S. P. Skinner Co. v. United States

40 Cust. Ct. 53
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJanuary 21, 1958
DocketC. D. 1958
StatusPublished

This text of 40 Cust. Ct. 53 (S. P. Skinner Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S. P. Skinner Co. v. United States, 40 Cust. Ct. 53 (cusc 1958).

Opinion

Lawhence, Judge:

This case presents the question of the proper tariff classification of an item of merchandise described on the invoice accompanying the entry herein as “A.18 Log Fires.”

Upon importation, said articles were classified as household utensils, composed wholly or in chief value of iron, within the purview of paragraph 339 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 339), as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T. D. 51802, and duty was imposed thereon at the rate of 20 per centum ad valorem.

Plaintiff contends that the log fires should properly have been classified as articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device in paragraph 353 of said act (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par 353), as modified by the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 86 Treas. Dec. 121, T. D. 52739, for which duty at the rate of 13% per centum ad valorem is provided.

For ready reference, we here set forth the competing provisions of the statute:

Paragraph 339, as modified, supra—

Table, household, kitchen, and hospital utensils, and hollow or flat ware, not specially provided for * * * :
* * * * J}: ^ *
Not plated with platinum, gold, or silver, and not specially provided for:
*******
Other:
*******
Composed wholly or in chief value of iron, * * * _ 20 % ad val.

[55]*55Paragraph 353, as modified, supra—

Articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, such as electric motors, fans, locomotives, portable tools, furnaces, heaters, ovens, ranges, washing machines, refrigerators, and signs, finished or unfinished, wholly or m chief value of metal, and not specially provided for:
‡ ^ # # sfc ij:
Other (except the following: * * * )_ 13%% ad val.

At the trial of this case, Stannage P. Sldnner, chairman of the board of the plaintiff corporation, was the only witness called to testify on behalf of plaintiff. No witnesses appeared for the Government.

Skinner, who had been connected with the importer herein for 35 years and was familiar with the various items of merchandise handled by his company and who stated specifically that he was familiar with the “A. 18 Log Fires” before the court, identified a sample of the imported articles which subsequently was received in evidence as plaintiff's exhibit 1.

He described the articles as being composed of iron which is somewhat translucent in nature and which has been formed and decorated to imitate logs. Together therewith, an electric socket, bulb, cord, switch, plug, and a spinner were imported.

He testified that the combined article is decorative in nature because it simulates a log fire, which is its sole function. The spinner, previously referred to, is placed on top of the electric bulb which, when heated for about 60 seconds by the electricity coursing through it, causes the spinner to revolve, aiding in the function of imitating or simulating a live or real log fire. The electrical parts which have been enumerated have no use whatsoever other than the sole function for which the article was designed. The electrical parts function all the time that articles like exhibit 1 are in use.

Skinner testified that the log fire would have no appeal whatsoever as an ornamental or decorative item without the electrical parts, admitting, however, that when exhibit 1 is not electrically operated, it would give the effect of four or five logs of wood in a fireplace. In such latter event, the witness stated, he believed the article would then be without any effect and it would not be ornamental or salable.

Sldnner testified that articles like exhibit 1 are used chiefly in the home, but are also used in hotel lobbies and other places.

On cross-examination by Government counsel, plaintiff’s witness testified as follows:

X Q. In your opinion, as it is lighted up and you come into a room where it is in operation, would you say that you get the feeling of warmth and comfort? — • A. I would say it is a nice feeling of comfort. It is very nice to sit around a fireplace that has a little scintillating effect. It is next door to a nice log fire.

X Q. And the members in the family would be reacting in a similar manner?— A. Yes, it gives cheer.

[56]*56On redirect examination, Skinner testified that the log fires do not supply any heat to a room, their sole purpose being for the ornamental or decorative effect which they produce when in use.

In the determination of the case before the court, two questions must be resolved, namely, (1) are the imported log fires household utensils within the tariff connotation of that term, and (2) are they essentially electrical articles within the purview of paragraph 353 of the tariff act?

What constitutes a household utensil within the purview of paragraph 339, supra, has been the subject of many judicial decisions in this and our appellate court. As was aptly stated in Pramette Juvenille Furniture Co. v. United States, 36 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 61, C. A. D. 398—

The words “household utensils” as used in paragraph 339, supra, have been consistently construed by this court to refer to articles which serve a utilitarian purpose and are chiefly used in the household for the care and maintenance of the home for the convenience and comfort of its members.

It appears to be the contention of the defendant in its brief that since it was admitted by plaintiff's witness on cross-examination that a log fire, when in use, provides a “nice feeling of comfort” and would give cheer to the members of a family that said log fire is utilitarian in purpose. In support of that position, reference is made to the case of Heemsoth & Basse v. United States, 72 Treas. Dec. 385, T. D. 49191, wherein certain bird cages were held to be household utensils within the purview of paragraph 339 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

We cannot subscribe to the argument of defendant, for the reason that the test for classification of an article as a household utensil is not predicated upon the fact that, even though chiefly used in the household, it provides convenience and comfort to its members, or even that it assists in the care and maintenance of the household, but must be measured on the primary basis of whether or not it serves a utilitarian purpose.

In the Heemsoth case, above referred to, the court stated:

It is a matter of common knowledge of which this court may take judicial notice that the presence in the home of a singing canary bird in a cage contributes to the cheer and enjoyment of the occupants. Whether plain or ornamental the only use made of a" bird oage, such as those involved herein, is the utilitarian purpose of containing such a bird. We cannot conceive that an empty cage would be used solely for ornamental or decorative purposes.

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§ 1001
19 U.S.C. § 1001

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