Sablan v. Inos

3 N. Mar. I. 418, 1993 N. Mar. I. LEXIS 15
CourtSupreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands
DecidedJanuary 21, 1993
DocketCIVIL ACTION NO. 91-734
StatusPublished

This text of 3 N. Mar. I. 418 (Sablan v. Inos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sablan v. Inos, 3 N. Mar. I. 418, 1993 N. Mar. I. LEXIS 15 (N.M. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION

VILLAGOMEZ, Justice:

I.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint on July 9, 1991, seeking to enjoin the defendants from disclosing plaintiffs' tax returns and return information to the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Interior ("IG"). They alleged that a disclosure of their tax returns would violate the tax confidentiality provisions of 4 CMC § 1701(d) , as well as their right to privacy guaranteed by the CNMI Constitution. Plaintiffs asked the trial court to take constructive custody of all tax returns and return information filed with the government so as to prevent their production to the IG in connection with the IG's proposed audit of the CNMI tax system. At the same time, plaintiffs applied for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction against the defendants.

On July 10, 1991, the trial court denied the application for restraining order and permanent injunction on the basis that the IG was not made a party to the lawsuit. The trial court stated in its order:

The thrust and gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is to enjoin the IG from carrying out an audit of the defendants and they must join the IG as a party. Failure to do so dictates a denial of plaintiffs' application for a restraining order or injunction.

The trial court assumed that 48 U.S.C. § 1681b1 applies in the CNMI. It concluded without discussion that what the "plaintiffs [422]*422are actually seeking is an injunction against the enforcement of 48 U.S.C. § 1681(b)

The court did not dismiss the complaint, noting that the case was still at a preliminary stage and plaintiffs could still join the IG. The same day, plaintiffs petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus to require the lower court to proceed without the IG, as a party to the lawsuit, and to restrain the defendants. On July 30, 1991, we denied the petition for mandamus on the basis that the lower court's ruling (that the IG was an indispensable party) was not clearly erroneous for purposes of mandamus and the injunction' sought was premature.2

On August 18, 1991, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint setting forth additional allegations that the IG would in fact audit plaintiffs' tax returns. They also moved for reconsideration of the earlier denial of a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction. The next day, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the action without prejudice because plaintiffs still had not joined the IG.

On August 20, 1991, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the action.3 They also filed a second petition for mandamus and, in the alternative, an emergency motion to enjoin the defendants [423]*423from disclosing their tax returns pending appeal. We denied the petition for mandamus, but enjoined the release of the tax returns pending appeal and ordered the Superior Court to temporarily take constructive possession of such documents.

The appeal was argued on December 23, 1991, On December 26, 1991, at the request of the parties, we issued an expedited order to be followed by this opinion setting forth our analysis and reasoning.

II.

Although three issues were raised on this appeal, in our December 26, 1991 order, we addressed only the first two issues. The issues are:

1. Whether the Inspector General is an indispensable party to the lawsuit;

2. Whether the defendants are prohibited by law from disclosing plaintiffs' tax returns and return information to the Inspector General; and

3. Whether the trial court should take custody and constructive possession of the tax returns and return information.4

The first issue is the main issue. However, in order to determine whether the IG is an indispensable party, we need to address the second issue, a subsidiary issue, which relates to the applicability of 48 U.S.C. § 1681b to the CNMI. We summarily [424]*424dispose of the third issue, infra.

III.

INDISPENSABILITY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Rule 19, Com.R.Civ.P., governs the determination of whether a person needs to be joined as a party. It provides:

(a) Persons to be Joined if feasible. A person who is subjact to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practice [sic] matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest[,] or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the Court shall order that he be made a party.

We hold that the IG need not be joined as a party to the lawsuit for the following reasons.

The relief sought by the plaintiffs is essentially to prohibit the release of their tax documents to the IG, in view of the proposed federal audit under 48 U.S.C. § 1681b. The relief requested would run only against the Commonwealth Government which [425]*425has custody of such documents. Therefore, complete relief can be accorded among those already parties to the lawsuit.

As explained infra, the trial court's ruling that the IG is an indispensable party was based on its view that 48 U.S.C. § 1681b, under which the IG sought to conduct its audit of the Commonwealth's tax system, applies to and has validity in the Commonwealth. To the extent that such federal law violates the fundamental provisions of the Covenant, we find that such law has no force and effect in the Commonwealth and cannot be applied. Thus, there is no interest that the IG can claim would be affected by the lawsuit.

The IG has bean aware of this action since plaintiffs filed their original complaint on July 9, 1991. Yet, it has not asserted any interest in joining this litigation. The IG instead has since chosen to subpoena the Governor of the Commonwealth and later sought the enforcement of its subpoena before the District Court.

Since the basis for the IG's interest in this lawsuit rests on a statute which we find to be inapplicable in the CNMI; and since complete relief can be awarded in its absence; and since the IG has failed to assert its interest herein; we are of the opinion that it is not an indispensable party to the lawsuit.

IV.

THE IG'S AUTHORITY TG AUDIT THE LOCAL TAX SYSTEM OF THE CNMI

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Related

Reynolds v. Sims
377 U.S. 533 (Supreme Court, 1964)
Gaffney v. Cummings
412 U.S. 735 (Supreme Court, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
3 N. Mar. I. 418, 1993 N. Mar. I. LEXIS 15, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sablan-v-inos-nmariana-1993.