Ryan v. Farmington Zoning Board of App., No. Cv92-0513984s (Feb. 4, 1994)

1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 1217
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedFebruary 4, 1994
DocketNo. CV92-0513984S CV93-0520361S CV93-0522242 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 1217 (Ryan v. Farmington Zoning Board of App., No. Cv92-0513984s (Feb. 4, 1994)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryan v. Farmington Zoning Board of App., No. Cv92-0513984s (Feb. 4, 1994), 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 1217 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION These three zoning appeals pertain to the same parcel of real estate. The cases were consolidated and tried together before this court. The citizens who are the parties in CT Page 1218 interest are the same in each of the three appeals, although the parties Ryan and not official parties in the second of the cases, Schultz, the decision in that case accords with their position as advanced in their consolidated brief filed in these appeals.

The property which is the subject of these appeals is located in the Town of Farmington. It consists of a parcel of land which is four acres in area, bounded on the south by Old Mountain Road and on the west by Ely Road. The property at one time consisted of an additional 2.347 acres, which abutted the subject property on the east. Some years prior to these appeals the property was subdivided. The 4.0 acres resulting from that subdivision is the subject of these appeals.

The court finds, on the basis of the evidence presented that Virginia M. Ryan is the owner of property which abuts the subject property, on the north. See exhibit A, deed from Peter and Clara Scott to Virginia M. Ryan dated December 3, 1991, and the testimony of Virginia M. Ryan that she has owned and occupied the abutting property since December 3, 1981. The court finds that Virginia M. Ryan is an aggrieved party, per C.G.S. 8-8, and that the court has jurisdiction to hear the cases captioned Ryan.

The court finds that the plaintiffs Abbott Schultz, Jr. and Nancy E. Schultz are the owners of the subject property. See exhibit A, case #CV93-0520361, deed from Archie E. Albright and Elizabeth B. Albright dated March 13, 1992. The plaintiffs are aggrieved parties and the court has jurisdiction to hear the case captioned Schultz.

There is located on the subject four acre parcel a four bedroom dwelling house of substantial size. A portion of the front of the house extends beyond the building line on Old Mountain Road. The house is very old. The testimony before the Board of Appeals is that the interior of the house is in a poor state of repair. The intrusion across the building line causes the house to be a legally permissible nonconforming use.

The property includes two outbuildings, a garage and a barn, which are located approximately in the center or middle of the four acres. They are located north-northwest of the house. A large oak tree is located approximately fifty feet CT Page 1219 to the rear of the house, and possesses a very extensive limb spread.

I. The Variance — Case #CV92-0513984S

On May 26, 1992, Schultz made application to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance to "Permit the retention of existing building as a non-residential accessory building in the front half of the lot in R-80 zone," and further, "Variance to maximum 15' height requirement."

The testimony before the board by Mr. Schultz is to the effect that he intended to construct a new house in the center of the property, attaching it to the existing garage, and intended to use the existing old dwelling house only as an outbuilding. It was his intention that the existing house be used for "hobbies, that type of thing."

Per the zoning regulations this could not be accomplished for two reasons. First, Article IV, Section 2A provides that accessory buildings shall be located only in the rear yard of a lot. The location of the old house, as an accessory building would not comply with that requirement. Second, accessory buildings "shall not exceed a height of fifteen feet." The old house is 15 ft. 2 inches high. A change in the character of the building from residence to accessory use would also subject the building to the fifteen foot height limitation for accessory uses, due to the change of the character of its use.

The Zoning Board of Appeals granted the variance on June 15, 1992. The reason stated in the record is "The Board found that the existing structure was of historical significance and that its removal to another location would create practical hardship due to topography and an extremely large oak tree in close proximity to it; also that the alteration of its height would be detrimental to its historical value."

The zoning ordinance, Article II, A1, allows only one dwelling per lot. Unless the present dwelling could qualify as an accessory use a second dwelling could not be placed on the lot. The present dwelling could not qualify as a proper accessory use, as it cannot be claimed to be properly located on the lot, and it is in excess of the height limitations for the new proposed accessory use. These same requirements CT Page 1220 affect each property located in the R-80 zone.

Article V, section 4A3 allow the Zoning Board of Appeals to grant a variance where it finds "exceptional shape size, or topography of the lot." The reasons given by the Board do not include any such finding. Other permissible reasons for granting a variance are "other exceptional situations or condition of the building or land." The finding of the Board do not include any such finding.

The existence of a tree on the lot is not such an unusual condition. Most land does have trees on it. The ordinance allows for granting a variance in the event of "practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship. " Not being able to erect a second dwelling, or a desire to preserve all structures on a lot, or a desire to convert a dwelling to a "hobby building," or to preserve a tree, is not considered to be "practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship. "

All of these circumstances "generally apply to other property in the neighborhood." See Ordinance Article V, Section 4 A3a. The fact that the existing structure was found to be "of historical significance" is not a criteria under the provisions of the ordinance. Property laudable as that concern may be, it is not a criteria under the ordinance. Historic preservation is the proper subject of other legislation, creating historic districts, and the placing of specific property on State or National Historic registers.

"Disappointment in the use of property does not constitute exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship; and a variance should not be granted unless it is in harmony with the general purposes and intent of the zoning ordinance."

Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 657, 662. (internal citations omitted).

". . . the trial court reviews the record to determine whether it has acted fairly or with proper motions or upon valid reasons." Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, p. 662. (emphasis added). CT Page 1221

". . . the record is barren of any evidence which would justify a finding of exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship.

Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, p. 663.

It is further noted that the defendants specifically waived their rights to file a brief on this variance appeal, to present oral argument on at this Variance Appeal, which appears to be realistic, considering the status of the evidence before the Board.

For the reasons set forth herein the appeal of the plaintiff Virginia M. Ryan in Case #CV92-0513984S is sustained. Judgment enters for the plaintiff in that appeal.

II. Schultz v. Town Plan Zoning Commission, CV93-0520361S

On November 13, 1992, the plaintiff submitted to the defendant Town Plan Zoning Commission of the Town of Farmington an application for re-subdivision of said property.

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Related

DeMaria v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission
271 A.2d 105 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1970)
Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals
211 A.2d 687 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1965)
Federico v. Planning & Zoning Commission
500 A.2d 576 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 1217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryan-v-farmington-zoning-board-of-app-no-cv92-0513984s-feb-4-1994-connsuperct-1994.