S t . Louis v . Eldredge, et a l . CV-95-178-B 09/11/97
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Vincent St. Louis
v. Civil N o . 95-178-B
Carleton Eldredge, et a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Vincent S t . Louis seeks clarification and/or reconsideration of a prior order addressing his federal claims against Rockingham County. Rockingham County does not object to the motion for clarification, but moves for summary judgment to the extent that the federal claims against it have not already been addressed. The county also moves for summary judgment on S t . Louis’s state law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negligence asserted against it and the individual county defendants: Carlton Eldredge, the former Rockingham County Attorney; William Hart, the current Rockingham County Attorney; and Robert Ducharme, an Assistant Rockingham County Attorney.1
1 S t . Louis also alleged other federal claims and state law torts against the City of Portsmouth, Rockingham County, and various city and county officials. These claims were dismissed by my order of January 2 6 , 1996 and my concurrent orders of March 3 1 , 1997. Those orders contain the factual background for S t . Louis’s action. I. COUNT VII — SUPERVISORY LIABILITY S t . Louis’s complaint contains two counts naming Rockingham County as a liable defendant. Count V I I , captioned “Supervisory Liability,” alleges that the county is liable for failing to properly supervise and train the individual county defendants. Count VIII, captioned “Municipal Liability” alleges that the county is liable for the unconstitutional actions of its employees because those actions were undertaken pursuant to the “customs, policies, and practices of Rockingham County.” On January 2 6 , 1996, I dismissed all of S t . Louis’s federal claims except for “his First Amendment claim against Rockingham County.”2 On March 3 1 , 1997, I granted summary judgment with respect to S t . Louis’s remaining federal claims against the county. However, in the body of that order, I expressly addressed only S t . Louis’s claim in Count VIII that the county was liable because of the county attorney’s alleged policy decisions to initiate and/or permit a baseless prosecution against S t . Louis. I did not address Count VII because S t . Louis did not assert a separate failure to train and/or supervise
2 I did not expressly address which counts in the complaint remained viable, but it was my intention to leave undisturbed both Count VII and Count VIII.
2 argument in response to the county’s motion for summary judgment.
S t . Louis now asks that I clarify the disposition of Count
VII. Even though S t . Louis did not timely assert his failure to
train and/or supervise argument in response to the county’s
motion for summary judgment, I grant his motion and address the merits of his contention.3 However, to the extent that S t . Louis
argues that this count is viable against the individual county
defendants, he is mistaken, for Count VII names only Rockingham
County as a defendant. Thus, I decline to address the merits of
this argument.
S t . Louis alleges that his First Amendment rights were
violated because Rockingham County failed to supervise and train
the prosecutors in the Rockingham County Attorney’s office,
allowing them to unconstitutionally prosecute S t . Louis for
obscenity. An inadequate training or supervision claim can be the basis for § 1983 liability only in “limited circumstances.”
Swain v . Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 , 11 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Board
of the County Comm’rs v . Brown, 117 S . C t . 1382, 1388 (1997)).
To maintain his claim, S t . Louis must demonstrate that conduct
3 To some degree, Counts VII and VIII overlap. To the extent that S t . Louis has claimed in Count VII that the county is liable for failing to properly supervise the decision to initiate the obscenity prosecution, his claim fails for the reasons set forth in the March 3 1 , 1997 order.
3 properly attributable to Rockingham County was the “moving force” behind his alleged injury. Id. Furthermore, the inadequacy of training or supervision may serve as the basis for liability only upon a showing that the failure amounted to a “deliberate indifference” to individuals’ rights. Brown, 117 S . C t . at 1390; City of Canton v . Harris, 489 U.S. 3 7 8 , 388 (1989).
“Deliberate indifference” may be established by showing that a municipality adhered to a training program in the face of a continuing series of constitutional violations. Swain, 117 F.3d at 11 (citing Brown, 117 S . C t . at 1390). Also, “[t]he Supreme Court has left open the possibility that a failure-to-train claim can succeed without showing a pattern of constitutional violations. ‘[I]n a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip [municipal employees] with specific tools to handle recurring situations . . . .’” Id. (quoting Brown, 117 S . C t . at 1391).
S t . Louis does not dispute that his prosecution for obscenity was the first in many years in Rockingham County. Moreover, S t . Louis has failed to present any evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that Eldredge acted with
4 deliberate indifference based on a known pattern of constitu- tional violations. Nor does this case fall within the narrow class of cases where liability may exist in the absence of a pattern of constitutional violations. Accordingly, based on the record before m e , no rational juror could conclude that Eldredge’s training of his assistant prosecutors was so deficient as to lead “inexorably to a constitutional violation.” Seekamp v . Michaud, 109 F.3d 8 0 2 , 808 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Hegarty v . Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st C i r . ) , cert. denied, 116 S . C t . 675 (1995)); see Affidavit of Robert E . Ducharme in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Counts V , V I , VII and XII (doc. n o . 5 9 ) ; Supplemental Affidavit of Robert E . Ducharme (attached to doc. n o . 4 1 ) ; Prosecutorial Guidelines for Investigation and Enforcement of Obscenity Statutes (attached to doc. n o . 4 1 ) . For these reasons, to the extent that I have not already done s o , I grant the county’s motion for summary judgment with respect to S t . Louis’s § 1983 supervisory liability count
(Count VII). 4
4 If S t . Louis also seeks damages under Count VII for an alleged violation of the New Hampshire Constitution, this state law claim is also doomed to failure. Rockhouse Mtn. Property Owners Assoc. v . Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 597-602 (1986) (no right to money damages for alleged deprivation of equal protection and due process under New Hampshire Constitution); Penney v . Middleton, Civ. N o . 92-555-B, slip o p . at 20 (D.N.H. 5 II. STATE LAW CLAIMS5
The individual county defendants, Eldredge, Hart, and
Ducharme, assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on
S t . Louis’s malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negli-
gence claims based on the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
New Hampshire law affords absolute immunity to prosecutors whose
actions are “functionally related to the initiation of criminal
process or to the prosecution of criminal charges.” Belcher v .
Paine, 136 N.H. 1 3 7 , 147 (1992). This immunity stems from the
prosecutor’s exercise of judicial functions in his role as
an advocate. Id. at 146-47. Although Belcher dealt with
malicious prosecution rather than abuse of process, its
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S t . Louis v . Eldredge, et a l . CV-95-178-B 09/11/97
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Vincent St. Louis
v. Civil N o . 95-178-B
Carleton Eldredge, et a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Vincent S t . Louis seeks clarification and/or reconsideration of a prior order addressing his federal claims against Rockingham County. Rockingham County does not object to the motion for clarification, but moves for summary judgment to the extent that the federal claims against it have not already been addressed. The county also moves for summary judgment on S t . Louis’s state law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negligence asserted against it and the individual county defendants: Carlton Eldredge, the former Rockingham County Attorney; William Hart, the current Rockingham County Attorney; and Robert Ducharme, an Assistant Rockingham County Attorney.1
1 S t . Louis also alleged other federal claims and state law torts against the City of Portsmouth, Rockingham County, and various city and county officials. These claims were dismissed by my order of January 2 6 , 1996 and my concurrent orders of March 3 1 , 1997. Those orders contain the factual background for S t . Louis’s action. I. COUNT VII — SUPERVISORY LIABILITY S t . Louis’s complaint contains two counts naming Rockingham County as a liable defendant. Count V I I , captioned “Supervisory Liability,” alleges that the county is liable for failing to properly supervise and train the individual county defendants. Count VIII, captioned “Municipal Liability” alleges that the county is liable for the unconstitutional actions of its employees because those actions were undertaken pursuant to the “customs, policies, and practices of Rockingham County.” On January 2 6 , 1996, I dismissed all of S t . Louis’s federal claims except for “his First Amendment claim against Rockingham County.”2 On March 3 1 , 1997, I granted summary judgment with respect to S t . Louis’s remaining federal claims against the county. However, in the body of that order, I expressly addressed only S t . Louis’s claim in Count VIII that the county was liable because of the county attorney’s alleged policy decisions to initiate and/or permit a baseless prosecution against S t . Louis. I did not address Count VII because S t . Louis did not assert a separate failure to train and/or supervise
2 I did not expressly address which counts in the complaint remained viable, but it was my intention to leave undisturbed both Count VII and Count VIII.
2 argument in response to the county’s motion for summary judgment.
S t . Louis now asks that I clarify the disposition of Count
VII. Even though S t . Louis did not timely assert his failure to
train and/or supervise argument in response to the county’s
motion for summary judgment, I grant his motion and address the merits of his contention.3 However, to the extent that S t . Louis
argues that this count is viable against the individual county
defendants, he is mistaken, for Count VII names only Rockingham
County as a defendant. Thus, I decline to address the merits of
this argument.
S t . Louis alleges that his First Amendment rights were
violated because Rockingham County failed to supervise and train
the prosecutors in the Rockingham County Attorney’s office,
allowing them to unconstitutionally prosecute S t . Louis for
obscenity. An inadequate training or supervision claim can be the basis for § 1983 liability only in “limited circumstances.”
Swain v . Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 , 11 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Board
of the County Comm’rs v . Brown, 117 S . C t . 1382, 1388 (1997)).
To maintain his claim, S t . Louis must demonstrate that conduct
3 To some degree, Counts VII and VIII overlap. To the extent that S t . Louis has claimed in Count VII that the county is liable for failing to properly supervise the decision to initiate the obscenity prosecution, his claim fails for the reasons set forth in the March 3 1 , 1997 order.
3 properly attributable to Rockingham County was the “moving force” behind his alleged injury. Id. Furthermore, the inadequacy of training or supervision may serve as the basis for liability only upon a showing that the failure amounted to a “deliberate indifference” to individuals’ rights. Brown, 117 S . C t . at 1390; City of Canton v . Harris, 489 U.S. 3 7 8 , 388 (1989).
“Deliberate indifference” may be established by showing that a municipality adhered to a training program in the face of a continuing series of constitutional violations. Swain, 117 F.3d at 11 (citing Brown, 117 S . C t . at 1390). Also, “[t]he Supreme Court has left open the possibility that a failure-to-train claim can succeed without showing a pattern of constitutional violations. ‘[I]n a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip [municipal employees] with specific tools to handle recurring situations . . . .’” Id. (quoting Brown, 117 S . C t . at 1391).
S t . Louis does not dispute that his prosecution for obscenity was the first in many years in Rockingham County. Moreover, S t . Louis has failed to present any evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that Eldredge acted with
4 deliberate indifference based on a known pattern of constitu- tional violations. Nor does this case fall within the narrow class of cases where liability may exist in the absence of a pattern of constitutional violations. Accordingly, based on the record before m e , no rational juror could conclude that Eldredge’s training of his assistant prosecutors was so deficient as to lead “inexorably to a constitutional violation.” Seekamp v . Michaud, 109 F.3d 8 0 2 , 808 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Hegarty v . Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st C i r . ) , cert. denied, 116 S . C t . 675 (1995)); see Affidavit of Robert E . Ducharme in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Counts V , V I , VII and XII (doc. n o . 5 9 ) ; Supplemental Affidavit of Robert E . Ducharme (attached to doc. n o . 4 1 ) ; Prosecutorial Guidelines for Investigation and Enforcement of Obscenity Statutes (attached to doc. n o . 4 1 ) . For these reasons, to the extent that I have not already done s o , I grant the county’s motion for summary judgment with respect to S t . Louis’s § 1983 supervisory liability count
(Count VII). 4
4 If S t . Louis also seeks damages under Count VII for an alleged violation of the New Hampshire Constitution, this state law claim is also doomed to failure. Rockhouse Mtn. Property Owners Assoc. v . Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 597-602 (1986) (no right to money damages for alleged deprivation of equal protection and due process under New Hampshire Constitution); Penney v . Middleton, Civ. N o . 92-555-B, slip o p . at 20 (D.N.H. 5 II. STATE LAW CLAIMS5
The individual county defendants, Eldredge, Hart, and
Ducharme, assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on
S t . Louis’s malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negli-
gence claims based on the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
New Hampshire law affords absolute immunity to prosecutors whose
actions are “functionally related to the initiation of criminal
process or to the prosecution of criminal charges.” Belcher v .
Paine, 136 N.H. 1 3 7 , 147 (1992). This immunity stems from the
prosecutor’s exercise of judicial functions in his role as
an advocate. Id. at 146-47. Although Belcher dealt with
malicious prosecution rather than abuse of process, its
straightforward holding clearly extends prosecutorial immunity
Nov. 2 1 , 1994) (following Rockhouse); see also, Kelley v . City of Manchester, Civ. N o . 94-358-M, slip o p . at 27-28 (D.N.H. Sept. 2 9 , 1995) (deciding Rockhouse foreclosed monetary awards for violations of other provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution); Kimball v . City of Somersworth, Civ. N o . 90-477-M, slip o p . at 6-9 (D.N.H. Feb. 1 7 , 1993) (same); Legrand v . City of Dover, Civ. N o . 90-579-L, slip o p . at 14 (D.N.H. Oct. 8 , 1992) (same). 5 I reject S t . Louis’s claim that the county’s motion for summary judgment on the state law claims should be denied on the ground that it is untimely. No point would be served in requiring the parties to proceed to trial only to have me enter judgment as a matter of law for reasons that are properly presented in a motion for summary judgment.
6 to abuse of process claims which are related to the initiation
of criminal process. Id. Belcher also extends prosecutorial
immunity to negligent conduct: In the present case, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant acted negligently or reck- lessly in his investigation of the underlying allegations of sexual abuse. As a result, the plaintiffs state that they were wrongfully charged with the felonious sexual assault of [the victim] “causing them to incur substantial legal bills to defend themselves, and that they were caused to suffer great mental anguish and emotional harm, lost wages and business income, great and permanent injury to their reputa- tions, and great and permanent injury to their earning capacities. . . .” The injuries alleged all flow from the initiation of criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs following the grand jury's return of an indictment. There is no allegation that the plaintiffs were harmed by the defendant's investigation, as such. Each element of damages set forth in the writ is a direct result of the defendant's decision to initiate criminal proceedings by seeking an indictment. . . . The decision to indict, even when based on an incomplete investigation, is clearly within the scope of absolute immunity. . . . We hold that the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity for his actions at issue in the negligence count of this case, and therefore that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action.
Id. at 147-48. S t . Louis’s negligence count is based on the same
type of conduct and injuries at issue in Belcher. Therefore, I
7 dismiss S t . Louis’s malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negligence claims against defendants Eldredge, Hart, and Ducharme. S t . Louis’s state law claims against Rockingham County, based on respondeat superior liability, are similarly barred by municipal immunity. See, e.g., Goss v . City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 449, 451 (1995) (municipality immune from police and prosecutor’s discretionary decision not to notify parole officer of parolee’s arrest); Bergeron v . City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421 (1995) (“Government entities are immune from liability for conduct that involves the exercise of a legislative or judicial function . . . ” ) ; Gardner v . City of Concord, 137 N.H. 253, 256 (1993) (“The existence of municipal immunity for discretionary functions is fundamental to our system of
separation of powers.”). Therefore, I dismiss S t . Louis’s state law claims against Rockingham County.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, I grant in part S t . Louis’s motion
for clarification and reconsideration (document n o . 5 5 ) . I also
grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts V , V I ,
8 VII, and XII (document n o . 5 8 ) . Having dismissed all of S t .
Louis’s claims against the remaining defendants, I instruct the
clerk to enter judgment for the defendants in accordance with
this order and my orders of January 2 6 , 1996 and March 3 1 , 1997.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro United States District Court
September 1 1 , 1997
cc: Brian T . Stern, Esq. Donald E . Gardner, Esq.