S. Rose Co. v. Hasenzahl

133 S.W. 547, 141 Ky. 676, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 50
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 20, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 133 S.W. 547 (S. Rose Co. v. Hasenzahl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S. Rose Co. v. Hasenzahl, 133 S.W. 547, 141 Ky. 676, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

William Bogers Clay, Commissioner

Beversing.

Appellant, The S. Bose Company, a corporation, is engaged in the State of New York in the business of importing, buying and selling rough diamonds, carbon and bort, etc., for use for mechanical and scientific purposes. On March 7, 1908, it sold and delivered to appellee, William Hasenzahl, to be paid for in thirty days from said date, six stones of drill bort, weighing 7 7-32 carats, at $6.00 per carat, and five stones of carbon, weighing 5 1-2 carats, at $40.00 per carat, making a total of $263.31. Appellee declined to pay for the stones so purchased, and appellant brought this action to recover the purchase price. Appellee confessed judgment in the sum of $43.31, the agreed price of the six stones of drill bort, but entered a defense as to the balance of the account. A trial bv jury resulted in a verdict for appellee. From the judgment based thereon, this appeal is prosecuted.

It apnears from the record that the goods purchased by appellee were not only sold and delivered to him with[677]*677out any warranty or guaranty on the part of appellant, but upon the following express terms and conditions of non-guaranty, to-wit:

“IMPORTANT NOTICE. Carbon and all other diamonds being a natural formation, their temper being beyond human knowledge, it CAN NOT BE GUARANTEED. Our years of experience and facilities enable us to get the best quality the market affords. By returning them IMMEDIATELY all the goods will be exchanged, PROVIDED they have not been SET, TRIED OR BROKEN.”

Appellee does not contend that he was not aware of the above notice when the goods were delivered; on the contrary, he admits that the goods were sold under the terms above set out. To the petition, which is. in the usual form for goods sold and delivered at appellee's instance and request, appellee filed an answer containing three paragraphs. In the first paragraph he denied that appellee had sold and delivered to him any merchandise, at any time, of the value of $263.31, or of any value in excess of $13.31. For the purpose of overcoming the effect of the terms and conditions of non-guaranty upon which the goods were sold, he pleaded in the second paragraph that, unknown to him, appellant had doctored or manipulated the carbon by coating the same with paraffine or some other substance unknown to appellee, thereby concealing the true nature thereof and making it impossible for appellee to detect the defects or true nature thereof; that said carbon were defective and of poor quality; all of which was known to appellant, but that by reason of said coating it was impossible for appellee to detect the true nature and character of the same until the carbons were tried or used; that at the time he accepted the carbons he did not know that the same had been coated, but believed that they were in their natural state or formation, and had he known that the carbons had been coated or manipulated he would not have accepted the same. The third paragraph presented a counter-claim, which it is unnecessary to set forth, as the lower court sustained a demurrer thereto.

As appellant did not ask for a peremptory instruction, we refrain from passing upon tin? question whether or not there was any evidence justifying the submission of the case to the jury. It is, however, contended that the verdict of the jury is flagrantly against the evidence, land we shall now proceed to a consideration of that question.

[678]*678Appellee testified that appellant sent him a collection of carbons from which to make a selection. Of the number he retained five. He ordinarily inspected the carbons under a magnifying glass. He did not find anything objectionable; they looked good. It is possible to hide a defect in a carbon. The carbons were bought for the purpose of drilling. They were used in drilling a hole upon which progress had been made to the extent of .156 feet with white diamonds. When the carbons were used for this purpose they drilled only 12 feet, when they were crushed up. This showed that they were defective. They ought to have drilled in the formation where they were used, at least, 2,000 or 3,000 feet. The result showed that the carbons .were not natural stones, and that they had been doctored. It is possible to take a fresh broken diamond that is inferior and deceive a man with it by rubbing it with oil. or other substance. The porous parts of the outside-will absorb it and give the carbon a gloss just the same as the natural diamond would have. No one could tell whether or not the diamond had been so manipulated without testing it with chemicals or trying it or breaking it. On cross-examination, in answer to fhe question, “Can you state to this jury, under oath, that those diamonds were'doctored in any way,” appelllee answered, “well, I got no way to make a test.’’ When he examined them they seemed like natural stones. Because, they didn’t act right in the bit, he concluded they had been doctored. He was not able to state to the jury how the diamonds were doctored, but could tell them •how they could be doctored. In examining the diamonds he did'not discover anything on them at all. tlis only ¡reason for concluding that the stones had been doctored was that they were defective and he didn’t discover the defect.' He knew of the notice of non-guaranty accompanying the carbons. When the account was sent out for collection he did not in his letter claim that the carbons had been 'doctored; he merely stated that they were defective. He didn’t come to the conclusion that they bad been manipulated until his son reported that they were defective.

Ferdinand Hasenzahl,'appellee’s son, testified that he had been employed for ten years by his father in the diamond drill business. Remembered receiving the five carbons and six borts which his father had sent him in March, 1908. After drilling about 12 feet with the carbons they broke like glass. Looked at the carbons before using them. They appeared to be natural stones and he [679]*679couldn’t tell whether they were good or not until they were tried or broken. Whether they were colored or doctored he could not say, because he had no way of testing them until he set them in the bit. The carbons must have been tampered with; otherwise he would not have been deceived. There is no way of telling whether or not a diamond has been tampered with except by breaking or trying. On cross-examination he stated that he didn’t know whether a diamond could be tested with chemicals or not. He couldn’t prove that the stones were covered with any foreign substance, and could not, of his own knowledge, say whether they were or not. The reason that the diamonds were crushed was that they were of inferior quality. • He thought the diamonds had been manipulated in some way; otherwise he would not have been deceived. When he bought diamonds from others the agents would permt him to chip off the diamonds he was doubtful about. This was the only way he knew of to distinguish a good stone from a bad stone. He did not chip off the carbons in controversy, because he was afraid that if .-they were bad, appellant would not take them back. He had no right, however, to chip off the stones in question. If he had been buying these stones, he would have chipped them if he had the right to do so.

For appellant, Joseph S. Eose, the president and treasurer of the company, testified that his company was ló'cáted'in New York City. He sold the stones, for which suit was brought, to appellee. Appellee was to pay for them within thirty days.

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Bluebook (online)
133 S.W. 547, 141 Ky. 676, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 50, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/s-rose-co-v-hasenzahl-kyctapp-1911.