F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 30 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
BILLY G. RYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-7041 (D.C. No. 99-CV-65-P) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (E.D. Okla.) Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff Billy G. Ryle appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s determination that he is not entitled to Social Security disability
benefits. After “closely examin[ing] the record as a whole to determine whether
the [Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence and adheres to
applicable legal standards,” Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 531 (10th Cir. 1995),
we affirm.
Mr. Ryle alleged disability as of November 16, 1993, due to osteoarthritis
in his right ankle, painful cysts in his wrist, back pain, attention deficit disorder,
and depression. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Ryle could
not return to his old job of meatcutter, but he could perform certain sedentary jobs
existing in significant numbers in the regional and national economy. Therefore,
the ALJ determined that Mr. Ryle was not disabled at step five of the evaluation
process. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)
(describing the five-step process). On appeal, Mr. Ryle argues that the record
lacks substantial evidence to support (1) the finding that his claimed impairment
did not meet or equal a listed impairment at step three; and (2) the evaluation of
his residual functional capacity (RFC) at step four.
Concerning the first issue, Mr. Ryle asserts that he is presumptively
disabled at step three of the evaluative process because his impairment meets
or equals the criteria of Listing 1.03, concerning “ [a]rthritis of a major
-2- weight-bearing joint (due to any cause) .” It is Mr. Ryle’s burden to show that he
meets the listing criteria. See Nielson v. Sullivan , 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir.
1993).
Listing 1.03 requires a “history of persistent joint pain and stiffness with
signs of marked limitation of motion or abnormal motion of the affected joint on
current physical examination,” along with more specific showings under
subsections 1.03A or B. Unquestionably, Mr. Ryle has met the threshold
showing. The issue is whether he meets or equals the subsection requirements.
Mr. Ryle first argues that he meets Listing 1.03B, which requires a showing
of “[r]econstructive surgery or surgical arthodesis of a major weight-bearing joint
and return to full weight-bearing status did not occur, or is not expected to occur,
within 12 months of onset.” Surgical arthodesis was performed on his ankle in
September 1996, approximately three years after the alleged onset date and one
month after the hearing before the ALJ. 1 Mr. Ryle contends he satisfied the
listing requirements because he did not have full weight-bearing status from his
alleged onset date through his arthodesis--a period of more than twelve months.
The Commissioner, however, asserts that the failure to achieve weight-bearing
status must follow, not precede, the surgical procedure.
1 Surgical arthodesis was also performed in 1980, after which Mr. Ryle returned to work for over a decade. This procedure is irrelevant to our analysis.
-3- This court “give[s] substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation and
application of its own regulations.” See S. Valley Health Care Ctr. v. Health Care
Fin. Admin. , 223 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000). “We will only reject an
agency’s interpretation if it is unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent
with the regulation’s plain meaning.” Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter , 994 F.2d 735,
738 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, we cannot say that the Commissioner’s interpretation
of Listing 1.03B is unreasonable. The listing’s reference to a “ return to full
weight-bearing status” demonstrates an intent to require a causal connection
between the surgical procedure and weight-bearing status. Listing 1.03B
(emphasis added). Accordingly, Mr. Ryle has failed to show that his impairment
meets Listing 1.03B.
Alternatively, Mr. Ryle asserts that his impairment is equal in severity to
Listing 1.03A. He claims that, except for the fact that his affected joint is an
ankle, he has shown the listing’s requirement of “[g]ross anatomical deformity
of hip or knee (e.g. subluxation, contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis,
instability) supported by X-ray evidence of either significant joint space
narrowing or significant bony destruction and markedly limiting ability to walk
and stand.” Listing 1.03A.
A showing that an impairment is medically equivalent to a listed
impairment must be based solely on medical evidence. See Kemp v. Bowen ,
-4- 816 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526). Here, there
is no such evidence demonstrating that Mr. Ryle’s problem with his ankle is
medically equivalent to a similar problem with a hip or knee. Mr. Ryle cannot
qualify for benefits at step three under an equivalence theory.
The ALJ performed an adequate analysis of Mr. Ryle’s claimed
impairments under the terms of the applicable listings. Accordingly, we conclude
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Ryle’s ankle
impairment does not meet or equal the requirements for presumptive disability.
Next, Mr. Ryle challenges the ALJ’s determination that he had the RFC to
perform sedentary jobs that do not require repetitive pushing or pulling of leg
controls with the right leg; repetitive overhead reaching; exposure to unprotected
heights; balancing; more than occasional stooping, crouching, bending, or
climbing stairs; or work that would not allow him to alternately sit or stand every
hour. He maintains that the ALJ’s RFC finding does not take into account his
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 30 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
BILLY G. RYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-7041 (D.C. No. 99-CV-65-P) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (E.D. Okla.) Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff Billy G. Ryle appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s determination that he is not entitled to Social Security disability
benefits. After “closely examin[ing] the record as a whole to determine whether
the [Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence and adheres to
applicable legal standards,” Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 531 (10th Cir. 1995),
we affirm.
Mr. Ryle alleged disability as of November 16, 1993, due to osteoarthritis
in his right ankle, painful cysts in his wrist, back pain, attention deficit disorder,
and depression. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Ryle could
not return to his old job of meatcutter, but he could perform certain sedentary jobs
existing in significant numbers in the regional and national economy. Therefore,
the ALJ determined that Mr. Ryle was not disabled at step five of the evaluation
process. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)
(describing the five-step process). On appeal, Mr. Ryle argues that the record
lacks substantial evidence to support (1) the finding that his claimed impairment
did not meet or equal a listed impairment at step three; and (2) the evaluation of
his residual functional capacity (RFC) at step four.
Concerning the first issue, Mr. Ryle asserts that he is presumptively
disabled at step three of the evaluative process because his impairment meets
or equals the criteria of Listing 1.03, concerning “ [a]rthritis of a major
-2- weight-bearing joint (due to any cause) .” It is Mr. Ryle’s burden to show that he
meets the listing criteria. See Nielson v. Sullivan , 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir.
1993).
Listing 1.03 requires a “history of persistent joint pain and stiffness with
signs of marked limitation of motion or abnormal motion of the affected joint on
current physical examination,” along with more specific showings under
subsections 1.03A or B. Unquestionably, Mr. Ryle has met the threshold
showing. The issue is whether he meets or equals the subsection requirements.
Mr. Ryle first argues that he meets Listing 1.03B, which requires a showing
of “[r]econstructive surgery or surgical arthodesis of a major weight-bearing joint
and return to full weight-bearing status did not occur, or is not expected to occur,
within 12 months of onset.” Surgical arthodesis was performed on his ankle in
September 1996, approximately three years after the alleged onset date and one
month after the hearing before the ALJ. 1 Mr. Ryle contends he satisfied the
listing requirements because he did not have full weight-bearing status from his
alleged onset date through his arthodesis--a period of more than twelve months.
The Commissioner, however, asserts that the failure to achieve weight-bearing
status must follow, not precede, the surgical procedure.
1 Surgical arthodesis was also performed in 1980, after which Mr. Ryle returned to work for over a decade. This procedure is irrelevant to our analysis.
-3- This court “give[s] substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation and
application of its own regulations.” See S. Valley Health Care Ctr. v. Health Care
Fin. Admin. , 223 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000). “We will only reject an
agency’s interpretation if it is unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent
with the regulation’s plain meaning.” Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter , 994 F.2d 735,
738 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, we cannot say that the Commissioner’s interpretation
of Listing 1.03B is unreasonable. The listing’s reference to a “ return to full
weight-bearing status” demonstrates an intent to require a causal connection
between the surgical procedure and weight-bearing status. Listing 1.03B
(emphasis added). Accordingly, Mr. Ryle has failed to show that his impairment
meets Listing 1.03B.
Alternatively, Mr. Ryle asserts that his impairment is equal in severity to
Listing 1.03A. He claims that, except for the fact that his affected joint is an
ankle, he has shown the listing’s requirement of “[g]ross anatomical deformity
of hip or knee (e.g. subluxation, contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis,
instability) supported by X-ray evidence of either significant joint space
narrowing or significant bony destruction and markedly limiting ability to walk
and stand.” Listing 1.03A.
A showing that an impairment is medically equivalent to a listed
impairment must be based solely on medical evidence. See Kemp v. Bowen ,
-4- 816 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526). Here, there
is no such evidence demonstrating that Mr. Ryle’s problem with his ankle is
medically equivalent to a similar problem with a hip or knee. Mr. Ryle cannot
qualify for benefits at step three under an equivalence theory.
The ALJ performed an adequate analysis of Mr. Ryle’s claimed
impairments under the terms of the applicable listings. Accordingly, we conclude
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Ryle’s ankle
impairment does not meet or equal the requirements for presumptive disability.
Next, Mr. Ryle challenges the ALJ’s determination that he had the RFC to
perform sedentary jobs that do not require repetitive pushing or pulling of leg
controls with the right leg; repetitive overhead reaching; exposure to unprotected
heights; balancing; more than occasional stooping, crouching, bending, or
climbing stairs; or work that would not allow him to alternately sit or stand every
hour. He maintains that the ALJ’s RFC finding does not take into account his
poor writing skills, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and mild dysthmic disorder
(depression). As we have explained,
the ALJ must assess the nature and extent of [the claimant’s] physical limitations and then determine [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis. If the ALJ concludes that the claimant cannot perform any of his past work with his remaining RFC, the ALJ bears the burden at step five to show that there are jobs in the regional or national economies that the claimant can perform with the limitations the ALJ has found him to have. It is not the claimant’s burden to produce or
-5- develop vocational evidence at step five. At step five, the burden is on the agency to show that claimant retains the RFC to perform work that exists in the national economy.
Haddock v. Apfel , 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations
omitted).
The record, however, demonstrates that the ALJ considered the evidence on
the claimed limitations. Concerning the claimed mental limitations, the ALJ
noted that Mr. Ryle’s IQ was within the average range of intellectual functioning,
and observed that Mr. Ryle had not sought treatment for depression or ADD since
December 1993. After evaluating the evidence, the ALJ determined that the
alleged limitations were mild and without effect on Mr. Ryle’s ability to perform
work-related activities.
Additionally, Mr. Ryle asserts that the RFC assessment failed to give
proper weight to his treating physician’s check-mark agreement to the statement
that his “use of hands for repetitive movement to include grasping [was] limited.”
R., Vol. II at 250. An ALJ is required to give substantial weight to a treating
physician’s opinion as long as “it is well supported by clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence
in the record.” Bean v. Chater , 77 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation
-6- Here, the ALJ discussed the medical evidence and testimony with regard to
Mr. Ryle’s wrist. The medical records uniformly describe degenerative changes,
cysts, and pain, but also document full range of motion, no swelling, and no
clinical evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome. The treating physician’s brief
notation is therefore inconsistent with the other evidence in the record.
Additionally, Mr. Ryle testified that, on a scale from one to ten, his wrist pain
was only a two. After properly evaluating and weighing the evidence, the ALJ
concluded that Mr. Ryle’s wrist problems were mild, and like his ADD and
depression, would not affect his performance of work-related activities.
Accordingly, Mr. Ryle’s further arguments, based on the vocational expert’s
responses to hypothetical questions involving a person limited to occasional
repetitive hand motion, are irrelevant to his disability determination.
Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment and his
determination that Mr. Ryle’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
-7-