Ryan v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
This is an action by a minor against a lawnmower manufacturer for injuries sustained when her right foot came in contact with a mower blade. Defendants Dennis and Zelda Ryan requested the jury be instructed according to the parental immunity standard established in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968) arguing that the “reasonable parent” standard in Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.1980) did not apply to this case. Defendant’s motion for the Silesky instruction was denied; the jury was given the Anderson “reasonable parent” instruction.1
The injury occurred on June 10, 1980. Anderson was decided on July 3, 1980. Therefore, the issue is whether Anderson is to be applied retroactively or prospectively.2
In Minnesota, parent-child immunity was abolished in three stages. In Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 434, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a child was no longer immune from being sued by the parents. Id. The court stated that the new rule was to be applied prospectively. Id. In Silesky, the court held that a parent was no longer immune from being sued by its child subject to the following exceptions:
“(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care . . . . ”
281 Minn, at 442, 161 N.W.2d at 638. The court stated that the new rule was to be applied prospectively. Id. at 443, 161 N.W.2d at 638.
In Anderson the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of parental [382] immunity, overruled Silesky, and adopted a “reasonable parent” standard: “what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?” 295 N.W.2d at 599, 601 (emphasis in original). Unfortunately, the Anderson court did not indicate whether its decision was to be applied retroactively or prospectively.
“The general rule is that, absent special circumstances or specific pronouncements by the overruling court that its decision is to be applied prospectively, the decision is to be given retroactive effect.” Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn.1982). See generally Note, The Retroactivity of Minnesota Supreme Court Personal Injury Decisions, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 179 (1980). When a tort immunity is abolished, however, “courts usually apply their rulings , prospectively because litigants have justifiably relied on prior case law.” Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 283 (Minn.1981) (Amdahl, J., concurring specially)-
The key to the exception to retroactive overruling recognized in immunity cases is justifiable reliance. Absent justifiable reliance there is no reason to apply the exception.
Although Anderson involved the abolition of a tort immunity, the Minnesota Supreme Court began to erode parent-child immunity in 1966 in Balts. Two years later in Silesky the court essentially abolished parental immunity except for two circumstances. Because the court signaled the demise of parent-child immunity twelve years before this accident occurred, there could have been no justifiable reliance on the immunity. Moreover, the two exceptions in Silesky were “by no means clear;” they were “vaguely worded [and] highly subjective.” Anderson, 295 N.W.2d at 598. Therefore, there could not have been any justifiable reliance on these exceptions.3
Because there could have been no justifiable reliance, there is no reason to apply the exception to retroactive overruling. Therefore, the court holds that Anderson is to be applied retroactively and that the “reasonable parent” standard is the appropriate standard in this case.
Footnotes
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543 F. Supp. 380 (Ryan v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.