Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 28 2014, 9:15 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PATRICIA CARESS MCMATH GREGORY F. ZOELLER Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana LARRY D. ALLEN Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RYAN WORLINE, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1312-CR-1041 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, Judge Cause No. 49G04-1303-MR-020499
August 28, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK, Senior Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 Ryan Worline appeals from his conviction and sentence for Murder, contending
that there were evidentiary errors necessitating a reversal of his conviction, and that
sentencing errors were made. We affirm.
ISSUES
Worline presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of bad character.
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding aggravating circumstances not supported by the evidence.
III. Whether Worline’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2012, Worline lived with his girlfriend, Chelsea Taylor, her thirteen-
month-old son, Jayden, and Worline’s almost two-year-old daughter, A.W., from a
previous relationship, at the Lakeshore Apartments. On January 17, 2012, Jayden’s father,
Jerraco Noel, met Taylor and Jayden at the clubhouse of the apartment complex for a
regularly scheduled visit shortly after 10:00 a.m. Noel noticed that Jayden seemed sick
and appeared to be tired. He observed no visible injuries on Jayden except for some mucus
in Jayden’s nose and a scratch on his forehead. Later during the course of the visit, Worline
and A.W. were in an adjacent room in the clubhouse. As Noel was preparing to leave,
Worline called Noel a deadbeat. Noel returned Jayden to Taylor’s care and told her that
1 Indiana Code § 35-42-1-1 (2007).
2 he did not want Worline to be present at any future visitations. When Noel was driving
away from the apartment complex, he received a telephone call from Worline, during
which the two argued and exchanged threats.
That same day, Taylor left for work at approximately 4:30 p.m., leaving Worline to
care for Jayden and A.W. Later that evening, Worline’s neighbors heard what sounded
like an altercation and a loud thumping coming from Worline’s apartment between 7:00
p.m. and 9:00 p.m. One of Worline’s neighbors heard a baby crying when she returned
home from between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. A neighbor who lived in the apartment
directly below Worline’s apartment hit the ceiling with a frying pan to make the thumping
noise stop. She also described the sound as being similar to free weights being dropped.
She then went upstairs to knock on Worline’s door. Prior to going upstairs, she had looked
out her window to determine if Worline or Taylor, her neighbors directly upstairs, were
home. She knew which cars belonged to the two and observed that only Worline’s car was
parked outside.
After the neighbor knocked on the door she heard what sounded like a child’s hand
slap on the front door at approximately her knee level. A male voice inside the apartment
whispered, “Come here.” Tr. p. 462. No one opened the door. The neighbor returned to
her apartment after which the noise began again.
Taylor came home from work at approximately 10:00 p.m. on January 17, 2012,
and found Worline lying in bed with A.W. Jayden was in his crib in another room and
appeared to her to be asleep. The next morning two of Worline’s neighbors saw him talking
to another man at his apartment door. Worline’s appearance at that time was described as
3 calm with a “cold controlling demeanor.” Id. at 424.
Worline placed a call to 911 at approximately noon on January 18, 2012. When
police officers arrived at the apartment they found Worline attempting to perform CPR on
Jayden in the middle of the living room floor. Jayden’s injuries, which were extensive,
were immediately apparent to the responding officers. Jayden had numerous bruises and
abrasions all over his body, including on his shoulder, arms, legs, and back. There were
several abrasions on Jayden’s head and he had a skull fracture.
After the officers arrived, they observed that Taylor appeared visibly upset, while
Worline remained “stone-faced” and emotionless. Id. at 45. Jayden was pronounced dead
at the scene by medical personnel. Investigators found a bloody towel in Worline’s
washing machine, and subsequent testing revealed that the DNA from the blood on the
towel matched Jayden’s DNA. Investigators also seized other evidence including a
baseball bat, a hammer, and Worline’s cell phone.
The autopsy performed at the Marion County Coroner’s Office reflected that Jayden
had died from blunt force trauma to the head. In addition to the abrasions and injuries
initially observed, Jayden had abrasions to his pelvic area. The abrasions to Jayden’s head
were likely caused at the same time, but were distinct from Jayden’s skull fracture. The
coroner estimated that Jayden had been dead for up to twelve hours before the 911 call,
and could have lived from between four and twelve hours after the injuries were inflicted.
Jayden had several hemorrhages in his eyes, surrounding his ocular nerves, and around the
nerve roots in his neck. The coroner also found evidence of brain swelling and subdural
hemorrhaging around the brain.
4 Both Worline and Taylor were interviewed by police officers. In her interview,
Taylor claimed that she had not noticed any injuries on Jayden and that he seemed to be
breathing while in his crib when she had come home on January 17, 2012 at approximately
10:00 p.m. She further stated that she fell asleep on the couch, awaking at 5:30 a.m. on the
morning of January 18, 2012, to go to school, but instead of going to school went to bed
with Worline.
Worline’s interview was recorded and he waived his Miranda rights during his 2
interview. Worline stated that he had made dinner for A.W. and Jayden on January 17,
2012, and that they had all watched a movie together. When asked to account for all of the
events leading up to Jayden’s death, including events that happened on January 17, 2012,
Worline never mentioned any noises and did not recount an activity that would have
explained the noises heard by others on January 17, 2012. Worline claimed that Jayden
had no injuries and could not think of a reason explaining why Jayden would have sustained
injuries. He stated that it was not possible for A.W. to have inflicted the injuries on Jayden,
and that Taylor would never have done so. Worline had injuries to his knuckles, which
were red and scabbed. When asked to explain for those injuries, Worline claimed that he
had injured his hand with a door, and had aggravated that injury by placing his hands in
his pockets.
The State charged Worline with Murder and neglect of a dependent resulting in
death, a Class A felony. Prior to trial, Worline moved to suppress evidence of text
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
5 messages he had sent to Taylor in the month leading up to Jayden’s death. The trial court
postponed ruling on the motion to suppress until the trial court had heard the context of the
evidence at trial. The trial court did warn the State, however, that the messages might be
too remote in time to be admissible. The trial court admitted the text messages over
objection. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Worline guilty of murder and
neglect of a dependent resulting in death. The trial court sentenced Worline to sixty-five
years in the Indiana Department of Correction with ten years suspended and five years on
probation on the murder conviction and did not enter a sentence on the conviction for
neglect of a dependent resulting in death, citing double jeopardy concerns. Worline now
appeals. Additional facts will be supplied as needed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Worline argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting text messages
he sent to Taylor, a picture in which he is mocking Jayden, and testimony about his
argument with Noel, Jayden’s father, contending that the evidence was irrelevant to the
murder charge and was offered only to show Worline’s bad character. “The decision to
admit or exclude evidence at trial is squarely within a trial court’s discretion and we afford
it great deference on appeal.” VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. 2013) (citing
Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. 2003)). We will not disturb the trial court’s
decision “unless it is clearly contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
of the case or misinterprets the law.” Id. “In reviewing the admissibility of evidence, we
consider only the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling and any unrefuted evidence
6 in the defendant’s favor.” Dawson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied. On review we will not reverse the trial court’s decision to admit evidence if
that decision is sustainable on any ground. Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind.
2002).
With respect to all of the challenged evidence Worline contends that it is irrelevant
and was unduly prejudicial to him because it was offered to show his bad character. Indiana
Evidence Rule 404(b) provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pre-trial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Our Supreme Court has stated as follows about the goal of Evidence Rule 404(b):
Rule 404(b) “is designed to prevent the jury from making the ‘forbidden inference’ that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind. 1999); see also Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. 2003) (noting the purpose behind Rule 404(b) is to “prevent[ ] the State from punishing people for their character, and evidence of extrinsic offenses poses the danger that the jury will convict the defendant because . . . he has a tendency to commit other crimes”) (internal quotation omitted). “In assessing the admissibility of 404(b) evidence [the] trial court must: (1) determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.” Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681-82 (Ind. 2013). “[A]ll relevant evidence is
‘inherently prejudicial’ in a criminal prosecution, so the inquiry boils down to a balance of
7 probative value against the likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the
jury.” Richmond v. State, 685 N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ind. 1997) (internal quotation omitted).
Worline claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting text messages
from him to Taylor because they were not properly authenticated. We recently addressed
the admissibility of text messages in Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied.
“To lay a foundation for the admission of evidence, the proponent of the evidence must show that it has been authenticated.” Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. This authentication requirement applies to the substantive content of text messages purported to be sent by a party. See id. Under Indiana Evidence Rule 901(a) as it existed at the time of Pavlovich’s trial, authentication of evidence was “satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” “Absolute proof of authenticity is not required.” Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The proponent of the evidence needs to establish only a reasonable probability that the document is what it is claimed to be. Id. Once this reasonable probability is shown, any inconclusiveness regarding the exhibit’s connection with the events at issue goes to the exhibit’s weight, not its admissibility. Id. Additionally, authentication of an exhibit can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Newman v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
6 N.E.3d at 976.
Additionally, we stated as follows in Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 990 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), trans. denied:
Before the cellular telephones were admitted into evidence, a police officer testified about how the items seized from Hape, which included the telephones, were catalogued and tracked. Tr. p. 232-33, 236. The officer identified the exhibit on the record, id. at 239, and testified that he had personally initialed the seals across the top and side of the bag. Id. at 239- 40. The State presented sufficient evidence to authenticate that the cellular telephones were the telephones retrieved from Hape, and their admission into evidence did not constitute error.
8 Here, the State presented testimony about how Worline’s cell phone, an Apple iPhone, was
seized from his home. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Brett Seach
testified about his examination of Worline’s cell phone and how the data, including the text
messages, was downloaded from the cell phone. Officer Seach further testified to his
extensive training and experience with various methods used to extract data from cell
phones. This evidence was sufficient to show that the messages were from Worline’s cell
phone.
Moreover, the background image on the home screen of Worline’s cell phone was
a picture of Taylor and Worline. The user generated device name was “ryan2.” Tr. p. 601.
The email accounts associated with that cell phone were “rdworline@aol.com,”
“rdworline@yahoo.com,” and “rworline@me.com.” Id. at 602. Included among the
contacts portion of the cell phone was an entry for Taylor, which listed her phone number
as ending in 8911. There also was contact information for Worline including (1) a picture
of Worline, (2) email addresses rdworline@aol.com and rworline@me.com, (3) a link to
Worline’s Facebook account, (4) Worline’s home address, and (5) a phone number ending
in 1772, which was the same phone number associated with that iPhone.
Additionally, the text messages themselves included information regarding
Worline’s and Taylor’s children that was unique enough to establish Worline as the author
of the messages. See Pavlovich, 6 N.E.3d at 979 (circumstantial evidence, including
familiarity with and detailed knowledge about unique matters, was sufficient to
authenticate authorship of text and email messages). The facts of this case are even
9 stronger than those in Pavlovich, where the defendant’s cell phone was never directly
seized or searched. Here, Worline’s cell phone was seized and searched directly. Taken
all together, this evidence is more than sufficient to authenticate that Worline authored the
text messages.
We now turn to the relevancy of the challenged evidence. Indiana Evidence Rule
401, prior to its amendment effective January 1, 2014, provided that “‘Relevant evidence’
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” As stated in Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997):
In sum, the standard for assessing the admissibility of 404(b) evidence in Indiana is: (1) the court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403. When inquiring into relevance, the court may consider any factor it would ordinarily consider under Rule 402. These may include the similarity and proximity in time of the prior bad act to the charged conduct, and will presumably typically include tying the act to the defendant. But these factors are simply illustrative of the many aspects that may, depending on the context, be required to show relevance.
Here, the text messages between Worline and Taylor, including the photograph of
Worline mocking Jayden, who was depicted crying, are relevant to show the relationship
between Worline and Jayden and motive for the murder. “Evidence of motive is always
relevant in the proof of a crime.” Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996).
Furthermore, “[a] defendant’s prior bad acts are also usually admissible to show the
relationship between the defendant and the victim.” Id. The text messages revealed
Worline’s hatred for Jayden, his jealousy of the attention Jayden received, and resentment
10 of the amount of time Taylor devoted to his care. The texts also revealed Worline’s
frustration with their current living arrangements, with particular reference to Jayden, and
Worline’s indication that he believed he might snap. In those texts, Worline expressed
how he hated coming into a room after Jayden because he could smell him.
The photograph of Worline holding Jayden and mocking him, dated one day prior
to Jayden’s death, is also indicative of the contentious relationship and possible motive for
murder. The photograph is illustrative of Worline’s feelings about Jayden immediately
prior to Jayden’s murder. This evidence, although adverse, was relevant to the murder
charge.
Also, the testimony about the January 17, 2012 argument between Worline and
Jayden’s father, Noel, provided an additional motive for Jayden’s murder. Worline called
Noel a deadbeat, which led to Noel requesting that Worline no longer be present during
Noel’s parenting time with Jayden. The two engaged in a heated argument on the telephone
during which both made threats. Worline was angry about the parenting situation as it
pertained to Jayden, and Jayden’s murder could be explained in part as the result of animus
from the earlier argument.
Weighing the probative value of that evidence against its potential prejudice to
Worline, we conclude that the evidence, which was relevant, was not excessively
prejudicial to Worline. The text messages were sent in the months leading up to Jayden’s
murder until Worline’s telephone stopped working. The photograph was taken the day
before Jayden’s murder. The argument between Worline and Noel occurred on the day
Jayden was murdered. This evidence reflected Worline’s feelings about Jayden and the
11 nature of the relationship months, days, and hours before Jayden’s murder. They were
relevant to the murder charge and the probative value outweighs any potential prejudice.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged exhibits and
testimony into evidence.
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SENTENCING
Worline claims that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on two
aggravating circumstances Worline contends were not supported by the evidence. The
aggravating circumstances at issue were that (1) Jayden’s injury or death was from shaken
baby syndrome and (2) Worline hated Jayden.
The standard of review for such a challenge is as follows:
A trial court’s sentencing order will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Such abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. A trial court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.
Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a)(9) (2012) provides that when a trial court is
determining the sentence to be imposed for a crime, the trial court may consider that the
injury to or death of the victim of the offense was the result of shaken baby syndrome as
defined by statute. Indiana Code section 16-41-40-2 (1998) defines shaken baby syndrome
12 in pertinent part as the vigorous shaking of an infant or a young child that may result in
bleeding inside the head, and cause death, closed head injury, or subdural hematoma. The
record shows that Jayden’s injuries could have been caused by Worline slamming Jayden
into a door or wall, or throwing or dropping him on the ground. Worline contends that
application of this aggravating factor is erroneous because, while there was evidence of the
conditions that can be caused by shaken baby syndrome, there was no evidence that the
conditions were caused by vigorous shaking.
Although there is no direct testimony to establish a vigorous shaking, there is
enough evidence in the record to establish that Jayden was vigorously shaken. The forensic
pathologist who testified about Jayden’s injuries noted that he had bruising on his arms
consistent with being grabbed or squeezed. Neighbors testified about hearing loud
thumping noises over a period of time. A reasonable person could conclude that Jayden
was vigorously shaken such that he suffered injuries consistent with shaken baby
syndrome. This is so even though the final cause of Jayden’s death was blunt force trauma
to the head. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this aggravating
circumstance.
Worline also challenges the trial court’s finding that Worline’s hatred of Jayden was
an aggravating circumstance. Initially, we observe that the written sentencing order does
not reflect that hatred was found to be an aggravating circumstance. The trial court’s
statements about Worline’s hatred of Jayden could have been made in support of its finding
that Worline committed the murder while in a position of care, custody, or control of
Jayden. It could also have been made in support of the finding that the murder was
13 committed because Worline’s hatred of Jayden had enraged him to commit the murder in
such a brutal manner. One could reasonably infer that a man who severely beat and finally
killed a thirteen-month-old child under his care, hated the child.
To the extent Worline’s hatred of Jayden was intended to be a separate aggravating
circumstance, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding. The text messages were
replete with Worline’s expressions of animosity and loathing of Jayden, a thirteen-month-
old child. Not only do the messages reveal a motive for Jayden’s murder, but reveal a
motive to harm him extensively.
Assuming, arguendo, that those aggravating circumstances were improperly found,
the result would have been the same. “Only one aggravator is necessary for the trial court
to impose an enhanced sentence.” Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1146 (Ind.
2000). “Even when a trial court improperly applies an aggravator, a sentence enhancement
may be upheld if other valid aggravators exist.” Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535
(Ind. 2002).
Here, the trial court found that the nature of the crime was greater than the elements
necessary to prove murder because Jayden was severely beaten, and was left to suffer from
the blunt force injuries to his head without seeking assistance for him. Further, the trial
court properly found that Jayden, the victim, who was thirteen-months old, was less than
twelve years old. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(3). A.W., who was almost two years old,
was in the apartment when Jayden was murdered. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(4). Worline
had the care and control of Jayden at the time of Jayden’s murder. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-
7.1(a)(8). The presence of these valid and unchallenged aggravating circumstances support
14 the trial court’s decision to impose an enhanced sentence.
III. INAPPROPRIATE SENTENCE
Worline seeks review of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) claiming
that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of
the offender. He claims that his lack of criminal history reflects on his character such that
the trial court’s sentencing choice is inappropriate. At the time of Worline’s sentencing,
the sentencing range for a person convicted of committing murder was a fixed term of
between forty-five years and sixty-five years with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years.
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2007). The trial court imposed a sixty-five-year sentence with
fifty-five years executed in the Department of Correction and ten years suspended with five
years of probation. Worline contends that he should have received a fifty-five-year
sentence with ten years suspended.
Worline’s sentence is within the range allowed by statute and the trial court’s
sentencing statement was detailed. “The principal role of appellate review should be to
attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those
charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived
‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). The
defendant bears the burden of persuading the court on review that his sentence is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
Regarding the character of the offender, the trial court noted that Worline essentially
had no criminal record. His arrest for public intoxication did not result in a conviction.
However, the nature of the offense supports the trial court’s imposition of an enhanced
15 sentence. Worline, who was twenty-nine years old at the time he murdered Jayden,
displayed a growing contempt for the thirteen-month-old child frequently left in his care.
The injuries Jayden suffered were the result of a brutal beating that took some time to
inflict. Jayden suffered a blow that fractured his skull, and the injuries were inflicted while
another young child was present in the apartment. The fact that Worline would inflict such
injuries on a baby is a reflection of a character unworthy of appellate relief under our
standard of review. Worline has not met his burden of persuading us that his sentence is
inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.