IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ALEX RYLE, § § Defendant Below, § No. 470, 2019 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1404000692 (N) § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: March 13, 2020 Decided: May 5, 2020
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
ORDER
(1) The appellant, Alex Ryle, has appealed the Superior Court’s denial of
his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the
Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) The record reflects that in February 2015 a Superior Court jury found
Ryle guilty of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and other weapons
offenses. After his conviction, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion to
declare Ryle an habitual offender and sentenced him to a total of twenty-three years of imprisonment, followed by decreasing levels of supervision. This Court affirmed
on direct appeal.1
(3) Ryle initially had been represented by court-appointed counsel (“initial
counsel”). After his initial counsel declined to file motions that Ryle wanted to
pursue, Ryle moved to dismiss his counsel and for the appointment of new counsel,
and his initial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. A Superior Court Commissioner
held a colloquy with Ryle and allowed counsel to withdraw; Ryle then proceeded
pro se, including at trial. His request for the appointment of counsel for sentencing
was granted, and initial counsel represented him at sentencing. Different counsel
(“appellate counsel”) represented him on appeal.
(4) In August 2017, Ryle filed a timely first motion for postconviction
relief and a motion for appointment of counsel. The Superior Court appointed
counsel to represent Ryle in the postconviction proceedings. Postconviction counsel
ultimately moved to withdraw under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7). After
receiving briefing from Ryle and the State and affidavits from initial and appellate
counsel, a Superior Court Commissioner issued a report recommending that the
court deny Ryle’s motion for postconviction relief and grant postconviction
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Ryle filed objections to the Commissioner’s report.
On October 21, 2019, the Superior Court entered an order accepting the
1 Ryle v. State, 2016 WL 5929952 (Del. Oct. 11, 2016).
2 Commissioner’s report, denying the motion for postconviction relief, and granting
postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw. Ryle has appealed to this Court.
(5) Ryle makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the
procedural bars that are set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 are
unconstitutional. Second, he contends that his appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to argue on appeal that the Superior Court should have
suppressed the firearm and Ryle’s statement to police as a sanction for alleged
discovery violations committed by the State.
(6) Ryle’s argument that the procedural bars that are set forth in Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61 are unconstitutional does not provide a basis for relief. The
Superior Court did not hold that Ryle’s claims were procedurally barred—rather, it
considered them on the merits. The procedural bars therefore had no bearing on the
outcome of Ryle’s motion postconviction for relief, and no further consideration of
this argument is necessary.
(7) Ryle’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective also does not
warrant relief. Ryle argues that his appellate counsel failed to argue on appeal that
the Superior Court should have sanctioned a “discovery violation” committed by the
State. Ryle does not explain the context underlying his argument, but it appears to
relate to a motion that he made, after jury selection and when trial was set to begin,
to suppress the firearm and his videorecorded statement to police. He sought
3 suppression based on the State’s purported failure to make a timely production of
those items to him in discovery.2 The Superior Court did not suppress the evidence,
but it did give other relief, such as ensuring that Ryle had an opportunity to inspect
the weapon before trial.3
(8) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.4 We review de novo constitutional claims, including claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.5 In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.6 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.7 A
defendant must also make concrete allegations of actual prejudice to substantiate a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.8
2 See State v. Ryle, 2015 WL 5004903, at *3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying motion for new trial and describing motion to exclude evidence and the court’s rulings). 3 Id. at *4. 4 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 5 Id. 6 Harris v. State, 2018 WL 3239905, at *2 (Del. July 2, 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 7 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
4 (9) The Strickland framework also applies when evaluating the
effectiveness of appellate counsel.9 To establish that the representation provided by
appellate counsel was unreasonable, a defendant must show that counsel failed to
find arguable, nonfrivolous issues to appeal and to file a brief raising them.10
Appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select the
arguments that maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.11 Therefore, when
appellate counsel files a merits brief raising issues for consideration on appeal, a
defendant who argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an argument
on appeal must show that the argument that was not presented was “clearly stronger”
than the arguments that were presented.12
(10) Ryle has demonstrated neither that his appellate counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness nor actual
prejudice. First, he has not demonstrated prejudice because the Superior Court found
that no discovery violation occurred,13 and Ryle has not established otherwise.
9 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013). 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. (quotations omitted). 13 See State v. Ryle, 2019 WL 5306847, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2019) (“[T]he Court found no discovery violation occurred. Thus, appellate counsel wasn't unreasonable when he fully examined the record and found no basis to raise any discovery issues on appeal.” (footnotes omitted)).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ALEX RYLE, § § Defendant Below, § No. 470, 2019 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1404000692 (N) § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: March 13, 2020 Decided: May 5, 2020
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
ORDER
(1) The appellant, Alex Ryle, has appealed the Superior Court’s denial of
his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the
Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) The record reflects that in February 2015 a Superior Court jury found
Ryle guilty of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and other weapons
offenses. After his conviction, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion to
declare Ryle an habitual offender and sentenced him to a total of twenty-three years of imprisonment, followed by decreasing levels of supervision. This Court affirmed
on direct appeal.1
(3) Ryle initially had been represented by court-appointed counsel (“initial
counsel”). After his initial counsel declined to file motions that Ryle wanted to
pursue, Ryle moved to dismiss his counsel and for the appointment of new counsel,
and his initial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. A Superior Court Commissioner
held a colloquy with Ryle and allowed counsel to withdraw; Ryle then proceeded
pro se, including at trial. His request for the appointment of counsel for sentencing
was granted, and initial counsel represented him at sentencing. Different counsel
(“appellate counsel”) represented him on appeal.
(4) In August 2017, Ryle filed a timely first motion for postconviction
relief and a motion for appointment of counsel. The Superior Court appointed
counsel to represent Ryle in the postconviction proceedings. Postconviction counsel
ultimately moved to withdraw under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7). After
receiving briefing from Ryle and the State and affidavits from initial and appellate
counsel, a Superior Court Commissioner issued a report recommending that the
court deny Ryle’s motion for postconviction relief and grant postconviction
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Ryle filed objections to the Commissioner’s report.
On October 21, 2019, the Superior Court entered an order accepting the
1 Ryle v. State, 2016 WL 5929952 (Del. Oct. 11, 2016).
2 Commissioner’s report, denying the motion for postconviction relief, and granting
postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw. Ryle has appealed to this Court.
(5) Ryle makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the
procedural bars that are set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 are
unconstitutional. Second, he contends that his appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to argue on appeal that the Superior Court should have
suppressed the firearm and Ryle’s statement to police as a sanction for alleged
discovery violations committed by the State.
(6) Ryle’s argument that the procedural bars that are set forth in Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61 are unconstitutional does not provide a basis for relief. The
Superior Court did not hold that Ryle’s claims were procedurally barred—rather, it
considered them on the merits. The procedural bars therefore had no bearing on the
outcome of Ryle’s motion postconviction for relief, and no further consideration of
this argument is necessary.
(7) Ryle’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective also does not
warrant relief. Ryle argues that his appellate counsel failed to argue on appeal that
the Superior Court should have sanctioned a “discovery violation” committed by the
State. Ryle does not explain the context underlying his argument, but it appears to
relate to a motion that he made, after jury selection and when trial was set to begin,
to suppress the firearm and his videorecorded statement to police. He sought
3 suppression based on the State’s purported failure to make a timely production of
those items to him in discovery.2 The Superior Court did not suppress the evidence,
but it did give other relief, such as ensuring that Ryle had an opportunity to inspect
the weapon before trial.3
(8) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.4 We review de novo constitutional claims, including claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.5 In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.6 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.7 A
defendant must also make concrete allegations of actual prejudice to substantiate a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.8
2 See State v. Ryle, 2015 WL 5004903, at *3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying motion for new trial and describing motion to exclude evidence and the court’s rulings). 3 Id. at *4. 4 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 5 Id. 6 Harris v. State, 2018 WL 3239905, at *2 (Del. July 2, 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 7 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
4 (9) The Strickland framework also applies when evaluating the
effectiveness of appellate counsel.9 To establish that the representation provided by
appellate counsel was unreasonable, a defendant must show that counsel failed to
find arguable, nonfrivolous issues to appeal and to file a brief raising them.10
Appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select the
arguments that maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.11 Therefore, when
appellate counsel files a merits brief raising issues for consideration on appeal, a
defendant who argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an argument
on appeal must show that the argument that was not presented was “clearly stronger”
than the arguments that were presented.12
(10) Ryle has demonstrated neither that his appellate counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness nor actual
prejudice. First, he has not demonstrated prejudice because the Superior Court found
that no discovery violation occurred,13 and Ryle has not established otherwise.
9 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013). 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. (quotations omitted). 13 See State v. Ryle, 2019 WL 5306847, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2019) (“[T]he Court found no discovery violation occurred. Thus, appellate counsel wasn't unreasonable when he fully examined the record and found no basis to raise any discovery issues on appeal.” (footnotes omitted)). See also See Ryle, 2015 WL 5004903, at *3-4 (indicating that Ryle did not properly request the items he sought and stating that “[e]ven if Mr. Ryle had made a proper discovery request and the State had failed to timely disclose discoverable materials, the Court had broad discretion in remedying such,” and “exclusion of evidence is certainly not the only cure, even when an actual discovery violation occurs” (footnote omitted)).
5 Moreover, even if he had established a discovery violation, this Court reviews for
abuse of discretion the sanction imposed by a trial court for a discovery violation,
and will reverse the trial court’s decision only if it was clearly erroneous.14 For these
reasons, Ryle has not shown that the outcome of the appeal likely would have been
different if appellate counsel had raised the discovery sanction issue on appeal. For
similar reasons, this issue was not “clearly stronger” than the arguments that
appellate counsel presented on appeal, which earned oral argument.15 Ryle therefore
also has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice
14 Cabrera v. State, 840 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. 2004). 15 See Docket, Ryle v. State, 566, 2015 (Del.). See also Hudson v. State, 2020 WL 362784, at *7 (Del. Jan. 21, 2020) (“Here, appellate counsel presented the issue he thought had the most chance of success and gained oral argument on direct appeal. Hudson has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.”).