Ryan Sylvia and Shannon Sylvia v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 15, 2010·No. 03-09-00427-CV·Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-09-00427-CV

Ryan Sylvia and Shannon Sylvia, Appellants



v.



Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 231,258-B, HONORABLE RICK MORRIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N



Ryan and Shannon Sylvia appeal from a final order terminating parental rights. In two issues on appeal, Ryan and Shannon assert that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination and that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence regarding Ryan's childhood. We will affirm the termination order.



BACKGROUND

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Ryan and Shannon Sylvia to their three daughters, three-year-old R.S., two-year-old S.S., and one-year-old T.S. Also parties to the termination suit were two older children of Shannon's (and stepchildren of Ryan's), ten-year-old K.W., who was Shannon's daughter from a prior relationship with Jeremiah Warner; (1) and sixteen-year-old R.B., who was Shannon's daughter from a prior relationship with Alexander Tapia. In addition to seeking termination of the Sylvias' parental rights to the three children of their relationship, the Department sought to terminate Shannon's parental rights to K.W. but not R.B.

The termination suit was based on allegations that Ryan had sexually abused and/or exposed himself to his stepdaughters on multiple occasions and that Shannon knew or had reason to know of Ryan's abusive behavior but did nothing to stop it. The suit was tried to a jury. The Department called several witnesses to testify, including Ryan and Shannon; R.B. and K.W (Shannon's two oldest daughters); Dr. Michael Campbell, a psychologist who had evaluated Ryan and Shannon; Brenda Bearden, a licensed clinical social worker who had provided therapy to Shannon; Melissa Reese, a friend of the Sylvias to whom K.W. had made an initial outcry alleging abuse; and Lurene Tapia, the conservatorship caseworker for the children. Ryan and Shannon also called several witnesses to testify, including Dr. Gregg Hupp, a psychologist who had examined Ryan and Shannon; Ryan's sister, 17-year-old S.G.; Ryan's mother, Lori Gildea; and John Bennyhoff, an 18-year-old son of Shannon and stepson of Ryan. We will review the testimony of these and other witnesses in detail when we analyze the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that both Ryan and Shannon's parental rights to all three of their children should be terminated and that Shannon's parental rights to K.W. should also be terminated. The district court rendered a final order terminating their parental rights and naming the Department sole managing conservator of the children. This appeal followed.



ANALYSIS

In their first issue, Ryan and Shannon assert that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination of their parental rights. In their second issue, they contend that the admission of certain evidence regarding Ryan's childhood history "caused unfair prejudice and prevented a fair trial."



Evidentiary sufficiency

We will first address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. We will assume without deciding that the challenged evidence regarding Ryan's childhood history, which we discuss later, was inadmissible and, therefore, will not consider that evidence in our sufficiency analysis. See North Dallas Diagnostic Ctr. v. Dewberry, 900 S.W.2d 90, 97 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1995, writ denied) (refusing to consider inadmissible evidence in determining sufficiency of evidence); see also In re L.A.C., No. 02-08-00324-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9876, at *3 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth Dec. 10, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in parental termination case, excluding allegedly inadmissible evidence from sufficiency review).



Standard and scope of review

A court may terminate parental rights based on findings by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a parent has committed any of several statutory bases for termination and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2009); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370-72 (Tex. 1976). Clear and convincing evidence is "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980).

In a legal sufficiency review of a finding terminating parental rights, an appellate court reviews all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). To give appropriate deference to the fact-finder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, a reviewing court must assume that the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could do so. Id. An appellate court disregards all evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id.

In a factual sufficiency review of a finding terminating parental rights, the inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations. Id. A court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the fact-finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. A court of appeals should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.

In this case, the district court submitted, and the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Ryan, and Shannon: (1) "knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children," see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D) (West Supp.

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