Rybarczyk v. Weis

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rybarczyk v. Weis

264 A.D. 830, 35 N.Y.S.2d 740, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4890

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 20, 1942

StatusPublished

This text of 264 A.D. 830 (Rybarczyk v. Weis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rybarczyk v. Weis, 264 A.D. 830, 35 N.Y.S.2d 740, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4890 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1942).

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Opinion

Judgment affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. -All concur, except Crosby, P. J., who dissents and votes for reversal on the law and facts and for granting a new trial in the following memorandum: The referee improperly rejected the offer of evidence that the transfer which is sought to be set aside was made for the purpose of defrauding creditors. The referee’s theory seems to have been that, since the creditors were not asserting the fraudulent character of the transfer, the defendant could not assert it as a defense to this action. This theory is incorrect. (Pierce v. Pierce, 253 App. Div. 445; Simis v. Simis, 146 id. 655.) The third paragraph of the complaint supports the conclusion that plaintiff’s transfer was made for a fraudulent purpose. (The judgment declares null and void the deed by plaintiff conveying realty to defendant Weis.) Present — Crosby, P. J., Cunningham, Taylor, Harris and MeCurn, JJ.

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Judgment affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. -All concur, except Crosby, P. J., who dissents and votes for reversal on the law and facts and for granting a new trial in the following memorandum: The referee improperly rejected the offer of evidence that the transfer which is sought to be set aside was made for the purpose of defrauding creditors. The referee’s theory seems to have been that, since the creditors were not asserting the fraudulent character of the transfer, the defendant could not assert it as a defense to this action. This theory is incorrect. (Pierce v. Pierce, 253 App. Div. 445; Simis v. Simis, 146 id. 655.) The third paragraph of the complaint supports the conclusion that plaintiff’s transfer was made for a fraudulent purpose. (The judgment declares null and void the deed by plaintiff conveying realty to defendant Weis.) Present — Crosby, P. J., Cunningham, Taylor, Harris and MeCurn, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

264 A.D. 830, 35 N.Y.S.2d 740, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4890, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rybarczyk-v-weis-nyappdiv-1942.

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