24CA2248 Ryman v Nuss 11-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2248 Montezuma County District Court No. 23CV30049 Honorable Todd Jay Plewe, Judge
Connie Ryman,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Matthew Alan Nuss,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025
Kelly and Fronapfel Law, PC, Jon L. Kelly, Christine M. Kelly, Dolores, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Matthew Alan Nuss, Pro Se ¶1 Connie Ryman appeals the district court’s judgment
partitioning the mobile home she owned with Matthew Alan Nuss.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Ryman and Nuss co-owned the mobile home. After they had a
falling out, Ryman filed a complaint for partition of the mobile
home, along with other claims not at issue in this appeal.
¶3 The court conducted a bench trial at which Ryman and Nuss
testified. They largely agreed on the facts. Ryman purchased the
mobile home for $28,908.01 (the purchase price). Nuss did not
contribute any money toward the purchase price. Ryman titled the
mobile home in her and Nuss’s names.
¶4 Nuss, but not Ryman, lived in the mobile home. The parties
had no agreement requiring Nuss to pay rent to Ryman. Nuss
testified that he maintained the mobile home, made improvements
to it, and paid for the utilities and rent for the lot.
¶5 In closing argument, Ryman’s counsel asked the court to
“issue an order that the [mobile home] be sold, the proceeds divided
first to reimburse the parties proportionately for their proven
investment in the property,” and “[i]f there’s anything left over, it
1 could get divided 50/50 between them.” Nuss, who represented
himself at trial, asked the court, among other things, to offset from
Ryman’s share the expenses that he incurred while maintaining the
mobile home and to allow him to buy Ryman’s interest in the mobile
home so he could continue living there.
¶6 After hearing the evidence, the court concluded that Ryman
“intended to gift a one-half . . . interest” in the mobile home to Nuss
and that “the parties own an equal interest in the mobile home.” In
support of these conclusions, the court found that Ryman and Nuss
were romantic partners when Ryman purchased the mobile home,
they intended to open a business together, Ryman never lived in the
mobile home, and Nuss exclusively possessed it. The court ruled
that, as “part owner[s],” neither party was entitled to a setoff for
maintenance or rent.
¶7 The court ordered Ryman to obtain an appraisal for the mobile
home and to grant Nuss a thirty-day option period to purchase her
half of the appraised value. The court ruled that, if Nuss did not
pay Ryman half of the appraised value within thirty days, Ryman
“shall proceed to immediately sell the mobile home” and “[a]ll net
2 proceeds from the sale . . . shall be divided equally between the
parties.”
¶8 The mobile home appraised at $34,000.00 (the appraised
value), reflecting that its value had appreciated by $5,091.99 (the
appreciation) since Ryman purchased it. Ryman filed this appeal
after submitting the appraisal to the court. (Nuss claims that he
obtained a loan to purchase Ryman’s half of the appraised value
but that Ryman “refused the payment and filed this appeal.”)
II. Analysis
¶9 Ryman asserts two errors on appeal.
¶ 10 First, Ryman contends that the court erred as a matter of law
by not awarding her the entire amount of the appreciation. She
asserts that the court misapplied the law when it determined that
her contribution toward the purchase price was a gift to Nuss
because neither party believed the “purchase of the mobile home
was a gift.” But Ryman concedes that the district court correctly
concluded that she and Nuss were equal one-half owners of the
mobile home — the very conclusion of law that the court’s gift
finding supported.
3 ¶ 11 Ryman appears to argue that, based on the court’s finding
that her contribution of the purchase price was a gift to Nuss, it
erroneously equally divided the appreciation instead of awarding it
all to her. She claims that the court should have found that she
was “entitled to an offset for the increase in property value due to
her investment” in the mobile home. (Because Ryman makes no
effort to explain the connection between the court’s gift finding and
its division of the appreciation, Ryman’s challenge to the court’s gift
finding is undeveloped and we therefore do not consider it. See
Grand Junction Peace Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024
COA 89, ¶ 28, 558 P.3d 1021, 1031 (declining to consider
“undeveloped, bald assertion”). For the same reason, we do not
address the merits of Ryman’s conclusory argument that the court
erred by finding that Ryman’s contribution of the mobile home’s
purchase price was a gift to Nuss.)
¶ 12 Second, Ryman contends that, even if the court did not err as
a matter of law by awarding her only half of the appreciation, it
abused its discretion by “failing to offset [Ryman]’s contribution to
the property to her share of the assessed property value.”
4 ¶ 13 She asserts that, by furnishing the purchase price, she put the
parties in a position to benefit from the increase in the mobile
home’s value. Thus, her argument continues, the court should
have “divided [the appraised value] equally” between Ryman and
Nuss and then “offset the amount owing against the one-half share
held by each tenant.” As we understand Ryman’s argument, she
contends that, in addition to awarding her half of the appraised
value of the mobile home ($17,000.00), the court should also have
awarded her the appreciation ($5,091.99) minus the amount that
Nuss spent on improvements to the mobile home ($850.00), for a
total award of $21,241.99.
¶ 14 We conclude that Ryman’s arguments fail because she either
waived or failed to preserve them.
A. Waiver
¶ 15 “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or
privilege.” Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo.
1984). A waiver can be express or implied, “as, for example, when a
party engages in conduct which manifests an intent to relinquish
the right or privilege, or acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Id.
5 ¶ 16 At trial, Ryman’s counsel twice told the court that Ryman
sought to recover the purchase price and that any excess above the
purchase price could be divided between Ryman and Nuss equally.
The court ultimately divided the appreciation equally between the
parties, as Ryman’s counsel requested.
¶ 17 But on appeal, Ryman contends that, although the court
correctly concluded that she and Nuss were equal one-half owners
of the mobile home, the court erred by dividing the appreciation
equally between the parties. We conclude that Ryman waived this
contention because she made the opposite argument in the district
court. Thus, any error is not reviewable. See In re Estate of Musso,
932 P.2d 853, 857-58 (Colo.
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24CA2248 Ryman v Nuss 11-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2248 Montezuma County District Court No. 23CV30049 Honorable Todd Jay Plewe, Judge
Connie Ryman,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Matthew Alan Nuss,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025
Kelly and Fronapfel Law, PC, Jon L. Kelly, Christine M. Kelly, Dolores, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Matthew Alan Nuss, Pro Se ¶1 Connie Ryman appeals the district court’s judgment
partitioning the mobile home she owned with Matthew Alan Nuss.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Ryman and Nuss co-owned the mobile home. After they had a
falling out, Ryman filed a complaint for partition of the mobile
home, along with other claims not at issue in this appeal.
¶3 The court conducted a bench trial at which Ryman and Nuss
testified. They largely agreed on the facts. Ryman purchased the
mobile home for $28,908.01 (the purchase price). Nuss did not
contribute any money toward the purchase price. Ryman titled the
mobile home in her and Nuss’s names.
¶4 Nuss, but not Ryman, lived in the mobile home. The parties
had no agreement requiring Nuss to pay rent to Ryman. Nuss
testified that he maintained the mobile home, made improvements
to it, and paid for the utilities and rent for the lot.
¶5 In closing argument, Ryman’s counsel asked the court to
“issue an order that the [mobile home] be sold, the proceeds divided
first to reimburse the parties proportionately for their proven
investment in the property,” and “[i]f there’s anything left over, it
1 could get divided 50/50 between them.” Nuss, who represented
himself at trial, asked the court, among other things, to offset from
Ryman’s share the expenses that he incurred while maintaining the
mobile home and to allow him to buy Ryman’s interest in the mobile
home so he could continue living there.
¶6 After hearing the evidence, the court concluded that Ryman
“intended to gift a one-half . . . interest” in the mobile home to Nuss
and that “the parties own an equal interest in the mobile home.” In
support of these conclusions, the court found that Ryman and Nuss
were romantic partners when Ryman purchased the mobile home,
they intended to open a business together, Ryman never lived in the
mobile home, and Nuss exclusively possessed it. The court ruled
that, as “part owner[s],” neither party was entitled to a setoff for
maintenance or rent.
¶7 The court ordered Ryman to obtain an appraisal for the mobile
home and to grant Nuss a thirty-day option period to purchase her
half of the appraised value. The court ruled that, if Nuss did not
pay Ryman half of the appraised value within thirty days, Ryman
“shall proceed to immediately sell the mobile home” and “[a]ll net
2 proceeds from the sale . . . shall be divided equally between the
parties.”
¶8 The mobile home appraised at $34,000.00 (the appraised
value), reflecting that its value had appreciated by $5,091.99 (the
appreciation) since Ryman purchased it. Ryman filed this appeal
after submitting the appraisal to the court. (Nuss claims that he
obtained a loan to purchase Ryman’s half of the appraised value
but that Ryman “refused the payment and filed this appeal.”)
II. Analysis
¶9 Ryman asserts two errors on appeal.
¶ 10 First, Ryman contends that the court erred as a matter of law
by not awarding her the entire amount of the appreciation. She
asserts that the court misapplied the law when it determined that
her contribution toward the purchase price was a gift to Nuss
because neither party believed the “purchase of the mobile home
was a gift.” But Ryman concedes that the district court correctly
concluded that she and Nuss were equal one-half owners of the
mobile home — the very conclusion of law that the court’s gift
finding supported.
3 ¶ 11 Ryman appears to argue that, based on the court’s finding
that her contribution of the purchase price was a gift to Nuss, it
erroneously equally divided the appreciation instead of awarding it
all to her. She claims that the court should have found that she
was “entitled to an offset for the increase in property value due to
her investment” in the mobile home. (Because Ryman makes no
effort to explain the connection between the court’s gift finding and
its division of the appreciation, Ryman’s challenge to the court’s gift
finding is undeveloped and we therefore do not consider it. See
Grand Junction Peace Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024
COA 89, ¶ 28, 558 P.3d 1021, 1031 (declining to consider
“undeveloped, bald assertion”). For the same reason, we do not
address the merits of Ryman’s conclusory argument that the court
erred by finding that Ryman’s contribution of the mobile home’s
purchase price was a gift to Nuss.)
¶ 12 Second, Ryman contends that, even if the court did not err as
a matter of law by awarding her only half of the appreciation, it
abused its discretion by “failing to offset [Ryman]’s contribution to
the property to her share of the assessed property value.”
4 ¶ 13 She asserts that, by furnishing the purchase price, she put the
parties in a position to benefit from the increase in the mobile
home’s value. Thus, her argument continues, the court should
have “divided [the appraised value] equally” between Ryman and
Nuss and then “offset the amount owing against the one-half share
held by each tenant.” As we understand Ryman’s argument, she
contends that, in addition to awarding her half of the appraised
value of the mobile home ($17,000.00), the court should also have
awarded her the appreciation ($5,091.99) minus the amount that
Nuss spent on improvements to the mobile home ($850.00), for a
total award of $21,241.99.
¶ 14 We conclude that Ryman’s arguments fail because she either
waived or failed to preserve them.
A. Waiver
¶ 15 “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or
privilege.” Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo.
1984). A waiver can be express or implied, “as, for example, when a
party engages in conduct which manifests an intent to relinquish
the right or privilege, or acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Id.
5 ¶ 16 At trial, Ryman’s counsel twice told the court that Ryman
sought to recover the purchase price and that any excess above the
purchase price could be divided between Ryman and Nuss equally.
The court ultimately divided the appreciation equally between the
parties, as Ryman’s counsel requested.
¶ 17 But on appeal, Ryman contends that, although the court
correctly concluded that she and Nuss were equal one-half owners
of the mobile home, the court erred by dividing the appreciation
equally between the parties. We conclude that Ryman waived this
contention because she made the opposite argument in the district
court. Thus, any error is not reviewable. See In re Estate of Musso,
932 P.2d 853, 857-58 (Colo. App. 1997) (explaining that a waiver
extinguishes error and appellate review).
B. Preservation
¶ 18 Even assuming that Ryman did not waive her appellate
arguments, she failed to preserve them.
¶ 19 To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must bring the issue
to the court’s attention so the court has an opportunity to rule on
it. See Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo.
App. 2010); see also Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019
6 COA 11, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 597, 600 (“It is axiomatic that in civil cases,
issues not raised in or decided by the trial court generally will not
be addressed for the first time on appeal.”).
¶ 20 Ryman never requested, in the alternative or otherwise, that
the court award Ryman one-half of the assessed value of the mobile
home plus the entire amount of the appreciation minus Nuss’s
“invest[ment] in repairing” the mobile home.
¶ 21 We are not persuaded by Ryman’s arguments to the contrary.
In her opening brief, Ryman claims that she preserved her
arguments by requesting (1) “the partition and sale of the mobile
home” and (2) “that she be reimbursed for the purchase of the home
from the sale.” However, neither of Ryman’s requests alerted the
district court to the relief she seeks on appeal. See Est. of
Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718, 721 n.5
(Colo. 1992) (“Arguments never presented to, considered or ruled
upon by a trial court may not be raised for the first time on
appeal.”).
¶ 22 For these reasons, Ryman’s assertions are unavailing.
III. Disposition
¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.
7 JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.