Plaintiff retired with 21.5 years of credited service and was married to Defendant for 16 of those

CJ::: 28 (:::::J Page36of40 years. Plaintiff purchased an additional five years of service credit during the marriage-these 1

2 additional years are presumptively community property and purchased with a loan paid for

3 through deductions from Defendant's retirement plan. Therefore, the community interest is the 4 16 years of marriage plus the 5 years purchased by the community, or 21 years. Dividing this by 5 the total property interest of 21.5 years plus the 5 years of purchased service credit (26.5 years), 6 the Court apportions the community's share at 81%. See Section 5.A. infra. 7

8 Applying this formula, Defendant is entitled to half of the community's

9 share, or 40.5%, of Plaintiff's net monthly benefit since March 2009. Plaintiff's monthly benefit 10 is currently $2,691.94 but will rise to $3,000 in January 2015. The Court calculates the current 11 arrears as of October 2014 to be $1,090.24 x 67 months, or $73,046.08. The monthly obligation 12

13 of $1090.24 continues until January of 2015 when it increases to $1,215. This obligation is

14 continuing for as long as Plaintiff collects his monthly retirement benefit. Defendant shall also 15 have a 40.5% interest in any cost of living adjustments or other payments issued ancillary to his 16 retirement benefit. 17 THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM 18

19 RETIREMENT FUND TO ISSUE DEFENDANT'S 40.5% SHARE OF PLAINTIFF'S RETIREMENT

20 DIRECTLY TO DEFENDANT, including any other ancillary benefits at the same proportion, upon

21 this Court's issuance of the final decree of divorce. The Court will further issue any necessary 22 qualified domestic relations orders required by 4 GCA § 8101.2(b)(8)(C). 23

__j24 ii. Apportionment of Defendant's Defined Contribution Plan <::( -,.P25 Defendant began working for the Government of Guam in 1993 and was still L- (.!)26 working when the Parties separated. All the contributions to her 401, 457, and 403-B retirement -27 cr. plan up to separation are all presumptively community property as she made them during the t"':J28 \:~>,.,rt"

Page37 of40 ,_.· marriage and derived from earnings during the marriage. The total value of these plans at 1

2 separation was $43,157.13 (401 plan) plus $29,190.40 (457 plan) plus $6,662.57 (403-B plan)

3 or $79,010.10. See Section 5.A. infra. 4 The Court deems all of Defendant's defined contribution Government of Guam 5 retirement at the time of separation as community property. Therefore, THE COURT HEREBY 6 AWARDS PLAINTIFF HALF THE VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT PLANS, or $39,505.05. 7

8 e. Other property not specifically identified are each of the parties' sole and separate property. 9

10 All other personal belongings currently in the parties control and possession shall

11 remain their sole and separate property. 12 D. DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY DEBTS 13 Plaintiff has paid for nearly all of the debts after the parties' final separation. Defendant 14 admits that all of the debts herein identified are community debts and that, except for three 15

16 installment payments on the 2005 Toyota RAV4 loan, she did not pay any of these debts, she

17 did not reimburse Plaintiff for his payments and she has not contributed towards paying for 18 these debts. Furthermore, she admits liability for some of the debts; however, the parties failed 19 to clearly identify the proportion in which each party is obligated for these debts, with the 20 exception of the Mortgage on the Blue House with First Hawaiian Bank and the Mortgage on 21

22 Lot No. 276-NEW-1 Merizo.

23 The mortgages on the Blue House, which the Court has determined is community _J 24 property as it is the marital home of the parties, and the mortgage for the Merizo property is a -<::( 25 ""? ~ community debt because it was incurred by both parties during the marriage. Babauta I, 2011 ~·= 26 (!) -~ 27 Guam <]{39; 19 G.C.A. §6102(b)("Community debt means a debt contracted or incurred by either cr:: c:J 28 Page38of40 or both spouses during marriage which is not separate debt."). Thus, pursuant to the provisions 1

2 of 19 G.C.A. §6104(a):

3 Community debts shall be satisfied first from all community property and all property in which the spouses own an undivided 4 equal interest as joint tenants or tenants in common, excluding the 5 residence of the spouses. Should such property be insufficient, community debts shall then be satisfied from the residence of the 6 spouses. Should such property be insufficient, only the separate property of the spouse who contracted or incurred the debt shall be 7 liable for its satisfaction. If both spouses contracted or incurred the 8 debt, the separate property of both spouses is jointly and severally liable for its satisfaction. 9

10 Other community debts of the parties include the following: 11 1. The First Hawaiian Bank Visa credit card is community debt of the parties as it 12

13 was incurred during the marriage;

14 2. The Bank of America Visa credit card is community debt of the parties as it was 15 incurred during the marriage; 16 3. The Navy Federal Credit Union Visa credit card is community debt of the parties 17 as it was incurred during the marriage; 18

19 4. The Bank of Hawaii American Express credit card is community debt of the

20 parties as it was incurred during the marriage; 21 5. The CitiBank credit card is community debt of the parties as it was incurred 22 during the marriage; 23 ·]. j. _j 6. The Navy Federal Credit Union auto loan for the 2005 Toyota RAV4 in 24 <::( :z: 25 Defendant's possession is community debt of the parties as it was incurred during the marriage; -~

(9 26 7. The Visa credit card having an account balance of approximately $130,000 as of

cr.: 27 March 2009, is community debt of the parties as it was incurred during the marriage; ("') 28 Page39of40 However, the parties failed to clearly identify the proportion in which each party is 1 ,.. 2 obligated for the debts and as the Court has granted Plaintiff a divorce on the ground of

3 irreconcilable differences and Defendant a divorce on the ground of adultery, the Court orders 4 Plaintiff solely liable for the debts of the community as listed herein. 5 E. SEPARATEDEBT 6

7 1. Plaintiff's Separate Debt. The following are Defendant's separate debt:

8 (a) The mortgage on Lot No.7, Block 6, Tract 232, Sinajana, (131 Pahong Court); 9

10 (b) The mortgage on Lot No.1, Tract 927, Yigo,

11 (c) The mortgage on Lot No. 4, Block No. 20, Tract No. 232, Sinajana. 12 Consequently, Plaintiff remains solely liable for payment of these obligations. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court HEREBY GRANTS PLAINTIFF A DIVORCE ON 15 THE BASIS OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES, and hereby GRANTS DEFENDANT A DIVORCE ON 16

17 THE GROUND OF ADULTERY, but denying Defendant relief as to all her other asserted claims.

18 The Court further DECREES NEITHER PARTY IS ENTITLED TO SPOUSAL SUPPORT. 19 The Court HEREBY ORDERS COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF to prepare the Interlocutory 20 and Final Decrees of Divorce consistent with the Court's Findings herein and obtain approval as 21 __J to form from opposing counsel. <::( 22 z 23 SO ORDERED this 31st day of October, 2014.

(!) 24 -er:: 25 0 S RVICE VIA COURT BOX 26 I knowledge that a copy ~~ the lnal hereto was placed m the HONORABLE MARIA T. CENZON rt bo : Judge, Superior Court of Guam

Page40of40