Ryan Vandercook v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company

923 N.W.2d 921, 325 Mich. App. 195
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 24, 2018
Docket339145
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 923 N.W.2d 921 (Ryan Vandercook v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryan Vandercook v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 923 N.W.2d 921, 325 Mich. App. 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*197 Defendant, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, appeals as of right the trial court's determination that the parties' acceptance of the case evaluation award only resolved the claims that were included in plaintiff's case evaluation summary. Defendant asserts that the trial court misinterpreted *923 MCR 2.403 and neglected to consider controlling caselaw for its decision. We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand.

Plaintiff, Ryan Vandercook, sued defendant for breach of a no-fault automobile insurance policy issued by defendant, seeking to recover no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for expenses, loss of wages, replacement services, and other benefits related to injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile accident on December 23, 2014. Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief to determine his right to PIP benefits and defendant's right to reduction, set offs, or reimbursements *198 of paid benefits. The case was submitted for case evaluation. Plaintiff's case evaluation summary listed disputed benefits and asserted that defendant owed approximately $93,000 for medical expenses and family-provided attendant care. Defendant stated in its case evaluation summary that it had properly paid all PIP benefits, and defendant challenged numerous categories of benefits and the specific benefits demanded by plaintiff for, among other things, medical services, attendant care, mileage, and wage loss. Defendant further contended that it had overpaid for services, entitling it to reimbursement. Defendant also claimed a right to setoff because plaintiff received government-provided benefits and had the right to receive other government benefits that he refused to take.

The case evaluation panel considered the case and unanimously awarded plaintiff $45,000. Plaintiff accepted the award but typed into the form that he accepted the award "as to benefits referenced in Plaintiff's Case Evaluation Summary only. Not including wage loss." Defendant also accepted the award, which-because both parties had accepted-had the effect of settling the case for that amount. See MCR 2.403(M). After notification of the parties' mutual acceptance, defendant moved for clarification from the trial court as to whom the proper payees were for payment of the case evaluation award. 1 Plaintiff responded by arguing that he had limited his case evaluation acceptance *199 to the unpaid bills he had referred to in his case evaluation summary. Plaintiff offered no legal argument and cited no rule, statute, or caselaw for his position.

At the hearing on defendant's motion, defendant argued that MCR 2.403 clearly provides that mutual acceptance of a case evaluation award resolves all claims in an action through the date of the case evaluation. Plaintiff countered that he had accepted the case evaluation award with a limited acceptance, which purportedly precluded defendant from refusing to pay plaintiff's providers for those benefits that had accrued and not been in dispute before the date of case evaluation. The trial court denied defendant's motion, ruling that only the claims or damages presented in plaintiff's case evaluation summary were subject to the court rules regarding case evaluation sanctions. The trial court reasoned that "[n]o-fault cases are different because the claim continues to accrue the entire time that the case is pending in some-in some circumstances ...." However, the court did not rely on or even address the portion of MCR 2.403(M)(1) that contains an exception for claims involving PIP benefits that have not accrued at the time of the case evaluation. Consequently, the parties *924 were unable to agree on a proposed order to submit to the trial court for entry because defendant contended that MCR 2.403 and controlling caselaw did not permit a party to limit his or her acceptance to anything other than the entirety of the party's claims asserted in the lawsuit.

The parties' failure to agree on the order prompted them each to file motions. Plaintiff moved to set aside the case evaluation, and defendant moved to settle the order and dismiss the case pursuant to MCR 2.403(M). At some point, defendant issued and sent plaintiff a check in the amount of the case evaluation award. At *200 the hearing on the parties' competing motions, plaintiff announced that on the basis of his limited acceptance of the panel's decision, he had filed a separate lawsuit for the PIP benefits that he claimed were not resolved by the case evaluation award. Defendant argued that the court rule and controlling caselaw did not permit plaintiff's separate lawsuit. The trial court ultimately ruled against defendant, reasoning that the parties' case evaluation acceptance had only resolved the claims included in plaintiff's case evaluation summary. Defendant now appeals.

"The proper interpretation and application of a court rule is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Haliw v. Sterling Hts. , 471 Mich. 700 , 704, 691 N.W.2d 753 (2005). The interpretation and application of a court rule is governed by the principles of statutory construction, commencing with an examination of the plain language of the court rule. Id. at 704-705, 691 N.W.2d 753 . "The intent of the rule must be determined from an examination of the court rule itself and its place within the structure of the Michigan Court Rules as a whole." Id. at 706, 691 N.W.2d 753 . This Court has explained:

The goal of court rule interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the drafter, the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court must give language that is clear and unambiguous its plain meaning and enforce it as written. Each word, unless defined, is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and the Court may consult a dictionary to determine that meaning. [ Varran v. Granneman , 312 Mich. App. 591 , 599, 880 N.W.2d 242 (2015) (citations omitted).]

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Bluebook (online)
923 N.W.2d 921, 325 Mich. App. 195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryan-vandercook-v-auto-owners-insurance-company-michctapp-2018.