MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants S & G Investment, Inc., a Maryland corporation
(hereafter “S & G”), brought the instant action as the owner of a residential row brick house at 751-12th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., which was encumbered by a first deed of trust securing the payment of a note in the original amount of $9,250 held and owned at the time of foreclosure by the Home Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereafter “Home Federal”).
The suit is against Home Federal- and the trustees named in the deed of trust and charges a breach of trust by the trustees of their fiduciary duties in the conduct of the sale foreclosing the lien securing the note held by Home Federal. The primary request for relief is damages against the trustees but the complaint also seeks to have the foreclosure set aside. A third claim alleges that the due date of the unpaid principal of the note was not properly accelerated and that the trustees erred in applying the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to satisfy the principal amount of the indebtedness secured by the first deed of trust. After a very careful analysis of the facts and the law, we are unable to find controlling merit in any of S & G’s contentions and hence affirm the decision and judgment of the District Court.
I
On October 26, 1969, appellant S & G, following earlier delinquencies which had been corrected, became three months delinquent in the monthly payments due on a note secured by first deed of trust on the row brick house above referred to. On October 27, 1969, Home Federal, the then owner and holder of the secured note, sent appellant a letter and notice by certified mail, return receipt requested,
at the Maryland
address it had been given by S & G,
stating that Home Federal intended to foreclose the loan by trustee sale on December 2, 1969.
The notice of foreclosure sale required by the statute (D.C. Code § 45-615(b)) was also sent to the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia
and a copy of said notice was enclosed in the letter to S & G.
The trustees, pursuant to the power of sale contained in the deed of trust and in conformance with the procedure customary in the District of Columbia, at the request of Home Federal, thereafter advertised the forthcoming foreclosure sale in customary form by due and proper notice in the Washington STAR. The advertisement appeared on five separate days in the editions published on November 20, 22, 25 and 28, and December 1, 1969. It is common knowledge that the STAR has a daily circulation in excess of 400,000 and reaches all areas of the Washington Metropolitan Area. Thus over two million separate notices of the forthcoming foreclosure sale were
printed, published and distributed to the public in the Washington area prior to the foreclosure sale.
The foreclosure sale took place as scheduled on December 2, 1969, when the property was sold to an innocent purchaser (Seheve). Thereafter he rehabilitated and repaired the property to a substantial extent
and later sold it again to another innocent purchaser. Then, just over one year after the foreclosure sale, on December 2, 1970, appellants started this action seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale, or to apply the proceeds of the sale in a different manner, or to obtain a judgment in damages.
Appellants’ principal claim is that the trustees under the deed of trust violated their fiduciary duty in not attempting to give
personal
notice of the foreclosure sale to
both
the owner of the property (S & G) and the holder of the second trust (Davis Mortgage Company). So far as notice to the owner is concerned, Home Federal fully complied with the statute
and there is no reason why the trustees should not be permitted to rely upon such compliance.
As for the claim that the trustees, in addition to the published notice in the newspaper, were required to give
personal
notice of the foreclosure sale to the holder of the
second trust,
this is unsupportable as a legal matter. Such notice has never before been required in the District of Columbia and the decided cases are generally to the contrary.
While the holder of a second trust in some instances might be a likely bidder at a foreclosure sale under the first trust, the law generally considers that the burden is on the holder of the second trust to keep informed of the status of the first lien.
If the holder of the second trust desires notice of a foreclosure sale, he usually so notifies the trustees. This the Davis Mortgage Company, the second lienor, failed to do, even though it was in the investment business and presumably knowledgeable in the field. It also had some indication of the precarious financial condition of S & G as its own note, originally for 90 days, had been frequently extended after payment of interest only, with the last extension being granted on November 13, 1969, while the instant foreclosure was in progress.
Moreover, it is completely erroneous for appellants to argue that notice was not given to the holders of the first and second trusts. Both were given constructive notice by virtue of the publication of the customary form of advertisement of the foreclosure sale in the two million copies of the newspaper
printed and distributed by the Washington STAR. Constructive notice is the equivalent of actual notice.
In the District of Columbia, publication of a newspaper advertisement is the usual and customary method of giving notice of a foreclosure sale. Such advertisement satisfies the statute
and the terms of the deed of trust which provided that the trustees have power
upon such default, and by request of the Association [Home Federal] to sell said realty, or any part thereof, at public auction in such manner, at such time and place, upon such terms and conditions, and
after such previous advertisement as the said trustees may deem best for the interests of all concerned
....
It would have been better if the owner had actually received the additional personal notice that was properly mailed to 5 & G, but the failure of S & G to receive it was due partly to its own dereliction and not entirely to Home Federal or to the trustees. Home Federal literally complied with the statutory requirements when it mailed the required letter and notice. In full compliance with the statute, the letter was sent to the
last known address,
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MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants S & G Investment, Inc., a Maryland corporation
(hereafter “S & G”), brought the instant action as the owner of a residential row brick house at 751-12th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., which was encumbered by a first deed of trust securing the payment of a note in the original amount of $9,250 held and owned at the time of foreclosure by the Home Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereafter “Home Federal”).
The suit is against Home Federal- and the trustees named in the deed of trust and charges a breach of trust by the trustees of their fiduciary duties in the conduct of the sale foreclosing the lien securing the note held by Home Federal. The primary request for relief is damages against the trustees but the complaint also seeks to have the foreclosure set aside. A third claim alleges that the due date of the unpaid principal of the note was not properly accelerated and that the trustees erred in applying the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to satisfy the principal amount of the indebtedness secured by the first deed of trust. After a very careful analysis of the facts and the law, we are unable to find controlling merit in any of S & G’s contentions and hence affirm the decision and judgment of the District Court.
I
On October 26, 1969, appellant S & G, following earlier delinquencies which had been corrected, became three months delinquent in the monthly payments due on a note secured by first deed of trust on the row brick house above referred to. On October 27, 1969, Home Federal, the then owner and holder of the secured note, sent appellant a letter and notice by certified mail, return receipt requested,
at the Maryland
address it had been given by S & G,
stating that Home Federal intended to foreclose the loan by trustee sale on December 2, 1969.
The notice of foreclosure sale required by the statute (D.C. Code § 45-615(b)) was also sent to the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia
and a copy of said notice was enclosed in the letter to S & G.
The trustees, pursuant to the power of sale contained in the deed of trust and in conformance with the procedure customary in the District of Columbia, at the request of Home Federal, thereafter advertised the forthcoming foreclosure sale in customary form by due and proper notice in the Washington STAR. The advertisement appeared on five separate days in the editions published on November 20, 22, 25 and 28, and December 1, 1969. It is common knowledge that the STAR has a daily circulation in excess of 400,000 and reaches all areas of the Washington Metropolitan Area. Thus over two million separate notices of the forthcoming foreclosure sale were
printed, published and distributed to the public in the Washington area prior to the foreclosure sale.
The foreclosure sale took place as scheduled on December 2, 1969, when the property was sold to an innocent purchaser (Seheve). Thereafter he rehabilitated and repaired the property to a substantial extent
and later sold it again to another innocent purchaser. Then, just over one year after the foreclosure sale, on December 2, 1970, appellants started this action seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale, or to apply the proceeds of the sale in a different manner, or to obtain a judgment in damages.
Appellants’ principal claim is that the trustees under the deed of trust violated their fiduciary duty in not attempting to give
personal
notice of the foreclosure sale to
both
the owner of the property (S & G) and the holder of the second trust (Davis Mortgage Company). So far as notice to the owner is concerned, Home Federal fully complied with the statute
and there is no reason why the trustees should not be permitted to rely upon such compliance.
As for the claim that the trustees, in addition to the published notice in the newspaper, were required to give
personal
notice of the foreclosure sale to the holder of the
second trust,
this is unsupportable as a legal matter. Such notice has never before been required in the District of Columbia and the decided cases are generally to the contrary.
While the holder of a second trust in some instances might be a likely bidder at a foreclosure sale under the first trust, the law generally considers that the burden is on the holder of the second trust to keep informed of the status of the first lien.
If the holder of the second trust desires notice of a foreclosure sale, he usually so notifies the trustees. This the Davis Mortgage Company, the second lienor, failed to do, even though it was in the investment business and presumably knowledgeable in the field. It also had some indication of the precarious financial condition of S & G as its own note, originally for 90 days, had been frequently extended after payment of interest only, with the last extension being granted on November 13, 1969, while the instant foreclosure was in progress.
Moreover, it is completely erroneous for appellants to argue that notice was not given to the holders of the first and second trusts. Both were given constructive notice by virtue of the publication of the customary form of advertisement of the foreclosure sale in the two million copies of the newspaper
printed and distributed by the Washington STAR. Constructive notice is the equivalent of actual notice.
In the District of Columbia, publication of a newspaper advertisement is the usual and customary method of giving notice of a foreclosure sale. Such advertisement satisfies the statute
and the terms of the deed of trust which provided that the trustees have power
upon such default, and by request of the Association [Home Federal] to sell said realty, or any part thereof, at public auction in such manner, at such time and place, upon such terms and conditions, and
after such previous advertisement as the said trustees may deem best for the interests of all concerned
....
It would have been better if the owner had actually received the additional personal notice that was properly mailed to 5 & G, but the failure of S & G to receive it was due partly to its own dereliction and not entirely to Home Federal or to the trustees. Home Federal literally complied with the statutory requirements when it mailed the required letter and notice. In full compliance with the statute, the letter was sent to the
last known address,
correctly addressed to S 6 G care of Mike Golob Association, Inc.
The address is in nearby Maryland and the statute required that the notice be mailed to the address indicated on the envelope. The letter was mailed on October 27, a Monday. This was in sufficient time to have been delivered before Saturday, November 1. S & G moved on November 1. However, the letter was returned stamped “Unclaimed” and a date of “November 14, 1969” was also stamped on the envelope. Also written on the face of the envelope was “NC 10/29/6 3192 Whiting.” This notation was not explained.
The reason for the return of the letter is otherwise unexplained and we need not speculate on the reasons since the letter was properly mailed to the proper address as the statute required. S & G had received two prior' letters at the same address, the latest on August 1, 1969, calling attention to its delinquency in payments, and S & G had not notified Home Federal of any change of address.
The claim now by S & G that the noteholder (Home Federal) and the trustees were somehow deficient in their duties by not being successful in bringing personal notice to S & G overlooks certain facts. First, S & G never notified Home Federal or the trustee of its change of address. Second, S & G was in serious default in its payments, was in the real estate investment business itself and knew that foreclosure was the ordinary consequence of such default. Third, S & G also was on notice that the statute required the lender to send notice of foreclosure to it at its last known address.
It must be recognized that D.C. Code § 45-615 (b) requires the
noteholder
to mail notice of the sale to the owner at his last known address. Such notice was mailed. Appellants contend that, in addition, the
trustees
must at a minimum satisfy themselves that
actual
notice was given or that reasonable steps were taken to give personal notice. Such would be an erroneous interpretation of the statute and of District law as it would require both the trustees and the noteholder to be responsible for giving such notice. To require both parties to see that notice is given is an absurd
interpretation of the law and it is clear that section 615(b) does not require it. The fact that the statute was enacted at all indicates that Congress considered that prior thereto there was no obligation on any person in the District of Columbia to give personal notice to the owner, much less to junior lienors. Congress would not have enacted a statute to require noteholders to give notice to owners if trustees were already required to give notice.
As to the interpretation of the statute, it was brought out at the congressional hearings preceding its enactment into law in 1968 that:
Under present practice [in the District of Columbia] a deed of trust may be foreclosed by the trustees without any prior notice to the unwary homeowner.
Senate hearings, p. 41.
Congress then proceeded to consider the foreclosure procedures in the District of Columbia and after evaluating various proposals it enacted D.C.Code § 45-615(b)
which required only that the noteholder should mail notice to the owner and to the Commissioner of the District. No other personal notice to the owner or any subordinate lienor was required. Congress knew from the testimony at the hearings that the prior law did not require personal notice to the owner, and junior lienors would be even less entitled to such notice. Thus, to accede to appellants’ contentions would completely change the law in the District of Columbia. Even if most creditors do give personal notice to defaulting debtors, and even to junior lien-ors in some instances, the validity of the foreclosure and the title conveyed does not depend upon such additional notice. For a great many years in the District of Columbia, the foreclosure of deeds of trust under the power of sale therein has been based upon publicly published advertisement. To now change the law could be upsetting to many titles to real property.
Of course, there are wide variations in the foreclosure laws of the various states, but in the absence of a specific contractual or statutory directive, it is not generally required that a creditor give
personal
notice to a defaulting debtor prior to foreclosure,
or to the holder of a second trust.
Foreclosure jurisdiction in such cases usually rests on due and proper public advertisement. The statute here requires the noteholder to mail notice to the owner. For the court also to rule, in effect, that both
the noteholder and the trustees must be responsible for notice to the owner, to use appellants’ phrase, “would stand the statute on its end.” There is absolutely no reason why the trustees were not perfectly entitled to rely upon the fact that Home Federal would comply with the statute, as it did, by mailing “written notice, by certified mail return receipt requested, of said sale to the owner of the real property encumbered by said deed of trust ... at his last known address, with a copy of said notice being sent to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia ... at least 30 days in advance of the date of said sale.” D.C.Code § 45-615(b).
Appellants’ arguments also overlook the fact that as a practical matter the statutes in the District of Columbia provide that in “actions for foreclosure of . deeds of trust”
publication may be substituted for personal service of process upon nonresidents.
D.C.Code § 13-336.
Maryland, from which comes much of our jurisprudence in such matters, recognized such constructive notice as far back as 1794. 2 Laws of Maryland (1800) (Kitty), November, 1794, ch. LX, See. IX. S & G was a Maryland corporation, at all times had its corporate residence in Maryland and thus was a nonresident of the District of Columbia. So as a matter of practical equity, S & G not only was mailed the notice required by the statute, in the manner required by the statute, but also received by publication the full constructive notice of the foreclosure sale that the statute provided for it as a nonresident.
Appellants suggest that Home Federal or the trustees should have given notice by telephone. This is a novel suggestion in property law — to foreclose mortgages by telephone notice. It is submitted that the trustees were entitled to rely upon what is more usual — service by
mailing
and by publication, which satisfied the statute, the law and the terms of the deed of trust.
II
The real burr in appellants’ contentions is their argument that the trustees were required to give personal notice to junior lienholders of the impending foreclosure sale. In this respect their theory is that a contrary construction of the trustees’ obligation would conflict with the recognized duty of a trustee to secure the highest price reasonably obtainable at sale. In support of such contention, appellants urge us to speculate that had the holders of the second trust been notified, “it is likely” that some additional funds would have been available to apply on the second trust. However, since appellees complied with the law, the terms of the trust deed and the statute, it is not open to us to require additional conduct and speculate as to what the results might have been. The force of appellants’ argument is for us to change the law.
However the law is well stated that:
The person selling [trustee] is not, when the sale is otherwise regular, required to make any personal effort to procure the attendance of bidders.
. , It is sufficient if the public
has been fully advised of the sale by legal publication of notice, and has the right and opportunity to attend and bid.
55 Am.Jur.2d Mortgages § 730 at pp. 662-63, citing Harlin v. Nation, 126 Mo. 97, 27 S.W. 330 (1893). As for the requirement that junior lienors must be served with notice of foreclosure sale of their security, that is not the law.
Glenn on Mortgages discusses whether “junior encumbrancers” should be given the same personal notice as the mortgagor when the first lien is foreclosed. He favors such practice—
But the rule is otherwise under the cases.
They clearly hold that the mortgagee need not give notice of sale to junior lienors or subsequent grantees, unless he is required so to do by the terms of the power or by statute. The mortgagee is under no duty to notify such a party; on the contrary, it is the latter’s business to keep informed as to what is going on with respect to the senior lien.
1 Glenn on Mortgages § 110.1 (1943) (emphasis added).
We thus adhere to the existing law in the District of Columbia and elsewhere that does not generally, except when obligated to do so by the statute, require notice to second lienors when the first lien is foreclosed by advertisement under a power of sale in a deed or mortgage.
It is also plain that when Congress enacted D.C.Code § 45-615(b), it rejected any requirement that holders of second deeds of trust be given personal notice. This was not an idle decision. Congress had before it in the 1968 Senate hearings on S. 2592 the whole panoply of abuses in the foreclosure of deeds of trust in the District of Columbia and it found that serious and flagrant abuses existed in foreclosures by holders of second deeds of trust (and third, etc.). They found no abuses in the foreclosure of first liens. The hearings disclosed that many second (and third, etc.) deeds of trust were given for merchandise purchases and home improvements in which the home owners were defrauded or were charged highly inflated prices. Leaving out the widespread instances where the junior liens were incurred as a result of high pressure salesmanship, fraud, misrepresentation, forgery, false completion certificates, shoddy work and inferior materials that were reflected in the Senate hearings, Congress also received testimony that in addition it was practically the uniform practice for the note and second deed of trust to be transferred
quickly
from the original contractor or vendor to a broker shortly after the transaction, then to be sold and assigned or transferred by him to a foreign or domestic financial institution and finally to end up in some subsidiary
corporation. In some instances the note may be sold with recourse and in others without recourse, and the nature and incidence of the transfer were determinative of the identity of the second lienor. Numerous transfers make it difficult to locate and determine the true owner of the second trust, or third, etc. If personal notice were required to be given to junior lienors, we would be imposing on the holder of the prior encumbrance what in many instances would be a difficult burden.
Congress, when it reviewed the subject in 1968, decided not to impose any such requirement. To change the long established law by court decision could be upsetting to existing legal titles. The suggestion that the law be changed or modified to require that notice be given to junior lienors is such a sufficient departure from existing law and practice that it should not be done except by Congress or by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as the authoritative expositor of local law in the District of Columbia.
Also, if holders of second deeds of trust were required to be notified, on the speculation that a higher price might result, the same logic would require trustees to notify those holding third deeds of trust, fourth deeds of trust, attaching creditors, mechanics lienholders, those with leasehold interests in the property, occupants of the property and owners of contiguous property. Where would the line be drawn? Speculatively, every one of such parties, under proper circumstances, might have an incentive to bid. And if we are going to speculate whether a trustee might have obtained a higher price by notifying any of such persons, will trustees next be required to hire a real estate agent to seek purchases from the general public, or to run an attractive picture of the property in the paper, or to paint the house, or repair it, or change the date of sale to what is alleged to be a more propitious time? Will it be proper to give notice to such people by telephone as appellants suggest should have been done here to the holder of the second lien? What if the creditor’s telephone call is not completed? What if he mistakenly dialed the wrong number? When legal titles to valuable property rights depend upon whether a person could prove that he dialed a correct telephone number in attempting to give notice to a subsequent lienor, property interests will hang by a narrow thread and title insurance costs will skyrocket, or the exceptions in title opinions will as a practical matter render them valueless against particular types of claims. In either event the necessitous borrower will be ill-served — either by higher costs or by less protection. Moreover, if we impose upon trustees the uncertain standards which appellants advocate, foreclosed home owners will suffer since prices received at foreclosure sales will be reduced to reflect the greater hazard to titles.
What appellants overlook is that deeds of trust in the District of Columbia are foreclosed in conformance with statute and recognized practice on the basis of
mailed
and
published
notice to the owner, that both such requirements were complied with and that the law here does not, under these circumstances, requise personal notice to holders of second deeds of trust. Long established rules affecting property rights should not be changed so precipitously, or in the manner appellants suggest, particularly after Congress refused to make such a change.
Ill
The circumstances as to the deficiency in price here are not such as to bring the case under our decisions which support setting aside a foreclosure sale because of the inadequacy of the price.
Justice Stephens in Jackson v. Fuller, 66 App.D.C. 239, 85 F.2d 816 (1936) con
sidered a case where the price received at the foreclosure sale was approximately 50% of the asserted assessed value of the property and about 38% of the asserted actual value. On such facts his opinion stated:
We cannot set aside a foreclosure sale on the basis of inadequacy of price alone, unless the inadequacy is such “as to shock the conscience and of itself suggest fraud or misconduct . .” [Citing cases] Neither percentage [50% or 38 %] can be held in respect of a forced sale shockingly inadequate. [W]here courts have held a sale price so low as to shock the conscience of the court, the discrepancy between the sale price and the value of the property has in most instances been much greater than in the instant case
66 App.D.C. at 241-242, 85 F.2d at 818-819. Appellants’ failure to base their claims on any shocking inadequacy in the foreclosure sale price is thus significant as indicating a deficiency in their cause of action. Monies advanced after the first deed of trust were used to remodel, restore and repair the premises that were in very poor condition. The extent of the work required, taken in conjunction with the relatively modest increase in market value, convinces us that this record does not make a showing of gross inequity that shocks the conscience.
IY
Appellants also contend that the trustees failed properly to apply the proceeds of the foreclosure sale because the monies they received were applied as if the entire principal indebtedness evidenced by the note secured by the first trust deed had been accelerated (Appellants’ Brief 43-51). In other words, appellants’ claim that payment of the entire unpaid principal amount of the note was not accelerated and that instead of applying the entire $8,025 received at the foreclosure sale to the satisfaction of the first lien, the trustees should have paid only $355.76 (three months’ delinquency) to the first trust holder (Appellants’ Brief, 50). If such construction were placed on the foreclosure, the holder of the first deed would give up about 96% of the security for his loan in return for payment of about 4%. His loan thereafter would be totally unsecured.
Appellants refer to the provision of the note which provides that in the
event of default in any monthly installment payment, “then the whole of the unpaid balance of the indebtedness and any advances, plus interest, and other charges aforesaid, shall immediately become due and payable, at the option of said Association [Home Federal].” The deed of trust also provides “the Association [Home Federal] shall have the right to declare the entire remaining indebtedness . . . immediately due and payable.” On the strength of these provisions appellants contend that Home Federal did not properly accelerate the entire unpaid principal. However, there is a further provision in the deed of trust, which deals more specifically with distributing the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. It provides:
[U]pon compliance by the purchaser with the terms of sale, [the trustees are directed] to convey said property in fee simple and without liability of any purchaser to see to the application of purchase money, and
from the proceeds of sale to pay
the expenses thereof, including an auctioneer’s allowance, and a commission of five per-centum to the trustees, the expenses, if any, of correcting any irregularity which may appear in the title, counsel fees or other costs expended in and about the protection or execution of this trust including expense of obtaining possession, all money advanced for costs and expenses, or taxes or assessments, or insurance with interest thereon, and all taxes, general and special assessments due upon said land and premises at the time of sale, all other charges, advances, loans, expenses and fees herein provided for, then
the whole amount then remaining unpaid of the principal of the said note, whether the same shall be due or not,
and interest thereon to date of payment,
it being agreed that said note shall, upon sale being made before the maturity of said note, be and become immediately payable at the election of the Association,
and any net surplus to the borrower, or his heirs or assigns, upon surrender and delivery to the purchaser or purchasers, his or their heirs or assigns, possession of the aforesaid premises so sold and conveyed.
Additionally, we note that the letter which Home Federal sent to S & G by “certified mail, return receipt requested”
stated that it had “initiated foreclosure action as evidenced by the enclosed notice” and that appellant was facing the “ultimate loss of [its] property.” Considering the value of the property, these remarks are some indication that upwards of $8,000 was being demanded and not $355. More importantly, however, enclosed with the letter of October 27, 1969, was a copy of the notice filed with the Recorder of Deeds on that date, as required by Public Law 90-566 (D.C.Code § 45-615). This was addressed to S & G and,
inter alia,
stated:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE DEBT SECURED BY THE DEED OF TRUST, MORTGAGE OR OTHER SECURITY INSTRUMENT INDICATED BELOW THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED BELOW WILL BE SOLD AT A FORECLOSURE SALE TO BE HELD ON OR AFTER DECEMBER 1, 1969. ******
Balance owed on the note: $7,510.46. This clearly indicated that the “Holder of the note: Home Federal Savings and Loan,” was foreclosing “To Satisfy the [$7,510.46] Debt Secured by the Deed of Trust . . . .”
Thus, when we consider the terms of the note with respect to acceleration, the terms of the deed of trust directing the manner of distribution of the proceeds and the notice filed with the Recorder of Deeds, we conclude that the trustees properly applied the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. The commencement of an action for the principal
sum is sufficient in itself to show that the holder exercised its option to accelerate the payment of the principal,
and the proceedings to foreclose by advertisement are, for such purpose, the equivalent of an action to foreclose.
It is not necessary in this case to make a determination concerning appel-lees' alternative claim of laches.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment accordingly.