Ryan Stacy v. Lewisville Independent School District

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 4:26-cv-00541 Ryan Stacy, Plaintiff, V. Lewisville Independent School District, Defendant.

ORDER Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 7. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 10. The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who issued a re- port recommending that the court grant defendant’s motion to dismiss and dismiss plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Doc. 14 at 11. Plaintiff filed objections. Doc. 15. Defendant responded to those objections. Doc. 16. The court reviews the objected-to portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Nettles ». Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass vy. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Furthermore, a party’s entitlement to de novo review does not en- title it to raise arguments that were not presented to the magis- trate judge without a compelling reason. See Cupit ». Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff first objects that the report improperly relied on the superseded original complaint instead of evaluating only the op- erative first amended complaint, contrary to the rule that an amended complaint supersedes all prior pleadings. Doc. 15 at 1-

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2. This objection misunderstands the report. The magistrate judge discussed the original complaint for purposes of explaining the procedural history of the case and the claims that were not re- urged in the amended complaint. The report’s analysis of the pleading requirement is rooted in plaintiff’s allegations asserted in his live pleading. See Doc. 14 at 5–10. To be sure, the report expressly states that “[p]laintiff’s amended complaint is the live complaint in this action.” Id. at 10 (citing Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting “the gen- eral rule that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended com- plaint specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.”)). Ac- cordingly, this objection is overruled. Plaintiff next objects that the report improperly applied a heightened pleading standard by treating the alleged retaliatory acts as isolated incidents rather than as a coordinated course of conduct that plausibly established constitutional violations. Doc. 15 at 2. But the report did not apply a heightened pleading stand- ard. Rather, it correctly noted that even under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, a plaintiff asserting constitutional claims against a mu- nicipality must allege: “(1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose ʻmoving force’ is the policy or custom.” Doc. 14 at 6–7 (quoting G.M. ex rel. Lopez v. Shelton, 595 F. App’x 262, 264 (5th Cir. 2014)). This is indeed the pleading standard consistently applied by the Fifth Circuit for constitutional claims brought against a municipality. See Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 777 (5th Cir. 2021) (“under Monell and its progeny, [plaintiff] must plead that (1) an official policy (2) prom- ulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” (cleaned up)). Ac- cordingly, plaintiff’s second objection is overruled. Plaintiff next objects that the report incorrectly concluded that plaintiff failed to plead municipal knowledge under Monell, despite allegations that the Board of Trustees received direct writ- ten notice of the alleged constitutional violations and failed to act. Doc. 15 at 2. The report did not find, as plaintiff argues, that the Board of Trustees lacked knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation, but rather that plaintiff has failed to allege facts that de- fendant’s Board of Trustees had actual or constructive knowledge of any policy or custom. Doc. 14 at 8. Accordingly, this objection is overruled. Last, plaintiff objects that the report improperly narrowed the single-incident ratification doctrine by failing to recognize that the Board of Trustee’s alleged decision to preserve the challenged records and foreclose administrative remedies could constitute an official policy under Monell. Doc. 15 at 2-3. This objection is couched in plaintiffs ratification theory of liability. But as the re- port expressly stated, the Fifth Circuit has narrowed the theory of ratification to “extreme factual situations.” Doc. 14 at 9 (citing Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to find ratification in case in which officer shot fleeing suspect in the back); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 168-72 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding ratification when officers “poured” gunfire onto a truck and killed innocent occupant)). Neither plaintiff’s objection nor his allegations suggest that the extreme factual circumstances of a ratification theory are present here. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is granted. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are dismissed with prejudice. The court does not address any claims plaintiff asserted in his original complaint (Doc. 1) that plaintiff did not assert in the live complaint (Doc. 7). See Murphy v. Scott, 56 F.3d 1384, 1995 WL 337688, at *1 (Sth Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (citing Kzng v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (Sth Cir.1994)). Any pending motions are denied as moot. So ordered by the court on July 20, 2026.

—_ fz MPBELL BARKER _ United States District Judge

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