Ryan Willrich v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00431-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00431-CR ___________________________

RYAN WILLRICH, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 432nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1645889

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Ryan Willrich appeals his murder conviction and life sentence. In his

only appellate issue, Willrich argues that the trial court reversibly erred by excluding

from evidence Defendant’s Exhibit 2, a single page from his medical records

containing a statement he had made to a surgeon. Because Willrich was not harmed

by the exclusion of this evidence, we will affirm.

Background

Willrich does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. To inform our harm analysis, however, we provide a summary of the facts

proven at trial.

Sam,1 the deceased, was close friends with Spencer Washington. They had

known each other since childhood and were “like brothers.” One night in 2020,

Spencer drove Sam to a hamburger restaurant in east Fort Worth so that Sam could

pick up his daughter, Sally, from her mother, Sandra. Sandra arrived at the restaurant

first and pulled into line at the drive-through. Willrich was riding in the front

passenger seat of her car, and Sally was in the back seat along with Robin, who was

Sandra’s child by Willrich.

1 To protect the identities of the minor children involved in this case, see Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3), we refer to them and their parents—except for Willrich—by pseudonyms.

2 While Sandra, Willrich, and the children were in the drive-through line, Spencer

and Sam pulled into the restaurant’s parking lot. Sam got out of Spencer’s car, jogged

over to Sandra’s car, and waved at her. Before they could say anything to each other,

Sandra “heard two shots go off.” She saw that Willrich had a gun. She recognized the

gun as a purple handgun that she kept in a backpack in between the center console

and front passenger seat of her car. Sam fell to the ground, and Sandra saw blood

coming out of his mouth. She screamed at Willrich, “[T]hat’s [Sally’s] daddy[! W]hy

did you do that[?]” Meanwhile, Spencer got out of his car with a .40 caliber

semiautomatic pistol, ran over to Sandra’s car, and fired eight shots into her car,

shattering her back windshield and striking Willrich. He then ran back to his car, got

in, and drove away. Sam died at the scene, but Willrich survived and was charged with

Sam’s murder.

Sandra and Spencer both testified at Willrich’s trial. Spencer admitted that he

intentionally shot Willrich after seeing him shoot Sam. Sandra recalled hearing

Spencer say at the time either “you shot my cousin or you killed my cousin, one of

those.” She also testified to her opinion that Spencer was trying to defend Sam when

he shot Willrich. Spencer remembered looking at Sandra when he “pulled [Sam] up on

the sidewalk” and telling her that Sam “was killed for no reason.”

3 Surveillance footage from the restaurant was admitted into evidence.2 The

video showed Spencer’s car pulling into a parking space and Sam exiting the vehicle

and jogging across the parking lot, out of frame. Although the video did not capture

the shooting, two gunshots can be heard, after which Spencer can be seen exiting his

vehicle and running over to the same area where Sam had gone. Eight more gunshots,

in rapid succession, can then be heard, followed by an unidentified woman’s voice

yelling, “Call the ambulance now, now!”

After the State rested, Willrich offered in evidence thousands of pages of

medical records from the hospital where he spent several days after being shot by

Spencer. The State objected under hearsay;3 specifically, the following statement

appeared on one page of the records: “patient reports that he was in line for food on

Lancaster when he thinks someone attacked him and tried to kill him.” The State

objected “to all the exhibits in their entirety because the only purpose that [Willrich

was] offering [the evidence] for [wa]s to get [his] self-serving statement in front of the

2 Rhona Wedderien, the forensic litigation support specialist for the Tarrant County District Attorney’s office, testified that she created the video to which we refer by taking the audio from one recording and overlaying it with the video from another recording. 3 “Hearsay” means a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Hearsay is not admissible unless a statute, the Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed under statutory authority provide otherwise. Tex. R. Evid. 802.

4 jury.”4 The trial court sustained the State’s objection but admitted the medical records

in their entirety for the record only. Willrich then rested his case without calling any

witnesses or offering any other evidence. The jury found Willrich guilty of murder,

and after hearing more evidence and arguments at the trial on punishment, the trial

court assessed Willrich’s punishment at life in prison.

Discussion

On appeal, Willrich complains only of the trial court’s exclusion of his Exhibit

2, the one-page exhibit on which his statement to the doctor about being “attacked”

while waiting in line for food appears. He does not deny the hearsay nature of the

statement but argues that it was admissible as a statement made for medical diagnosis

or treatment, see Tex. R. Evid. 803(4), and because it was “necessary to explain or

contradict acts or declarations first offered by the State,” see Allridge v. State,

762 S.W.2d 146, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (quoting Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d

572, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). The State, relying on the rule against hearsay and

the general rule in Texas that “self-serving declarations are not admissible in evidence

as proof of the facts asserted,” see id., argues that the statement was not admissible

under either exception. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by

sustaining the State’s objection and excluding the exhibit, any such error was harmless

and therefore not reversible.

Willrich’s immediate response to this objection was, “That may, in fact, be the 4

case.”

5 Willrich and the State disagree on what harm analysis should apply here.

Willrich contends that excluding his statement “violated his constitutional right to

present a complete defense” and was thus “of constitutional weight.” He says that the

trial court’s ruling should be analyzed for harm under Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 44.2(a), which provides, “If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals

constitutional error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must

reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a

reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.”

Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). The State counters that “Willrich cannot show a

constitutional violation” and that, even if the trial court erred in excluding Willrich’s

statement, “such error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the verdict.” See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (“Any other error, defect,

irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”);

Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“A substantial right is

affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.”).

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and applicable case law, we believe that

any error in the trial court’s exclusion of Willrich’s Exhibit 2 should be analyzed as

“other error” under Rule 44.2(b). A constitutional error within the meaning of Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) “is an error that directly offends the United States

Constitution or the Texas Constitution, without regard to any statute or rule that

6 might also apply.” Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 121 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004),

aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Generally, the erroneous admission or

exclusion of evidence is nonconstitutional error governed by Rule 44.2(b) if the trial

court’s ruling merely offends the Rules of Evidence. See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d

356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(holding exclusion of evidence supporting defendant’s defensive theory was

nonconstitutional error when it did not prevent defendant from presenting a defense).

Willrich contends that the erroneous exclusion of his “exculpatory” statement

in Exhibit 2 denied him his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The right

to due process of law includes within it the right to a fair trial. Marx v. State,

987 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When a trial court sustains the State’s

objection to the admission of a defendant’s evidence, a federal due process violation

may arise only if (1) a state evidentiary rule categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the

defendant from offering otherwise relevant, reliable evidence vital to his defense or

(2) the trial court’s clearly erroneous ruling results in the exclusion of admissible

evidence that forms the vital core of a defendant’s theory of defense and effectively

prevents him from presenting that defense. Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 540

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 219; see also Tiede v. State,

76 S.W.3d 13, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

7 In Walters, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the appellant’s

self-serving statement to a 911 operator. 247 S.W.3d at 205–06. The Court of

Criminal Appeals held that that error was non-constitutional. Id. at 206. The Court

reasoned that “the erroneously excluded evidence was relevant to [the] appellant’s

self-defense theory, but its exclusion did not prevent him from presenting a defense.”

Id. at 222. Because the excluded testimony would have only “incrementally” furthered

the appellant’s defensive theory (self-defense), the Court ruled that the error was not

of constitutional dimension. Id. at 221–22 (quoting Ray v. State, 178 S.W.3d 833, 836

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). 5

The same logic leads us to the same conclusion in this case. Because Willrich

did not make an opening statement, testify, call any witnesses, or get any exhibits into

5 More recently, in Wells v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed a trial court’s erroneous exclusion of a defendant’s self-serving statements as constitutional error under Rule 44.2(a). 611 S.W.3d 396, 409–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The Court made clear in Wells, though, that it was analyzing the error for constitutional harm “[b]ecause the erroneous exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence offered by a defendant facing a possible death sentence implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 410. Willrich was not facing the death penalty, and he did not offer his statement in evidence as mitigation. He also has not made an Eighth Amendment argument for the admissibility of his statement. And, even in Wells, the Court stated that the defendant “ha[d] not demonstrated a constitutional due process violation because the trial court’s ruling did not prevent him from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury. . . . The excluded [evidence] was not critical to [his] defense, and the trial court’s exclusion of it did not deprive [the defendant] of a fundamentally fair trial.” 611 S.W.3d at 423. The same can be said of Willrich’s statement at the hospital in this case.

8 evidence for the jury’s consideration, we look to his closing argument at the trial on

the merits for his defensive theory.

Willrich’s defensive theory, as argued to the jury, was that the State had not

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally and knowingly killed Sam. He

claimed that he “had no idea who was at that window when he shot” and that all he

knew was that he had to protect himself, Sandra, and the children. He reminded the

jury of what the State’s evidence had shown and argued that Sam “did not let them

know in any way that [he and Spencer] were there parked and coming over to the car”

and that they were in “a bad part of town . . . late at night.” He emphasized that he

and Sam had “no connections,” “no animosity,” “no jealousy,” and “no bad blood

between” them. He argued that it made “no sense whatsoever” that he had motive to

shoot Sam but that “[w]hat ma[de] sense is he thought there was somebody there

threatening them[,] and he was taking care of it.” Willrich was thus able to present a

defense.

Because the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding Willrich’s Exhibit 2 did not

prevent him from presenting a defense, we hold that any such error “was not of

constitutional dimension.” See Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 222. Our harm analysis is

therefore governed by Rule 44.2(b). Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).

Under Rule 44.2(b), neither the defendant nor the State has the burden to

prove harm or harmlessness as to whether the appellant’s substantial rights were

affected; rather, we have the duty to assess harm by independently examining the

9 record as a whole. Loch v. State, 621 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). An error

does not affect a substantial right if the appellate court has a fair assurance from an

examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury or that it

had but a slight effect. Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In

deciding that question, we consider (1) the character of the alleged error and how it

might be considered in connection with other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence

supporting the verdict, (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating

guilt, and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Id.;

Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We may also consider the

jury instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, and

even voir dire, if applicable. Haley, 173 S.W.3d at 518–19; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d

at 355–56.

Considering the record as a whole, we can reach no other conclusion but that

the exclusion of Willrich’s Exhibit 2 did not affect his substantial rights. As we have

just discussed, Willrich was able to present his defensive theory—that he was

attempting to protect himself and his family when he shot Sam, not realizing who he

was—to the jury. His statement to the doctor at the hospital would not have

furthered this defensive theory.

The context of Willrich’s statement is critical here. The full paragraph of the

doctor’s notes containing Willrich’s statement about being attacked reads as follows:

10 30 y.o. male presents by EMS for reported GSW with multiple wounds on the back of the head, neck, shoulder, scapula, and arm. En route EMS resuscitated patient with 1 g of TXA and 2L bolus. [P]atient reports that he was in line for food on Lancaster when he thinks someone attacked him and tried to kill him. He reports some tingling to the arms and legs and some pain to his posterior neck and head. He reports some pain to the left forearm as well.

Read in context, Willrich made his statement about being “attacked” while

waiting in line for food as a way to explain his gunshot wounds. The uncontested

evidence at trial showed that those gunshot wounds were inflicted by Spencer.6 There

was no evidence from any source, including the medical records that Willrich

proffered, that Sam had “attacked” Willrich or otherwise caused his injuries, and

Willrich does not contend otherwise. 7

Perhaps the most compelling reason why Willrich was not harmed by the

exclusion of his statement is that the jury received plenty of other evidence that

Willrich was “attacked.” Again, it was uncontested at trial that Spencer shot Willrich.

Spencer admitted on the witness stand that he had shot Willrich multiple times. He

6 This belies Willrich’s appellate contention that his statement “directly explained a motive for Willrich’s shooting of” Sam and “directly contradicted” Sandra’s and Spencer’s testimony that Willrich shot Sam with no provocation before being attacked by Sam. 7 For this reason, Willrich’s appellate contention that “[h]ad the statement been admitted into evidence, Willrich could have [had] the jury charge include the law of self-defense” fails. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a) (providing that “a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force”).

11 testified that his “intent was to shoot . . . Willrich.” Willrich also elicited testimony

from Sandra that she did not see him point a gun, fire a gun, or threaten Spencer in

any way. Other than providing more detail about the nature of Willrich’s injuries, the

only part of his statement that would have told the jury something not established by

the evidence admitted for their consideration was Willrich’s thought that

“someone . . . tried to kill him,” something that the jury could have inferred from the

evidence before them and would have had, at most, only a slight effect on their

verdict. See Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 423 (“Better evidence of [the matter that the

defendant was seeking to prove] came in through a variety of other sources, and the

exclusion of the [evidence] could not have affected the jury on the mitigation issue.”).

Finally, we note that the excluded statement may not have helped Willrich’s

case at all. Although a jury might have drawn an inference favorable to Willrich from

the evidence, it could also have inferred that the statement evinced the guilty mind of

a man who had just committed murder and was trying to fabricate a justification for

his actions. Cf. Lagaite v. State, 995 S.W.2d 860, 863–64 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (“Although the statement defendant wished to offer may

have suggested he did not know [the deceased] had been murdered, a jury could also

have believed [that defendant] made the statement in an effort to cover up the

murder.”).

We conclude that, in the context of the entire case against Willrich, the trial

court’s alleged error in excluding Willrich’s Exhibit 2 did not have a substantial or

12 injurious effect on the jury’s verdict and did not affect Willrich’s substantial rights.

See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Thus, we must

disregard the trial court’s alleged error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We overrule

Willrich’s only issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Willrich’s only issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 21, 2025