SABER ACCEPTANCE CO. L.L.C. v. CURRAN

2015 OK CIV APP 8
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in SABER ACCEPTANCE CO. L.L.C. v. CURRAN. Read the opinion of the Court — 2014 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 91
Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma·Decided July 11, 2014·Published

Opinion

OSCN Found Document:SABER ACCEPTANCE CO. L.L.C. v. CURRAN
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SABER ACCEPTANCE CO. L.L.C. v. CURRAN
2015 OK CIV APP 8
Case Number: 112501
Decided: 07/11/2014
Mandate Issued: 01/23/2015
DIVISION I
As Corrected: February 11, 2015
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION I


Cite as: 2015 OK CIV APP 8, __ P.3d __

SABER ACCEPTANCE CO., L.L.C., Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Matthew A. Curran, Defendant,
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC., Garnishee/Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE DOUGLAS GOLDEN, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Chris Knight, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant,
J. Schaad Titus, Robyn M. Funk, J. Miles McFadden, Titus Hillis Reynolds Love Dickman McCalmon, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee.

Larry Joplin, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Saber Acceptance Co., L.L.C. (Creditor), seeks review of the trial court's order granting the motion for summary judgment of Garnishee/Appellee Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. (Garnishee), on the Creditor's claim to wages of the judgment debtor, Defendant Matthew A. Curran (Debtor). In this appeal, Creditor asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law in its application of Oklahoma statutes, 12 O.S. §§1171.2 and 1173.4.

¶2 Creditor obtained a judgment against Debtor, and sought to garnish his wages from Garnishee. Garnishee answered, asserted Debtor's wages were subject to a prior income assignment for child support, and alleged that Debtor had no available wages subject to garnishment. Creditor took issue with Garnishee's answer, and asserted that, by its calculation, Debtor had available wages subject to its garnishment.

¶3 Garnishee filed a motion for summary judgment. Garnishee asserted that, where a "continuing earnings garnishment is issued against a defendant already subject to an income assignment for child support," §1173.4(I)(1) of title 12, O.S., proscribed withholding of more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the defendant debtor's disposable earnings to satisfy both the prior income assignment for child support and subsequent garnishment. Garnishee argued that the 25% limitation was consistent with Oklahoma exemptions, 31 O.S. §1(A)(18), as well as the pre-emptive federal law codified in the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§1671, et seq., §§1672(c),1 1673(a),2 1673(b)(2),3 and the Department of Labor's implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. §870.11(b)(2).4 Garnishee presented evidentiary materials demonstrating that the income assignment for child support required the withholding of more than thirty-one percent (31%) of Debtor's disposable earnings, in excess of the 25% limit imposed by §1173.4(I)(1), and therefore, Garnishee could withhold no earnings of Defendant in response to Creditor's garnishment.

¶4 Creditor filed a motion for summary judgment. Creditor asserted that §1171.2(B) of title 12, O.S., subjected up to fifty percent (50%) of a defendant's disposable earnings to withholding for child support, and that Creditor was entitled to garnishment of the difference between the percentage of Debtor's disposable earnings allowed by §1171.2(B), and the percentage of Debtor's disposable earnings actually withheld pursuant to the prior child support income assignment, in this case, between ten and eighteen percent (10% and 18%) depending on Debtor's actual weekly disposable earnings.

¶5 On consideration of the parties' briefs and arguments after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment of Garnishee and denied the motion for summary judgment of Creditor, holding:

[Creditor] may not garnish [Debtor's] disposable earnings by and through its garnishment summons to [Garnishee] as long as the amount due to satisfy the child support garnishment/income assignment against [Debtor] meets or exceeds 25% of [Debtor's] disposable earnings. . . .

Creditor appeals, and the matter stands submitted on the trial court record.5

¶6 "A garnishment proceeding may be decided by summary process resulting in a post-judgment order where it appears there is no dispute as to any identified material fact or inference to be drawn therefrom and all material facts are stipulated or otherwise established." O'Neill v. Long, 2002 OK 63, ¶9, 54 P.3d 109, 112. (Footnote omitted.) "These legal rulings are reviewable de novo, independent of and without deference to the trial court." Id. (Emphasis original.)

¶7 Issues of statutory construction likewise present questions of law that we review de novo. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶9, 179 P.3d 606, 609. Apparently "[c]onflicting legislative acts should be construed in such a way as to reconcile the provisions and render them consistent and harmonious, giving force and effect to each." Strong v. Laubach, 2004 OK 21, ¶9, 89 P.3d 1066, 1070. (Citation omitted.)

¶8 In this respect, §1171.2(B) of title 12, O.S., provides:

The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of any person for any workweek which is subject to garnishment or income assignment for the support of a minor child shall not exceed:

1. Fifty percent (50%) of such person's disposable earnings for that week, if such person is supporting his spouse or a dependent child other than the child with respect to whose support such order is used; and

2. Sixty percent (60%) of such person's disposable earnings for that week if such person is not supporting a spouse or dependent child.

The fifty percent (50%) specified in paragraph 1 of this subsection shall be deemed to be fifty-five percent (55%) and the sixty percent (60%) specified in paragraph 2 of this subsection shall be deemed to be sixty-five percent (65%), if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to garnishment or income assignment to enforce a support order with respect to a period which is prior to the twelve-week period which ends with the beginning of such workweek.

Section 1173.4(I)(1) of title 12, O.S., then provides:

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SABER ACCEPTANCE CO. L.L.C. v. CURRAN, 2015 OK CIV APP 8 (Okla. Ct. App. 2014).

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