S. Marks & Co. v. Crow

13 P. 55, 14 Or. 382, 1887 Ore. LEXIS 14
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 14, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 13 P. 55 (S. Marks & Co. v. Crow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S. Marks & Co. v. Crow, 13 P. 55, 14 Or. 382, 1887 Ore. LEXIS 14 (Or. 1887).

Opinion

Thayer, J.

The respondents commenced a suit in the court below to subject certain real property situate in said county to the payment of a certain judgment recovered by the respondents in an action at law in said court against the appellant, H. G. Crow, on the 19th day of January, 1884, for the sum of $323.94 and costs of action. The judgment was recovered upon an indebtedness due from said appellant to the respondents, alleged to have been contracted between January 1, 1877 and 1881.

It appears that during said time the said appellant was the owner of the said real property, and that he continued to own the same until the 26th day of February, 1883, when he executed a deed to the same to the appellant, E. J. Crow, who is his brother. The real object of the suit is to declare this deed fraudulent and void as against the respondents’ judgment, and the main question in the case is whether the deed was executed in good faith and for a valuable consideration.

It appears from the transcript, that on the 22d day of October, 1879, the said H. G. Crow executed to E. J. Crow a promissory note for $6,500, payable six months after date, with interest at the rate of one per cent, per month, and to secure its payment executed a mortgage upon the land in suit ; that about the 25th day of October, 1880, the respondents held a note against said H. G. Crow, secured by mortgage upon real property, upon which there was at that time due $632.57; and at that date said E. J. Crow called upon respondents and paid it off, and took a transfer of the claim to him[384]*384self; and that within a day or two from that time said II. G. Crow confessed judgment upon the note in said circuit court, and at or about the same time also confessed judgment to the said E. J. Crow upon the note and mortgage of October 22, 1879, to the amount of $7,700.80, which two judgments were duly entered in said court. Four thousand dollars of this alleged indebtedness is claimed by the appellants to be the consideration of said deed. The remainder of it is admitted by the appellants to have been liquidated by the said II. G. Crow. The circuit court, after hearing the proofs and evidence, found the following facts :

(1) “That the promissory note dated October22, 1879,for S£5,500.00, described in the complaint, and the mortgage given to secure the same by defendant H. G. Crow, to his brother E. J. Crow, was without consideration, and was made and accepted by said defendants to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of said defendant H. G. Crow.

(2) “ That on October 28, 1880, defendant TI. G. Crow confessed judgment in favor of E. <T. Crow for $7,700.80 upon said note and mortgage; that said judgment was without consideration, and false and fraudulent, and made and taken for the purpose of hindering and delaying the creditor’s of II. G. Crow.

(3) “ It is not true that on or about October 25, 1880, the defendant H. G. Crow, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, furnished the money therefor, or caused the defendant E. J. Crow to purchase from S. Marks & Co., the plaintiffs, the note and mortgage of H. G. Crow to said Marks & Co., of date January 12, 1878, for $421.07, as mentioned in the complaint; but the same was purchased by said E. J. Crow with his own money.

(4) “ It is not true that the judgment confessed by said defendant H. G. Crow in favor of defendant E. J. Crow, on the 27th day of October, 1880, for the sum of $032.57, upon the note and mortgage mentioned in my third finding of facts, was made or taken with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of defendant II. G. Crow.

[385]*385(5) “ That the deed of conveyance of the real property described in the complaint executed by H. G. Crow to E. J. Crow, on the 26th day of February, 1883, was executed and received by the parties thereto for the purpose of hindering and delaying the creditors of said H. G. Crow.

(G) “ The said H. G. Crow has remained in the exclusive possession of the real property described in the complaint, since the date of the deed of February 26,1883, from himself to E. J. Crow, and has received the exclusive benefits and proceeds' of said land ; and there was or is no agreement between himself and said E. J. Crow, by which he should account to said E. J. Crow for any part of the rents and profits of said lands ; but he has, ever since the date of said deed, and is now receiving the sole and exclusive benefits of the land and the income therefrom.”

And thereupon found as conclusions of law, that the deed of February, 1883, should be set aside, the land sold, and the proceeds applied (1) to the payment of the judgment in favor of said E. J. Crow against H. G. Crow for $637.57, recovered October 27, 1880. (2) To the payment of the respondents’ judgment.

The respondents5 counsel contends that the findings of the court are conclusive as to the facts, the same not having been excepted to, as provided in the amendment of section 393, civil code, adopted at the session of the legislative assembly in 1885. (Session Laws of 1885, p. 69.) This amendment was passed after the' suit was commenced, and took effect before the hearing was had, and before the testimony was all taken; but the part of the testimony taken after the amendment went into effect related simply to the rebuttal of certain impeaching evidence, and was given orally before the court. Aside from this, all the testimony was taken by deposition, in accordance with section 393 of the civil code, as amended in 1871. (Session Laws of 1871, pp. 91, 95.)

The question then arises as to the effect of the amendment of 1885, above referred to. It provides “ that all issues of fact in suits in equity may be tried by the court; the evidence shall [386]*386be presented, and the trial conducted in the same manner as actions at law ; Provided, that the court may, at its discretion, refer the case to a referee, pursuant to the provisions of section 805 of this code ; that in all suits the court, in rendering its decisions therein, shall set out in writing its findings of fact upon all the material issues of fact presented by the pleadings, together with its conclusions of law thereon; but such findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be separate from the decree, and shall be filed with the clerk, and shall be incorporated in and constitute a part of the judgment roll of said case ; and such findings of fact shall have the same force and effect, and be equally conclusive, as the verdict of a jury in an action at law. Exceptions may? be taken during the trial to the ruling of the court, and also to the finding of fact, and a statement of such exceptions, prepared and settled as in actions of law; and the same shall be filed with the clerk within ten days from the entering of the decree, or such further time as the court may allow'.”

This amendment wms evidently intended to permit the court to proceed and try a suit in equity in the same manner as a case at law is tried where a jury trial is waived. The provision in regard to taking exceptions is not explicit. Exceptions to findings of fact cannot be taken during the trial, as the language of the provision would seem to require. Exceptions of that character cannot, in the nature of things, be taken until after the decision is rendered.

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Bluebook (online)
13 P. 55, 14 Or. 382, 1887 Ore. LEXIS 14, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/s-marks-co-v-crow-or-1887.